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Victoria 3 - Dev Diary #28 - Flags

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Hi folks, welcome to another dev diary, and get hyped for what I know you're longing for: flags. I'm Ofaloaf, one of the designers on the game, and somehow they let me write a dev diary. Let's go!

Let's start at the beginning. What is a flag?

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A flag is a thing of beauty.
A flag is a decorative design on a bit of fabric, often used to communicate something, such as a message or identity, to the viewer. In Victoria 3, all flags are flags associated with countries. They're neat designs that serve as visual shorthand for a state, and they just look pretty too, most of the time.

orange free state.PNG

In the Victorian era, what counts as the flag of a country was a bit… vague, depending on who you were asking. Some countries, like the United States and France, very clearly had a single flag that served as the national flag that everybody knew them by, but others weren't so clear.

Look - here's some period examples of what people considered Russia's flag to be:

Selection from 'The maritime flags of all nations', 1832, as seen on Wikimedia Commons
The_maritime_flags_of_all_nations,_1832_(FOL_LA_ROQ_1542_NOR)_croppo.jpg


Selection from 'Pavillons et cocardes des principales puissances du globe d'apres des documens officials', 1850, as seen in the David Rumsey Map Collection.
russie.png

First thing that's noticeable is that it's not just one flag. The tricolor that is used as the Russian Federation's flag now was just one of several in use in the 19th century up through to the 1850s, as a merchant flag or civil ensign used to identify civilian ships in foreign ports. The Romanov dynasty's emblem is also used as a Russian flag, and then there's two naval jacks - the flags with the blue saltires or diagonal crosses stretching across them- which are also widely recognized. Eventually, the Russian government started trying to consolidate everything and issued a decree on June 23rd, 1858, proclaiming a single "state flag", a black-gold-white tricolor. In 1883, the white-blue-red "merchant" flag was officially accepted as a national flag to be used on special occasions, and in 1896 it wholly replaced the black-gold-white tricolor as Russia's state flag.

Man, ain't that a doozy of flags to pick from! How are we supposed to pick which one to use in Victoria 3? Well, good news there - we can use more than one flag! We got dynamic flags triggered by script!

russianflags.png

Any trigger which is valid for a country, like checking if a specific state is owned by the player or if a war is happening, can be used to trigger a different flag in the game. We've used that to spice up flag varieties in different situations - for example, a united Scandinavian monarchy has a different flag depending on whether the Danes are in charge or not:

scandinavia.png

Spicy! And that's on top of just using the usual checks like governments, the number of states in a country, and so forth - right, yes, you probably want to see the stars in the American flag, don't you? I know I do. They do change based on the number of states in the Union.

I can taste the freedom.
freedom.png

There's even some unique flags for when one country becomes the puppet of another. In some cases, a generic "oh no I am a puppet now" design is used for the puppeted country's flag with the "master" country's flag inserted as a canton in the upper-left corner of the puppeted country's flag, while in other cases a wholly unique flag is made for a particular combination of puppeteer and puppet.

puppeteer and puppet.png

There's also a sort of fallback system, to provide flags for every polity even if we can't really settle on one particular design, or if they're feisty dynamic rebels, or what-have-you. Flags can be randomly generated, with particular triggers set so some flag elements only appear if a tag is of a particular culture, religion, or ideology, among other things.

randomflags.png

And, for the modders out there, it shouldn't be difficult for you folks to put together more flags if you want (and of course you want to make more flags, right?) - we use a system similar to the one Crusader King 3 uses for its coats of arms. France's default flag is a simple example of how the system works:

Code:
FRA = {
    pattern = "pattern_solid.tga"
    color1 = "blue"

    colored_emblem = {
        texture = "ce_tricolor_vertical.dds"
        color1 = "white"
        color2 = "red"
    }
}

All that's going on there is that a plain blue field is set as the background, and then a single graphical element with the central third and right third of the tricolor as colorable sections is slapped on top, with white and red respectively added in there to make a nice and tidy blue-white-red tricolore. Magnifique!

And to plug that bad boy into the game, all you need is a little scripting in another file that goes a little something like this:

Code:
FRA = { # France
    flag_definition = {
        coa = FRA
        subject_canton = FRA
        allow_overlord_canton = yes
        coa_with_overlord_canton = FRA_subject        
        priority = 1
    }
    flag_definition = {
        coa = FRA
        subject_canton = FRA
        allow_overlord_canton = yes        
        overlord_canton_scale = { 0.337 0.337 }            
        priority = 10
        trigger = { 
            coa_def_republic_flag_trigger = yes
        }
    }
    [And so forth. Find more flags by playing the game!]    
}

You can create as many flag definitions as you like, and you can plug the same flag design into multiple definitions or make a unique one for every definition if you want to go insane scripting it all up. Triggers are straightforward to plug in (and you can script generic triggers if you don't want to write the same combination of checks over and over again). If you want to mod flags, there's a delightful amount of flexibility with this system.

So there you have it! We got flags. We got lots of flags! We got randomized combinations of flags that go on for days! You could script more flags if you really want to poke at the game's innards! Flags.

Now, as we march towards the Holiday season, the dev diaries are taking a bit of a break. We will be back in January with a brand new topic in our first dev diary for 2022. Happy Holidays and a Happy New Year!
 
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I do not argue for the sake of arguing.

I’m arguing because everything you’ve so far said in this thread has been based in reductive misconceptions and failures to understand Middle Eastern history—extremely common failures (so common they have their own name: “orientalism”), which have so far been a prevalent and even a dominant strand of discussions about representing the Middle East in Paradox games, resulting in weird representations throughout other Paradox titles. Reflecting bad (poorly understood, misconstrued) history makes history games bad, so I push back on nonsense suggestions and misconceptions such as the ones you’ve so far put forward.

You are arguing with a man who has a Turkish flag for a profile pic and is named "Al-Khalidi". Now, for all I know he could be some Canadian atheist of English descent, but judging by the name and flag, it seems like you are calling what is very likely a Turkish Muslim an "orientalist". If my assumptions are true, you demonstrate incredible audacity.

I don't care to list credentials, but I've also studied Islamic societies and states very extensively at an academic level. The caliphate has been and continues to be the ideal form of political organization and unity for the Islamic world, at least for Sunnis (I have not studied Shias to a satisfactory extent to know). Any practicing Muslim who has not completely divorced their faith from their politics would see a restored pan-Arab (or, more commonly, pan-Islamic) caliphate as the most ideal political entity.

This doesn't mean there should be mechanics for it, it could literally just be a decision that causes a name change (like it essentially is in EU 4). Arguments about how plausible a unified Islamic state would be are irrelevant in my view. I don't see the harm in letting such a name change for a country that has achieved Arab or pan-Islamic unification. It could specifically be tied to an absolute monarchy or a "theocracy" government and set of laws (depending on how government forms are classified).

The argument that secularism and liberalism were on the rise in that era is also irrelevant, because, as we can already observe from the European countries showcased, the old aristocracy and church establishments are still in charge (as they should be, from a historical point of view). These are two sizeable, powerful, and rich interest groups that are heavily influenced by their faith when it comes to their politics and have a desire and an interest in preserving older forms of social, political and economic organization as best as they can.

The game is already indirectly implying that, if one chooses, they can try to keep these old systems intact, innovating and reforming as little as possible to ensure survival but otherwise keeping the political order as is. In these conditions, yes, a caliphate could have been a possible result. There is nothing "orientalist" about expecting a specific religion, set of nations, and cultures to want to retain the traditional political structures they have created and seek to create for themselves, instead of cowering to the demands of foreigners, if they are strong enough to resist said foreigners that is. That's precisely what Japan sought to do and succeeded in doing to a significant extent.
 
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"Parliament passed the Treason Felony Act in 1848. This act made advocacy of republicanism punishable by transportation to Australia, which was later amended to life imprisonment. The law is still on the statute books; however in a 2003 case, the Law Lords stated that "It is plain as a pike staff to the respondents and everyone else that no one who advocates the peaceful abolition of the monarchy and its replacement by a republican form of government is at any risk of prosecution", for the reason that the Human Rights Act 1998 would require the 1848 Act to be interpreted in such a way as to render such conduct non-criminal"


Certainly useful as a law on colonies: penal colonization. But does also suggest australia to have a republican strain to it and well, then there are some other applications.
 
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But does also suggest australia to have a republican strain to it
The one time republicanism got seriously presented to the Australian electorate, it was heartily rejected.

(Partly because the system proposed stank to high heaven, of course.)
 
You are arguing with a man who has a Turkish flag for a profile pic and is named "Al-Khalidi". Now, for all I know he could be some Canadian atheist of English descent, but judging by the name and flag, it seems like you are calling what is very likely a Turkish Muslim an "orientalist". If my assumptions are true, you demonstrate incredible audacity.
This is ad hominem and appeal to authority, it is completely irrelevant. Names and avatars don’t telegraph capability, identity or even interests: I am sighted, Māori and have nothing to do with Czechia. If you have, as you say, studied history at any meaningful level you should be conscious that orientalism (and similar, less geographically specific biases and myopias) is insidious and repulsive precisely because it teaches the people being orientalised to be orientalists themselves.

Being a Turkish Muslim wouldn’t make one right or informed by default. In fact, given the standards of historiography in much of the Islamic world (and particularly in Turkey) on balance it gently suggests the opposite. Being audacious—which, as I’ve outlined above, I am not—would make me audacious, not wrong.
Any practicing Muslim who has not completely divorced their faith from their politics would see a restored pan-Arab (or, more commonly, pan-Islamic) caliphate as the most ideal political entity.
Explaining, of course, why pan-Islam was such a powerful unifying force across the long nineteenth century? As was pan-Arabism?

Except neither force really meaningfully existed at all, did it. Pan-Islam has been demonstrated to be a fictitious threat manufactured by European orientalist misconstruing and reduction of events in the Islamic world (see: Edward Said, Tamim Ansary, or Lord Cromer’s reports on the state of Egypt [1906 is a good one] for primary source material); pan-Arabism never really took off at all, but had its best years in the early Cold War. Even after the “Great Arab Revolt” a huge majority of Arabs felt affiliation to the Ottomans and even secular Turks (see: Michael Provence, Eugene Rogan). People hadn’t “completely divorced their faith from their politics”, their faith was just more complex than what modern orientalists get out of reading Islamic scripture.
This doesn't mean there should be mechanics for it, it could literally just be a decision that causes a name change
The Ottomans claimed the caliphate in the period and we continue to call them “the Ottomans”. So did the Sultanate of Sokoto. So did the Sharifate of Mecca (later Kingdom of Hijaz). Why should there be a name change? For what state in the period would claiming the caliphate mean a total abandonment of their identity up until then and complete reorientation to being the caliphate and nothing else? No state, because no state in the period—even Wahhabi Najd, Mahdist Sudan or the jihadi states of West Africa—was first and foremost a fundamentally Islamic structure wedded to classical Quranic principles of political organisation. The insistence that they were and would or even could have abandoned everything in their history to become “The Caliphate” is a typical invocation of the “Muslims are essentially Muslim” imagery central to Orientalist reduction. There should not be a “caliphate” name change in Victoria III, and the insistence that there should is textbook orientalism: reduction and staging of Islam for arrogant Western consumption.
I don't see the harm in letting such a name change for a country that has achieved Arab or pan-Islamic unification.
At the point of pan-Islamic unification it’s a bit less silly, because then it’s an absurd challenge and only barely part of the game anyway. It’s still on the same level as pushing for a formable “Christendom”, though.
The argument that secularism and liberalism were on the rise in that era is also irrelevant, because, as we can already observe from the European countries showcased, the old aristocracy and church establishments are still in charge (as they should be, from a historical point of view). These are two sizeable, powerful, and rich interest groups that are heavily influenced by their faith when it comes to their politics and have a desire and an interest in preserving older forms of social, political and economic organization as best as they can.
Sure, but Islamic fundamentalism is not the same as conservative or even reactionism and conflating the two demonstrates a foundational misunderstanding of both in the Islamic context. The brand of aristocratic-religious politics we can observe in eighteenth through early twentieth century Islamic societies is not fundamentalism any more than seventeenth century France was “fundamentalist Christian”. Tarring conservatism and fundamentalism with the same brush is, again, a Western interpretational imposition on the Islamic world: orientalism. Wearing veils in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was a symbol of status, to take one example. Sharia was not the privileged system of law, for another. Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate within the Victoria III period and saw very little resistance or condemnation, for a third.

Fundamentalism is a radically different beast from conservatism. On top of that, secular modernism was not only emerging but swiftly becoming a dominant force by 1836 (edging out conservativism and religious liberalism, not fundamentalism).

While you’re correct that alternative approaches to political development should be available, the real historical situation at game start and the most probable (i.e. the historical) later development should be the most probable and therefore the one which gets the most development and support, not reductive fantasy misreadings of the historical situation to make Islamic societies different and “cool”. And, as I’ve observed:
You would be hard pressed to name five states on the Victoria III map where fundamentalist Islamism was a powerful political force at any point in the period.
You’re saying “yes, it was completely irrelevant throughout the entire period of the game, but it should be possible for it to become relevant”.
Okay: once the historical trajectories and ahistorical but plausible trajectories of the Islamic world are well-developed and fleshed out in Victoria III by all means, advocate for fundamentalism to get slipped in all the places where it was niggling away at the underbellies of Islamic states… but not before then.
There is nothing "orientalist" about expecting a specific religion, set of nations, and cultures to want to retain the traditional political structures they have created and seek to create for themselves, instead of cowering to the demands of foreigners
What is orientalist is insisting that fundamentalism (which is what misinformed orientalists insist on—they’ve read and interpreted Islamic scripture out of real-world context and they’re insisting that their reading is what Muslims think, never mind that post-1300 Christians have historically ignored 95% of their own scriptures) is the same as “the traditional political structures” of the Islamic world. Show me Islamic states in 1836 that were “traditionally” fundamentalist Muslims (for example, a country which throughout its history bowed to the will of the caliph over their local rulers) and I’ll back off my observation that “fundamentalism was traditional and so is the caliphate” is textbook orientalism. Even the Wahhabi state in Najd was only “fundamentalist” relative to other states in the period. Traditional political structures in the Islamic world by the nineteenth century were things like the primacy of manufacturing guilds, the persisting power of feudal elites, the systems of tax farming (iqta) and institutionalised decentralisation of power, military-bureaucratic slave-elites, coexisting legal systems and confessional tax/levy regimes. The caliphate and so on aren’t “traditional systems of power” in the Islamic world of 1836 any more than rule from Rome is the traditional system of power in 1912 Portugal, and the dogged insistence that it is because Islam says so and Muslims are fundamentally Islamic is textbook orientalism. Worse, the insistence on having caliphates and other orientalist nonsense in Victoria III takes up bandwidth and reduces the likelihood that time will be spent on the real forces at play in the Islamic world: the breakdown of the guilds, the emergence of secular modernism, the distinctive Islamic liberalism of the 1830s on. Bad history produces a bad game.

Ironically, fundamentalism came about because the “traditional” ways of doing things weren’t fundamentalist enough. Fundamentalists are radical reformers, not traditionalists. That kind of radical reform was barely on the horizon in 1914, let alone 1836, and in fact emerged in the mainstream in reaction to the failures of secular modernism to substantially improve the lot of Islamic countries (Tamim Ansary, Eugene Rogan are accessible and good on this). Building such a fringe ideology contingent on so many events into the game makes very little sense, and the arguments that have so far been advanced in favour of building it in have been based on poor understanding and bad history: Orientalism, no matter who’s saying it.
 
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When I saw the flag of Michigan I almost fell out of my chair. Michigan should definitely get its own tag now, maybe succeeding as a result of the Toledo War when Ohio stole the Toledo strip from us?
 
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Traditional political structures in the Islamic world by the nineteenth century were things like the primacy of manufacturing guilds, the power of feudal elites, the systems of tax farming (iqta) and the institutionalisation of decentralised power, military-bureaucratic slave-elites, coexisting legal systems and confessional tax/levy regimes. The caliphate and so on aren’t “traditional systems of power” in the Islamic world of 1836 any more than rule from Rome is the traditional system of power in 1912 Portugal. Worse, the insistence on having caliphates and other orientalist nonsense in Victoria III takes up bandwidth and reduces the likelihood that time will be spent on the real forces at play in the Islamic world: the breakdown of the guilds, the emergence of secular modernism, the distinctive Islamic liberalism of the 1830s on. Bad history produces a bad game.

Ironically, fundamentalism came about because the “traditional” ways of doing things weren’t fundamentalist enough. Fundamentalists are radical reformers, not traditionalists.

Preach it, brother!
 
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This is ad hominem and appeal to authority, it is completely irrelevant. Names and avatars don’t telegraph capability, identity or even interests: I am sighted, Māori and have nothing to do with Czechia. If you have, as you say, studied history at any meaningful level you should be conscious that orientalism (and similar, less geographically specific biases and myopias) is insidious and repulsive precisely because it teaches the people being orientalised to be orientalists themselves.

Being a Turkish Muslim wouldn’t make one right or informed by default. In fact, given the standards of historiography in much of the Islamic world (and particularly in Turkey) on balance it gently suggests the opposite. Being audacious—which, as I’ve outlined above, I am not—would make me audacious, not wrong.

Explaining, of course, why pan-Islam was such a powerful unifying force across the long nineteenth century? As was pan-Arabism?

Except neither force really meaningfully existed at all, did it. Pan-Islam has been demonstrated to be a fictitious threat manufactured by European orientalist misconstruing and reduction of events in the Islamic world (see: Edward Said, Tamim Ansary, or Lord Cromer’s reports on the state of Egypt [1906 is a good one] for primary source material); pan-Arabism never really took off at all, but had its best years in the early Cold War. Even after the “Great Arab Revolt” a huge majority of Arabs felt affiliation to the Ottomans and even secular Turks (see: Michael Provence, Eugene Rogan). People hadn’t “completely divorced their faith from their politics”, their faith was just more complex than what modern orientalists get out of reading Islamic scripture.

The Ottomans claimed the caliphate in the period and we continue to call them “the Ottomans”. So did the Sultanate of Sokoto. So did the Sharifate of Mecca (later Kingdom of Hijaz). Why should there be a name change? For what state in the period would claiming the caliphate mean a total abandonment of their identity up until then and complete reorientation to being the caliphate and nothing else? No state, because no state in the period—even Wahhabi Najd, Mahdist Sudan or the jihadi states of West Africa—was first and foremost a fundamentally Islamic structure wedded to classical Quranic principles of political organisation. The insistence that they were and would or even could have abandoned everything in their history to become “The Caliphate” is a typical invocation of the “Muslims are essentially Muslim” imagery central to Orientalist reduction. There should not be a “caliphate” name change in Victoria III, and the insistence that there should is textbook orientalism: reduction and staging of Islam for arrogant Western consumption.

At the point of pan-Islamic unification it’s a bit less silly, because then it’s an absurd challenge and only barely part of the game anyway. It’s still on the same level as pushing for a formable “Christendom”, though.

Sure, but Islamic fundamentalism is not the same as conservative or even reactionism and conflating the two demonstrates a foundational misunderstanding of both in the Islamic context. The brand of aristocratic-religious politics we can observe in eighteenth through early twentieth century Islamic societies is not fundamentalism any more than seventeenth century France was “fundamentalist Christian”. Tarring conservatism and fundamentalism with the same brush is, again, a Western interpretational imposition on the Islamic world: orientalism. Wearing veils in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was a symbol of status, to take one example. Sharia was not the privileged system of law, for another. Mustafa Kemal abolished the caliphate within the Victoria III period and saw very little resistance or condemnation, for a third.

Fundamentalism is a radically different beast from conservatism. On top of that, secular modernism was not only emerging but swiftly becoming a dominant force by 1836 (edging out conservativism and religious liberalism, not fundamentalism).

While you’re correct that alternative approaches to political development should be available, the real historical situation at game start and the most probable (i.e. the historical) later development should be the most probable and therefore the one which gets the most development and support, not reductive fantasy misreadings of the historical situation to make Islamic societies different and “cool”. And, as I’ve observed:

You’re saying “yes, it was completely irrelevant throughout the entire period of the game, but it should be possible for it to become relevant”.
Okay: once the historical trajectories and ahistorical but plausible trajectories of the Islamic world are well-developed and fleshed out in Victoria III by all means, advocate for fundamentalism to get slipped in all the places where it was niggling away at the underbellies of Islamic states… but not before then.

What is orientalist is insisting that fundamentalism (which is what misinformed orientalists insist on—they’ve read and interpreted Islamic scripture out of real-world context and they’re insisting that their reading is what Muslims think, never mind that post-1300 Christians have historically ignored 95% of their own scriptures) is the same as “the traditional political structures” of the Islamic world. Show me Islamic states in 1836 that were “traditionally” fundamentalist Muslims (for example, a country which throughout its history bowed to the will of the caliph over their local rulers) and I’ll back off my observation that “fundamentalism was traditional and so is the caliphate” is textbook orientalism. Even the Wahhabi state in Najd was only “fundamentalist” relative to other states in the period. Traditional political structures in the Islamic world by the nineteenth century were things like the primacy of manufacturing guilds, the power of feudal elites, the systems of tax farming (iqta) and the institutionalisation of decentralised power, military-bureaucratic slave-elites, coexisting legal systems and confessional tax/levy regimes. The caliphate and so on aren’t “traditional systems of power” in the Islamic world of 1836 any more than rule from Rome is the traditional system of power in 1912 Portugal, and the dogged insistence that it is because Islam says so and Muslims are fundamentally Islamic is textbook orientalism. Worse, the insistence on having caliphates and other orientalist nonsense in Victoria III takes up bandwidth and reduces the likelihood that time will be spent on the real forces at play in the Islamic world: the breakdown of the guilds, the emergence of secular modernism, the distinctive Islamic liberalism of the 1830s on. Bad history produces a bad game.

Ironically, fundamentalism came about because the “traditional” ways of doing things weren’t fundamentalist enough. Fundamentalists are radical reformers, not traditionalists. That kind of radical reform was barely on the horizon in 1914, let alone 1836, and in fact emerged in the mainstream in reaction to the failures of secular modernism to substantially improve the lot of Islamic countries (Tamim Ansary, Eugene Rogan are accessible and good on this). Building such a fringe ideology contingent on so many events into the game makes very little sense, and the arguments that have so far been advanced in favour of building it in have been based on poor understanding and bad history: Orientalism, no matter who’s saying it.
The Ottomans maintained the use of the title of Caliph up to the empire's end, though, and were generally accepted as such domestically and abroad. However, this was more a simple matter of legitimizing the Ottoman state's authority and occasionally diplomatic clout than anything else. It is also worth noting that in the Ottoman empire religion was generally the primary basis of identity (e.g. in the 1923 population exchange between Greece and Turkey, 'Greek' and 'Turk' were strictly defined along religious lines).
 
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You are arguing with a man who has a Turkish flag for a profile pic and is named "Al-Khalidi". Now, for all I know he could be some Canadian atheist of English descent, but judging by the name and flag, it seems like you are calling what is very likely a Turkish Muslim an "orientalist". If my assumptions are true, you demonstrate incredible audacity.

Being Turkish, Muslim or a Turkish Muslim doesn't preclude one from orientalism. If anything modern Turks and large portion of other Muslims are very self-orientalizing in their perspective of Islamic identities and history of Islamic states.

As for the rest, while caliphate stayed an ideal to aspire generally its importance both as an ideal and a title waxed and waned over the centuries. While a strong Muslim state that governed over a large part of Muslims and importantly Hejaz could and would claim prestige and legitimacy from being caliphs the influence of such a title was only as strong as the state claiming it. For large parts of the era after fall of Abbasid caliphate, the title and ideal shifted in meaning and also in practice. Ottomans, the state which did claim legitimacy from being the caliphate only emphasized it when it became relevant to their policies, such as when they were pursuing a foreign policy in Indian ocean and North Africa in 16th century and it fell out of use after though it was always claimed and part of Ottoman Sultan's titles. In the era of Victoria, Ottoman empire only started to emphasize it after the Abdulhamid II adopted a type of Pan-Islamist ideology and started to shape his image as a protector of Muslims which was modelled directly after Russian Tsar and Pan-Slavism & Orthodoxy.

This is actually similar to how Ottomans used title of Kaiser-i Rum, Caesar of Rome. They emphasized the title first as they consolidated over Christians of former Roman Empire in Balkans and Anatolia and later in their rivalry with Holy Roman Empire, to take land from them and over control of Balkans and Hungary in general. The title also fell out of proactive use as they lost Hungary in particular and their aims of taking further territory from Habsburg rulers become improbable but stayed among titles of the Ottoman Sultan. This, I think, highlights the fact that the ideal of the optimal state whether Caliphate or Roman Empire via Translatio Imperii, both which are very similar concepts, while existent and legitimate among the ruled rests upon more in political realities, pragmatism and even opportunism in its usage in the government side.
 
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I can't believe 2022 is allready ending and we still don't have vic3
smh
Haha, I meant January!
Though I suppose Sweden has always been a bit ahead....
 
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