Changed it and reassigned it.Simon_Jester said:EDIT: maybe I should have submitted it under category "Land Units and Technology" instead of "text files and csv." It's not assigned to dec15200.
Changed it and reassigned it.Simon_Jester said:EDIT: maybe I should have submitted it under category "Land Units and Technology" instead of "text files and csv." It's not assigned to dec15200.
Good point.Simon_Jester said:Of course, you can make a pretty good argument that historical Germany didn't research all the possible land doctrines available to them. Some of the doctrine trees reflect paths that the Heer never took, like emphasis on strong static defenses.
I agree. The idea that it's imposed by the teams you have to choose from is nice, in theory, but may be wishful thinking. At least for some nations like the U.S. and Germany which have lots of high-grade teams so they don't have to make hard choices. And even if you don't have good team matches you can still do things -- it just takes much longer.Simon_Jester said:I think the idea is that differentiation is imposed on the player because the tech teams available to him channelize his research efforts. The problem is that there aren't enough different tech field types available for true differentiation; any researcher who has four or five matches with the techs in one area must inevitable have two or three matches with some of the others.
Because tactics like that depend in large part on local initiative by junior officers and NCOs, rather than strictly following orders handed down from army HQ. Officers have to feel that taking risks in combat won't get them sent to a gulag or shot by the NKVD when a good idea that wasn't pre-authorized doesn't pan out. The first thing that would have to happen is for the Purges not to occur. And you cannot have embedded political officers able to overrule the orders of unit commanders. I could go on and on, but the entire structure of the Red Army lacked the flexibility to emulate the Germans and western Allies. The same inflexibility that in large part enabled the Germans to progress as far as they did as fast as they did during Barbarossa (because many Soviet commanders were paralyzed with indecision, or overruled by their political officers or directly from Stavka). The difference in command styles is also why the Germans were able to time and time again repel massive Soviet thrusts with small mobile "fire brigades". It's why if you killed or captured a Soviet battalion HQ (or a regimental/division HQ) you'd effectively render the entire unit that HQ commanded out of action, because junior officers weren't encouraged to assume command and act on their own initiative when cut off from higher authority. In the German, and in particular American, armies you'd have to kill almost every officer and NCO before a unit would stop fighting.Simon_Jester said:Why would Stalin have to go for the Red Army to be able to adopt blitzkrieg tactics?
The US has been mobility-focused more or less since 1942. The Sherman tank is a perfect example of this. Crappy armor and undergunned, but agile, cheap to build, reliable, and easy to repair. Also compare Patton's solution to battlefield situations with most other Allied generals. Patton, almost single-handedly, rewrote US land doctrine during the war.Penta said:Or look at the US.
In WW2 it was firepower-focused.
From Vietnam onwards, it's been mobility-focused, as have most Western forces.
ShadoWarrior said:Because tactics like that depend in large part on local initiative by junior officers and NCOs, rather than strictly following orders handed down from army HQ. Officers have to feel that taking risks in combat won't get them sent to a gulag or shot by the NKVD when a good idea that wasn't pre-authorized doesn't pan out. The first thing that would have to happen is for the Purges not to occur. And you cannot have embedded political officers able to overrule the orders of unit commanders. I could go on and on, but the entire structure of the Red Army lacked the flexibility to emulate the Germans and western Allies. The same inflexibility that in large part enabled the Germans to progress as far as they did as fast as they did during Barbarossa (because many Soviet commanders were paralyzed with indecision, or overruled by their political officers or directly from Stavka). The difference in command styles is also why the Germans were able to time and time again repel massive Soviet thrusts with small mobile "fire brigades". It's why if you killed or captured a Soviet battalion HQ (or a regimental/division HQ) you'd effectively render the entire unit that HQ commanded out of action, because junior officers weren't encouraged to assume command and act on their own initiative when cut off from higher authority. In the German, and in particular American, armies you'd have to kill almost every officer and NCO before a unit would stop fighting.
Were there historical cases of a Soviet general actually being shot for insubordination after delivering such a spectacular victory?Ackillez said:Well stated. Under Russian doctrine, Rommel and Guderian would've been shot for insubordination for pocketing the French and Brits at Dunkirk (which is when many consider blitzkrieg as an operational doctrine to have been invented).
It was the general perception (pun intended). The preceding 5 years were more than ample evidence of what *might* happen to them if they deviated even a millimeter from what they were told to do and how they were to do it. Plenty of loyal (and talented) Soviet officers were Purged, along with those of questionable loyalty. Being right wasn't an assurance of safety. Stalin had considered, often, about eliminating Zhukov regardless of his value as a Marshal. He was perceived as a potential rival. In Stalinist Russia, no one was safe. No one at all. In some ways it was even worse than living in Nazi Germany. But I'm digressing.Simon_Jester said:Or were the Soviet generals merely convinced that such shootings would occur, and therefore unwilling to try to deliver such a spectacular victory?
ShadoWarrior said:The US has been mobility-focused more or less since 1942. The Sherman tank is a perfect example of this. Crappy armor and undergunned, but agile, cheap to build, reliable, and easy to repair. Also compare Patton's solution to battlefield situations with most other Allied generals. Patton, almost single-handedly, rewrote US land doctrine during the war.
First of all, historical Stalinist Russia was about as bad as it could have been. It could have, hypothetically, been at least slightly not-so-bad. Stalin didn't have to be quite as paranoid about threats to his power base as he was historically.ShadoWarrior said:It was the general perception (pun intended). The preceding 5 years were more than ample evidence of what *might* happen to them if they deviated even a millimeter from what they were told to do and how they were to do it. Plenty of loyal (and talented) Soviet officers were Purged, along with those of questionable loyalty. Being right wasn't an assurance of safety. Stalin had considered, often, about eliminating Zhukov regardless of his value as a Marshal. He was perceived as a potential rival. In Stalinist Russia, no one was safe. No one at all. In some ways it was even worse than living in Nazi Germany. But I'm digressing.
That could certainly be workable.dec152000 said:Might be good to shift some of those bonuses over to the LAnd Doctrines though.