What if France had actually extended the Maginot line

[Kovax]

The problem was not so much about having reserves, it was about committing them too soon, and sending them straight into the trap. Even after that, there were possibilities for a counter-attack, but at that point Gamelin seems to have dropped into a state of denial, and for a full critical day there was no effective overall control of the defense being orchestrated from above. After that, the situation changed so rapidly that by the time updates reached the French HQ, the information was already obsolete, and then even further outdated by the time the fresh orders based on it flowed to the front. There's an official military term for that intel-to-order loop time, but I'm not finding it here in this cluttered skull of mine.

In sharp contrast, the Germans gave the local commanders enough free reign to take advantage of opportunities as they saw them, leaving the French units sitting helplessly while they waited for fresh orders. The German approach worked ideally in just such a confused situation, not so well deep in the vast expanses of the Soviet Union where it took time to prepare and schedule the arrival of ammunition and supplies before undertaking any significant offensive, and units had to cooperate more closely to avoid leaving their flanks uncovered.

 

[LizarDAMN]

And it's not set in stone Germans would use Schlieffen plan anyhow. Hitler had other preferences. Saying France fell because they were unlucky is just silly claim with no facts to back it up. It really doesn't matter what materiel you have if you are horrible putting it to use.

 

[Sunforged General]

And it's not set in stone Germans would use Schlieffen plan anyhow. Hitler had other preferences. Saying France fell because they were unlucky is just silly claim with no facts to back it up. It really doesn't matter what materiel you have if you are horrible putting it to use.

Considering the plan was not changed until it was compromised by leaked intel, evidence shows the plan wasn't going to change unless there was a need to do so.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Considering the plan was not changed until it was compromised by leaked intel, evidence shows the plan wasn't going to change unless there was a need to do so.

Please don't feel that I am picking specifically on you as I appreciate that I am responding to a lot of your posts. However, the plan changing was due to a very complex set of circumstances which included for instance, competing ideas and ambitions from different generals, the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Nazi party government, a realisation that Germany could not win a prolonged war of attrition against the western Allies, a lack of mobile forces etc.

The idea that an entire operational plan involving millions of men would be changed at the whim of the general plan being disclosed is fanciful fan-fiction. If you are interested in the topic, Frieser covers it extremely well in his 'Blitzkrieg Legend's book.

 

[Sunforged General]

Please don't feel that I am picking specifically on you as I appreciate that I am responding to a lot of your posts. However, the plan changing was due to a very complex set of circumstances which included for instance, competing ideas and ambitions from different generals, the relationship between the Wehrmacht and the Nazi party government, a realisation that Germany could not win a prolonged war of attrition against the western Allies, a lack of mobile forces etc.

The idea that an entire operational plan involving millions of men would be changed at the whim of the general plan being disclosed is fanciful fan-fiction. If you are interested in the topic, Frieser covers it extremely well in his 'Blitzkrieg Legend's book.

Having your plan compromised because intel was leaked to the enemy is a very valid reason to change strategic plans. And it was not difficult to do considering Hitler and his staff changed from the Schlieffen Plan 2.0 to the Manstein plan in a couple of weeks.

 

[Ming]

The Germans were pretty lucky in the 1940 campaign. Even if the French high command was as bumbling and clueless as advertised, the whole German plan has multiple single points of failure. (Failure being France staying in the war. A spectacular by 1918 standards advance that carries panzers to the seine but fails to destroy the French army is a failure.)

1.) The allies get wise to or at least reasonably suspicious of German movements through the Ardennes. Allied air assets and Belgian infantry reported contact with the panzer divisions but the French high command did not believe they indicated the main thrust. If intelligence hadn't failed here, the german plan couldn't have worked as spectacularly as it did.

2.) The Belgians come to their senses and let the Allies into the country sometime in the winter. This almost came to pass at several points, not least of which after the capture of the aforementioned German officer. Not a guaranteed failure since the ardennes might be still uncovered at the beginning of the campaign but the allied response would be much easier.

3.) The Belgian chasseurs ardennais (or French cavalry sent later) Switch from delaying the German advance and withdrawing to defending roadblocks and making Horatio style suicidal last stands at river crossings. These efforts wouldn't last long but even a one day delay would be critical. Compare to the second Ardennes offensive in 44.

 

[Grandpa Maur]

The pace of operations staggered the world.

This is important. With hindsight, we kind of take it for granted, but it was something astonishing and, quoting someone (Sosnkowski?) "big (divisions) units vanished into thin air". And it happened again and again, to everyone, when first meeting the Germans, to Poles, French, Yugoslavians, British, Soviets and arguably in one small case to Americans as late as 1943 (Kasserine).

 

[Grandpa Maur]

I often wonder if the German leadership truly appreciated the economic disparity facing them.

Yes, of course. You quoted Tooze elsewhere, and he got some nice excerpts about that.

 

[yerm]

The real answer to the OP is that if France had fully walled off their entire border all the way to the sea, complete with far more fleshed out defensive structures opposing the ardennes and a mess of obstacles should anyone penetrate Belgium, it would have absolutely and completely worked. Germany would never break through it...

...Because Germany simply would never have to. The cost for construction along the Belgian line would be staggering given the lack of good terrain to integrate with. The budget going here means all kinds of cutbacks need to come elsewhere, leaving France critically weak in areas such as tanks or aircraft as a consequence. These fortifications would have also sapped tons of already-depleted military manpower towards labor and away from drilling, likely to result in a significant shortage of competent reserves.

The result is fully walled France now lacks the financial means to support a serious military outside its all-in defensive approach. The idea of going on the offensive is laughable. Promises of offensive support to Poland or anyone else are laughed at. The low countries can expect no hope of relief and are unlikely to even resist if invaded since now the only logical point of defense is the upper part of the Maginot, to their south.

 

[Sunforged General]

The real answer to the OP is that if France had fully walled off their entire border all the way to the sea, complete with far more fleshed out defensive structures opposing the ardennes and a mess of obstacles should anyone penetrate Belgium, it would have absolutely and completely worked. Germany would never break through it...

...Because Germany simply would never have to. The cost for construction along the Belgian line would be staggering given the lack of good terrain to integrate with. The budget going here means all kinds of cutbacks need to come elsewhere, leaving France critically weak in areas such as tanks or aircraft as a consequence. These fortifications would have also sapped tons of already-depleted military manpower towards labor and away from drilling, likely to result in a significant shortage of competent reserves.

The result is fully walled France now lacks the financial means to support a serious military outside its all-in defensive approach. The idea of going on the offensive is laughable. Promises of offensive support to Poland or anyone else are laughed at. The low countries can expect no hope of relief and are unlikely to even resist if invaded since now the only logical point of defense is the upper part of the Maginot, to their south.

Most of those points are irrelevant, since France in real life was unable to defend Poland and Belgium anyway. However, I do think you are exaggerating the cost of extending the Maginot Line. The one built on the German border cost about .83% of Frances GDP to build. Lets say extending it would be more expensive due to terrain issues on the border with Belgium so lets assume this extension would cost 1.66%. France could easily pay for this extended Maginot line by simply raising tax on all transactions in the country by 1.66% for a year.

Also, once France goes into Total war mode like they did in WWI, they may well start outproducing Germany in 1940. In 1940 the French had more trucks, more tanks, more artillery and far more warships than Germany, meaning France had the industrial capacity to eventually outproduce Germany.

 

[ThaHoward]

Having your plan compromised because intel was leaked to the enemy is a very valid reason to change strategic plans. And it was not difficult to do considering Hitler and his staff changed from the Schlieffen Plan 2.0 to the Manstein plan in a couple of weeks.

It was the French who believed the Germans would do another Schlieffen with the correct assumption that they would go through the Nederlands to get a broader front.

But long story short Manstein convinced Hitler that the main focal point should be in the Ardennes, some French said "this is going to happen" but French high command dismissed it as they believed it would be a repeat of 1914. Instead 1940 saw broad attacks in Belgium and the Netherlands, yhe Allies reacted as accordingly (moved into Belgium) but the Germans did not, instead they drove their main attack force through the Ardennes and swinging to the coast rather than Paris.

Tl;dr it was ironically the Allies who expected the Germans to do another Schlieffen. Instead they made another axis of advance, the entire point of the Maginot Line was to force the Germans to do another Schlieffen. Still they broke their lines in an unexpected way, go figure.

As for the wall. Pretty much what is said here, also if it extended to the Belgian border they would feel betrayed and wouldn't allow the Allies to dig into Belgium to stop the German advance - a vital point for the whole Maginot Line (to funnel the Germans into Belgium). But this happened regardless when the Germans were allowed to remilitarize the Rhineland, the Belgians declared neutrality and British and French troops were not allowed to go into Belgium, before well the Germans did.

 

[viale]

As for the wall. Pretty much what is said here, also if it extended to the Belgian border they would feel betrayed and wouldn't allow the Allies to dig into Belgium to stop the German advance - a vital point for the whole Maginot Line (to funnel the Germans into Belgium). But this happened regardless when the Germans were allowed to remilitarize the Rhineland, the Belgians declared neutrality and British and French troops were not allowed to go into Belgium, before well the Germans did.

This is important. Extending the Maginot to the Channel drives Belgium into a German alliance whether they want to or not. And probably would also neuter British guaranties towards the Belgians.

Is there any documents regarding Belgian foreign policy aims during that time, because seeing as they were central to the strategies of both sides surely they must have contemplated a back-up plan if the French walled them off in a possible war with Germany.

 

[Osteles]

This is important. Extending the Maginot to the Channel drives Belgium into a German alliance whether they want to or not. And probably would also neuter British guaranties towards the Belgians.

Is there any documents regarding Belgian foreign policy aims during that time, because seeing as they were central to the strategies of both sides surely they must have contemplated a back-up plan if the French walled them off in a possible war with Germany.

Afaik, we had troops on both borders and would have defended against the first who entered. Can't recall where i read it though.

 

[Denkt]

It is far easier to wage a defensive warfare rather than an offensive. German high command classified their division in 5 ratings with the best being divisions suitable for all operations while the second worst being fully suitable for defensive operations.

If the French was more organized and better prepared they could probably have hold of the Germans and stalemated the front, to wage an offensive have been said to require about 3 to 1 numerical advantage and could Germany get such advantage over the western Alliance, even locally?

To understand how difficult it was to wage an offensive consider that in 1944-45 western front that the allies had total air superiority, signifcant quality superiory and also being well supplied against a second tier army and still they suffered as much if not more than the axis army. Germany in 1940 was in a far worse position than the allies in 1944 for waging an offensive other than the allies not being able to prepare as well as they should have done.

For operation Barbarossa Germany paid a very Heavy price, when the operation started the german high command classified nearly all 125 or so divisions as being of the highest rating, in january 1942 (less than six months later) only 8 or so divisions was given that rating with nearly all other division dropping down to the lowest rating and the german army was never able to reach the same quality it had in 1941 but still it was able to do well on defence but not so much on offense.

 

[Kovax]

For operation Barbarossa Germany paid a very Heavy price, when the operation started the german high command classified nearly all 125 or so divisions as being of the highest rating, in january 1942 (less than six months later) only 8 or so divisions was given that rating with nearly all other division dropping down to the lowest rating and the german army was never able to reach the same quality it had in 1941 but still it was able to do well on defence but not so much on offense.

The quality of a division depends not only on the training of the riflemen and NCOs on the front line, but on the specialists and support personnel behind them. The former can be replaced and will quickly return to "regular" or "veteran" status after a few months. The latter take years to train, and are not easily replaced. When Germany made its "do or die" push to take Moscow in late '41, it shifted many of those specialists and support people to the front lines in desperation to fill gaps as they appeared, and they suffered high casualties. Germany was able to put more warm bodies on the line, but was NEVER able to replace the lost expertise behind them. The armies of 1943-45 were not back up to the caliber of those in 1940-41, at least in terms of training and expertise.

The situation in France was different in that the German support services were never thrown onto the front lines, but several French divisions ended up with mobile German forces savaging their rear areas, so Germany could, in theory, have fought a bloody war of attrition and not suffered anywhere near the rapid decline in quality that happened on the Eastern Front during the winter of '41-42.

 

[ThaHoward]

The quality of a division depends not only on the training of the riflemen and NCOs on the front line, but on the specialists and support personnel behind them. The former can be replaced and will quickly return to "regular" or "veteran" status after a few months. The latter take years to train, and are not easily replaced. When Germany made its "do or die" push to take Moscow in late '41, it shifted many of those specialists and support people to the front lines in desperation to fill gaps as they appeared, and they suffered high casualties. Germany was able to put more warm bodies on the line, but was NEVER able to replace the lost expertise behind them. The armies of 1943-45 were not back up to the caliber of those in 1940-41, at least in terms of training and expertise.

The situation in France was different in that the German support services were never thrown onto the front lines, but several French divisions ended up with mobile German forces savaging their rear areas, so Germany could, in theory, have fought a bloody war of attrition and not suffered anywhere near the rapid decline in quality that happened on the Eastern Front during the winter of '41-42.

What support roles do you have in mind? Frontline troops and specialist roles there are often much more difficult to train and motivate, ref. issues with using rear echelon troops in the front.

That being said the US, USSR and UK also had issues in the late war with loss of manpower and expertize, albeit to varying degrees.

Note that this is not a disagreement.

 

[Kovax]

What support roles do you have in mind?

This can range from intelligence and information analysis, artillery support, repair and maintenance, and communications to supply distribution and medical services. If your men at the front aren't getting the things they need WHEN and WHERE they need them, they're fighting an uphill struggle. If they and their commanders know what they enemy is doing, or better, what the enemy is preparing to do, they can respond accordingly with effective counters. Getting the wrong caliber ammunition, or having broken equipment that isn't fixed promptly, does them no good. A well-trained combat element is only effective until it runs out of stuff; a well-supplied and well-informed combat element can maintain effectiveness under pressure for a lot longer. The late-war German army ended up with a lot of experienced fighting troops, but became increasingly incapable of offensive operations due to supply shortages and inefficiencies, poor maintenance, and a steady deterioration of intelligence gathering and analysis. The crazy stories of troops surrounded in Stalingrad getting condoms instead of ammunition and rations make fine examples.

 

[Henry IX]

Losses were also severe for the artillery, many of whom ended up fighting as riflemen after they lost their guns during the retreat from Moscow. This was a severe problem as the German superiority quality of artillerymen was a critical (if often unrecognised) factor in their victories in 1939-41. They generally fired a significantly higher tonnage of shells than their opponents, even when the theoretical throw weight of the artillery deployed was lower.

 

[yerm]

Losses were also severe for the artillery, many of whom ended up fighting as riflemen after they lost their guns during the retreat from Moscow. This was a severe problem as the German superiority quality of artillerymen was a critical (if often unrecognised) factor in their victories in 1939-41. They generally fired a significantly higher tonnage of shells than their opponents, even when the theoretical throw weight of the artillery deployed was lower.

Not only this, but German artillery superiority was contingent on the specialists operating them. They simply did not have the flexible setup that the USA did here - they needed their highly trained math nerds to have their advantage and were hamstrung with amateur gunners. Germany was far more weakened by attrition in this particular area than basically any other nation with their far simpler arrangements.

Most of those points are irrelevant, since France in real life was unable to defend Poland and Belgium anyway. However, I do think you are exaggerating the cost of extending the Maginot Line. The one built on the German border cost about .83% of Frances GDP to build. Lets say extending it would be more expensive due to terrain issues on the border with Belgium so lets assume this extension would cost 1.66%. France could easily pay for this extended Maginot line by simply raising tax on all transactions in the country by 1.66% for a year.

Also, once France goes into Total war mode like they did in WWI, they may well start outproducing Germany in 1940. In 1940 the French had more trucks, more tanks, more artillery and far more warships than Germany, meaning France had the industrial capacity to eventually outproduce Germany.

France's entire military budget for 2018 was 1.82% of its GDP. This number has been increasing since past years and the goal is 2% by 2025. You are suggesting that the maginot would be 2.5% of the nation's GDP... this is quite simply not some minimal expense or anything you can merely raise taxes to accommodate, it is a very major investment that requires redefining the entire budget to make work.

I absolutely realize the military expenses of pre-NATO Europe were considerably higher. Not the point. I instead merely insist that 1.66, or hell just .83% if we do NOT assume higher cost, do not come out of thin air. France was war weary. If you increase funding to a defensive military project you must necessarily either reduce funding elsewhere to cover it or watch your project cancelled by the new government who replaces your overwhelmingly unpopular tax-raising one.

In fact, just as a matter of good practice, when what-iffing about WWII or really any historical military exchange, try not to ever just throw more/bonus military funds arbitrarily to one nation unless fundraising IS your what-if hypothetical. France magically adding 1.66% GDP out of thin air to make tanks and planes probably stops Hitler too. Be fair about spending and budgets.

 

[ThaHoward]

Losses were also severe for the artillery, many of whom ended up fighting as riflemen after they lost their guns during the retreat from Moscow. This was a severe problem as the German superiority quality of artillerymen was a critical (if often unrecognised) factor in their victories in 1939-41. They generally fired a significantly higher tonnage of shells than their opponents, even when the theoretical throw weight of the artillery deployed was lower.

Artillery is king. This is still as true as it was in WW1, WW2 and the Gulf War. The modern day US Army classify their artillery arm as both "Combat" and not "Combat Support" or "CSS". Reason for my previous question, as support roles is a very broad term, with many combat roles being more difficult to train and specialize than combat support and CSS roles.