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What's not to be expected from the Balkans?
They are a gold mine for this kind of things hehehe.
They are a gold mine for this kind of things hehehe.
I suppose that's one way to put it, yes.
Three Hurrahs for the insane Balkans!
Can it get any worse?
Please?
Watch this space.
What will Turkey do? With Balkans in flames and Soviets meddling in Bulgaria, they´d better react now. And has Mustafa Kemal´s poor liver succumbed to cirrhosis yet, or has he limited his alcohol comsumption enough to struggle on little longer than in OTL?
Sadly, if Kemal hangs on longer it will only be in his quasi-insane state where he's kept under guard, only to periodically escape, run to a bar, and start dancing on tables after getting drunk.
(This sort of thing is why dictatorships never work).
There's a reason nobody in Berlin is upset over what Hungary's up to, actually.
There is another.
The term clusterfuck seems to fit this situation nicely. But enough of sideshows, no matter how intriguing they may be, it would be nice to know more about the USSR. Refresh my memory please, did Uncle Joe start shooting his officers? Or is he resting on his laurels not having a fiercely anti-communist Nazi Germany to worry about?
Questions too many questions....
But what could you expect when you're writing the most thorough and enjoyable alt-history version of the OTL WW2 period
Questions too many questions....
But what could you expect when you're writing the most thorough and enjoyable alt-history version of the OTL WW2 period
Oh, he shot them. But I think the Red Army's been underestimated for far too long. Sure, it lost during Barbarossa. Like, err, France. And Poland. And Orway. And British forces. And Americans, as Kasserine Pass illustrates.
Second, while I don't think the USSR is up to its Kursk and Bagration (which oddly is never remembered by World War II buffs), it's managed to finish the rearming and reforming it was undergoing in 1941, and hasn't lost the "professional" troops it did in Barbarossa. Its military is smaller, sure, but so is everyone else's. Although is the loss of a 3rd Reich in wartime a net loss if there's still a Polish, Czechoslovak, French etc. military? I think yes.
But what could you expect when you're writing the most thorough and enjoyable alt-history version of the OTL WW2 period
Aww. Shucks.
As a preview, a brief geography lesson.
Along the Danube tribtutaries, Romania has swampy, dismal land. There's more swamp to the west. Then there are the Moldovan highlands, a land of jagged hills. And then more swamp. So Romania itself is fairly defensible.
Bessarabia, however, is basically an extension of the Ukrainian plain. It has rolling farms and vineyards, and few hills.
Oh, and around 93,000 ethnic Germans.
I can see the appeal, with the Party's title being straight-to-the-point.
How did they end up in Romania?
The same germans ended up everywhere else in eastern Europe: After the Black Death people were screaming for peasants to farm the land and merchants to live in the cities. The germans were happy to provide. Whenever eastern-european potentates wanted people to settle new areas they seemed to go to the germans. There were hundreds of thousands in the Soviet Union, many of which had lived there since the days of Catherine, for instance. (which lead to odd stuff like Kazakhstan having a 20% german minority after Stalin deported them there...)
Bingo. Proponents of Lebensraum merely saw themselves as heirs to that tradition. Though the Bessarabia Germans really only date to around 1813 or so, when the Tsar invited them in.
I actually tended to believe in something similar - that there are far too many myths and plain lies about the Red Army.
The problem is that is seems pure, old fashioned lies and fairly stories are replaced by hard facts which aren't too favourable.
Logistics and problems in communication and coordination were a real plague.
Just see how an avarage Soviet mechanized corps was built - massive numbers of tanks, but too little infantry, relatively few radiostations and weak support as if no lessons were learnt from previous years - not necessarily from those small clashes with the Japanese, but from Poland (summer!) and Finland (winter).
Unconfortable tanks without radiostations, with extremely poor visibility (in combat usually open-topped because someone had to find the right directions) and lacking proper technical support so in time of a couple of days a brigade could turn into a weak battalion because tanks weren't properly maintained and fuel 'went missing'.
Infantry suffered from similar problems - extremely centralised command structures (noone was willing to take responsibility so higher ranks had to decide about everything) which resulted in regiments from the same division camped a kilometer or two away from each other, but one unit didn't ideantify the other so both reported enemy presence to the divisionary or corps command. Friendly fire during the night was common because infantrymen had to stay awake which could only cause massive exhaustion with noticeable consequences during the following day... The next day the HQ had to deal with this problem, but often they had a wrong idea where thse usints really are so... it started again.
It was the same in the airforce (bombers appearing in wrong places but reporting something different and identifying friends as enemies which caused confusion when eported to their HQ) and much worse in the navy.
Add to that the morale of ordinary footsoldiers who when liberated from 'convincing influence' of their officers often volunteered to join the enemy because they would be treated as traitors anyway putting their families in danger - this way they would be counted as missing or dead which was better for their relatives, as they believed.
So in the end higher command was quickly losing control, divisions and brigades were turning into some ad hoc structures and after a couple of days noobody knew what is actually happening. It all took time to reorganise the forces so divisions and brigades could be worth their names, but because a number of commanders feared consequences of decisions they didn't even bother to report the truth. But who would - many orders they received were far from realistic because of poor recon or ordinary incompetence.
I remember reading about Soviet offensive in north-east Poland aiming to capture Wilno/Vilnius - everything was there, I mean everything forces from different corpses of different armies ordered to capture the city days before it was humanly possible and uninformed about the actual presence of their neighbours learning about it when they've met, in the mostly abandoned city, after they exchanged fire, and not just once.
I am not saying that it was as bad as sometimes is told (as especially some weird Wehrmacht and SS - especially them - fans tend to claim) war after all is also about confusion, but hardly as good as is sometimes said either.
I guess the biggest problems resulted every time when the Soviet moved faster - slower advance might eliminate many of those problems, but would give the enemy enough time to slow down offensive actions reducing it to a crawl. Quite probable especially considering that every Soviet neighbour expected them to attack and they all cooperated to some degree - Finland with Estonia, Romania with Poland, Latvia with Poland and Japan with Poland.
To various degree, but still.
The Red Army experienced massive change during the war, but at least half of that happened because of defeats it suffered. Victories however costly tought very little - many problems encountered in Mongolia or Poland were completely ignored.
I wonder how much those rumours were true - relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary were generally good. Hungary loathed Trianon, but their disgust was directed at Romania and Slovakian part of Czechoslovakia.
Attacking YUG in 1941 was seen as a failure of pre-war policy.
I guess in this reality where German danger is less troubling Yugoslavia might be seen in a different way, especially with the country falling apart.
Glad to read another update BTW - not too many well written AARs these days.
After reading the above post, it seems somewhat surprising that the Soviets even won the war at all, given how sloppy and confusing things were amid the fighting.
Even a confused and incomptetent Soviet army was a massive war machine.
Also, the German army was spread thin already before Barbarossa, and then they tried to take on the largest country in the world. It's more surprising the Germans got as far as they got.
Also, the German army was spread thin already before Barbarossa, and then they tried to take on the largest country in the world. It's more surprising the Germans got as far as they got.
Because they've learnt, it was very costly, but they've learnt a lot - especially in 1942 and early 1943, though some stupid mistakes were made to the very end mainly because of politically motivated orders (i.e. 'take the city for Lenin's birthday', you have a week'.).
Of course many problems were NEVER eliminated e.g. T-34swere only equipped with radiostations in sufficient numbers in 1944, but remained noisy, exhausting to drive and their targeting devices remained worse than German (one of several reasons why accuracy of fire of the Soviet tanks remained inferior).
Besides eastern Europe is different in many ways and Soviet forces knew that - you need to adapt to harsh conditions and never forget that all those large spaces you are conquering matter much less than in France. Every successful army fighting in this region had to adapt its tactics (Polish-Lithuanian) or didn't have to (Mongols), but the second was very rare.
German leadership failed to understand that, but perhaps they couldn't do much anyway - with as many as 40 types of trucks alone in a division even providing spare parts was a nightmare.
Another problem was that vehicles operating in those areas had to be modified to some degree. It is one of several reasons why for example Poles modified their vehicles which had to be more resilent and possibly half-tracked (mud, swamps etc) or why everyone was using cavalry in this region.
Anyway. In general Soviets could afford comminting mistakes while their enemies didn't. Soviet leadership seen war as an enormous industrial effort so they were prepared to deliver massive amounts of equipment and supplies.
I guess that defensive war against the Red Army was more sensible - you could destroy roads, bombard bridges (according to a Polish study from 1930s there were only 7 bridges necessary to destroy to cause huge problems for the entire front to the north of Prypet i.e. in Belorus) and recruit deserters and POWs, especially Ukrainians, Caucasians and Cossacks.
Of course only some could afford that. Perhaps only Germany would be able to handle it for sufficient time to win this way ( with much different policy than in the reality obviously), everyone else would end up like Finland, regardless how large Soviet casualities would be.
Perhaps Korean scenario was achievable by Poland or Romania - a truce with some territorial losses - I guess Moldavia and a large part of Polish controlled Belorus, but that is better than losing.
I have no idea how else it would be possible to win. Poles attempted to prepare undersground structures to use various ethnical groups in the Soviet Union, but that might only worked if supported by sizable resources, with substantial help from different area (bombing Baku oilfields, Japanese activities in the far east etc), if there were some natural and semi-natural disasters (floods or food riots caused by famine) and with some victories for example in Ukraine.
Of course that was a different case with some larger, pan-european effort - volunter divisions, expeditionary forces, a form of Lend-Lease, but I don't know how the creator of this reality is going to solve that.
I am talking too much anyway. I'll better wait for another update or continue my Dutch AAR after waking it from a coma...
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Hrmm. While these are all valid points, I wonder if they only seem atrocious because the other nations aren't also considered. After all, the Luftwaffe had the habit of bombing the wrong country.
Sorry, I don't follow this?
MMm. this has some truth, but let's not forget that the USSR did learn from some of the problems in Finland, and was rearming and modifying the army in 1941.
Consider too that the Red Army in 1941 was still a pretty unprofessional force, because it had been rapidly expanded and lost a great many officer.s
I guess in this reality where German danger is less troubling Yugoslavia might be seen in a different way, especially with the country falling apart.
Glad to read another update BTW - not too many well written AARs these days.
Well, it's from OTL. I have no idea of the veracity of those rumors, but given Hungary's opposition to recognizing its borders I wouldn't be surprised if there were some plans.
I wonder how much the optics problem comes from a Soviet lack of precision engineering. Hrmm.
Rule 1 of Faeelin's AARs: Expect the unexpected, unless the expected is a leftist party in a democratic state choosing the best option.
That is true, but in the Soviet air force it was more frequent. I think it can be compared to the state of the Japanese air forces (both naval and amry) after 1944 i.e. enthusiastic reports about enemy losses which were totally untrue.
Because Soviets had to rely on aerial recon due to their centralised command structures it meant any mistakes would have greater effect than in more decentralised forces where officers' initiative was more important.
Hmm... Soviet POWs, at least ordinary soldiers quite often decided to stay with the enemy. For example in Poland in 1939 KOP forces under Orlik-Ruckman took numerous prisoners in several clashes, so did the Franciszek Kleeberg's S.G.O 'Polesie' - most of their Soviet POWs declared that they want to stay and fight with the Poles because they will be treated as traitors if they return. They were employed as unarmed auxilia - have no idea what happened to them when Kleeberg's forces capitulated in October.
I read somewhere there were up to 500 POWs who were later sent to Gulag, but cannot quote the source and have no idea how reliable it is.
I am also not sure how it was in Finland.
From some for sure - winter warfare, heavy tanks to destroy fortification (so mainly KV-2) etc, but some were never tested in practice.
That is why an avarage Soviet mechanized corps was so badly designed - c. 1000 armoured vehicles, but one short-ranged radio per company (so 3-4 times less than in France or Poland if not worse), a mixture of different tanks in a unit which were neither prepared nor designed to cooperate in one unit, too little infantry and poor technical support.
In effect the massive unit started falling apart the moment it moved with dozens of vehicles suffereing mechanical problems because technical support was inadequate DURING the PEACE all the more dangerous because in war it was more difficult to even report such problems.
Those fundamental errors were not fully revealed untill 1941 - that is why some structures were completely re-designed in later years.
Of course. That is why at least some errors would be eliminated in the 40s, but structural flaws wouldn't be because that would mean questioning the highest authorities and planners. Difficult without some facts to support any changes.
I am also not certain if Soviet companies or battalions would reach quality comparable to Estonian or Polish without some hard and costly lessons. Acting on their own initiative would be difficult to an avarage Soviet officer. Of course there are exceptions, the problem is there were major flaws in training in or - if I can use more crude form - 'breeding' those officers.
Even elite Soviet formations suffered from such problems i.e. in 1939 first waves of NKVD shock troops (border units trained to act as quasi-commando formations capturing bridges, important objects etc) suffered casualties when crossing rivers and streams because some soldiers ordered to cross those couldn't swim and were not properly supplied with necessary equipment.
I cannot really speculate how Soviet paratroopers would act, but there would be massive confusion for sure and I cannot even bet if they wouldn't be eliminated by territorial units supported by reserves and para-military volunteers given Soviet idea of dropping the paras without sufficient supplies and support (not enough transport planes).
Finally there are the statistics - while looked well on paper with many units reported as well equipped with full number of vehicles, men and supplies subordinates tended to conveniently forget that for example only 1/3 of vehicles are in combat ready condition or those machine guns are still in a different city. They tended to lie or just not reveal the whole truth and their superiors often tended not to ask too much - after all they were also reporting to their superiors.
During the war it gradually changed, but some things remained the same - for example reported enemy casualities were so exaggerated that higher command tended to ignore them and judge success or a failure of an offensive instead according to the territory it took i.e. capturing a certain hill or town which in practice meant that massive forces could be directed to capture a virtually meaningless piece of terrain while enemy forces caused massive casualities and were able to retreat in order (if retreated - 'no step back' was a brilliantly suicidal idea indeed in those conditions).
I guess so, but I have an impression that the conflict with Yugoslvia was rather unexpected. With Romania sure, with Czechosloavakia even more given Hungarian idea to drive a wedge between CZE and ROM and re-establish a border connection with Poland (seen as historical because existed almost always in the past), but with YUG... well perhaps this time it wouldn't be understood as surrendering semi-neutral and independent international policy as it was in real life.
I think that this could have also something to do with the general attitude towards any industrial project. With tanks - simplicity (production!), armour, cannon, engine was all - crew confort or anything else seemed to matter less.
Together with tests made in relatively favourable conditions and let's be frank poor quality of production in the country it resulted in combat ready equipment far worse than in theory. Of course during the war many of Soviet factories suffered from inadequately trained workers supposed to produce enormous numbers of equipment, but still stalinist economy tended to support quantity over quality even if numerous problems in combat could be avoided with better management.
That is why the Pz III which was brought to the USSR in 1940 or 41 and tested caused such a shock and was judged superior in many ways to T-34 which was a newer and more modern design.
It was similar in many ways with German Pz II or Polish 7TP captured in Poland in 1939 - some solutions were implemented, but some proved too costly or were judged less important because would make mass production more difficult.
Ok. That would be all, I am talking too much already.
I think I have a more detailed answer for that.
According to my source the optics and communication equipment was simply very expensive, especially for less developed countries.
I will use the examples of Poland and Czechoslovakia.
Tank 7Tp without weaponry, radios and optics costed 165 000 zloty (5 zloty = 1 $), but with the necessary equipment it was 250 000 zloty. And that s still without costs of training, ammunition, fuel or infrastructure.
One battalion would cost c. 18 000 000 zloty (all costs, except maintainance).
Projected cost of a medium tank (14 TP) with all necessary equipment was around 500 000 zloty, so c. 100 000 $ which was a price for a whole company of tankettes.
In March 1939 a military mission was sent to Czechoslovakia in another attempt to purchase medium tanks for the Polish Army (it started as early as in 1937 when Somua was asked, but French government stopped the transaction) Skoda proposed its latest model S IIc medium tank.
The CZE company proposed to sell tanks for 60 065 $ per tank (if 50 tanks were ordered) or for 57 760 $ (in a 100 tank order) including all necessary equipment, except fuel, ammo etc.
In general it was more costly for a semi-industrialised country to produce electronics or optics and I guess the USSR would pay even more for producing such equipment, not to mention that its quality would remain worse.
Wow. This is very, very interesting. I've never heard of this happening before.
Well, the USSR did perform some major field operations in 1940 and 1941, which exposed some serious flaws in the Red Army. How far they'd go without a major war though... Hrm.
I wonder what they'd learn from the bangup in Manchuria they fought ATL, as the Japanese Empire collapsed?
(Italics mine).
Is that that different from German practice at the time, though? And I can't help but contrast to the French habit of mixing infantry with tanks.
:rofl:
But were Estonian and Polish troops adequately equipped, in comparison to the Soviets?
Why did the French stop the transaction?
Because they were Idiots and feared it might antagonize ze Germans?
I am not suprised. Decent studies about the war in 1939 (in Polish) appeared only relatively recently. I guess in 5-10 years there will be something in English about this subject.
You have the link to the Snyder's work about Ukraine from Alojzy which is great - it might be used as a guideline.
At least Poles were prepared to create a brigade or a division of ex-Soviet so essentially 'White Russian' soldiers which would eventually happen in the course of war. Officers would be a problem - there were numerous georgians and Ukrainians, some Azeris, Armenians, even Chechens and Tartars, but very few Russians with military experience.
There was of course a small 'white russian' community in Poland, but Tzarist Russian militarymen were not too keen on fighting under Polish command.
I guess it would depend on Japanese tactics and weaponry. China is not a very good territory to wage mobile, motorised warfare and Japan didn't have resources to create more than 6-10 mobile divisions, unless they've changed their priorities.
The problem is that terrain would make tanks slightly less useful, much like in Spain so cooperation between heavy and light tanks, armoured cars and infantry on trucks would be difficult to test.
In addition Japan wasn't famous for their AT cannons - sure some were decent, but artillery was less numerous in general, even if sometimes perfectly trained (American troops terrorised by one-two perfectly commanded batteries in Pacific islands come to mind).
The problem is that Soviets combined ultra-fast (in theory) BTs with old T-26 (essentially modified Vickers E), amphibious tanks with armoured cars and all that with medium tanks such as T-34 and slow, heavy KV-1 and KV-2.
Everything together in one large mass.
Surely older types would be gradually replaced, so T-26, T-28, T-35, BTs etc would be removed, but the entire unit still would remain difficult to command and coordinate.
Poor communications would remain a problem while technical problems a nightmare, unless the Chinese campaign would teach them something - involvement in Spain or the logistical disaster in Poland didn't.
Historically only in 1942 heavy tanks were formed in independent units to support more important activities, which should happen from the beginning.
One word to add in the end - Soviets planned to have 61 armored and up to (different data) 37 mechanized divisions which would require 277 000 cars and c. 30 000 armoured vehicles...
IN 1941 there were c. 2500 (from c. 25 000 armoured vehicles including c.4000+ meachine gun armed tanks) relatively modern tanks, but early T-34 were seen as inadequate so would be replaced.
I was going to use a different example, but though it was too... weird.
Anyway here it goes. In 1939 the night before the invasion of Poland a number of sabotage-commando groups were paradropped, especially in Belorus.
They were supposed to gather and lead communist cells organised by illegal Western Belorussian Communist party so I think they were supposed to be generally well trained and well motivated people.
But after reading that at least in one case some of the would-be-liberators HID in the transport plane and returned home... I am not so sure.
I wonder how really those missions were treated, perhaps as one-way trip...
Estonians were not. They had four infantry divisions (three peacetime, understrenght and one quickly mobilised) - c. 16 000 men each so avarage.
Each was decently trained on smaller level, quite like in Latvia, but according to British sources they were better trained and organised.
I am not sure how reliable those claims are - I feel they favoured the Estonians because their support played an important part in 1920 war against the Soviets and Estonian army might be treated as offspring of the British army.
Anyway they had plenty of artillery, mainly I WW, with 37 mm German AT cannons (around 20 in a division in 1939) and small calibre AA artillery in each unit.
Estonia had decent territorial defences, so there were plenty of well trained reservists, there was a cavalry regiment (expanded to a brigade for a war) and some older tanks, armoured trains and river warships with Polish TKS as the most modern armored equipment.
Err... almost forgot that it is occupied in your AAR so it is pointless...
About POL. Historically in 1939 the first part of the industrialization plan (the COP) was almost done and I think in your reality it would be concluded safely in 1940 as expected. State worked on infrastructure, supported some companies, guaranteed credits while private capital expanded industry e.g. locomotive and machine comapny Hipolit Cegielski Poznan is a good example - in 1938 they open a new factory in Rzeszów to produce licensed AA and AT cannons as well as industrial tools. In 1939 the new factory generates 2/3 of the entire income of the entire company.
If nothing dramatic happened I guess there would be plenty of equipment for example radiostations produced by state owned PZTiR were ordered, but only 1/10 was delivered to September 1939. During the war Germans produced those radios, mainly in Austria so they were pretty decent.
AA and AT cannons wouldn't be a problem with new factories and more capital after major investments were completed.
Historically untill 1939 production capacity was sufficient, but funds were not so SePeWe (a state-owned trust funded to coordinate weapon export) sold large quantities to Britain, the Netherlands, Romania and Republican Spain (the last received only 27 AT cannons - Poland might be the second largest exporter* of weaponry for the Republic, but more modern weapons were sold only from 1939). With more money available rearmament of the Polish Army should be more advanced, perhaps even completed (I have detailed plans and some progress reports - can quote if necessary).
Even in 1939 infantry was decently armed, a couple of infantry divisions even started receiving divisionary, motorised AT companies.
Compared to the Soviets the main difference would be in artillery, or rather its numbers which Russians always liked very much - even in the XVIth century. Poles assumed that their artillery would be better trained and commanded which might be enough or not.
Also Soviet divisions would be supported by tanks which in case of Poland would only appear in some - either recon tanks 4TP or rearmed with long barelled 20 mm cannon tankettes acting as light tank destroyers.
Finally there is the terrain and the fortifications which were built or in construction. Pretty decent bunkers supposedly more resilent (at least experts say so - I've visited many forums to find data in recent months) than Czechoslovak because of some better blend of concrete used to construct them. Some Russian sources call them Pilsudski's Line, but that is an exaggeration. Yet were good enough to protect central area of the eastern border. Small number were planned in Wilno too.
But it was mainly in the 'Prypet Marsh Sea' - with factors such as the Pinsk River Flotilla playing its part especially in autumn and spring - so not in the most important combat zone.
Also in 1940 there would be three and in 1942 four mechanized brigades organized to contain rapid attacks of tank formations (Maczek's 10th, Rowecki's Warsaw Brigade + one around Lódz and one in Kutno - I called them Lódzka and Plocka for my pack) in most probable areas of tank incursions three of each were identified in the east.
When it comes to the entire rest of the equipment - sub-machine guns, machine guns, mortars, rifles situation would be comparable unless the Poles would manage to rearm infantry with the semi-automatic rifles which were produced from late 1939, but I doubt it was possible. Not for 1,3-5 million soldiers and 3 million reservists, volunteers, paramilitary or even women volunteers and of course the Georgians, the Ukrainians etc.
Sorry for answering this way, but it is hard to make a decent comparison without mentioning other factors.
They needed some for their army first.
In the end Poles bought some R-35 despite the fact that they didn't suit polish doctrine of mobile warfare, were slow and caused problems in eastern territories whith this
road network. Yes - only ONE solid road in the north-east...
Anyway the French gave the loan with only limited options to spent it. Somua wasn't available in 1937 nor in 1939 for funds from the French credit or for cash.
It was the same with the Brits, and it was too late with the Czechs. 14TP and more advanced designs (even semi-legendary '34TP' as one of less known designs is nicknamed because of its turrent and armament similar to T-34) would be available only in 1940-41.
I apologise for such a long answer, but I've almost completed my research about pre-war POL industry and military which proved to be much more complicated subject than I've expected.
If you need anything - data about POL jet engines rocketry, radars, chemical weapons, fortifications, paratroopers, tanks, weapons export, main companies, industrialisation, colonialism or plans for 1942+ etc I have it all decently covered. But each is a large subject of its own.
There were even attempts to construct the death ray emiter...
I will end with a poster for the 15 Year development plan:
and those:
Sadly I cannot find how to hide the images under spoilers...
* Officially Poland was neutral in this conflict and was unwilling to antagonise non-interventionist France so weaponry was officially sent to China, Peru, Paraguay, Estonia or the favourite - to Uruguay while in the reality it was transported by Latin American or Estonian ships to Spain. In the end everyone was happy - Poland, the Republic, friendly Estonia and bribed officials from Latin America. The Nationalists got some weapons, but paid less (probably from loans from Germany) so it ws the Repblic which received massive amounts of weaponry e.g. 114 000 rifles, 200 000+ hand ganades, 300+ cannons, 80 tanks etc.
SePeWe earned so much it was possible to rearm several divisions. Another unknown chapter of history.
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Are you serious? How on Earth did the Poles even attempt to build something so weird as that?