Exactly what is the metric by which you're measuring this? Both SS and Heer divisions got crushed in Normandy [Germany lost 40 divisions and 2200 AFV's in only 3 months in Normandy, SS and Heer units equally], both SS and Heer divisions crushed opposition before 1941.
The fact that the infrastructure of Northern France had been bombed so intensively prior to the Allied Invasion, meant that the Germans found it very difficult to retreat én mass, and particularly to take their heavy equipment with them. Supplying their forces in Northern France was also a nightmare for the Germans with most the railroad hubs damaged beyond repair and many bridges and central traffic centers similarly damaged.
That defeat was caused as much by airpower as by ground forces, and many of those AFVs were destroyed by their own crews due to running of of fuel or ammunition or abondoned and "killed" by Allied ground or airforces.
The Allies may or may not have been "as good as" or "better" than the German army/SS, but that is irrelevant. The Allies became "good enough" so as to better-apply the forces they had and the Germans (both SS and Heer) stagnated or became worse.
To those who suggest the German army was definitively superior to the Allies, here's the problem. The Germans were clearly better than the Allies before 1941.. but then they lost the path fighting the USSR. The USSR generals recognized that they weren't able to defeat the Germans in pitched battle.. so what they couldn't solve on the tactical level they dealt with operationally. To me, this represents a frank self-evaluation on the part of the Red Army and represents a remarkable degree of institutional learning. The Germans never adjusted, which is curious. What good is winning a tactical firefight if your division or corps loses the operational battle? To those who support Dupuy's conclusions that the German army was "more effective," I say that his calculations are based on bad and improper data, that his formulas are not statistically or substantively sound, and that a deterministic model of war does not make much sense anyway.
It is my belief that the most important reason for the post 1941 German Army losing its edge and starting to stagnate, war due to the war being fought in the factories and in labs. The ineffeciency and rivalry in the German War Industry did a lot to hurt the German war-effort, in particular the inability to cooperate and share knowledge delayed many projects that could have given the Germans the overhand. But I do agree with you on the matter of the Germans losing their path or initiative in Russia. In the summer of 1942 the Germans were only able to launch Operation Blau with half as many divisions as Operation Barbarossa, due to the rest being required to hold the ever extending front line. This meant that the Germans had a hard time building a reserve that could be used either offensively or defensively, and as more fronts were opened this problem intensified.
I also agree with the Germans, on a whole, losing their qualitative advantage from 1941 and onwards. This was due to the great losses of experienced and veteran personnel they suffered on the Eastern Front, in North Africa, Italy and finally in Northern France. Meanwhile the Allied and Russian forces were mobilized and trained, and gained vital fighting experience, to a degree that the Germans could not match due to the losses and demand of reinforcements from all the fronts - especially the meatgrinder that was the Eastern Front. Of course there are exceptions such as the elite divisions of the Heer and the SS divisions which were prioritized in terms of weapons, supplies and reinforcement personnel, but as there were wiped out and re-formed they too lost their edge.
On the tactical and operational prowess of the Germans, it is important to remember that the Germans had most of their divisions in the East tied down defending a huge frontline and supressing the increasingly active partisan movements, with many other divisions tied down in the West suppresing the occupied countries and to defend against the anticipated Allied invasion. Also there is the fact that during and post 1943, the the Russian and Allied divisions achieved a much higher degree of motorization than their Germans opponents (In the case of the Russians this was mainly due to US supplied Studebaker trucks and White halftracks). The increased superiority in armour was equally important and again in the case of the Russians thanks to US supplies of everything from boots, tinned food and radios, to explosives, fuels and other war-essential materials (Those supplies allowed the Russian Industry to focus almost entirely on War Production, and meant that the Russians were able to turn out thousands of tanks each month).
The marked superiority in mobilization and armour was one of the main reasons for the great successes of the Russians on the Eastern Front, particularly after Operation Zitadelle when the Germans were forced to send precious motorized and tank forces to Italy. I think it was because of this that the Germans were not able to think and plan on an operational level. The fact that they were fighting a defensive war with far less resources of men and equipment than their opponents meant that the Germans were forced to concentrate on the tactical level, as they could never achieve superioty on a great level than tactically post july 1943. (Now, you might bring up the Ardennes Offensive and the offensive against Budapest - yet these operations were conducted at the expense of the other fronts, with disasterous results)
I would support the claim that the German Army was more effective, due to the fact that it was able to prolong the war for as long as they did, in spite of being massively outnumbered in every way, and due to the fact that the German Army deployed weapons and tactics that were copied by all sides during and after the war.
The equivalent action ingame is to upgrade one tank division, keep another using the older model, and then blame "the people" somehow for not winning a battle equally fast with older equipment.
Not sure what you are getting at?
Here's
another example of an erroneous "myth" from world war 2: "Siberian Divisions" never existed.
Interesting and well-argued reading. Thank you for this
