Firstly i would say you finally should spend the money and by Zetterlings book instead of talking like you have read it but didnt. Would you look less hilarious.
You really like to lie about what books other people have actually read.
Zetterling looks at ALL deliveries to ALL German Panzer Divisions of the Wehrmacht and ALL deliveries to ALL Panzer Divisions of the Waffen SS.
He makes the claim in
Normandy 1944. Not "all" Panzer Divisions of all time. End of story.
Secondly, Wehrmacht Tiger units started to send personel in spring 1942 with the first deliveries in August 42, the SS later and only in company size as you can for example read it up in Michael Woods Tigers of the Deathhead.
What does this have to do with SS Panzer Corps having actual large-scale deployments of Tigers in 1943? You keep blabbing about
unrelated details to cover up the fact that the SS
had priority in 1943. I already know of the Tiger deployments in 1942 in the Eastern Front. They were embarrassing failures around Leningrad.
Thirdly, lets look at the Ardennes offensive, the XLVII Pz Korps compiled on the 28 December 44 a list of enemy combat vehicles captured or destroyed: 325 tanks and TDs ans 267 other armored vehicles, the to the LVIII.
Again, you apparently don't understand that "offensives" consist of multiple battles and that attributing all Allied tank losses to Panzer action is faulty to begin with. By late 1944 it's already known that 30%+ of Allied tank losses were to Panzerfaust.
2. PzDiv against Task Force Booth + Combat Command Reserve of the 9th AD:
2nd Tank bataillon lost 59 tanks, parts of 52nd Armored Infantry Bataillon lost 697 men, all Battailon leaders lost, 73 Half tracks lost, 35 Trucks and three M8 SPGs against neglible german personel losses and no AFV lost.
*yawn* Ok, so let's take your first example and look at it.
You just say "2nd Panzer Division wiped out Task Force Booth and 9th AD". German tanks awesome! RAR!
So when and where did this happen?
Oh? You don't know?
http://warfarehistorynetwork.com/da...ored-at-bastogne-and-the-battle-of-the-bulge/
Let's explain what
really happened.
"Task Force Booth" - which you list separately from CCR of 9th AD - were in fact the same unit. Task Force Booth was a
component of CCR 9th Armored Division. As noted in the dispositions here:
CCR, 9th Armored was now split into two task forces. The northernmost roadblock near Lullange, under the command of Captain L.K. Rose (Task Force Rose), consisted of a company of Sherman tanks (A Company, 2d Tank Battalion), one armored infantry company (C Company, 52nd AIB), and a platoon of armored engineers. The second roadblock near Allerborn, under the command of Lt. Col. Ralph S. Harper (Task Force Harper), consisted of a company and a half of Sherman tanks (C and D Companies, 2nd Tank Battalion), one company of armored infantry (B Company, 52nd AIB), and a platoon of armored engineers. What was left of CCR was placed under the command of Lt. Col. Robert M. Booth (Team Booth) and occupied the high ground immediately north of Allerborn. It consisted of a company of armored infantry (minus one platoon), one platoon of tank destroyers, and one platoon of light tanks and had the mission of protecting the left flank and rear of Task Force Harper. CCR’s 73rd Armored Field Artillery provided artillery support from a small village called Buret just northwest of Task Forces Rose and Harper.
Note that put all of the stuff together, and CCR is no more than one battalion of armor and armored infantry.
They fought an
entire Panzer Division around Dec 17-19. Three days against 4-1 odds!
And yet what did they accomplish?
The Sherman tanks of A Company opened fire and counted hits on all three German tanks. Due to German superiority in armor, however, only one enemy tank was disabled while the other two turned back for cover.
Oh look, one German AFV destroyed (I thought they had zero losses?) and two forced to turn back!
According to Lauchert’s timetable, his reconnaissance battalion should have been in Bastogne well over an hour earlier.
Oh look, the Germans reporting timeline delays. More on this later.
But let's focus more on the action:
In the exchange of fire, A Company knocked out three Mark IVs with one Sherman destroyed, the main gun of a second was disabled, and a third Sherman threw a track, forcing its crew to destroy it.
Hey, hey, I thought the Germans had no AFV losses. Now they've lost
three Mark IVs for one destroyed Sherman and two damaged! Are the
numerically superior Germans actually just trading tank-for-tank with the US Army?
While Task Force Rose’s complement of Shermans was slowly dwindling, 2nd Panzer Division tanks kept multiplying as more of the division rolled up from Clervaux. The sounds of enemy tanks could be heard to Task Force Rose’s right, and since the armored infantry’s antitank platoon could not cover the task force’s right flank, a platoon of Shermans was dispatched. The Shermans came upon three enemy tanks, one of which was quickly destroyed with the other two withdrawing into defilade. One Sherman became bogged down in the mud and had to be evacuated.
More German tanks blowing up! I thought they were supposed to have a 180-1 kill ratio?
The 116th Panzer Division logs for this date report a number of skirmishes with American armor. Just after midnight, in a message to its corps headquarters, 116th Panzer reported heavy resistance and the taking of prisoners from the American 52nd Armored Infantry Battalion.
Now the Germans are mad and throw a
second Panzer Division into the mix. Again, let's remember:
One US armor
battalion and another of armored infantry, now up against
two German Panzer Divisions!
But really, was the tank fight that mattered?
At about the time Colonel Gilbreth was readying his force to withdraw, the first units of the 101st Airborne Division began arriving in the assembly area near Bastogne and, before night fell again on the 18th, the 101st Airborne would have all four regiments unloaded from their trucks and deployed in and around Bastogne.
Nope, because here's the secret:
The tank losses? The infantry losses? They were
meaningless. The Germans in fact completely lost the
entire Ardennes Offensive during the operations where they supposed "wiped out" a US tank battalion for "no losses" (which, as noted above, is a complete lie - there are
at least five enemy tanks confirmed to have been knocked out, with many more not recorded in greater detail).
The reality is instead this:
We had two US
battalions - a tank battalion and an armored infantry one - fighting a
delaying action against two
Panzer Divisions.
That means the Americans were outnumbered by a factor of something like 9-1, and yet
successfully stopped the Germans from occupying Bastogne until the 101st arrived to secure the town! And in the meantime, they were in some instances trading tanks evenly with the Germans despite being outnumbered!
This again is a stark demonstration of why people who blindly quote loss figures (the German ones in this case being a complete lie - as attested by the US accounts) and pretend it's proof of German tank superiority are
not experts on the subject in any way or form.
War is
not a bloody spreadsheet. They are
not just numbers on a loss tally.
Battles are a sequence of events. And more importantly, they are a sequence of events to achieve specific ends.
It didn't matter than those two battalions couldn't beat two Panzer Divisions. It didn't matter if the final "score" favored the Germans. Two battalions winning against two Divisions is an unrealistic expectation to begin with.
The best they could do therefore was to delay the Panzers and lay the groundwork for future victory.
In this case, we had an
outnumbered US force trading tank for tank with the enemy and delayed them long enough to secure Bastogne - at the time the most important piece of real estate in the area because without it the Germans couldn't really supply further advances.
And as a result, 2nd Panzer Division ran out of gas before it reached its objectives. Task Force Peiper also ran out of gas and had to abandon its tanks:
http://www.battleofthebulgememories...-the-trap-that-doomed-kampfgruppe-peiper.html
Finally, on the night of December 23, after destroying their equipment at La Gleize, Peiper led the remnants, 800 men, of the Kampfgruppe on a foot retreat.
In short, the Americans in fact
won this engagement regardless of the score sheet - they achieved their objectives in the face of daunting odds and secured a bigger overall victory for the rest of the army. Meanwhile you're still trying to pretend 60 years later that the Germans won because they had a higher "score", when in reality the Germans were clearly flubbing their loss reports - they lost multiple tanks and didn't report them.
But yeah, sure, Panzers win because you and a bunch of long-dead Nazis just invent charts out of thin air and then try to posture your way to winning an argument. It's really sad.