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Simon_Jester said:
EDIT: maybe I should have submitted it under category "Land Units and Technology" instead of "text files and csv." It's not assigned to dec15200.
Changed it and reassigned it. ;)
 
Simon_Jester said:
Of course, you can make a pretty good argument that historical Germany didn't research all the possible land doctrines available to them. Some of the doctrine trees reflect paths that the Heer never took, like emphasis on strong static defenses.
Good point.

Which again touches on the issue that (IMO) the doctrines are too generalized. And as they currently are, there is no static defense-specific doctrine path. Heck, the defensive doctrines don't even affect the efficiencies of forts. They seem to be fixed at 100% and nothing changes it. The CORE defensive doctrines give bonuses to non-static tactics (counterattack, delay, and withdrawal), as well as generalized defensiveness.

So the fact that the Heer didn't devote much effort to developing battlefield static defenses (Atlantic Wall aside), or that the Soviets and Japanese did, is not reflected in CORE. Nor can you change history and decide to do so for whatever country you're playing.
 
I'll grant that there's a problem with differentiation. I think the idea is that differentiation is imposed on the player because the tech teams available to him channelize his research efforts. The problem is that there aren't enough different tech field types available for true differentiation; any researcher who has four or five matches with the techs in one area must inevitable have two or three matches with some of the others.

Some either/or choices, similar to the ones found in other parts of the tech tree (as between six-batallion and nine-batallion divisions) would be nice.
 
Simon_Jester said:
I think the idea is that differentiation is imposed on the player because the tech teams available to him channelize his research efforts. The problem is that there aren't enough different tech field types available for true differentiation; any researcher who has four or five matches with the techs in one area must inevitable have two or three matches with some of the others.
I agree. The idea that it's imposed by the teams you have to choose from is nice, in theory, but may be wishful thinking. At least for some nations like the U.S. and Germany which have lots of high-grade teams so they don't have to make hard choices. And even if you don't have good team matches you can still do things -- it just takes much longer.

Choices, like 6bn/9bn or similar stuff in the air and naval trees would be nice to see in the land doctrines too. In Vanilla you did see such choices. The Soviets, for example, were on a different path than the Germans or Americans, and cannot change course. In CORE, there is no such restriction. If the Soviets want to emulate the Germans in land warfare, they can. The only issue is that they are slower at achieving their goals because their tech teams aren't as good. Since CORE is supposed to be historically accurate, this (IMO) is a major flaw because the Soviets should not be able to employ the same doctrines as the Germans or Americans. Their historical command structure simply wouldn't allow for it.
 
Well, the Soviet military was highly centralized, which would be a handicap. But I'm not sure it's fair to say that the Soviets could not have adopted a doctrine roughly similar to that of the Germans (for instance).

I think the only real issue with differentiation-by-tech-specialty is that the difference between researching a tech with several matching specialties and one without isn't large enough to deter players from researching any given land doctrine tech.

On the other hand, that may reasonably be called a feature and not a bug. This way, it will be less cost-effective to research all the off-specialty techs. And that more accurately reflects the historical event, because historically there were often overlaps between nations' doctrines. Everybody developed improved combined arms coordination during the war. Everybody came up with doctrine for maneuvering around the enemy's flank or into his rear. The Germans did have competent static-defense doctrines (they knew very well how to defend in place); it's not as if they completely ignored that area even if it wasn't their emphasis.

So maybe the differentiation shouldn't be perfect, though it would be nice if there were a few more either/or choices involved to make it a little more differentiated. For instance, there could be a few land doctrines that play a role similar to the 'industrialization level' techs by permanently locking some of the doctrines.
 
For the Soviets to be flexible enough to adopt such tactics would require a change in political leadership at the highest levels, which AFAIK isn't possible in the game.

Oh, and not everyone developed improved combined-arms coordination. The Japanese, for instance, never really did it. And the Soviet practice was very crude compared to the Germans and UK/US. But that's quibbling over minor details and I do agree with your point.

But if we can't get a major overhaul of the land doctrines so that they "look & feel" more like those in other trees, at least the research cost factor of the existing v0.3 land doctrines should be looked at. I still feel they're about 30-40% too expensive in time.
 
Simon_Jester said:
Why would Stalin have to go for the Red Army to be able to adopt blitzkrieg tactics?
Because tactics like that depend in large part on local initiative by junior officers and NCOs, rather than strictly following orders handed down from army HQ. Officers have to feel that taking risks in combat won't get them sent to a gulag or shot by the NKVD when a good idea that wasn't pre-authorized doesn't pan out. The first thing that would have to happen is for the Purges not to occur. And you cannot have embedded political officers able to overrule the orders of unit commanders. I could go on and on, but the entire structure of the Red Army lacked the flexibility to emulate the Germans and western Allies. The same inflexibility that in large part enabled the Germans to progress as far as they did as fast as they did during Barbarossa (because many Soviet commanders were paralyzed with indecision, or overruled by their political officers or directly from Stavka). The difference in command styles is also why the Germans were able to time and time again repel massive Soviet thrusts with small mobile "fire brigades". It's why if you killed or captured a Soviet battalion HQ (or a regimental/division HQ) you'd effectively render the entire unit that HQ commanded out of action, because junior officers weren't encouraged to assume command and act on their own initiative when cut off from higher authority. In the German, and in particular American, armies you'd have to kill almost every officer and NCO before a unit would stop fighting.
 
Hi,

This is partially reflected in game, as trying to advance as the SOV through the Operational techs is very difficult. You have very poor team matching there and can probablly get 2+ of the other doctrines for one Operational one. IMO most nations developed at least some of the doctrines in each branch. It's just that many of them did not advance very far. JAP is indeed an excelent example of very little Armor/Combined Arms/Manuever type doctrines.

mm
 
Penta said:
Or look at the US.

In WW2 it was firepower-focused.

From Vietnam onwards, it's been mobility-focused, as have most Western forces.
The US has been mobility-focused more or less since 1942. The Sherman tank is a perfect example of this. Crappy armor and undergunned, but agile, cheap to build, reliable, and easy to repair. Also compare Patton's solution to battlefield situations with most other Allied generals. Patton, almost single-handedly, rewrote US land doctrine during the war.

Germany is a paradox, because the Wehrmacht was (in the main) mobility-focused while the armaments industry was firepower-focused. So the troops were stuck using equipment that wasn't always ideal for how they wished to fight.
 
ShadoWarrior said:
Because tactics like that depend in large part on local initiative by junior officers and NCOs, rather than strictly following orders handed down from army HQ. Officers have to feel that taking risks in combat won't get them sent to a gulag or shot by the NKVD when a good idea that wasn't pre-authorized doesn't pan out. The first thing that would have to happen is for the Purges not to occur. And you cannot have embedded political officers able to overrule the orders of unit commanders. I could go on and on, but the entire structure of the Red Army lacked the flexibility to emulate the Germans and western Allies. The same inflexibility that in large part enabled the Germans to progress as far as they did as fast as they did during Barbarossa (because many Soviet commanders were paralyzed with indecision, or overruled by their political officers or directly from Stavka). The difference in command styles is also why the Germans were able to time and time again repel massive Soviet thrusts with small mobile "fire brigades". It's why if you killed or captured a Soviet battalion HQ (or a regimental/division HQ) you'd effectively render the entire unit that HQ commanded out of action, because junior officers weren't encouraged to assume command and act on their own initiative when cut off from higher authority. In the German, and in particular American, armies you'd have to kill almost every officer and NCO before a unit would stop fighting.

Well stated. Under Russian doctrine, Rommel and Guderian would've been shot for insubordination for pocketing the French and Brits at Dunkirk (which is when many consider blitzkrieg as an operational doctrine to have been invented).
 
Ackillez said:
Well stated. Under Russian doctrine, Rommel and Guderian would've been shot for insubordination for pocketing the French and Brits at Dunkirk (which is when many consider blitzkrieg as an operational doctrine to have been invented).
Were there historical cases of a Soviet general actually being shot for insubordination after delivering such a spectacular victory?

Or were the Soviet generals merely convinced that such shootings would occur, and therefore unwilling to try to deliver such a spectacular victory?
 
Simon_Jester said:
Or were the Soviet generals merely convinced that such shootings would occur, and therefore unwilling to try to deliver such a spectacular victory?
It was the general perception (pun intended). The preceding 5 years were more than ample evidence of what *might* happen to them if they deviated even a millimeter from what they were told to do and how they were to do it. Plenty of loyal (and talented) Soviet officers were Purged, along with those of questionable loyalty. Being right wasn't an assurance of safety. Stalin had considered, often, about eliminating Zhukov regardless of his value as a Marshal. He was perceived as a potential rival. In Stalinist Russia, no one was safe. No one at all. In some ways it was even worse than living in Nazi Germany. But I'm digressing.

The point of all this is that, IMO, the land doctrines should have nation-specific techs just like there are for naval. And while in the process of adding more techs, a few dealing specifically with fixed fortifications might be nice (since there are none whatsoever now).
 
ShadoWarrior said:
The US has been mobility-focused more or less since 1942. The Sherman tank is a perfect example of this. Crappy armor and undergunned, but agile, cheap to build, reliable, and easy to repair. Also compare Patton's solution to battlefield situations with most other Allied generals. Patton, almost single-handedly, rewrote US land doctrine during the war.

Hi,

Don't agree here. USA had a somewhat mobile focus, but in actual execution most USA operations were rather plodding excercises in leveraging vastly superior firepower. The vast amount of "mobility" that USA forces obtained had far more to do with USA's ability to provide mass quantities of vehicles rather than any doctrinal drive to equip the army with them in order to mount truely mobile campaigns. Patton is the exception to this mentality.

mm
 
Hi,

Fortification Doctrines: AFAIK there are no commands to adjust fortification efficiency. Maybe I missed them but I don't see any in use in Vanilla. We can adjust costs, and already do in the Industrial techs. Might be good to shift some of those bonuses over to the LAnd Doctrines though.

SOV Generals: So should we force the SOV down the historical regimented doctrinal path when we don't force them to purge in the first place? SOV tech teams reflect the SOV emphasis on large formation operations and centralized execution.

mm
 
ShadoWarrior said:
It was the general perception (pun intended). The preceding 5 years were more than ample evidence of what *might* happen to them if they deviated even a millimeter from what they were told to do and how they were to do it. Plenty of loyal (and talented) Soviet officers were Purged, along with those of questionable loyalty. Being right wasn't an assurance of safety. Stalin had considered, often, about eliminating Zhukov regardless of his value as a Marshal. He was perceived as a potential rival. In Stalinist Russia, no one was safe. No one at all. In some ways it was even worse than living in Nazi Germany. But I'm digressing.
First of all, historical Stalinist Russia was about as bad as it could have been. It could have, hypothetically, been at least slightly not-so-bad. Stalin didn't have to be quite as paranoid about threats to his power base as he was historically.

So to lock the Russian player into a tech tree or to shackle them with a crippling tech that reflects the aftereffects of the Stalinist purges when the Soviet player might very well have not had the purges at all, or perhaps not even have a Stalinist government by 1941, seems unreasonable.

Second of all, even a Stalin who was deeply paranoid about the political loyalty of his generals could have seen, and to some extent did see, the benefits of allowing them a slightly freer rein at the front in their operations against the enemy. The fact that concepts like large armored formations suffered such a great hit when generals like Tukachevsky went down in the Purges was in part a historical accident.

It's definitely true that the degree of political influence over the Soviet military crippled its ability to wage something like a blitzkrieg historically, but I think that a human player should have the option of at least trying to overcome this disadvantage in part, though that should come with a price.

As it stood, the Red Army doctrine did evolve into a kind of mobile warfare, one heavily influenced by the cavalry-experienced generals who led it to victory after World War Two. It wasn't the same as German blitzkrieg, but it was in some ways similar- the main difference being that the Soviets planned to assault an enemy and break into his rear simultaneously, with the penetration being assisted by the disruption created by the assault, rather than simply outflank him and get into his rear that way.