What If Finland Had Cut Off Permanently the Murmansk Railroad - the US Declaration of War?

[Jopa79]

The red line is the original Murmansk Railroad completed during 1915-1917. In the WWII the railroad was endangered by the Finns and by the Germans. Due this threat the Soviets built and finished a new section connecting Murmansk Railroad to Arkhangelsk-Moscow track in late 1941.

The importance of Murmansk Port and the Murmansk Railroad for the Soviet war effort was highlighted after the US joined the WWII and started supporting the Soviet Union by the Lend Lease program. Due to the Gulf Stream the Port of Murmansk remained ice-free during freeze-cold Arctic winters and the Allied Arctic Convoys unloaded the cargo there and the war material was further transported by the Murmansk Railroad for the Soviet war effort.

In 1941 during the Finnish offensive phase and the Finnish invasion of Soviet Karelia, the Finns advanced to the River Svir and Lake Onega cutting off the Murmansk Railroad in its southern parts.

A map showing the Finnish offensive phase in 1941 (left). Right map - the thin black line is the Murmansk Railroad and its connections.

After the Finnish offensive phase the front lines were stabilized for 2 and half years of trench warfare. During this period the Murmansk Railroad was continually an objective and a target for the Finnish long-range patrols. These patrols sometimes spent even months behind the enemy lines. They attacked the Murmansk Railroad, blowing up the track and bridges, destroying trains and train cars, trying the best to disturb and harm the Soviet transportation. The strength of the patrols varied, sometimes just a few men, the largest patrol consisted 1 300 of men. The patrols had a radio connection to high-ranking HQ staff from where they received orders and instructions. However and though the long-range patrols operated in large-scale it didn't have a decisive result for the outcome of the war. The new track connection from Belomorsk at the White Sea to east was secure for the Soviets and this was the route for the American Lend Lease without a interference by the Finns.

Long-range patrols were often grueling by both - mental and physically. Although the men did everything they could it wasn't always enough. SA-kuva.

Probably the most difficult and sensitive matter in cutting off the Murmansk Railroad was the Finnish Foreign Affairs. Attacking the Murmansk Railroad was also attacking against the Allied support for the Soviet Union. There was a risk that the United States would upset, if the Finns went too far in the American view. For this reason Finland maintained fairly cautious while operating against the Murmansk Railroad - the Finns didn't want any conflict with the US. However, there is one exception in this procedure.

A.F. Airo was a Finnish lieutenant general. He was the main strategic planner of the Finnish operations during the WWII and second-in-command after Mannerheim. SA-kuva.

Completely against the general Finnish view Airo had a strong opinion and a outright demand about cutting off the Murmansk Railroad. In Airo's view cutting off the Soviet lifeline would significantly weaken the USSR and would bring Finland one step closer for favorable peace terms despite of the deterrent - a possible declaration of war by the US. In Airo's claim, during a certain phase of the Continuation War it was possible for Finland to cut off permanently the Murmansk Railroad, either it should had been implemented during the offensive phase in 1941, or a new possibility was in summer 1942. With two other Finnish high-ranking officers Airo planned a Finnish attack to Belomorsk. Airo claimed that the Finns would easily advance to this important railroad node, the German 20th Mountain Army present in Finnish Lapland would had supported the Finnish attack preventing the Soviet relief for Belomorsk - in the process the Soviet forces present in Kola Peninsula would had been surrounded and left without supply. In a filmed interview 1978 Airo said:

- I think, it was a mistake to not to attack Belomorsk. When at war, all means must be used. If someone was afraid of the US declaration of war onto Finland, this threat didn't have an effect on me. England had already declared war onto us and if the United States was going to do the same, what would it had changed?

Airo's masterplan was proposed for Mannerheim. Airo stated that both - Mannerheim and Ryti measured the plan too risky and it was never implemented. All that Airo was so sure about still remains only speculative - the Finnish easy advance to Belomorsk - the German support for the Finnish advance - the Soviet response after surrounded at Kola Peninsula - would the cutting off the Murmansk Railroad weaken enough the Soviets and lead to favorable peace terms for the Finns...but what about the US? If Airo's plan would had been successfully executed would the Americans just watch from the sidelines or declare war on Finland?

 

[krieger11b]

I think Airo summed up pretty well why a US declaration of war would be essentially meaningless being already at war with the UK. I mean what was the US going to do about it? Cutting off the Murmansk railroad would cause about 0.000004% of the US population to be in an uproar. No US citizens were officially working on the railroad, meanwhile US citizens were being killed by U-Boots in the Atlantic since 1940 and hell even when a German U-Boot accidentally (or maybe not accidentally) torpedoed a US destroyer USS Kearny was torpedoed with 11 dead and 22 wounded in October 1941 and the outright sinking of the USS Reuben James the same month there was not a large call to war by the US population. So I really don't even understand how anyone could think cutting off one railroad in the USSR would be enough to get congress to try and declare what would have been a hugely unpopular war.

 

[ikki]

Well it would have meant a break with the deal with stalin in which the line would remain open as would a supplyline to leningrad. Which in turn would have resulted in a soviet socialist finnish peoples republic, a "autonomous" part of the soviet union.

https://biblioteket.stockholm.se/titel/11190
The book can be found in finnish and swedish and is based on S-32 a since gone missing file of mannerheims gathered intelligence. Such as the allied-soviet pact preceeding the molotov-rbbentropp... not coming after as propaganda history tells us along with much more. To the point that history as written is little more than a joke.

 

[Jopa79]

I think Airo summed up pretty well why a US declaration of war would be essentially meaningless being already at war with the UK. I mean what was the US going to do about it? Cutting off the Murmansk railroad would cause about 0.000004% of the US population to be in an uproar. No US citizens were officially working on the railroad, meanwhile US citizens were being killed by U-Boots in the Atlantic since 1940 and hell even when a German U-Boot accidentally (or maybe not accidentally) torpedoed a US destroyer USS Kearny was torpedoed with 11 dead and 22 wounded in October 1941 and the outright sinking of the USS Reuben James the same month there was not a large call to war by the US population. So I really don't even understand how anyone could think cutting off one railroad in the USSR would be enough to get congress to try and declare what would have been a hugely unpopular war.

If Germany defeated the Soviet Union, the most significant front in Europe would be closed and the Allies would be far more like to lose the entire war in Roosevelt's personal opinion further concluding that the US needed to help the Soviets in their fight against Germany. For the Americans the question of the Murmansk Railroad was not about how many US citizens it employed, but delivering the Lend-Lease to its ally, the USSR. If the Murmansk Railroad would fall into Finnish or German hands it would close one of main-delivering route of the Lend-Lease:

• Arctic Convoys (Murmansk)
• Persian Corridor (Basra)
• Pacific Route (Vladivostok)

The total value in US$ of the delivered US Lend-Lease for all nations during the WWII was 48 000 millions. The Soviet share of it was 11 000 millions. In tons the Allied delivery for the Soviets through the WWII was 17 499 861 tons. The percentage share delivered via the Arctic Convoys and Murmansk was 23%. This route was the shortest, the most direct, but also the most dangerous route. The Battle of the Atlantic - the Allied naval campaign against the German U-boat peril and the German U-boats and Wolf-Packs hunting the Allied convoys is all about delivering or not the US Lend-Lease to its ally nations in Europe.

Before mid-1942 the Arctic Convoys and Murmansk was the main route of the delivery. The Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route were not fully operational until nearing the end of year 1942. Before this (1941-1942) was also the era when the Soviet Union was at its nearest to collapse and lose the war against Germany. Delivering the Lend-Lease during this period via the Murmansk Railroad was a major support for the Soviet war effort and one of the main reasons why the Soviet Union survived during 1941-1942. If the Soviets didn't survive also the Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route were useless as well as all the US push and effort to keep the Soviets alive. There is a clear reason why cutting off one railroad in the USSR would be enough to get congress to try and declare a war.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

Heh, I see the OP was inspired by the discussion in this thread: https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/index.php?threads/continuation-war.1298532/

My thoughts on the matter align with General Airo and @krieger11b. The following is taken from a reply I wrote in the aforementioned thread to someone noting how Finland definitely did not want the US to declare war on the country:

Which is what Airo is saying. He simply questions the logic of it, since a US declaration of war realistically-speaking would not have made Finland's situation any worse. He is likely correct in this. After all, it wasn't some half-hearted political pressure from FDR on Stalin that saved Finland from Sovietization in the summer of 1944, rather it was Finland's armed forces together with units and much-needed anti-tank materiel from Germany, that stopped the Soviet Karelian Offensive at the VKT & U-lines, as well as at Ilomantsi, in June-August 1944. Arguably impeding American lend-lease to the Soviets might have ended up saving more Finnish lives than not cutting the Murmansk Railway ended up costing.

 

[Jopa79]

Heh, I see the OP was inspired by the discussion in this thread: https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/index.php?threads/continuation-war.1298532/

My thoughts on the matter align with General Airo and @krieger11b. The following is taken from a reply I wrote in the aforementioned thread to someone noting how Finland definitely did not want the US to declare war on the country:

Yes, I was inspired by the discussion, but also by the Airo-interview you posted (it really was interesting). Many thanks - acknowledgements.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

Yes, I was inspired by the discussion, but also by the Airo-interview you posted (it really was interesting). Many thanks - acknowledgements.

No problem at all, I very much enjoy spreading this kind of knowledge.

You might also find this ten-part documentary series interesting, here's a little sample scene from a negotiation between German Lieutenant Colonel Veltjens and Finnish Marshal Mannerheim taking place in August 1940, the link should take you to 46:55:

It's a great shame there are no English subtitles, for this is one of the best historical documentary series I've ever seen, and definitely the best one ever made depicting Finland's situation in 1938-41, from the beginning of the so-called Yartsev "negotiations", to the start of the Continuation War. Very professionally made.

All ten parts are on YouTube, but you can watch it in better quality from Yleisradio's archive here: https://yle.fi/aihe/artikkeli/2017/11/09/sodan-ja-rauhan-miehet-faktaa-vai-fiktiota

 

[olm]

Seems like logistics could be a bit problematic though. Soviets could simply use railway to bring reinforcements to Belomorsk. Finnish supply lines would go over significant stretch of area that had fairly little infrastructure.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

Seems like logistics could be a bit problematic though. Soviets could simply use railway to bring reinforcements to Belomorsk. Finnish supply lines would go over significant stretch of area that had fairly little infrastructure.

The idea was that the Finns would take Sorokka (Belomorsk) with ease, and once secured, would hand over the sector to German divisions from the north, and thus move their own forces from there back south again.

 

[Jopa79]

Seems like logistics could be a bit problematic though. Soviets could simply use railway to bring reinforcements to Belomorsk. Finnish supply lines would go over significant stretch of area that had fairly little infrastructure.

Finnish supply lines during the Rukajärvi offensive in autumn 1941. Rukajärvi was captured by the Finnish 14th Infantry Division and the attack to Belomorsk was halted only 70 km away from the railroad hub - an order by Mannerheim due to the foreign affairs. SA-kuva.

Finnish troops at Rukajärvi. The forces fighting in this direction the Finns had a upper hand over the Soviets in both - quality and quantity. SA-kuva.

 

[LizarDAMN]

I suspect that the Mannerheim's decision not to advance was more down to the uncertain state of the war against the Soviet Union than possible declaration of war from the US.

As long as the war hangs in the balance, there is no need to do anything. If the Germans gain upper hand, it will be wise to contribute and cut the railroad. If they start to lose, it's better not to agitate soviets any more than needed. So basically the same thing that happened with the Siege of Leningrad.

 

[Rubidium]

The idea was that the Finns would take Sorokka (Belomorsk) with ease, and once secured, would hand over the sector to German divisions from the north, and thus move their own forces from there back south again.

That seems risky? If you fail to take the city, then you are out of luck (and in a bad spot). And the Soviets will be pretty much forced to counterattack (and can use the remainder of the railroad, which they still control, to support said attacks, while Finnish resupply will be much more difficult). Especially if you are waiting to launch your offensive in 1942, at which point the Soviets have gotten their act together much better than they were in the opening days of Barbarossa.

While a US declaration may be meaningless on a practical level, if the Allies still win it will make it much easier for the Soviets to justify annexing the whole thing, rather than opting for Finlandization.

It also probably wouldn't decide the war: Lend-Lease was important for the Soviets to go over onto the offensive, but they'd already halted and started to push back the Axis before Lend-Lease got to be more than a trickle. They might advance more slowly as the war progressed, so the eventual Yalta dividing line may be somewhere further east, but they won't be able to knock the Soviets out of the war entirely. Especially since the logical target for one of their major offensives at this point would be clearing the Murmansk railroad, which likely means the Finns take a much higher number of losses (even if they turn over the area to the Germans, they'll need to be called in to deal with any counterattack).

Basically it just means a lot more people die without changing the final result, as with most "the Axis do slightly better in this area" scenarios.

 

[krieger11b]

If Germany defeated the Soviet Union, the most significant front in Europe would be closed and the Allies would be far more like to lose the entire war in Roosevelt's personal opinion further concluding that the US needed to help the Soviets in their fight against Germany. For the Americans the question of the Murmansk Railroad was not about how many US citizens it employed, but delivering the Lend-Lease to its ally, the USSR. If the Murmansk Railroad would fall into Finnish or German hands it would close one of main-delivering route of the Lend-Lease:

• Arctic Convoys (Murmansk)
• Persian Corridor (Basra)
• Pacific Route (Vladivostok)

The total value in US$ of the delivered US Lend-Lease for all nations during the WWII was 48 000 millions. The Soviet share of it was 11 000 millions. In tons the Allied delivery for the Soviets through the WWII was 17 499 861 tons. The percentage share delivered via the Arctic Convoys and Murmansk was 23%. This route was the shortest, the most direct, but also the most dangerous route. The Battle of the Atlantic - the Allied naval campaign against the German U-boat peril and the German U-boats and Wolf-Packs hunting the Allied convoys is all about delivering or not the US Lend-Lease to its ally nations in Europe.

Before mid-1942 the Arctic Convoys and Murmansk was the main route of the delivery. The Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route were not fully operational until nearing the end of year 1942. Before this (1941-1942) was also the era when the Soviet Union was at its nearest to collapse and lose the war against Germany. Delivering the Lend-Lease during this period via the Murmansk Railroad was a major support for the Soviet war effort and one of the main reasons why the Soviet Union survived during 1941-1942. If the Soviets didn't survive also the Persian Corridor and the Pacific Route were useless as well as all the US push and effort to keep the Soviets alive. There is a clear reason why cutting off one railroad in the USSR would be enough to get congress to try and declare a war.

Before Pearl Harbor that doesn't matter.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

That seems risky? If you fail to take the city, then you are out of luck (and in a bad spot). And the Soviets will be pretty much forced to counterattack (and can use the remainder of the railroad, which they still control, to support said attacks, while Finnish resupply will be much more difficult). Especially if you are waiting to launch your offensive in 1942, at which point the Soviets have gotten their act together much better than they were in the opening days of Barbarossa.

An attack on lightly defended Sorokka was not going to fail. Now, my knowledge of the situation is obviously far lesser than what a man like General Airo in his position and with his expertise has, but when he says the FDF could easily have taken Sorokka, I am inclined to believe him.

Btw the Russians did launch offensives across the entire Eastern Front in 1942, including against the Finns. It was a disaster, for the Russians.

While a US declaration may be meaningless on a practical level, if the Allies still win it will make it much easier for the Soviets to justify annexing the whole thing, rather than opting for Finlandization.

Again, politics and Western pressure had nothing to do with the Russians not occupying Finland, that was all on their big push to occupy the country in 1944 getting obliterated. Arguably also the fear of an extensive Finnish guerrilla campaign, further bolstered by Finns hiding enough materiel for at least 35 000 men in the countryside, played a role in calling off any post-Continuation War plans to violate the peace treaty and occupy the country.

It also probably wouldn't decide the war: Lend-Lease was important for the Soviets to go over onto the offensive, but they'd already halted and started to push back the Axis before Lend-Lease got to be more than a trickle. They might advance more slowly as the war progressed, so the eventual Yalta dividing line may be somewhere further east, but they won't be able to knock the Soviets out of the war entirely. Especially since the logical target for one of their major offensives at this point would be clearing the Murmansk railroad, which likely means the Finns take a much higher number of losses (even if they turn over the area to the Germans, they'll need to be called in to deal with any counterattack).

Basically it just means a lot more people die without changing the final result, as with most "the Axis do slightly better in this area" scenarios.

A lot of conjecture here. Indeed cutting off the Murmansk Railway would not have decided the war; the Allies would have reacted and sped up the opening and expansion of other routes. It would however have meant a fair bit less lend-lease in 1941, which could have saved some Finnish lives.

The Russians would not have retaken the Murmansk railroad before 1944 at the earliest; they didn't have the spare forces, and arguably before 1943-44, the competence for it, nor would the railroad have mattered much after losing it anyway.

Btw here's a map of the 1942 Russian attacks on the Finnish front:

The Soviets conducted four attacks in the first half of 1942, all of which were repelled by Finnish–German defenders.

 

[L'Afrique]

Finland takes a railroad at the cost of finnish lives (and soviet lives) and changes nothing about the outcome of the war. Sounds great. War is awesome. All the dead soldiers and their nonexistent descendants will understand, I'm sure, that bleeding out in the snow was worth it so Finland would look even cooler to wargamers.

And in the miracle universe where this does change things... Finland gets back a few bits of glorious backwater taiga and the Nazis commit genocide on how many people?

Yeah, no, actually, the US should have declared at least ceremonially war on Finland even in real life. National pride doesn't justify joining the Axis.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

Finland takes a railroad at the cost of finnish lives (and soviet lives) and changes nothing about the outcome of the war. Sounds great. War is awesome. All the dead soldiers and their nonexistent descendants will understand, I'm sure, that bleeding out in the snow was worth it so Finland would look even cooler to wargamers.

And in the miracle universe where this does change things... Finland gets back a few bits of glorious backwater taiga and the Nazis commit genocide on how many people?

Yeah, no, actually, the US should have declared at least ceremonially war on Finland even in real life. National pride doesn't justify joining the Axis.

The ignorance is strong in this comment.

 

[Jopa79]

Finland takes a railroad at the cost of finnish lives (and soviet lives) and changes nothing about the outcome of the war. Sounds great. War is awesome. All the dead soldiers and their nonexistent descendants will understand, I'm sure, that bleeding out in the snow was worth it so Finland would look even cooler to wargamers.

Do you consider only the winning party of a war may affect about the outcome of a war? How about the losing party - is it always wrong and the actions it made during pre-war and wartime, are those wrong and may only affect negatively on the result of a war? Who said war is awesome? 'Bleeding out in the snow' was/is exactly why Finland stands today - without it, sharing the fortunes with the Baltic States would had happened.

Finland gets back a few bits of glorious backwater taiga

In precisely, which territories exactly do you refer in here?

National pride doesn't justify joining the Axis.

What do you mean by this - joining the Axis is a part of the Finnish national pride - or Finland had to join the Axis because of its national pride? How do you exactly describe the Finnish national pride?

 

[mccarty.geoff]

What would Finland have cared if the US declared war on them? It isn't really material. I think if 1/10th of the Soviet Army fought as well as the Soviet infantry on the Kola peninsula they'd have been in Berlin by 1942. In retrospect Germans should have based their forces along the Gulf of Finland and let the Finns fight the sideshow war in the arctic.

 

[LizarDAMN]

In retrospect Germans should have based their forces along the Gulf of Finland and let the Finns fight the sideshow war in the arctic.

There is nothing important there. In the North however are the important iron ore mines of Sweden, which must run uninterrupted or the German warmachine is in trouble.

By sending some many troops to close proximity to Sweden, they secured the mines against any Soviet aggression and at the same time gave Sweden a reminder that they could take the mines by force if needed.

 

[Kenttäharmaa]

There is nothing important there. In the North however are the important iron ore mines of Sweden, which must run uninterrupted or the German warmachine is in trouble.

By sending some many troops to close proximity to Sweden, they secured the mines against any Soviet aggression and at the same time gave Sweden a reminder that they could take the mines by force if needed.

Well the Germans being in Northern Finland in the first place was mostly about Finnish nickel, which was vital to the German war effort at that point. They had plans to occupy the Petsamo nickel mine anyway in case Finland refused German aid in the fall of 1940 and was subsequently occupied by the Russians.

Anyway the Germans operating in the south and the Finns in the north, as opposed to what historically happened, is unrealistic due to a number of political and practical reasons.