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Sunforged General

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)#Hitler_breaks_the_Pact

Doesnt this show that without Soviet imports, Germany would not have the capability to invade the USSR.
Without Soviet Imports (imported prior to operation Barbarossa) Germany in June 1941 would already be out of Rubber and Grain. No rubber means a flat tire cannot be replaced, meaning a flat tire permanently knocks out a truck or aircraft. No grain means German soldiers will be fighting hungry.

By October 1941, things get much worse for Germany without Soviet imports, as not only are they out of Rubber and Grain, but now they're also out of oil and Manganese (essential to steel production). Without these supplies, Germany wont be getting anywhere near Moscow, or for that matter, its unlikely they would even take Minsk and Kiev. By October 1941, the German army is collapsing.

Since Operation Barbarossa is hamstrung by lack of supplies, they likely dont take much of western Ukraine as they did in real life, and because of this they cant capture enough grain fields, oil fields, or supplies, to fuel future offensives, like they did in real life.

I would guestimate that by December 1941 of this timeline German troops have been 100% removed from Soviet Territory, Germany is now starving for supplies and resources, and the Soviets are likely planning an offensive into Romania, which would further remove what insufficient oil supplies Germany had left. After Romania falls, the Germans have no fuel for aircraft or tanks, so would be reduced to being a WW1 esque force attempting (and failing) to resist the 10,000 T-34 rush toward Berlin in mid 1942.

But tell me your thoughts on this scenario.
 
It is a myth and a play with numbers. German lasted very well to 1945 without Soviet import. Stalin may make mistakes but he is not stupid!
They lasted until 1945, because in 1941-42 they acquired huge amounts of Grain and Oil from Ukraine. If they dont capture those supplies, they run out pretty quick. The imports from the USSR between 1939-1941 are what made operation Barbarossa possible.
 
No.

We did this a couple of weeks ago and the answer remains the same. The imports were significant but nothing that dominated the German economy.

That isn't even remotely close. In 1940, Germany acquired 7600K tonnes of oil, of which only 2075K was imported.

During the MR pact, Germany imported only 900K tonnes from the Soviets. So I am sorry to say, Germany was not as cripplingly dependent on Soviet oil (and probably not the others either) prior to the invasion of France.

You stated that Germany got most of its oil from the Soviet trade. It didn't. Germany acquired approximately 33M metric tonnes in the 1938-41 period. Only 0.9M came from Soviet trucks. That amounts to only about 2.7% of German oil up until it reaches the gates of Moscow. I do not believe that it would make that much more of an impact. Oil did not become an issue until 1942 when the Anglo-US strategic bombing campaign started to drop significant volumes of bombs.


This is simply not true an accurate reflection. Pre-war Germany had approximately 8.8M tonnes in storage and following the blockade, by mid 1940 this had only reduced by 1.3M (Tooze's Wages of destruction). The number presented in the Wikipedia table reflects only on imports from the Soviet Union vs internal production. It doesn't account for the huge volume of grain that was imported from Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia. Tooze quotes the German statistical yearbook which is available online. I am sure that if you would like to better understand the grain situation in Germany in 1940, you could find the exact picture. Needless to say, Germany was in a fire situation, but the Soviet supplies were not critical.
 
Since Operation Barbarossa is hamstrung by lack of supplies, they likely dont take much of western Ukraine as they did in real life, and because of this they cant capture enough grain fields, oil fields, or supplies, to fuel future offensives, like they did in real life.
No, no and no.

German offensive power in Barbarossa was developed from a build up in 1938, and German's left over munitions stocks following the fall of France ( 1940 saw Germany produce a massive amount of munitions in preparation for another attritional western front), and stocks captured in France ( like the oil captured from the Alsace refineries).

Again reiterating, German economy was not as cripplingly dependent on Soviet aid as you seem to want to believe!
 
No, no and no.

German offensive power in Barbarossa was developed from a build up in 1938, and German's left over munitions stocks following the fall of France ( 1940 saw Germany produce a massive amount of munitions in preparation for another attritional western front), and stocks captured in France ( like the oil captured from the Alsace refineries).

Again reiterating, German economy was not as cripplingly dependent on Soviet aid as you seem to want to believe!
You can claim that all you want, but many historians disagree with you. Without Soviet imports, Germany cannot invade in 1941, they can try in 1940, or they can run out of oil and food. Germany is a severely import dependent country, even today.
  • Philbin III, Tobias R. (1994), The Lure of Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions, 1919 - 1941, University of South Carolina Press, ISBN 0-87249-992-8
  • Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941, Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0-275-96337-3
  • Hehn, Paul N. (2005), A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941, Continuum International Publishing Group, ISBN 0-8264-1761-2
  • Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L. (1997), Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0-231-10676-9
  • Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-11204-1
  • Shirer, William L. (1990), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 0-671-72868-7
  • Wegner, Bernd (1997), From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939-1941, Berghahn Books, ISBN 1-57181-882-0
 
No.

We did this a couple of weeks ago and the answer remains the same. The imports were significant but nothing that dominated the German economy.
We did this a couple weeks ago, and I brought out a list of references, and you did not. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_...nistry_of_Agriculture,_Forestry_and_Fisheries

Even today, Germany is not self sufficient on food, if all imports were halted, Germany can only meet 80% of the calorie needs of its population. So either 20% of Germans starve to death, or everyone has to live on less food. Less food is especially bad for your soldiers.
 
Germany is a severely import dependent country, even today.
Even today, Germany is not self sufficient on food
Well, today's Germany is smaller in area with a bigger population compared to pre-WW2.
Figures that even with respecting technological advances in agriculture from the last ~80 years it's not very surpising that "even" today Germany is not self-sufficient... :rolleyes:
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)#Hitler_breaks_the_Pact

Doesnt this show that without Soviet imports, Germany would not have the capability to invade the USSR.
Without Soviet Imports (imported prior to operation Barbarossa) Germany in June 1941 would already be out of Rubber and Grain. No rubber means a flat tire cannot be replaced, meaning a flat tire permanently knocks out a truck or aircraft. No grain means German soldiers will be fighting hungry.

By October 1941, things get much worse for Germany without Soviet imports, as not only are they out of Rubber and Grain, but now they're also out of oil and Manganese (essential to steel production). Without these supplies, Germany wont be getting anywhere near Moscow, or for that matter, its unlikely they would even take Minsk and Kiev. By October 1941, the German army is collapsing.

Since Operation Barbarossa is hamstrung by lack of supplies, they likely dont take much of western Ukraine as they did in real life, and because of this they cant capture enough grain fields, oil fields, or supplies, to fuel future offensives, like they did in real life.

I would guestimate that by December 1941 of this timeline German troops have been 100% removed from Soviet Territory, Germany is now starving for supplies and resources, and the Soviets are likely planning an offensive into Romania, which would further remove what insufficient oil supplies Germany had left. After Romania falls, the Germans have no fuel for aircraft or tanks, so would be reduced to being a WW1 esque force attempting (and failing) to resist the 10,000 T-34 rush toward Berlin in mid 1942.

But tell me your thoughts on this scenario.

Remember a few different things here:

  • Rubber can be made via synthetic means, and was for most of the powers in the war, including the Germans - For Germany, importing rubber through Russia before the war started was a convenience, not a necessity.
  • Grain is not an issue. The Germans were perfectly happy (indeed excited) about the prospect of starving 'undesireable' people to death while ensuring that the German war machine and supporting population got enough food - at any rate the primary source of grain during the war for Germany was France.
  • Oil is a real issue, but the fact of the matter is that the Germans were hopelessly short of oil with or without their imports from Russia. Obviously they wanted to get their hands on as much oil as they could, but the imports from Russia weren't big enough to be decisive. They were going to lose the war in either case as a result of their severe shortage of oil.
  • Manganese also is a real issue, but guess what - the Germans ran out of it anyway in late 1943/early 1944 and the war continued another 18 months - at any rate Hungary and Sweden were the primary German sources of Manganese.

After the war started, the Germans basically failed to capture any 'excess' from the Ukraine region - there was no excess grain, because agriculture was disrupted by the fighting - they didn't capture any areas that produced oil. They didn't capture any factories or supplies, because the Russians moved or destroyed them in their retreat.

There is another enormous factor that you are failing to account for, and that is the fact that the USSR didn't GIVE any of this stuff to the Germans - they traded it. And what did they trade it for?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)

The Soviet Union received the incomplete Admiral Hipper-class naval cruiser Lützow, the plans to the battleship Bismarck, information on German naval testing, "complete machinery for a large destroyer", heavy naval guns other naval gear and samples of thirty of Germany's latest warplanes, including the Bf 109 fighters, Bf 110 fighters, Ju 88 and Do 215 bombers.[2][3][4] The Soviet Union also received oil and electric equipment, locomotives, turbines, generators, diesel engines, ships, machine tools and samples of Germany artillery, tanks, explosives, chemical-warfare equipment and other items.[2]

Hmm - having critical war material to examine before the war, as well as machine tools, locomotives and other industrial equipment sounds like exactly the sort of thing that would strengthen the Soviet economy and military intelligence doesn't it? The soviets were certainly aware of it:

Joseph Stalin noted in discussion with Politburo members – “ship, which you've bought from expected enemy, is equal to two ships - one more at you and one less at enemy”.
 
You can claim that all you want, but many historians disagree with you. Without Soviet imports, Germany cannot invade in 1941, they can try in 1940, or they can run out of oil and food. Germany is a severely import dependent country, even today.
  • Philbin III, Tobias R. (1994), The Lure of Neptune: German-Soviet Naval Collaboration and Ambitions, 1919 - 1941, University of South Carolina Press, ISBN 0-87249-992-8
  • Ericson, Edward E. (1999), Feeding the German Eagle: Soviet Economic Aid to Nazi Germany, 1933-1941, Greenwood Publishing Group, ISBN 0-275-96337-3
  • Hehn, Paul N. (2005), A Low Dishonest Decade: The Great Powers, Eastern Europe, and the Economic Origins of World War II, 1930-1941, Continuum International Publishing Group, ISBN 0-8264-1761-2
  • Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L. (1997), Pariahs, Partners, Predators: German-Soviet Relations, 1922-1941, Columbia University Press, ISBN 0-231-10676-9
  • Roberts, Geoffrey (2006), Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953, Yale University Press, ISBN 0-300-11204-1
  • Shirer, William L. (1990), The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany, Simon and Schuster, ISBN 0-671-72868-7
  • Wegner, Bernd (1997), From Peace to War: Germany, Soviet Russia, and the World, 1939-1941, Berghahn Books, ISBN 1-57181-882-0

It is interesting that there are tons of "historians" think they are smarter than Stalin.
That Wiki link say, June 1941 inventory: 1350 thousand tons, total import from USSR (less than 2 years): 912 thousand tons.
But on this link, it say: Germany inventory Jan 1941: 56 million barrels (about 5600 thousand tons), import from USSR: 4.5 mil barrels. (about 450 thousand tons)
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1020261.pdf

Another source say oil from Soviet trade is less than oil captured from France reserve.

Which is correct? I would just rely on real life strength of Nazi troops over time instead.
 
You can claim that all you want, but many historians disagree with you.
No, you just listed a bunch of books. How about a picture of those books in your library, or a screenshot of your Kindle library?

I take my information From Tooze's Wages of Destruction (the concept form the basis of several chapters 9 section 4 and figure 11, and chapter 10). Specifically noted is the comment that in 1940 70% of German military spending was split between aircraft and munitions (starting at location. 6506 on Kindle which is in chapter 10 section 2).

It also forms a strong theme for chapters 2 and 3 of Frieser's Blitzkrieg legend.
 
It is interesting that there are tons of "historians" think they are smarter than Stalin.
.

Intelligence is not Stalins calling card. In fact he might not be that bright.

What he did have was an iron resolve to solve all his problems by any means necessary. Cerebral hemorrhage, Gulag Archipelago, disgrace and public shame.

Disagree with Stalin, you are granted a vacation home in Siberia. If you are lucky. If not, you are merely dragged into the hallway and shot in the head.

You want to lionize a murderous tyrant, that is your prerogative.
 
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Since OP changed his avatar, everything makes much more sense.
 
Sad but true.
 
Remember a few different things here:

  • Rubber can be made via synthetic means, and was for most of the powers in the war, including the Germans - For Germany, importing rubber through Russia before the war started was a convenience, not a necessity.
  • Grain is not an issue. The Germans were perfectly happy (indeed excited) about the prospect of starving 'undesireable' people to death while ensuring that the German war machine and supporting population got enough food - at any rate the primary source of grain during the war for Germany was France.
  • Oil is a real issue, but the fact of the matter is that the Germans were hopelessly short of oil with or without their imports from Russia. Obviously they wanted to get their hands on as much oil as they could, but the imports from Russia weren't big enough to be decisive. They were going to lose the war in either case as a result of their severe shortage of oil.
  • Manganese also is a real issue, but guess what - the Germans ran out of it anyway in late 1943/early 1944 and the war continued another 18 months - at any rate Hungary and Sweden were the primary German sources of Manganese.
After the war started, the Germans basically failed to capture any 'excess' from the Ukraine region - there was no excess grain, because agriculture was disrupted by the fighting - they didn't capture any areas that produced oil. They didn't capture any factories or supplies, because the Russians moved or destroyed them in their retreat.

There is another enormous factor that you are failing to account for, and that is the fact that the USSR didn't GIVE any of this stuff to the Germans - they traded it. And what did they trade it for?

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German–Soviet_Commercial_Agreement_(1940)



Hmm - having critical war material to examine before the war, as well as machine tools, locomotives and other industrial equipment sounds like exactly the sort of thing that would strengthen the Soviet economy and military intelligence doesn't it? The soviets were certainly aware of it:
Rubber was not being made in sufficient quantities via synthetic means in 1941. Also about the Grain, the shortage would be universal in 1941 without Soviet imports. France was barely self sufficient in grain, capturing it yielded almost nothing in excess for Germany. As for trying to starve people to make up the difference, Germany was already doing that. It was clearly not enough.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Nazi_Germany#Use_of_conquered_territories

Second paragraph.

"The grain harvest in France in 1940 was less than half what it had been in 1938. Grain yields also fell (compared to their pre-war levels) in Germany itself, as well as in Hungary and the occupied Netherlands and Yugoslavia."
 
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No, no and no.

German offensive power in Barbarossa was developed from a build up in 1938, and German's left over munitions stocks following the fall of France ( 1940 saw Germany produce a massive amount of munitions in preparation for another attritional western front), and stocks captured in France ( like the oil captured from the Alsace refineries).

Again reiterating, German economy was not as cripplingly dependent on Soviet aid as you seem to want to believe!
This is entirely incorrect. After the battles in Poland and France, Germany was exhausted of ammunition for example. The build up to Barbarossa in supplies happened in 1940-1941.
 
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