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Polish diplomacy if the thirties was a failure, it dispirited their allies and emboldened their enemies. It seized small gains for pride by jeopardizing gains for the nation's survival.
That's strange assessment. What could Poland possibly have done to help Czechoslovakia, in a situation where Czechoslovakia's protectors and guarantors had thrown that country to the Nazi wolves already?

No kind of high minded principled stand on the Teschen issue could have changed that country's fate.
 
That's strange assessment. What could Poland possibly have done to help Czechoslovakia, in a situation where Czechoslovakia's protectors and guarantors had thrown that country to the Nazi wolves already?

Not alienate every neighbor it had and try and form a copy of the Little Entente?
 
Not alienate every neighbor it had and try and form a copy of the Little Entente?
No I mean what could they have possibly done to save CZECHOSLOVAKIA

There was nothing that could save them. Teschen or not Teschen. Czechoslovakia was not doomed by any polish actions, but by French and British actions.

As for Poland alienating its neighbors... Yes that would certainly have changed things. Hitler would have trembled had he had to face the mighty Polish - Lithuanian - Czechoslovakian alliance. Why not add Yugoslavia for maximum impotency.

The Eastern Europeans couldn't do anything to save themselves regardless of what they did. 1938 was not 1921, the Soviets and Germany were back to their full strength and they were determined to have small countries for breakfast, lunch and dinner. Industrial warfare against industrial powers requires industries and manpower that none of the eastern European states had. Without a large power patron looking out for them, each of the smaller countries was best served by pursuing policies that cozied up to one of the two big powers on the continent regardless of the damage that might do to its other small neighbors.
 
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That's strange assessment. What could Poland possibly have done to help Czechoslovakia, in a situation where Czechoslovakia's protectors and guarantors had thrown that country to the Nazi wolves already?

No kind of high minded principled stand on the Teschen issue could have changed that country's fate.
The Czechs should have, and could have, fought. Had they done so, Polish aid would have been invaluable.
 
I'm Not going to comment on the outcome of a plausible scenario since there are to many factors involved to predict an outcome. However, I prefer seeing this in NF since this scenario is actually based on historical events. I would like to ask to modders that they can makes this, togheter with operational unthinkable happen.
 
No I mean what could they have possibly done to save CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Ally with them. There were two events regarding CSSR. First, the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany, second, the liquidation of the remnant. Polish annexation of Teschen happened during the first, not the second.
As for Poland alienating its neighbors... Yes that would certainly have changed things. Hitler would have trembled had he had to face the mighty Polish - Lithuanian - Czechoslovakian alliance. Why not add Yugoslavia for maximum impotency.
Let's check wikipedia:
According to English wikipedia, Germany invaded with 1,500,000 men and Poland defended with 1,000,000 men. That ratio seems remarkably low to me, the German wiki raises German strength to a mere 1,600,000. In both cases, approximately 50,000 Slovaks are not included. Not only would these have been missing from the German side in the case of a Polish-Czechoslovakian alliance, but fought on the other side.
I have trouble finding something on the Czechoslovakian army, ironically, google brought me to an old entry on this very forum
I'm currently listening to The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich by William Shirer. According to his sources, Czechoslovakia (who had about a million men, of which 800.000 where front line units
Apart from that, wikipedia claims that the 1921 population of the CSSR was 13,607,385. For Poland, I found a 1931 population of 21,993,444, so the one million CSSR army seems a bit much, taking the Polish ratio of population to army strength would leave an army of 600,000. Still enough to cancel out German numerical superiority.
So a Polish-Czechoslovakian alliance would have made a difference. Individually, both were just small enough to be quickly and decisively defeated by the full might of the Germany army. Both at once would at the very least have complicated things and complications were something Germany could ill afford as her whole force was committed with no meaningful reserves left to combat unforeseen complications. Yugoslavia joining in would have brought another 300,000 on the table that would need to be conquered. And Germany needed to defeat both quickly, least France decides that fighting Czechs and Poles are preferable to waiting Brits and have come to the party. Worse, in reality, France didn't undertake any meaningful attacks on Germany in part due to the believe that Poland was doomed anyway, if she instead decided that her aid was needed and useful, she might have been actually aggressive, which likely would have spelt doom for the Wehrmacht.
 
The Czechs should have, and could have, fought. Had they done so, Polish aid would have been invaluable.
With or without the French and British?

Ally with them. There were two events regarding CSSR. First, the annexation of the Sudetenland by Germany, second, the liquidation of the remnant. Polish annexation of Teschen happened during the first, not the second.

Let's check wikipedia:
According to English wikipedia, Germany invaded with 1,500,000 men and Poland defended with 1,000,000 men. That ratio seems remarkably low to me, the German wiki raises German strength to a mere 1,600,000. In both cases, approximately 50,000 Slovaks are not included. Not only would these have been missing from the German side in the case of a Polish-Czechoslovakian alliance, but fought on the other side.
I have trouble finding something on the Czechoslovakian army, ironically, google brought me to an old entry on this very forum

Apart from that, wikipedia claims that the 1921 population of the CSSR was 13,607,385. For Poland, I found a 1931 population of 21,993,444, so the one million CSSR army seems a bit much, taking the Polish ratio of population to army strength would leave an army of 600,000. Still enough to cancel out German numerical superiority.
So a Polish-Czechoslovakian alliance would have made a difference. Individually, both were just small enough to be quickly and decisively defeated by the full might of the Germany army. Both at once would at the very least have complicated things and complications were something Germany could ill afford as her whole force was committed with no meaningful reserves left to combat unforeseen complications. Yugoslavia joining in would have brought another 300,000 on the table that would need to be conquered. And Germany needed to defeat both quickly, least France decides that fighting Czechs and Poles are preferable to waiting Brits and have come to the party. Worse, in reality, France didn't undertake any meaningful attacks on Germany in part due to the believe that Poland was doomed anyway, if she instead decided that her aid was needed and useful, she might have been actually aggressive, which likely would have spelt doom for the Wehrmacht.
Are you saying the Poles and Czechs together could have defied the Wehrmacht? Acheton you need to read less Wikipedia if that's where you get that idea from. There are better sources to inform oneself about the balance of power and the military strength of the pre WW2 nations of Europe.

The Wehrmacht was far better armed, trained and led, than those two countries could have afforded. Not to mention that unlike the Wehrmacht the czech army would have to expect the desertion and defection of most of its German speaking servicemen before even a single shot were fired.

You should not consider just population numbers as a basis for military power relationships between the European powers of 1938. There's a world of difference between an army fielded by a poor and at best semi industrialized country like Poland and a numerically comparable army fielded by an industrial power house like Germany (or France for that matter). Their quality, equipment, and training are not comparable are not comparable. The political boundary conditions are also very different and directly influence the way they can fight.

Poland was a unitary nation state with a population that was strongly committed to the nation's defense. Czechoslovakia was a multi ethnic state that could only count on the commitment of a part of its population to a defense against Germany - the German and Hungarian servicemen would certainly have deserted and defected from the army at the first opportunity. Yugoslavia was even worse off, it was by 1938 deeply mired in an internal political strife and could count on at best only the Serbian half of the population to support a war effort against Germany (and possibly Hungary and Italy as well). And even then only a defensive one. It would have been totally unrealistic to expect a hypothetical Yugoslavian participation in a 1938 war over Czechoslovakia to mean anything other than them sitting on their arse and fortifying their borders, while not lifting a finger to the defense of Czechoslovakia or Poland or anyone else. If they had even managed that, and not collapsed into civil war over the anger of the non Serbian population against a war in which they would not have seen any point.

Czechoslovakia could have stood a chance had France and Britain firmly guaranteed the country's inviolability. With one or both western powers at war with Germany, the Polish army could have made a difference... But not with just the eastern Europeans by themselves against Germany. They would have stood no chance.
 
The catch is, Poland expected France to come to their aid if big neighbor Germany decided to give war a change. Of course, the French expected Poland to come to their aid if Germany went west again. With the Polish-German non-aggression treaty, Poland seemed to want it both ways, assistance in case Germany attacks Poland, peace in case German attacks anyone else. This is not the basis of an alliance.

That is what France&UK started with. In the treaty of Locarno of 1925 the western allies during the occupation of the Rhineland negotiated with still democractic Germany that "western borders" (of Germany, France and Belgium) are fixed and guaranteed by France, UK and Italy (a reassurance to France that then withdrew it’s troops from the Rhineland and to Germany as suddenly the UK would NOT join France if France would be the attacker). Eastern borders were still open for renogatiating leaving Poland and the Czechoslovakians hanging. That treaty was seen by the UK as a way to reconcile Germany and France, while signalling to the smaller countries that were not backed by a major power to come to terms and perhaps agree to some bordercorrections.

So what that meant to France and Poland: France and Poland were allied since 1921 and both agreed to come to the others aid if Germany attacked either with some thoughts even about a joint attack on Germany at times of threat.

Only that after Locarno France would now no longer be able to attack the western border of Germany (as that meant that Italy and the UK would step in) but that Germany would be able to put diplomatical, economical and perhaps even military pressure on Poland. France turned from a reliable ally of Poland to - nothing and Poland was practically on it’s own.

And when France entered the Franco-Soviet treaty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Soviet_Treaty_of_Mutual_Assistance
that was aimed against Germany it made things even worse, as anything involving trusting the soviet/russians was impossible for Poland and the perceived threat of treaty was the perfect diplomatic excuse (that even british politicans like Lloyd George admitted) for Germany to rearm quicker and to declare the spirit of Locarno had been broken by France.

We should not place the blame for WW2 or the failure of a diplomatic solution entirely, not even in the major part, on Poland.
 
That is what France&UK started with. In the treaty of Locarno of 1925 the western allies during the occupation of the Rhineland negotiated with still democractic Germany that "western borders" (of Germany, France and Belgium) are fixed and guaranteed by France, UK and Italy (a reassurance to France that then withdrew it’s troops from the Rhineland and to Germany as suddenly the UK would NOT join France if France would be the attacker). Eastern borders were still open for renogatiating leaving Poland and the Czechoslovakians hanging. That treaty was seen by the UK as a way to reconcile Germany and France, while signalling to the smaller countries that were not backed by a major power to come to terms and perhaps agree to some bordercorrections.

So what that meant to France and Poland: France and Poland were allied since 1921 and both agreed to come to the others aid if Germany attacked either with some thoughts even about a joint attack on Germany at times of threat.

Only that after Locarno France would now no longer be able to attack the western border of Germany (as that meant that Italy and the UK would step in) but that Germany would be able to put diplomatical, economical and perhaps even military pressure on Poland. France turned from a reliable ally of Poland to - nothing and Poland was practically on it’s own.

And when France entered the Franco-Soviet treaty
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Franco-Soviet_Treaty_of_Mutual_Assistance
that was aimed against Germany it made things even worse, as anything involving trusting the soviet/russians was impossible for Poland and the perceived threat of treaty was the perfect diplomatic excuse (that even british politicans like Lloyd George admitted) for Germany to rearm quicker.

We should not place the blame for WW2 or the failure of a diplomatic solution entirely, not even in the major part, on Poland.
Yeah this is a very good assessment of what Poland had to deal with.

The arrogance of the UK was incomprehensible with hindsight: On the one hand the UK had, together with France, more or less created the eastern European states of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, at the Versailles peace treaty. On the other hand, the UK totally did not recognize these nations as anywhere equal to itself or even any other "great" nation. The British view throughout the 1920s and 1930s was, that good relations with Germany were far more important to Britain than any kind of support or backing to the beleaguered small nations that it had helped create. And that good relations could and should be cultivated by showing as much understanding as possible to Germany's angry demands on its eastern neighbors. The attitude was that these little nations had to right to British support even (especially) when Germany leaned on them. German grievances like complaints about minorities and Danzig were in British eyes automatically just and legitimate while complaints from the small nations that the German demands were threatening their independence were not even registered in London.

Neville Chamberlain put it best when he talked about Czechoslovakia:
How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.
He was of course being facetious: He was prime minister and certainly had any number of dossiers and research articles available to him about anything any everything related to Czechoslovakia and its people. But that he pandered in a such irresponsible way to the isolationist feelings among his less informed citizens shows how crassly the British elites had closed their eyes to the political realities that shaped their world and that determined the security of the British themselves.

It was almost as if the British thought that the independence of small eastern European states was of no relevance to the UK's interests in Europe. Only when Hitler had already devoured Czechoslovakia, and was getting ready to invade Poland, did the British wake up to the cold hard reality that they had pissed away their own security by not defending more vigorously earlier the eastern European states from Germany's depredations.
 
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Neville Chamberlain put it best when he talked about Czechoslovakia:

He was of course being facetious: He was prime minister and certainly had any number of dossiers and research articles available to him about anything any everything related to Czechoslovakia and its people. But that he pandered in a such irresponsible way to the isolationist feelings among his less informed citizens shows how crassly the British elites had closed their eyes to the political realities that shaped their world and that determined the security of the British themselves.

It was almost as if the British thought that the independence of small eastern European states was of no relevance to the UK's interests in Europe. Only when Hitler had already devoured Czechoslovakia, and was getting ready to invade Poland, did the British wake up to the cold hard reality that they had pissed away their own security by not defending more vigorously earlier the eastern European states from Germany's depredations.

That isn't really true at all. It completely ignores the situation in Britain itself. The country had neither the desire nor the capabilities to fight. The British military made it very clear to Chamberlain that it wouldn't be possible to send anything but a token force to the continent, and that it wasn't in any way capable of preventing Germany from taking Czechoslovakia. It further felt it was way behind Germany in re-arming and that keeping peace for as long as possible would shift the balance more and more towards the allies.

Granted, the military did overestimate Germany's military strength, but that isn't really something Chamberlain could know. When you have a population that was adamantly against another war - to the point where the government might have fallen if it had taken action - especially over territory that most people thought Germany did have a valid claim on, when you have an army that tells you that they wouldn't be able to send more than two ill-equiped divisions to the continent and that any war wouldn't save the country it was supposed to save, it seems pretty obvious that the most logical option is to do what Chamberlain did. It may not have turned out well, but that is judging from hindsight, which is never the proper way to judge someone's decision from the past.

Chamberlain may have been too much of a diplomat, in that he thought that everyone, even Hitler, would hold up "fair" agreements, but that is basically all you can blame him for. He didn't have much of a choice, so he bought time and ramped up miltary spending. If you operate based on the assumption that your population is vehemently against another war, and your military doesn't think it is in any way ready to fight one, his decision was indeed the most logical to take. You can't just judge decisions based on what (you think) you know, you have to judge them based on what the person who made them knew. Barbarossa is another example of a leader making decisions based on false data, as German intelligence drastically underestimated Soviet military strength.
 
With or without the French and British?


Are you saying the Poles and Czechs together could have defied the Wehrmacht? Acheton you need to read less Wikipedia if that's where you get that idea from. There are better sources to inform oneself about the balance of power and the military strength of the pre WW2 nations of Europe.

The Wehrmacht was far better armed, trained and led, than those two countries could have afforded. Not to mention that unlike the Wehrmacht the czech army would have to expect the desertion and defection of most of its German speaking servicemen before even a single shot were fired.

You should not consider just population numbers as a basis for military power relationships between the European powers of 1938. There's a world of difference between an army fielded by a poor and at best semi industrialized country like Poland and a numerically comparable army fielded by an industrial power house like Germany (or France for that matter). Their quality, equipment, and training are not comparable are not comparable. The political boundary conditions are also very different and directly influence the way they can fight.

Poland was a unitary nation state with a population that was strongly committed to the nation's defense. Czechoslovakia was a multi ethnic state that could only count on the commitment of a part of its population to a defense against Germany - the German and Hungarian servicemen would certainly have deserted and defected from the army at the first opportunity. Yugoslavia was even worse off, it was by 1938 deeply mired in an internal political strife and could count on at best only the Serbian half of the population to support a war effort against Germany (and possibly Hungary and Italy as well). And even then only a defensive one. It would have been totally unrealistic to expect a hypothetical Yugoslavian participation in a 1938 war over Czechoslovakia to mean anything other than them sitting on their arse and fortifying their borders, while not lifting a finger to the defense of Czechoslovakia or Poland or anyone else. If they had even managed that, and not collapsed into civil war over the anger of the non Serbian population against a war in which they would not have seen any point.

Czechoslovakia could have stood a chance had France and Britain firmly guaranteed the country's inviolability. With one or both western powers at war with Germany, the Polish army could have made a difference... But not with just the eastern Europeans by themselves against Germany. They would have stood no chance.
Germany in 1938 also didn't have the army it had in 1939 though, not by a long shot. In the end of 1938, the total army strength was about equal to the army that invaded Poland (at which time other, limited, forces were deployed elsewhere). https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history...ys-strength-now-51-divisions-Nov-30-1938.html

So what we have is 1.6 million Germans total against 2.6 million Poles+Czechoslovaks; your points about relative equipment may be relevant, but even then having a 1:2 minority while on the attack is tricky to overcome.

We also discussed it here before https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...great-powers-armies-in-september-1938.623701/

So in summary, in 1939, Poland and pre-Sudeten Czechoslovakia stood only a limited chance against Germany. But in 1938, the sides were nowhere near lopsided. Of course it would still be difficult, and Germany had more room for expansion, but not as hopeless as you make it out to be.
 
That isn't really true at all. It completely ignores the situation in Britain itself. The country had neither the desire nor the capabilities to fight. The British military made it very clear to Chamberlain that it wouldn't be possible to send anything but a token force to the continent, and that it wasn't in any way capable of preventing Germany from taking Czechoslovakia. It further felt it was way behind Germany in re-arming and that keeping peace for as long as possible would shift the balance more and more towards the allies.

Granted, the military did overestimate Germany's military strength, but that isn't really something Chamberlain could know. When you have a population that was adamantly against another war - to the point where the government might have fallen if it had taken action - especially over territory that most people thought Germany did have a valid claim on, when you have an army that tells you that they wouldn't be able to send more than two ill-equiped divisions to the continent and that any war wouldn't save the country it was supposed to save, it seems pretty obvious that the most logical option is to do what Chamberlain did. It may not have turned out well, but that is judging from hindsight, which is never the proper way to judge someone's decision from the past.

Chamberlain may have been too much of a diplomat, in that he thought that everyone, even Hitler, would hold up "fair" agreements, but that is basically all you can blame him for. He didn't have much of a choice, so he bought time and ramped up miltary spending. If you operate based on the assumption that your population is vehemently against another war, and your military doesn't think it is in any way ready to fight one, his decision was indeed the most logical to take. You can't just judge decisions based on what (you think) you know, you have to judge them based on what the person who made them knew. Barbarossa is another example of a leader making decisions based on false data, as German intelligence drastically underestimated Soviet military strength.
Please don't misunderstand me. I'm not blaming Chamberlain for making the decision on 1938 to abandon Czechoslovakia to the Nazis. In blaming all the British governments since 1918 for being so shortsighted that they thought eastern Europe could be ignored without threatening Britain's own security.
 
With or without the French and British?


Are you saying the Poles and Czechs together could have defied the Wehrmacht? Acheton you need to read less Wikipedia if that's where you get that idea from. There are better sources to inform oneself about the balance of power and the military strength of the pre WW2 nations of Europe.
The low margin of actual German superiority got me puzzled. But if I remember right, Poland committed the bulk of her forces directly to the front, due to (justified) fears that any territory Germany took, it might easily keep in a peace brokered by the western allies. However, that disposition played right into the hands of the Wehrmacht, allowing it to break through and encircle the bulk of the Polish army right from the get go. Which, btw, wasn't some unforeseeable totally new "Blitzkrieg", but rather the application of doctrines like "Schwerpunkt" and "Vernichtungsgedanke" which had been the German army's bread and butter before there was a German army, these concepts going back to the post-Napoleonic Prussian army and where thus over a hundred years old.

What I am trying to say is, Poland could have held out for considerably longer and inflicted significantly higher casualties on the invaders than she actually did, if only her leadership had taken into account what was possible with their army and not just focused on what was desirable to achieve.

The Wehrmacht was far better armed, trained and led, than those two countries could have afforded. Not to mention that unlike the Wehrmacht the czech army would have to expect the desertion and defection of most of its German speaking servicemen before even a single shot were fired.
Better led for sure, as said above, at least at high levels. Better trained, on one hand, I read some (iffy) claims that the German training doctrine was superior, though OTOH, the Wehrmacht had expanded rapidly in the previous years only. As for armed, probably better than the Polish army, though it is interesting to note how many of the German tanks used were Czech models (the Pz 35(t) and the Pz 38(t)), particularly in relation to then rather rare German Panzer III and IV's, the rather light-weight Panzer I and II's being the mainstay of the German army then.

Also note, that to my knowledge, the CSSR was rather well industrialized. Czech industry and Polish manpower could have made for a powerful combination and a reliable one if both sides realize that they will either hang together or be hung together. The image of facing Germany would still have been a daunting one, but giving stiff resistance might just entice other powers, not to come to their aid, but to smother the German juggernaut while they sill can. In any case, it certainly was the only viable alternative to becoming a German vassal, if you already decide to refuse to become your big bad neighbor's puppet, you better get all the allies you can get. What you do not to is gleefully take a bit of a common neighbor the big bad is dismembering while he already wonders what ointments he will use on you.
 
Also note, that to my knowledge, the CSSR was rather well industrialized. Czech industry and Polish manpower could have made for a powerful combination and a reliable one if both sides realize that they will either hang together or be hung together. The image of facing Germany would still have been a daunting one, but giving stiff resistance might just entice other powers, not to come to their aid, but to smother the German juggernaut while they sill can. In any case, it certainly was the only viable alternative to becoming a German vassal, if you already decide to refuse to become your big bad neighbor's puppet, you better get all the allies you can get. What you do not to is gleefully take a bit of a common neighbor the big bad is dismembering while he already wonders what ointments he will use on you.
Life isn't a fairy tale. Once the French and British had given up on Czechoslovakia there was no glorious but risky alternative left to the two options of vassalization and military destruction. The Czechs were wise to choose the way they did, at least if you consider it wisdom to avoid physical harm and industrial scale massacre of your own people. Poland chose other option and suffered like no other country for it. Prague too could have become a wrecked ruin like Warsaw, the Czechs could also have been treated like the Poles, their elites exterminated by the Germans, perhaps their whole people displaced wholesale into a General Gouvernement in Eastern Moravia or Slovakia. There was no way out for them.
 
Life isn't a fairy tale. Once the French and British had given up on Czechoslovakia there was no glorious but risky alternative left to the two options of vassalization and military destruction. The Czechs were wise to choose the way they did, at least if you consider it wisdom to avoid physical harm and industrial scale massacre of your own people. Poland chose other option and suffered like no other country for it. Prague too could have become a wrecked ruin like Warsaw, the Czechs could also have been treated like the Poles, their elites exterminated by the Germans, perhaps their whole people displaced wholesale into a General Gouvernement in Eastern Moravia or Slovakia. There was no way out for them.
I spelled out why there was an alternative 3 posts ago, I guess you missed it?
 
I spelled out why there was an alternative 3 posts ago, I guess you missed it?
No I think you said the same thing that Acheron said: That Poland and Czechoslovakia had, on paper, an army strength comparable to Germany, and that they could have together defied Germany militarily.

To which I answered that this was not so :) Your analysis of the numbers makes no account of the potential way in which those numbers could have been employed. What would have been a strategy for a Czechoslovakian military deployment against Hitler's Wehrmacht, in September 1938? How could Poland have aided them? Both countries had large armies and the Czechs had a bunch of tanks, but so did the French a year later. Neither had anything even approaching a military strategy to deal with
1) CSR being surrounded on three sides by Germany, and lacking fortifications along the former Austrian border
2) Neither country having open sea lanes or riverine lanes by which military and civilian supplies could have been imported in case of war (Poland had the Baltic but the Germans would have closed that shut, CSR had the Elbe and Danube rivers but Germany would close the one and get Hungary to close the other easily)
3) The possibility of a devastating attack by a third party while their own defense was fully engaged against the Wehrmacht - Poland had the USSR to the east who was, if anything, seen as an even worse enemy than Germany; CSR had a long border with Hungary in the south, and Hungary had a ton of grievances with the CSR including revenge fantasies about Trianon. Hungary would quite certainly have attacked them some time after the start of the war.
4) Both countries, especially CSR, having prepared their militaries almost exclusively in defense, not in deep attack, against modern armies. The Poles had some experience from the Polish-Soviet war and likely a more aggressive mindset but totally lacked preparations for mobile industrialized warfare. CSR had spent the 1920s and 1930s constructing bunkers along the German border, creating a huge fortress line that was pretty much their whole defensive strategy. And rightly so, from their point of view, since geography dictated that the Czechs had to stop German breakthroughs or else the war would be lost due to the lack of depth available for a more mobile defense.

There were good reasons why the Czechs folded in 1938. The main reason being that to go to war, alone, was hopeless. An offer of alliance from Poland, instead of land demands, would not have changed anything about that. At best, the British and French would have stood by and watched the two get slaughtered by Germany for a few weeks before offering/demanding a "meditation" that would likely have involved Poland and Czechoslovakia handing over large parts of their territory to Germany. The Czechs would have been done for after such a "mediation", just like they were after the historical Munich agreement, only worse now because the Nazis will have it in for them later. The Poles would at best have been severely weakened, Danzig would certainly be lost, the Polish army depleted, if not worse. Poland would at best limp away from such a war in a comparable state to Finland after the Winter War. At worst, the Germans would have crushed Czechoslovakia first by attacking from all sides together seht the Hungarians, then moved against Poland, unhindered by French and British hand-wringing. If the Poles are lucky then Stalin comes to their aid, and then bolshevizes eastern Poland while fighting Hitler. If the Poles are unlucky then Stalin comes to Hitler's aid, and then bolshevizes eastern Poland. It's not pretty, whichever way the dice fall.

Had there been a chance that the French and British could have summoned a forceful response to a German attack on Czechoslovakia, such as an ultimatum demanding that Germany submit their grievance to arbitration, backed by threat of war, then Poland coming to Czechoslovakia's aid would have made a lot of sense. In that situation, any escalation of the conflict, and any delay of Germany's conquest of Czechoslovakia, would increase the chance that the two western powers would enter the war and possibly defeat Germany on a prolonged struggle.

But as has been said already in this thread, the British were not about to commit to any military confrontation with Germany, and France would likewise not go at it alone. There might be attempts at bluffing from France and Britain, but unless the Germans lose their nerve, Poland and Czechoslovakia would both be defeated and partitioned.
 
Wait. . . if we are discussing Poland and Czechoslovakia (somehow) joining hands against Germany in September of 1938, even with weak Western Allied support Hitler is considerably more vulnerable prior to Munich so you have to take German domestic situation in mind as there's a potentially massive wildcard.

Now you can't set foreign or military policy on that, but if you want a route to the least dark timeline that's probably it.
 
No I think you said the same thing that Acheron said: That Poland and Czechoslovakia had, on paper, an army strength comparable to Germany, and that they could have together defied Germany militarily.

To which I answered that this was not so :) Your analysis of the numbers makes no account of the potential way in which those numbers could have been employed. What would have been a strategy for a Czechoslovakian military deployment against Hitler's Wehrmacht, in September 1938? How could Poland have aided them? Both countries had large armies and the Czechs had a bunch of tanks, but so did the French a year later. Neither had anything even approaching a military strategy to deal with
1) CSR being surrounded on three sides by Germany, and lacking fortifications along the former Austrian border
2) Neither country having open sea lanes or riverine lanes by which military and civilian supplies could have been imported in case of war (Poland had the Baltic but the Germans would have closed that shut, CSR had the Elbe and Danube rivers but Germany would close the one and get Hungary to close the other easily)
3) The possibility of a devastating attack by a third party while their own defense was fully engaged against the Wehrmacht - Poland had the USSR to the east who was, if anything, seen as an even worse enemy than Germany; CSR had a long border with Hungary in the south, and Hungary had a ton of grievances with the CSR including revenge fantasies about Trianon. Hungary would quite certainly have attacked them some time after the start of the war.
4) Both countries, especially CSR, having prepared their militaries almost exclusively in defense, not in deep attack, against modern armies. The Poles had some experience from the Polish-Soviet war and likely a more aggressive mindset but totally lacked preparations for mobile industrialized warfare. CSR had spent the 1920s and 1930s constructing bunkers along the German border, creating a huge fortress line that was pretty much their whole defensive strategy. And rightly so, from their point of view, since geography dictated that the Czechs had to stop German breakthroughs or else the war would be lost due to the lack of depth available for a more mobile defense.

There were good reasons why the Czechs folded in 1938. The main reason being that to go to war, alone, was hopeless. An offer of alliance from Poland, instead of land demands, would not have changed anything about that. At best, the British and French would have stood by and watched the two get slaughtered by Germany for a few weeks before offering/demanding a "meditation" that would likely have involved Poland and Czechoslovakia handing over large parts of their territory to Germany. The Czechs would have been done for after such a "mediation", just like they were after the historical Munich agreement, only worse now because the Nazis will have it in for them later. The Poles would at best have been severely weakened, Danzig would certainly be lost, the Polish army depleted, if not worse. Poland would at best limp away from such a war in a comparable state to Finland after the Winter War. At worst, the Germans would have crushed Czechoslovakia first by attacking from all sides together seht the Hungarians, then moved against Poland, unhindered by French and British hand-wringing. If the Poles are lucky then Stalin comes to their aid, and then bolshevizes eastern Poland while fighting Hitler. If the Poles are unlucky then Stalin comes to Hitler's aid, and then bolshevizes eastern Poland. It's not pretty, whichever way the dice fall.

Had there been a chance that the French and British could have summoned a forceful response to a German attack on Czechoslovakia, such as an ultimatum demanding that Germany submit their grievance to arbitration, backed by threat of war, then Poland coming to Czechoslovakia's aid would have made a lot of sense. In that situation, any escalation of the conflict, and any delay of Germany's conquest of Czechoslovakia, would increase the chance that the two western powers would enter the war and possibly defeat Germany on a prolonged struggle.

But as has been said already in this thread, the British were not about to commit to any military confrontation with Germany, and France would likewise not go at it alone. There might be attempts at bluffing from France and Britain, but unless the Germans lose their nerve, Poland and Czechoslovakia would both be defeated and partitioned.
Well you certainly have made a different argument here.
But I don't think any of it reaches the height of 'Poland and Czechoslovakia together is hopeless'. You seem to recognize that by filling in your follow-up with explanation why Czechoslovakia alone is hopeless.

Limping away like Finland post-Winter War is not hopeless compared to actual history. And that already had a ridiculously different balance of forces - the Soviets had up to twice as many troops engaged as the Fins, rather than half as many total (as the Germans would have here).

So I posit instead that the Poles will occupy East Prussia (having vast numerical superiority against a front the Germans will probably put on low priority), the Germans bounce off the Sudetenland while marching on Prague, but the loss of Königsberg prompts a coup against Hitler after which a status quo ante peace is signed under supervision of the Entente powers (who see this peace as buying just as much time as the Munich agreement would have).
 
Germany in 1938 also didn't have the army it had in 1939 though, not by a long shot. In the end of 1938, the total army strength was about equal to the army that invaded Poland (at which time other, limited, forces were deployed elsewhere). https://www.telegraph.co.uk/history...ys-strength-now-51-divisions-Nov-30-1938.html

So what we have is 1.6 million Germans total against 2.6 million Poles+Czechoslovaks; your points about relative equipment may be relevant, but even then having a 1:2 minority while on the attack is tricky to overcome.

We also discussed it here before https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...great-powers-armies-in-september-1938.623701/

So in summary, in 1939, Poland and pre-Sudeten Czechoslovakia stood only a limited chance against Germany. But in 1938, the sides were nowhere near lopsided. Of course it would still be difficult, and Germany had more room for expansion, but not as hopeless as you make it out to be.
And poles/ Czechoslovaks don't have to like... Take Berlin. They just have to blunt the German attack and then wait for the French to come in.