World War 2 and Manpower

[thedarkendstar]

I've been quite interested in Manpower as of late it’s often talked about the Soviets and how many men they were able to field despite the amount lost in the initial phases of Barbarossa and while they are an important part of this I want to examine them versus other countries. The German population in 1939 was about 80 million the Soviets was a bit more than double that in my head that reads to me as okay the Soviets have double the manpower but in the war at least how we see it that doesn’t play out.


Until Operation Bagration in 1944 the Germans occupied large amounts of the Soviet Union in doing so the Soviets should have been cut off from large amounts of its population not only to bring into the army but work on the factories. The Germans on the other hand until right at the end had access to there entire nation's capacity hell they had access to the industrial capacity of France, and most of Europe at the time not to mention the Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Finns also fighting the Soviet. So I have to wonder with all these massive differences why did the Germans run into manpower shortages so quickly and before the Soviets when they seemed to have so much going for them the Soviets on paper had about twice the number of people to draw from but in reality had a lot less due to much of it being under German occupation or siege yet despite the latter having full access and ally’s to pick up the slack the Germans ran into manpower shortages and production issues.

This is only one comparison the issue boggles me, even more, when it comes to other nations. The US and Britain for instance, by comparison, suffered rather few losses in the war but somehow both had manpower issues the latter being worse than the former for obvious reasons and the only thing I can think is how. The US population was 120-130 million and the British about 50 without considering its colonies with this in mind I don’t understand how the Soviets were able to mobilize so many men with so much occupied yet keep their factories pumping out material in record speed. When other nations couldn’t do the same the US specifically Germany managed to mobilize 13.6 million men through the war the US achieves 16 million with about 40-50 million more people and without having to replace nearly as many losses. However, the Soviets achieved 34 million that served in the war not even accounting for civilian deaths which is such a massive increase in the amount of personnel especially considering the amount that sadly died and how much was not available to them.

I want to know if each nation had specific issues that limited the number of men they could take into there military that other nations didn't have. Because on paper if for instance, the Brits mobilized the same percentage of there population as the Germans did there military would have been far larger but for some reason, they obviously couldn't and the same goes for the US and that's without me even talking at all about Japan and Italy with their prospective manpower.


TLDR I want to separate the on papers numbers for manpower based on countries to the realities of why some could call on more men and others couldn't.
If anyone has some informative videos or lectures on the topic I would love to see it.

 

[WhiteKnight77]

You appear to be forgetting that the USSR extended east beyond Moscow and Stalingrad. Stalin brought millions of troops from the interior and Siberia (while keeping enough troops to ensure that the Japanese would not invade per their promise not to). That English and US forces did not lose as many men KIA is more than likely due to training and that a trained veteran soldier is worth more than a conscript with the most basic of training and given a rifle and that the US wanted to keep said veterans to lead or train the replacements that inevitably would be needed. Compare that to throwing more and more men to take ground as the Soviets did. While they eventually learned, it took longer.

 

[Avernite]

I think a key point is this - Germany and the Soviet Union were literally scraping the barrel. The UK and USA were running out of normal manpower.

What this means is that the Germans and Soviets were deploying old men and boys, and significantly for the Soviets women.

As to why the difference, I don't have sources myself, but I recall a big difference between the Soviets and Germans being general mobilization of women; when men have to do the farming, industrial work, AND the fighting, it takes many more than if the women pick up a large part of the farming and industry.

And, of course, a lot of American/Canadian/British/... farmers and industrial workers were working behind the Soviet armies, too.

 

[JodelDiplom]

The soviets didn't actually beat the Germans through numerical superiority all of the time. IIRC in plenty of battles where the German generals thought (well, wrote) that they were outnumbered, study of the soviet archives actually showed that they were not outnumbered. The soviets had a way better armaments industry, were operating with less sideshow threaters to divide their attention, and they had the advantage of interior lines. AFAIK those three factors actually contributed as much to the German defeat, as the manpower differences.

 

[thedarkendstar]

The soviets didn't actually beat the Germans through numerical superiority all of the time. IIRC in plenty of battles where the German generals thought (well, wrote) that they were outnumbered, study of the soviet archives actually showed that they were not outnumbered. The soviets had a way better armaments industry, were operating with less sideshow threaters to divide their attention, and they had the advantage of interior lines. AFAIK those three factors actually contributed as much to the German defeat, as the manpower differences.

Yes, I didn't mean individual battles more the Soviet capacity to replace men well well well beyond the germans even more so then you would expect given the number of people they had.

You appear to be forgetting that the USSR extended east beyond Moscow and Stalingrad. Stalin brought millions of troops from the interior and Siberia (while keeping enough troops to ensure that the Japanese would not invade per their promise not to). That English and US forces did not lose as many men KIA is more than likely due to training and that a trained veteran soldier is worth more than a conscript with the most basic of training and given a rifle and that the US wanted to keep said veterans to lead or train the replacements that inevitably would be needed. Compare that to throwing more and more men to take ground as the Soviets did. While they eventually learned, it took longer.

Yes but you appear to be forgetting the highest concentration of people in the Soviet Union was the parts that the Germans occupied....

I think a key point is this - Germany and the Soviet Union were literally scraping the barrel. The UK and USA were running out of normal manpower.

What this means is that the Germans and Soviets were deploying old men and boys, and significantly for the Soviets women.

As to why the difference, I don't have sources myself, but I recall a big difference between the Soviets and Germans being general mobilization of women; when men have to do the farming, industrial work, AND the fighting, it takes many more than if the women pick up a large part of the farming and industry.

And, of course, a lot of American/Canadian/British/... farmers and industrial workers were working behind the Soviet armies, too.

Aye but the Soviets even at the end of the war were replacing their losses every single time while still maintaining Industrial production.

 

[Dinglehoff]

This may be of interest:

90-Division Gamble

Certain by-products and implications of the decision also deserve serious consideration by postwar students. The decision was a striking illustration of acceptance by Army leaders of the fact that there were limits to their slice of the American manpower pie. The 90-division troop basis represented their attempt to provide a realistic meeting ground of three fundamentals of modern warfare-strategy, production, and manpower. It represented the relatively small, if compact, ground combat force that the country that was also serving as the "arsenal of democracy" found it could provide for a global coalition war without unduly straining the war economy and standard of living of the American people. In the postwar debate over strategy, critics who have characterized the American case for concentration



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and power-drives as "narrow" and "rigid" have uniformly overlooked the impact of manpower ceilings on that case. It is doubtful that the United States could have succeeded with its 90-division ground combat force had not the ground forces of the Russians and other allies held and fought well. It is also doubtful that the United States could have succeeded with the size and kind of ground cutting edge it produced had not it also turned out an effective, heavy-fisted, long air arm. The self-denying limit on cutting edge of Army ground forces in favor of air force expansion undoubtedly spurred further the growing movement for air force autonomy.

My TLDR
Basically the US decided to limit it's army size to 90 divisions; thought to be the best balance for what the nations economy and production could support, without sacrificing production and quality both at home and in the armed forces.

Fundamentally, this kind of decision would be made from a position of relative security from existential threats to the country.

 

[Kurfürst]

British manpower WWII

This link might be of interest, it deals with british manpower issues during WWII in detail.

 

[Easy-Kill]

British manpower WWII

This link might be of interest, it deals with british manpower issues during WWII in detail.

The interested reader might also appreciate Steven Hart's work: Montgomery, morale, casualty conservation and ‘colossal cracks’: 21st army group's operational technique in North‐West Europe, 1944–45.

It is also important to note that the RAF numbered just over 1M men and the Royal Navy just under 1M men at the end of the war.

 

[Kovax]

Germany resorted to having women run most of the farms, and slave labor played an increasing role in industry as the war dragged on. There was literally nobody left to conscript without doing even more serious damage to their ability to produce necessary war materials, and that still wasn't enough.

The Soviets practically ran out of "available" manpower as well, but were able to conscript additional manpower by short-changing the civilian economy and many industrial processes for military support equipment (rather than weapons and ammunition), only because those shortages were made up for with goods sent by the US and UK. Without those goods, the Soviets would have had to choose between having more warm bodies on the front line or the equipment to arm them.

The UK suffered severe manpower shortages as well, but fielded a much smaller land army than the other major powers in the first place, so it was less apparent.

The US had to limit consumer goods to some degree, in order to free up the manpower for military goods and service in the armed forces, but was the least impacted of the major powers by a substantial margin.

 

[1 Star General]

Until Operation Bagration in 1944 the Germans occupied large amounts of the Soviet Union in doing so the Soviets should have been cut off from large amounts of its population not only to bring into the army but work on the factories. The Germans on the other hand until right at the end had access to there entire nation's capacity hell they had access to the industrial capacity of France, and most of Europe at the time not to mention the Romanians, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Finns also fighting the Soviet. So I have to wonder with all these massive differences why did the Germans run into manpower shortages so quickly and before the Soviets when they seemed to have so much going for them the Soviets on paper had about twice the number of people to draw from but in reality had a lot less due to much of it being under German occupation or siege yet despite the latter having full access and ally’s to pick up the slack the Germans ran into manpower shortages and production issues.

I gotta say, this question has also been bugging me as of late. When it became clear that the war in East will be an attritional drag (at the latest winter 1941), the Germans did indeed solicit help from Hungary, Romania and to a lesser degree other European vassals and allies. But not nearly as much as they could. And the allied forces were really not armed to the task. I often hear there wasn't enough equipment to field a larger force and the state of allied divisions in the East seems to confirm that. But it still is puzzling for me that the Soviets, who lost large parts of they're most valuable area (population centers, industry, resources, infrastructure) could so dramatically outproduce the Germans - controlling most of Europe, in 1941/1942 still largely fairly pacified and not bombed to smithereens yet. It just doesn't add up. Yes, Europe lacked oil. But it had plenty of coal and steel and dense rail network, and you don't necesserily have to arm allied armies with tanks. For holding the line (around Don bend in winter 1942 for example) they could compensate with artillery (field, antitank, AA). After all, it was the most mortal of all kinds of weaponry, same in WW2 as in WW1. It's confusing.

 

[Director]

During the war the US actually scrapped plans to build the full number of army divisions, as it was felt (correctly) they would not be needed. Some of that was because they saw that logistical constraints would mean those divisions could not be deployed overseas anyway, but mostly it was because the US Army and Marines knew they could win with what they had. The work of the US service staffs between the wars, in predicting and preparing for the WW2-winning effort, was astonishing - and astonishingly correct.

Don't forget that US aircraft production was larger than Britain, Germany, Russia, Japan and Italy combined, and they did that while simultaneously building the world's largest navy, and the world's largest air force, and the world's largest logistical support service, and while supplying and equipping Allied forces. And while building merchant shipping in unprecedented numbers... for a modern nation the armed forces consist of a lot more than just divisions and the manpower demands are not concentrated in the front-line troops.

It is safe to say that US manpower might have gotten a bit low but if necessary they could have put together a lot more divisions than they did. By 1943-44 they were actually cancelling warships and cutting back on aircraft production!


To understand the German predicament in 1942-45 you have to understand what they thought they were doing in 1941. Based on the German experience in Russia in WW1, and on Soviet performance against Finland, Hitler and the German generals seem to have believed that a single campaign would wreck the Soviet armies and allow them to take whatever they wanted, directly or at the peace talks. What the Imperial armies had done in three years in WW1, they hoped to do with motorized/mechanized units in one - the same method as in France, just on a bigger scale. There were no plans for successive campaigns because there weren't going to be any.

They did not pay attention to the forced-draft industrialization of Lenin and Stalin and did not see that Stalin would re-instate disgraced generals and improve the quality-level of army leadership. The Soviets had lots of armaments on hand because they made rugged, 'soldier-proof' gear that could be used hard and re-used... and because they started armaments production in the 20s and 30s and stockpiled it. Come the invasion, they opened up the storehouses, re-used the equipment of the dead and moved entire factories to the secure heartland alongside the new-built ones already there. Production suffered, and they had equipment shortages and had to use some obsolete equipment like small anti-tank guns... but the issues of WW1, with soldiers not having rifles and ammunition, had been corrected.

The single biggest obstacle to Russian military performance in WW1 - the Tsar's incompetent, corrupt administration - was removed and replaced with a regime that was capable of enforcing its will and willing to do anything to win. The horrors of Soviet rule are very real but Stalin and his men did 'force-draft' Russia to produce manpower and war materiel on a scale the Germans did not imagine, and would have nightmares over. Consider: when German military intelligence reported that all of the Soviet divisions existing when Barbarossa started had been confirmed as destroyed, the Soviet army in the field was then larger than its strength when Barbarossa started. And better equipped...

The Russian army at the start of Barbarossa was not just larger than the German intelligence estimate, it was (including reserve divisions) several times larger. And where western nations like France were able to mobilize before the battles started, the surprise nature of Barbarossa meant the Soviet reserves were behind the lines and available for later service. Where France ran out of room and surrendered when her main forces were cut off, the Soviet Union could (painfully and unwillingly) give up the Ukraine and several armies and still have manpower to raise new forces. Admittedly they were short of manpower in 44-45, but the Germans ran out somewhere between 42 and 43... and the Allies knocked out Italy and were clearly preparing to land in France...

But as for manpower... Hitler and his generals went into Russia with everything they could, hoping for and needing to land a single knockout blow before their oil reserves ran out. In 1941 it looked like they might succeed with 'just one more push'. In 1942, Hitler drove his allies to send troops to the East but there wasn't time or equipment to re-arm them (Luftwaffe and SS divisions were taking some as were new armored formations and Germany was having to make all of its arms from a zero stockpile in the late 1930s). 1942 saw the manpower run down, the destruction of 6th Army and the even greater loss of men and equipment in Tunisia, so from that point on German manpower was effectively out. And in 1943 the Red Army showed it had learned how to fight effectively and that it still had strength in reserve.

Germany could not draw reliable manpower in large numbers from its subjects and allies, either because they didn't have the economic base to supply large numbers of men, or because the men could not be equipped, or because the men resented being shipped off to a foreign war and were not reliable, or because those allies supported Hitler from fear and so did the minimum to avoid being swallowed. German treatment ensured the population of occupied areas could not be used.

The Soviet Union, with a larger population base to start from, could match or exceed German fighting power by 1943. Given the needs of other areas (North Africa, bomber defense, invasion of Italy, defense of France and Norway, submarine campaign) the demands on German manpower were not confined to the Eastern Front and could not meet overall needs.

So: TLDR - Germany was fighting on three fronts, the Soviet Union on one.

 

[1 Star General]

To understand the German predicament in 1942-45 you have to understand what they thought they were doing in 1941. Based on the German experience in Russia in WW1, and on Soviet performance against Finland, Hitler and the German generals seem to have believed that a single campaign would wreck the Soviet armies and allow them to take whatever they wanted, directly or at the peace talks. What the Imperial armies had done in three years in WW1, they hoped to do with motorized/mechanized units in one - the same method as in France, just on a bigger scale. There were no plans for successive campaigns because there weren't going to be any.

Yes, that's what they thought before Barbarossa began. The first signs of confusion why isn't it over yet started to show by late August /early September 1941. By the end of the year it was clear to all that the war will be long and strategic/economic dimension is going to be the key. Hence 1942 campaign was all about the drive for resources. It's clear the thinking in Berlin has changed after failures of winter 1941. The question then is, why didn't they readjust their industrial and strategic planning accordingly.

Germany could not draw reliable manpower in large numbers from its subjects and allies, either because they didn't have the economic base to supply large numbers of men, or because the men could not be equipped, or because the men resented being shipped off to a foreign war and were not reliable, or because those allies supported Hitler from fear and so did the minimum to avoid being swallowed. German treatment ensured the population of occupied areas could not be used.

The Romanians and Hungarians fought fairly well for that matter. The problem was they were not equipped properly. So we come back to the core question - of German industrial capacity. Germany was a much more industrialized and better organized economy in comparison to the Soviets. It enjoyed a period of relative peace and quiet at the home front and they had control over resource and industry pool of the large part of the European continent. Why did it get so outproduced by the Soviets, since it was their economy that was thrown in total disarray by initial German gains and it was them who lost large swats of key population, industrial and agricultural regions. Soviet Union was really close to economical collapse, food shortages were constant and severe. That I guess is the most interesting question.
Some research seems to point at Hitler's reluctance for implementing full scale war economy measures as coming through fear, that if he tightens the screw to much, the Germany will be thrown in crisis resembling the so called 'stab in the back' in WW1. But I'm not sure I'm fully convinced, the war was going badly off rails and the stakes were too high.

 

[Semper Victor]

For those who are interested about the Soviet issues with manpower, I heartily recommend The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, by Walter S. Dunn Jr. It offers solid numbers and puts the alleged Soviet lack of manpower in perspective.

 

[Director]

So we come back to the core question - of German industrial capacity. Germany was a much more industrialized and better organized economy in comparison to the Soviets.

As I said, the Germans didn't start massive armament production until the 1930s or so. The Soviets were pushing industrialization and armaments production from the time they came to power. From what I know, Hitler didn't permit a full shift to military production until fairly late, and I think a lot of their production potential was not optimally used. And a fair bit went to turning Luftwaffe and SS divisions into elite formations.

Giving allied and subject troops new equipment is only part of the issue - they have to be trained in its use. And if they have equipment of their own, and you just need them to hold a quiet sector, then why re-equip them? Having planned on a short campaign of a single season, why would Germany need to crank out masses of equipment for divisions they didn't plan to field? And when they discovered they needed it, they didn't have the time or resources to produce it.

 

[1 Star General]

As I said, the Germans didn't start massive armament production until the 1930s or so. The Soviets were pushing industrialization and armaments production from the time they came to power.

Which is irrelevant, as the Soviets started from a much lower baseline, and, crucially, most of the Soviet equipment produced earlier was proved obsolete on the field of battle in 1941. They won the war using gear manufactured AFTER German invasion (and they outproduced the Germans badly in terms of post 1941 output).
When it comes to the advantages they might have had in terms of pre-established chains of production, they mostly got nullified by loosing ground in Barbarossa - they only managed to relocate parts of their industry and even that was a complete mess at start. The Soviet industry had to be completely reorganized.

Giving allied and subject troops new equipment is only part of the issue - they have to be trained in its use. And if they have equipment of their own, and you just need them to hold a quiet sector, then why re-equip them?

Ahm... Because the frontlines were extremely long and the Germans were tragically overextended...? And they were fully aware of that. Bringing back the Don bend situation, were the Romanians held the wings of the 6th army, German high command kept alarming Hitler since early Falll 1941 that it's a disaster waiting to happen.
The Allies had substandard gear in inadequate quantities and even holding the line on the Eastern front was beyond their capabilities and the Germans were aware of that. The Allies kept bringing it up as a priority problem at the highest levels (e.g. Antonescu-Hitler talks) and cited it as the reason for reluctance to send bigger contingents. Also German staff reports of combat effectivness of the allied troops were rather clear. Re-equipping and training them was definitely doable, assuming the gear was available. So the real question is why it wasn't?

Having planned on a short campaign of a single season, why would Germany need to crank out masses of equipment for divisions they didn't plan to field? And when they discovered they needed it, they didn't have the time or resources to produce it.

I guess we're talking a bit past each other, as I keep referring to post 1941 strategic and industrial planning, and you keep bringing up pre-Barbarossa planning. I'm consciously playing a bit of devil's advocate role here, but let's at least discuss the same time-period. Hitler's approach to war has visibly changed in 1942 on the operational level, which reflected his realization that the war will be decided by the strategic/resource/industrial factors (he famously scolded his Generals constantly for taking these factors into account). After the failure of Barbarossa the whole German leadership realized the war is going to be long, and plans for 1942 didn't assume the single season drive to victory anymore.
Winter 1941/42 was also the time to adjust industrial/strategic planning and contrary to what you say, it could be done, as demonstrated by what happened afterwards. Wehrmacht's strength (both numerical and gear wise) peaked in 1943. German war economy capacity peaked even more late into the war, demonstrating how much potential there was earlier. If the Germans adjusted their economy earlier, they could've equip much stronger allied force.
So the real question is, why didn't they?

From what I know, Hitler didn't permit a full shift to military production until fairly late, and I think a lot of their production potential was not optimally used

Now, this is were you actually tackle the questions I posed in my posts (pity that in just 2 sentences). This is where, so to say, 'the bodies are buried'. Now, as stated earlier:
Some research seems to point at Hitler's reluctance for implementing full scale war economy measures as coming through fear, that if he tightens the screw to much, the Germany will be thrown in crisis resembling the so called 'stab in the back' in WW1. But I'm not sure I'm fully convinced, the war was going badly off rails and the stakes were too high.
If you could elaborate on that, I'd be obliged Cheers.

 

[Director]

I guess we're talking a bit past each other, as I keep referring to post 1941 strategic and industrial planning, and you keep bringing up pre-Barbarossa planning. I'm consciously playing a bit of devil's advocate role here, but let's at least discuss the same time-period.

You keep asking how the Russians outproduced the Germans and I keep pointing to the war the Germans expected to fight. And you keep asking how the Soviets out-produced the Germans and I keep pointing out Soviet emphasis on industrialization and armaments production from the 1920s onward.

So the real question is, why didn't they?

Same answer - they planned on a single knockout campaign, then thought they could get it done in 1942 and then had to try to figure out what to do next after Stalingrad and Tunisia happened.

Hitler's appreciation of the resource needs of the war pre-dates 1942. It is only that, after the 1941 campaign is not conducted according to his ideas, in 1942 he takes control and mandates the offensive in the south, for oil.

Now, this is were you actually tackle the questions I posed in my posts

Funny... I thought I'd been doing that as we went. Since I haven't, please feel free to do your own research and report your conclusions. As you say we are talking past each other and its time to stop.

 

[Henry IX]

Aye but the Soviets even at the end of the war were replacing their losses every single time while still maintaining Industrial production

By the end of the war the frontline Soviet divisions were often down to less than 4000 men - less than 1/3rd of nominal strength. The Soviets had basically run out of manpower by 1944 and were relying on drafts of fresh manpower from new classes (which they were calling up earlier and earlier) and manpower from newly reconquered territory.

The manpower difference was partly due to the Soviet Union's much younger population. Germany's manpower was impacted by the 'missing years' of the classes born between 1914 and 1918 in addition to the various problems of the Weimar republic such as hyper-inflation. In the same period the Soviet population had exploded and as a result they had a much younger population with a far higher proportion of conscriptable manpower.

In addition, the Soviet Union had a far smaller 'tail' than the other major powers. Most of the manpower of a rifle division was frontline soldiers. In comparison German divisions had a nominal strength around 50% greater than a Soviet division while actually having less frontline riflemen. While this was actually a problem for the Soviets (their formation consistently underperformed throughout most of the war) as they lacked the specialist roles that act as force multipliers, it did contribute to the German perceptions of endless hordes of Soviet soldiers.

I gotta say, this question has also been bugging me as of late. When it became clear that the war in East will be an attritional drag (at the latest winter 1941), the Germans did indeed solicit help from Hungary, Romania and to a lesser degree other European vassals and allies. But not nearly as much as they could. And the allied forces were really not armed to the task. I often hear there wasn't enough equipment to field a larger force and the state of allied divisions in the East seems to confirm that. But it still is puzzling for me that the Soviets, who lost large parts of they're most valuable area (population centers, industry, resources, infrastructure) could so dramatically outproduce the Germans - controlling most of Europe, in 1941/1942 still largely fairly pacified and not bombed to smithereens yet. It just doesn't add up. Yes, Europe lacked oil. But it had plenty of coal and steel and dense rail network, and you don't necesserily have to arm allied armies with tanks. For holding the line (around Don bend in winter 1942 for example) they could compensate with artillery (field, antitank, AA). After all, it was the most mortal of all kinds of weaponry, same in WW2 as in WW1. It's confusing.

Ideology and planning. The Germans planned for a short war, which the 'primitive and bestial' Soviets were always going to lose. The Soviets viewed war from a Marxist perspective, as a economic phenomenon where the side that can out-produce the other will win.

As such, the Soviets planned for a sustained campaign of total and ruthless mobilisation. The Soviet civilian economy virtually ceased to exist, with the Soviet population working very long hours on minimal rations, all to feed the military machine. In addition, the Soviets concentrated heavily on a small number of military products - generally only producing a handful of variants and types of major weapon classes. This was carried through to the point that superior weapons systems were rejected or put on hold so as to maintain production levels of existing weapon systems, for example the 57mm high velocity AT gun was abandoned in favour of the inferior but easer to produce 42mm and 76mm AT guns - the 42mm being a pre-war design and the 76mm being a variant of the ubiquitous 76mm field gun.

The Soviets also simply didn't produce whole classes of weapon systems such as shaped charge AT weapons (e.g. bazooka, PIAT, panzerfaust), half-tracks, armoured cars and capital ships. This allowed them to concentrate on making massive numbers of the things they did produce. They were partly able to do this because they were able to make up some of the shortfall with lend-lease and partly by simply accepting the limitations the lack of such systems produced.

The Germans embraced a 'warrior elite' ethos that attempted to equip the best division with the best equipment at all times. This meant that they were continuously upgrading equipment types and produced a huge range of different equipment. In addition, they had to fight a war across multiple fronts and against multiple enemies, meaning that they needed a navy and an air-force capable of multiple mission types, demanding many types of aircraft. Add to this chaotic economic management of the Nazi party and the difficulties in manning factories due to the needs of the army - Germany was fully mobilised by 1941, and there was really no way for the Germans to match Soviet production in the weapon types the Soviets concentrated on.

The Germans also never really got much out occupied Europe except for plunder and slave labour. This is partly due to the short term nature of German planning - they tended to plunder without regard for the consequences, resulting in the collapse of the French farming sector, and also always prioritised Germany first, meaning that French factories were starved of coal and iron, leading to miniscule levels of production from nominally substantial industrial assets. It is also related to the sheer brutality of the Nazi occupation, which basically ensured that the population would resist them in any way possible, the easiest being to just not both helping. What possible reason would you have for working hard for the Germans? The population of occupied Europe simply did not do anything more than the minimum required to avoid Nazi attention causing the productivity of non-German workers to be less than half of that of German workers. Hence, the theoretical productivity of occupied Europe was never really helpful to the Germans.

Finally, it is worth noting that the German economy was fundamentally resource constrained and most of the nations they occupied in Western Europe also had the same constraints, compounding rather than improving Germany's fundamental capabilities.

 

[1 Star General]

You keep asking how the Russians outproduced the Germans and I keep pointing to the war the Germans expected to fight. And you keep asking how the Soviets out-produced the Germans and I keep pointing out Soviet emphasis on industrialization and armaments production from the 1920s onward.

This is the answer which is usually given. It is is my opinion unsatisfactory for the reasons I stated in the part of previous post which you ignored, namely:

Which is irrelevant, as the Soviets started from a much lower baseline, and, crucially, most of the Soviet equipment produced earlier was proved obsolete on the field of battle in 1941. They won the war using gear manufactured AFTER German invasion (and they outproduced the Germans badly in terms of post 1941 output).
When it comes to the advantages they might have had in terms of pre-established chains of production, they mostly got nullified by loosing ground in Barbarossa - they only managed to relocate parts of their industry and even that was a complete mess at start. The Soviet industry had to be completely reorganized.

Now if you see no problems there then I guess we're out of things to discuss. But thanks for engaging.

 

[Henry IX]

Ahm... Because the frontlines were extremely long and the Germans were tragically overextended...? And they were fully aware of that. Bringing back the Don bend situation, were the Romanians held the wings of the 6th army, German high command kept alarming Hitler since early Falll 1941 that it's a disaster waiting to happen.
The Allies had substandard gear in inadequate quantities and even holding the line on the Eastern front was beyond their capabilities and the Germans were aware of that. The Allies kept bringing it up as a priority problem at the highest levels (e.g. Antonescu-Hitler talks) and cited it as the reason for reluctance to send bigger contingents. Also German staff reports of combat effectivness of the allied troops were rather clear. Re-equipping and training them was definitely doable, assuming the gear was available. So the real question is why it wasn't?

The Germans were never willing to weaken their forces to help their allies. In contrast to the Western Allies, who equipped all their forces to rough parity so a Brazilian division was about the same as an American one, the Germans always ensured their own forces were equipped first.

Ultimately this is a combination of ideology and trust. Hitler felt free to rip up any treaty or alliance whenever it suited his needs and presumably had to assume his 'allies' would do the same. Certainly neither the Romanians nor the Bulgarians had any real loyalty to Hitler and would likely have betrayed him if they were likely to benefit from doing so. Would you arm them to the same standard if you were in the same position.

The relative industrial weakness of Germany also meant that any equipment that was sent to their allies was equipment that was effectively removed from the Wehrmacht, unlike the Western Allies who had plenty of spare equipment.

Of course the best strategy would have been to disband some of the depleted infantry divisions in late 1941 and re-equipped allied divisions to replace them, both increasing combat power on the front lines and freeing manpower for the factories (hence increasing production) but this would have required trust and planning, neither of which the Nazis were renowned for...

 

[1 Star General]

Ideology and planning. The Germans planned for a short war, which the 'primitive and bestial' Soviets were always going to lose. The Soviets viewed war from a Marxist perspective, as a economic phenomenon where the side that can out-produce the other will win.

As such, the Soviets planned for a sustained campaign of total and ruthless mobilisation. The Soviet civilian economy virtually ceased to exist, with the Soviet population working very long hours on minimal rations, all to feed the military machine. In addition, the Soviets concentrated heavily on a small number of military products - generally only producing a handful of variants and types of major weapon classes. This was carried through to the point that superior weapons systems were rejected or put on hold so as to maintain production levels of existing weapon systems, for example the 57mm high velocity AT gun was abandoned in favour of the inferior but easer to produce 42mm and 76mm AT guns - the 42mm being a pre-war design and the 76mm being a variant of the ubiquitous 76mm field gun.

The Soviets also simply didn't produce whole classes of weapon systems such as shaped charge AT weapons (e.g. bazooka, PIAT, panzerfaust), half-tracks, armoured cars and capital ships. This allowed them to concentrate on making massive numbers of the things they did produce. They were partly able to do this because they were able to make up some of the shortfall with lend-lease and partly by simply accepting the limitations the lack of such systems produced.

The Germans embraced a 'warrior elite' ethos that attempted to equip the best division with the best equipment at all times. This meant that they were continuously upgrading equipment types and produced a huge range of different equipment. In addition, they had to fight a war across multiple fronts and against multiple enemies, meaning that they needed a navy and an air-force capable of multiple mission types, demanding many types of aircraft. Add to this chaotic economic management of the Nazi party and the difficulties in manning factories due to the needs of the army - Germany was fully mobilised by 1941, and there was really no way for the Germans to match Soviet production in the weapon types the Soviets concentrated on.

The Germans also never really got much out occupied Europe except for plunder and slave labour. This is partly due to the short term nature of German planning - they tended to plunder without regard for the consequences, resulting in the collapse of the French farming sector, and also always prioritised Germany first, meaning that French factories were starved of coal and iron, leading to miniscule levels of production from nominally substantial industrial assets. It is also related to the sheer brutality of the Nazi occupation, which basically ensured that the population would resist them in any way possible, the easiest being to just not both helping. What possible reason would you have for working hard for the Germans? The population of occupied Europe simply did not do anything more than the minimum required to avoid Nazi attention causing the productivity of non-German workers to be less than half of that of German workers. Hence, the theoretical productivity of occupied Europe was never really helpful to the Germans.

Finally, it is worth noting that the German economy was fundamentally resource constrained and most of the nations they occupied in Western Europe also had the same constraints, compounding rather than improving Germany's fundamental capabilities.

Yes, that is all true and thanks for laying it out in detail. But as further war years proved Germany readjusting to full war economy measures achieved very substantial gains in output terms. And it seems to be a consensus in the literature, that they resorted to it really really late. Why not earlier? The war was going off rails and the stakes were enormous.
Yes, they planned for a short war, but those fantasies were put to death with the failure of Barbarossa. The campaigns of 1942 were of a different nature already and from what I read the German leadership realized even if they win Fall Blau big, it would give of course them access to resources to fight a long war, but it won't necessary mean the collapse of the Soviet Union. There was a recognizable readjustment of thinking in the German elite after Barbarossa, from short war to long war calculations. But implementing full war economy came much much later and that's where the heart of my question lies, I guess, why?
As to Soviet industrial strategy, yes it seems to be a crucial factor and with a background in mentality and ideology, as you point out. But one can't really not marvel - how did they pull that one off? Large parts of the most populated, developed and resource rich lands occupied, the chaotic evacuation, +/- 10k rail cars to evacuate essentials of just 1 factory and there were hundreds, chaos of deliveries to new destinations (rail cars marked with chalk - and it rained some times)... All in all, reorganization of industry on gargantuan scale, with inevitable loses in the process, with completely new chains of supply built from scratch... All of that in conditions of non existent civilian economy and tragic food shortages. I guess the answer must lie somewhere in the totality and and ruthlessness of the regime, mixed with genuine patriotism and sacrifice of the ordinary Russians, but it is incredible nevertheless. And contrary to that, the Germans enjoyed quite a peaceful period on the home front. That contrast is striking and, in turn, provokes the question - how could the Germans screw up so bad?