Could an intelligent Italy have made a difference in WW1?

[Ming]

Luigi Cadorna is rightly regarded as one of the worst military strategists of WW1.

The strategy he implemented was to never give up in the face of adversity, no matter the consequences. Ignore whether the force you commanded could actually execute the strategy you settled on, or whether any army that ever existed could actually execute it.

This is why there were 11 offensives on the Isonzo river over the course of 3 years. Only one of which came anywhere near any metric of success and even that one couldn't have resulted in the breakout planned. Then, when the men under his command failed to execute an impossible strategy, he started executing them.

But what if the Italians tried a more intelligent approach that integrated better with Allied grand strategy?

I get that politically, Italy probably needed to try to occupy Istria and Trentino, but instead of launching 3-4 futile offensives a year, why not just 1 or 2 while sending an expeditionary corps to a different theater?

Italy probably wouldn't be able to organize anything substantial until 1916, but they should be able to operate in the med fairly freely.

They had just defeated the Turks in 1912 and even had a base to operate out of Rhodes. Could they have conducted an operation in support of Galipoli? Maybe send a corps to the sinai/palestine front?

If increased pressure on the Turks opens a supply route to Russia is the history of the war changed?

There must be good reasons this wasn't done. Surely there's gotta be more to it than the Cadorna-virus.

 

[bz249]

There must be good reasons this wasn't done. Surely there's gotta be more to it than the Cadorna-virus.

It is just a guess, but if the Italians achieve something against the Turks then they will demand their "lawful" share. Surely more than that

Treaty of Sèvres - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Was it something the Entente really wanted?

 

[Nikolai II]

There must be good reasons this wasn't done. Surely there's gotta be more to it than the Cadorna-virus.

Checking this post it seems like Cadorna was just the tip of the iceberg. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/it-military-incompetence.htm

The officer corps was steeped in the dogmatic military traditions of Piedmont and Savoy, and it tended to view their soldiers as an unpatriotic and unreliable rabble that could only be induced to fight through a regime of harsh discipline and the threat of punishment. These attitudes prevented the army from developing the “infrastructure” of morale, such as proper recreation facilities, coherent leave and rotation policies, realistic training programs, and a systemic means for explaining the war to the soldiers, throughout most of the conflict. When these lapses were coupled with the severe conditions that the Italians faced at the front, it was little wonder that the average soldier was discontented with his lot. It was only after the disaster at Caporetto that the Italian Army began to make systemic changes to address these problems.

Over 58 percent of the Italian Army was composed of peasants. This group, which made up a disproportionate percentage of the army’s infantrymen and illiterates, suffered the greatest losses of any class during the war and tended to be the most antiwar group in the nation. Wilcox argues that this demographic reality created unique morale challenges for the Italian Army. The peasants brought with them to the army expectations of a social contract between the leader and the led that mirrored the traditional “client-patron” relationships of their home villages. When these men believed that their officers and the army had failed to live up to their obligations, they felt free to act in their own interests to correct the imbalance. As the soldiers felt much more obligated and connected to their families than to the army or the nation, their resistance generally came in the form of desertions to aid those back home in bringing in the harvest or to meet other familial responsibilities. As Wilcox notes, however, some 60 percent of those who deserted later willingly returned to the ranks once their home obligations were met.

Italy might also simply have lacked the ability to send an army to Turkey, or more exactly to also send food and ammunition to it afterwards.

But it seems likely that anyone they'd put in command would probably have acted the same, or his generals would have forced him to act in a similar way.

 

[Rubidium]

I mean, the post-Cadorna Italian army was actually reasonably successful. They recovered from Caporreto, and eventually managed to not just push the Central Powers back, but even occupy Trieste in the closing months of the war. It's not inconceivably that a reasonably competent commander might have been willing to settle for smaller, more focused (and successful) offensives.

And they certainly could have intervened in the Balkans more decisively. But ultimately, the Italian front was never going to be the site of a decisive breakthrough that changed the war, and the Italian army was too small and fragile to make much difference.

A more interesting question would be an Italy that stays loyal to the Triple Alliance and sides with the Central Powers early on? A second front in the Alps would have been a serious challenge to France early on (although I doubt that Cadorna would have been any more strategic about fighting the French than the Austrians), and a joint Austro-Italian fleet (supplemented with the Goeben and Breslau, which is the whole reason they were there in the first place) would have been, at least on paper, a strong contender for control of the Mediterranean (and cut off the French from their African colonies, which were an important source of reinforcements in the early days of the war).

 

[Ming]

It is just a guess, but if the Italians achieve something against the Turks then they will demand their "lawful" share. Surely more than that

Treaty of Sèvres - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Was it something the Entente really wanted?

Well, the British were willing to offer Cyprus to Greece in 1915 if they joined the war. Maybe the French had other ideas, but I don't think it would have been too much to at least let the Italians think they would get something out of it. I mean, they eventually got a zone out of Sevres anyway.

Checking this post it seems like Cadorna was just the tip of the iceberg. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/it-military-incompetence.htm


Italy might also simply have lacked the ability to send an army to Turkey, or more exactly to also send food and ammunition to it afterwards.

But it seems likely that anyone they'd put in command would probably have acted the same, or his generals would have forced him to act in a similar way.

It would take time to organize, equip, and ship an expedition surely, but if they aren't throwing walls of bodies and clouds of shells at the Isonzo front then something should be possible. They were able to defeat the Ottomans and seize aegean islands just a few years earlier.

An extra division of rifles in the Sinai would be worth something in 1916, even without artillery. A corps changes the whole campaign. Also, what changes in Gallipoli if there's prospect of an Italian relief expedition?

I agree there probably would not be a vastly different Italian army just by removing Cadorna.

 

[Director]

Italy may have had good reasons for joining the Central Powers, but those were outweighed by political and economic considerations.

The first was the nature of the defensive alliance, which did not oblige Italy to join in unless Germany or Austria were attacked first. It was in Italy's interest to claim that had not been the case, and so they did so. This allowed Italy to basically open a bidding war for its military services.

In that bidding, Austria could and would not agree to part with any territory. The Entente, however, were quite happy to promise Austrian territory to Italy.

Further, Italian economic interests were closely allied with France and Britain, and Italy received much of its energy stocks (coal) from Britain. The CP were not going to be able to replace those stocks... or help defend Italy's long, long coastline.

So it was apparent early on that Italy would either remain neutral or - for a sufficient payment - enter the war on the Allied side.

But the actual value of Italy's military contribution, versus the expense to the Entente, was questionable. The country was politically fragile and economically under-developed, and there was a lot of tension between the northern and southern populations. Italy - like a lot of other nations - was just not going to be able to equip and sustain a large army in a long war. As against that, the Austrians were pretty well hated, so a war against them - especially a successful war - could help weld the nation together.

Attacking across the Isonzo position should have been abandoned after the first few disasters, but like Joffre, Haig and Conrad, bloody disaster did not seem to dissuade Cadorna. An Italian corps or two, inserted at the very start of the Dardanelles affair (when the fleet was committed to go it alone) might have helped knock the Ottomans out of the war. Or, with Allied naval assistance, landings in Dalmatia could have stressed the Austrian earlier and harder.

For the CP, the best outcome would have been for Italy to be a friendly neutral and trading partner. For the Allies, I agree that the Italian Army would have best been used overseas.

 

[Herbert West]

I'll again refer to the ACOUP blog. To summarize:

1. Militarily, there was nothing of value on that front for Italy to take.
2. However, there was political pressure to do something rather than just sit in the trenches. Granted, part of this pressure is coming from Cadorna, but there is a general WWI madness to act.
3. There was a general understanding that to claim territory, they would have to occupy it.
4. Italy absolutely lacked the real killing power necessary to do anything on that front, eg they lacked heavy artillery.
5. They could probably have been served better as extra fodder on the Western front.
6. However, they did tie down significant A-H armies that could have gone to other fronts.

Summa summarum: Yes, Italy could have done better. No, Italy could not have done that much better.


@Director: good points overall, but some quibbles:

1, A long coastline is actually not that big of a hinderance. Sure, shore bombardements are bad to be at the receiving end of, but they weren't all that common for reasons of mines and
2, Landing in Dalmatia is an absolute non-starter. It is even worse terrain than Isonzo, as far as pushing out goes, and none of the harbours would be big enough and secure enough. Think Gallipolli squared.
3, True, the best use would have been overseas, but that would have been blatant meat shield application. Probably not politically viable.

 

[Director]

@Herbert West - I agree with you - except:

1) A long coastline is an absolute strategic problem, unless you have naval superiority. Italy would have naval superiority over the Central Powers, whereas she would be seriously out-gunned by a British-French force.

I offer the Austrian bombardment of the port and rail center of Ancona right after Italy joined the war in 1915, which seriously delayed Italy's mobilization, as proof of the vulnerability of a long coastline. If Italy's navy is not able to win superiority then every port from Genoa to Syracuse is open to Entente attacks.

An invasion of Sicily in WW2 brought down the Mussolini government. I doubt it would have as serious an effect in WW1, but still... protecting that long coastline, with indifferent railroads that mostly have to run along the coast rather than inland, would tie down a large proportion of Italy's army.

2) Yeah. Landing in Dalmatia would be seriously risky - unless it was very lightly defended. Some pinprick raids would force the Austrians to deploy covering forces, and - who knows? - landings in Albania or Montenegro might go OK, especially so if the locals hate the Austrians more than the Italians.

3) We know the political cost of repeated battles of the Isonzo, which was high. I do agree that the best political strategy was for Italy to push for Pola and Trieste, it's just that the military cost of that is a non-starter. I suppose it depends on how much the Italians could learn from the battles on the Western Front before they joined the war, and how much influence the politicians had over the generals.

Despite Italy's good alpine troops, ANY campaign in WW1 is going to be one of numbers, attrition and casualties. If I were running their war I'd look for overseas campaigns as an alternative to fighting in the mountains.... and I would not go against my economic partners in the Entente.

 

[bz249]

Italy may have had good reasons for joining the Central Powers, but those were outweighed by political and economic considerations.

The first was the nature of the defensive alliance, which did not oblige Italy to join in unless Germany or Austria were attacked first. It was in Italy's interest to claim that had not been the case, and so they did so. This allowed Italy to basically open a bidding war for its military services.

In that bidding, Austria could and would not agree to part with any territory. The Entente, however, were quite happy to promise Austrian territory to Italy.

Further, Italian economic interests were closely allied with France and Britain, and Italy received much of its energy stocks (coal) from Britain. The CP were not going to be able to replace those stocks... or help defend Italy's long, long coastline.

All of these would have been out of the window if e.g. Germany won the Battle of Marne, since Italy (like Romania) had demands against both side, but was not prepared for a long war anyway (the plan was to use the pre-occupation of Austria-Hungary and go quickly through the Alpes and then the war will be over). The CP however could not offer a short, easy victory, while attacking A-H had this premise. But Italy was so ill-prepared that they cannot achieve it.

 

[Ming]

I mentioned in my OP that trying to advance against Austria-Hungary would be politically necessary for Italy, but it would have been smarter to try something other than going 110%. at the Isonzo over and over again and expending men at a rate Italy could not sustain.

If we find someone better than Cadorna but still without any foreknowledge or special genius, they are going to keep thinking what everyone else was up until about 1916, which is that they've about got the trench problem solved if they just have another go with a few more men, a few more guns, a new gizmo from the boffins, a little more elaborate of a plan, whatever.

My thinking is Italy could still try all that, just with less intensity. If they skip every other offensive on the Isonzo, that's over 100,000 casualties conserved by mid 1916, enough for a potent expeditionary force.

But where to send it?

I'm skeptical that expanding operations in the Adriatic would pay much dividends. Certainly, more pressure on AH is good, but I don't think they were near cracking until 1917 at the earliest and as Herbert pointed out, the terrain prohibits operations that could threaten something vital. Even if an unrealistic Brusilov level victory is achieved the Germans could just come in and shore things up. It's a better idea than more Isonzo, but not one that dramatically changes the war even if everything goes right, unless it happens before Oct 1915.

Italy actually did send some divisions to the western front. Sending more doesn't change much unless it frees up allied divisions to be sent somewhere else like Salonica (Another place Italy sent troops to) or the Middle East. That might be the best plan if internal politics allows it, especially if it could be worked out before Serbia is overrun.

The ottoman fronts on the other hand, seem like they would be the perfect mix of factors: Ability of Italy to act independently or take a key role in joint operations, possibility of massive success changing the war, and the opposition being more of a mess than Italy.

If Italy could somehow get something organized for the Balkans by late 1915 that might be a better move, but that could be beyond their ability and they might not be interested in trying until too late for Serbia anyway.

 

[bz249]

I'm skeptical that expanding operations in the Adriatic would pay much dividends. Certainly, more pressure on AH is good, but I don't think they were near cracking until 1917 at the earliest and as Herbert pointed out, the terrain prohibits operations that could threaten something vital. Even if an unrealistic Brusilov level victory is achieved the Germans could just come in and shore things up. It's a better idea than more Isonzo, but not one that dramatically changes the war even if everything goes right, unless it happens before Oct 1915.

Italy actually did send some divisions to the western front. Sending more doesn't change much unless it frees up allied divisions to be sent somewhere else like Salonica (Another place Italy sent troops to) or the Middle East. That might be the best plan if internal politics allows it, especially if it could be worked out before Serbia is overrun.

The ottoman fronts on the other hand, seem like they would be the perfect mix of factors: Ability of Italy to act independently or take a key role in joint operations, possibility of massive success changing the war, and the opposition being more of a mess than Italy.

If Italy could somehow get something organized for the Balkans by late 1915 that might be a better move, but that could be beyond their ability and they might not be interested in trying until too late for Serbia anyway.

I guess the problem with the Ottoman front is two fold. If the major Entente players would have thougt it important enough AND/OR the logistics have allowed it they could surely send a French / English colonial corps themselves even though they sent to e.g. Saloniki (thus they were not that narrow minded). And if Italy achieves something major there the price will be just too high, so why we should allow it.

Against even though the chances are extremely low as of 1916, Isonzo is still a potential war winner which could take Austria-Hungary out of the war.

 

[Rubidium]

@Herbert West - I agree with you - except:

1) A long coastline is an absolute strategic problem, unless you have naval superiority. Italy would have naval superiority over the Central Powers, whereas she would be seriously out-gunned by a British-French force.

I offer the Austrian bombardment of the port and rail center of Ancona right after Italy joined the war in 1915, which seriously delayed Italy's mobilization, as proof of the vulnerability of a long coastline. If Italy's navy is not able to win superiority then every port from Genoa to Syracuse is open to Entente attacks.

An invasion of Sicily in WW2 brought down the Mussolini government. I doubt it would have as serious an effect in WW1, but still... protecting that long coastline, with indifferent railroads that mostly have to run along the coast rather than inland, would tie down a large proportion of Italy's army.

It's actually far from clear who would have naval superiority in the Mediterranean in the case of a CP Italy. The Austrian and Italian fleets combined outnumbered the French fleet fairly heavily on paper (7 dreadnoughts to 3, if I am counting right), so it would come down to how many dreadnoughts the British were willing to spare (remembering that, unlike WWII, the German High Seas Fleet was not that much weaker than the Royal Navy, so the British would need to keep a hefty fleet to defend their home waters). Indeed, Triple Alliance pre-war planning had emphasized the Mediterranean theater fairly heavily (it's why the Germans had a battlecruiser and a light cruiser there in 1914 in the first place, as their contribution to the combined fleet). In practice, I imagine you see more or less a stalemate, with neither side actively seeking battle but content to remaining a fleet-in-being to deter the other.

Of course, with the Goeben and Breslau fulfilling their original purpose instead of going to create an international incident, the Ottomans may remain neutral for a little longer (I imagine they still end up siding with the Central Powers unless the war is an obvious disaster, but it will take longer for a CB to emerge).

2) Yeah. Landing in Dalmatia would be seriously risky - unless it was very lightly defended. Some pinprick raids would force the Austrians to deploy covering forces, and - who knows? - landings in Albania or Montenegro might go OK, especially so if the locals hate the Austrians more than the Italians.

Italy occupied the port of Vlore in Albania before joining the war, and would attempt to retain a protectorate over the country afterwards. An Italian focus on Albania wouldn't be decisive, but it might keep Serbia in the fight somewhat longer, and would certainly strengthen the Italian position there politically.

3) We know the political cost of seventeen battles of the Isonzo, which was high. I do agree that the best political strategy was for Italy to push for Pola and Trieste, it's just that the military cost of that is a non-starter. I suppose it depends on how much the Italians could learn from the battles on the Western Front before they joined the war, and how much influence the politicians had over the generals.

Despite Italy's good alpine troops, ANY campaign in WW1 is going to be one of numbers, attrition and casualties. If I were running their war I'd look for overseas campaigns as an alternative to fighting in the mountains.... and I would not go against my economic partners in the Entente.

Yeah, with hindsight by far the best option for Italy would have been to remain neutral. Sending large numbers of Italian troops to the Western Front seems politically a non-starter (even the US in 1917, with no direct territorial interests, didn't want to be put under European control and insisted on its own section of the front; I can't imagine "here, you Italians can fill in as needed in fighting for France" would have gone over well with the Italians either), even if it was probably the best idea strategically.

Politically the Italians are going to need to do something (both for their diplomatic position, but also to justify the suffering that the homefront will inevitably suffer in any war; the Entente may be their biggest trading partners, but they still had plenty of trade with the Central Powers as well), but there are few good options. That said, fighting eleven battles over the Isonzo is clearly the worst of their options.

 

[Director]

It's actually far from clear who would have naval superiority in the Mediterranean in the case of a CP Italy.

A very good point.

I believe it would come down to intangibles, including the powerful mystique of the Royal Navy. It is perhaps difficult for modern people to recapture the feeling, but the Royal Navy had been model and mentor to the world's navies, and it was thought to be unquestionably the best trained and equipped. For Italy it would be rather like a son taking up arms against his father - without the materiel, supplies and coal stocks his father could provide. And I do have trouble seeing Italian and Austrian naval forces working together - the memory of Lissa (and of the war for Venice) is still fresh. More likely would be a division of areas, with the Italians in the west and south, and the Austrians in the Adriatic and Greek waters, so far as their short ranges would permit.

Italy emphasized very high speeds in its warships, and built troop-carrying facilities into its first battleships, because they believed their long, exposed coastline required the navy to make a fast response. If you are going to cover landings, you have to establish control and maintain it - which would probably be beyond the Entente's means anywhere except Sardinia, perhaps Sicily, or the coast behind Genoa to Livorno. Of course, there are all those seaside railroad lines...

I believe that somewhat equivalent forces, aggressively used, could produce a situation much like World War II, with neither side able to control the waters but both able to contest for it, unless Churchill pushes for a Sardinian/Sicilian campaign. I would think there would be lots of cruiser-destroyer fights and few involving battleships, partly for want of fuel.

The French 'Danton' class pre-dreadnoughts were actually pretty good ships, if the engagement can be brought in to moderately close ranges. Add to that the seven dreadnoughts of the 'Courbet' and 'Bretagne' class and you have a respectable force. (On paper - which is the same way we would evaluate the Italian and Austrian navies). Add in a few RN capital ships - some of the early 12" dreadnoughts, and/or a couple of early battlecruisers, and I think you could cover landing in, say, Sardinia or even Sicily without pulling too much off the Grand Fleet. Certainly there would be no pause in capital ship construction in Britain from 1916 on.

If Italy goes with the Central Powers, the strong repercussions that I can see would be that the Serbs would be cut off - there would be not even a chance of an Entente landing in Greece - and the Ottomans would be free to concentrate on Russia and the Levant with no worries for Istanbul. There would be no 'second front' at the Dardanelles (and hence potentially a longer career in the Admiralty for Churchill), no distraction from the trenches in France for the British Army, and little or no shipping goods across the Mediterranean.

Even if Italy did not contribute much to the CP side, subtracting that little from the Entente and adding it to the CP side might shift the war. The Austrians and Ottomans would be relatively stronger and Russia no better off or a little worse. A slight difference might bring the Entente to the bargaining table.

 

[Yakman]

Sure. Italy could have done the smart thing and stayed neutral and hundreds of thousands of Italians would not have been killed or wounded senselessly

 

[Ming]

Sure. Italy could have done the smart thing and stayed neutral and hundreds of thousands of Italians would not have been killed or wounded senselessly

That goes for just about everyone in the war.

Even the Serbs would probably have answered the ultimatum differently if they knew what was in store for them.

 

[Yakman]

That goes for just about everyone in the war.

Even the Serbs would probably have answered the ultimatum differently if they knew what was in store for them.

Control of a Yugoslav Empire? That was the whole objective…

 

[Ming]

I'm not Serbian, or born in the late 1800s, but if you told me everyone I know has a 1 in 3 chance of dying but afterwards we get to paint a map our color for 20 years but then the Germans get to come in, perpetrate a genocide, after which we have to give it to the commies who get to have it for the next 50 years when it all falls apart into genocide again . . . I'd say 'no thanks'.

 

[Avernite]

A very good point.

I believe it would come down to intangibles, including the powerful mystique of the Royal Navy. It is perhaps difficult for modern people to recapture the feeling, but the Royal Navy had been model and mentor to the world's navies, and it was thought to be unquestionably the best trained and equipped. For Italy it would be rather like a son taking up arms against his father - without the materiel, supplies and coal stocks his father could provide. And I do have trouble seeing Italian and Austrian naval forces working together - the memory of Lissa (and of the war for Venice) is still fresh. More likely would be a division of areas, with the Italians in the west and south, and the Austrians in the Adriatic and Greek waters, so far as their short ranges would permit.

Italy emphasized very high speeds in its warships, and built troop-carrying facilities into its first battleships, because they believed their long, exposed coastline required the navy to make a fast response. If you are going to cover landings, you have to establish control and maintain it - which would probably be beyond the Entente's means anywhere except Sardinia, perhaps Sicily, or the coast behind Genoa to Livorno. Of course, there are all those seaside railroad lines...

I believe that somewhat equivalent forces, aggressively used, could produce a situation much like World War II, with neither side able to control the waters but both able to contest for it, unless Churchill pushes for a Sardinian/Sicilian campaign. I would think there would be lots of cruiser-destroyer fights and few involving battleships, partly for want of fuel.

The French 'Danton' class pre-dreadnoughts were actually pretty good ships, if the engagement can be brought in to moderately close ranges. Add to that the seven dreadnoughts of the 'Courbet' and 'Bretagne' class and you have a respectable force. (On paper - which is the same way we would evaluate the Italian and Austrian navies). Add in a few RN capital ships - some of the early 12" dreadnoughts, and/or a couple of early battlecruisers, and I think you could cover landing in, say, Sardinia or even Sicily without pulling too much off the Grand Fleet. Certainly there would be no pause in capital ship construction in Britain from 1916 on.

If Italy goes with the Central Powers, the strong repercussions that I can see would be that the Serbs would be cut off - there would be not even a chance of an Entente landing in Greece - and the Ottomans would be free to concentrate on Russia and the Levant with no worries for Istanbul. There would be no 'second front' at the Dardanelles (and hence potentially a longer career in the Admiralty for Churchill), no distraction from the trenches in France for the British Army, and little or no shipping goods across the Mediterranean.

Even if Italy did not contribute much to the CP side, subtracting that little from the Entente and adding it to the CP side might shift the war. The Austrians and Ottomans would be relatively stronger and Russia no better off or a little worse. A slight difference might bring the Entente to the bargaining table.

Did Entente shipping use the Mediterranean much in ww1? I know its blocking in Ww2 was a big deal, and of course in ww1 the Suez was under threat for a good while, but overall it seems it was much safer.

 

[Herbert West]

A very good point.

I believe it would come down to intangibles, including the powerful mystique of the Royal Navy. It is perhaps difficult for modern people to recapture the feeling, but the Royal Navy had been model and mentor to the world's navies, and it was thought to be unquestionably the best trained and equipped. For Italy it would be rather like a son taking up arms against his father - without the materiel, supplies and coal stocks his father could provide.

No offense, but this reads like something straight out of a 1916 RN propaganda leaflet. Sure, a lot of navies had some level of admiration of the RN, and vice-versa.

But it was not seen as an unbeatable juggernaut, nor were "lesser" navies incompetent buffoons. Cases in point: Ancona Raid, Otranto, sinking of the Szent Istvan.

Furthermore, the RN did, to some extent, drink its own cool-aid ("armour? what armour, we got speed!"), and was far less invincible than it thought. Case in point: all of Gallipoli.

An Adriatic/Mediterranean campaign would have not been a one-sided affair by a long shot. Hell, it wasnt one in WWII.

 

[bz249]

No offense, but this reads like something straight out of a 1916 RN propaganda leaflet. Sure, a lot of navies had some level of admiration of the RN, and vice-versa.

But it was not seen as an unbeatable juggernaut, nor were "lesser" navies incompetent buffoons. Cases in point: Ancona Raid, Otranto, sinking of the Szent Istvan.

Furthermore, the RN did, to some extent, drink its own cool-aid ("armour? what armour, we got speed!"), and was far less invincible than it thought. Case in point: all of Gallipoli.

An Adriatic/Mediterranean campaign would have not been a one-sided affair by a long shot. Hell, it wasnt one in WWII.

On the other hand the iterations of the German Navy were faithful followers of this religion and always went to the battle with a loser mentality (see Admiral Graf von Spee the Admiral and the ship named after him or Ingenohl, or Lütjens) and the WW2 Italian Navy was also not renowned for their unbreakable will to go toe-to-to with the enemy.