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Fire_Unionist

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This is sort of a spin-off of a previous thread I made, but extended to the entire war rather than Britain and France solely. We always get a lot of threads that ask whether the Axis could have won and how, so I like to look at how the Allies could have done even better than they actually did.

So, starting in September of 1939 (meaning that we can`t reverse any of the decisions that were made before that point), what is the earliest point at which the allies could realistically have won the war, and what decisions would have needed to be taken differently? Include the pacific theatre as well.
 
I could see a year earlier, with no sideshow in Italy, invasion in 1943 and a capitulation some time 1944, but not much earlier.
 
Why do I have complete deja vu for the what would happen if you popped back in time to change the outcome of a war?
 
I think if the French had managed to bleed the Germans a bit more in the Battle of France, and the Brits successfully fended off a German invasion of Norway, then the war could've been shortened. A bloody nose in France and an exposed flank to the north might've caused just enough hesitation in Germany to allow Stalin's armies the time they needed to recover from the Great Purge.
 
Strategic bombing of electric power stations in Germany as a priority target. The allies correctly diagnosed the German power grid as densely interconnected with many generation facilities. As a result they felt that it would not be a good target for attack.

What they missed was that the vast majority of dispatachable power production came from a tiny number of very large plants - most of which would not have been terribly hard to hit.

They also underestimated the effect that taking the electricity out might have. Many factories and machine shops in the UK and other places still depended on ‘direct drive’ from a nearby steam driven plant, or other locally generated sources of power. Germany by contrast (and the US as well) had shifted heavily to electrically operated machine tools and equipment getting power from the grid. This meant that electrical shortages would have major impacts on industrial production. Indeed the Nazis themselves were generally aware of this danger and couldn’t understand why it wasn’t targeted more heavily and aggressively.
 
They could have ignored Europe and focused on Japan, while maintaining lend lease to such a level that the soviets are unable to be quite as effective in their counterattack. Once the two have bled themselves dry, come in around probably 47 or so and clean up. Cold war will be over in the 50s.

Oh, WW2 again... actually take Norway instead of just mining it. Or, at least, make this a serious defensive effort and do not pull out to defend France. Cutting off German supplies up here by 1940 is a big deal, and even if not, it's a far better place to defend and technically they even held out longer than France in spite of losing expeditionary support to her.

Skipping Italy is a mistake. That was a grinder for German elite forces to get bottled up and pummeled. If anything, rush to Italy even faster than OTL.
 
If Market Garden didn't suffer from the numerous, completely avoidable setbacks that plagued the otherwise well-planned and well-fought operation, it could have allowed the Allies to smash the Germans against the Rhine, or at least put them in a very good position to end the war sooner.

Before then, I don't know if they really could have done things significantly better. It took a lot of hard work and a bit of luck to get to where they were in late 1944.
 
Best case scenario: Successful counter-attack in 1940 leads to 4 panzer divisions get cut off in northern France without fuel. German generals launch coup against Hitler and negotiate a truce by Christmas out of fear of the looming soviet threat to the east. Decades later nerds on the paradox forums debate whether the Second Entente War could have lasted longer and what effect that might have had on the British and French empires.
 
Best case scenario: Successful counter-attack in 1940 leads to 4 panzer divisions get cut off in northern France without fuel. German generals launch coup against Hitler and negotiate a truce by Christmas out of fear of the looming soviet threat to the east. Decades later nerds on the paradox forums debate whether the Second Entente War could have lasted longer and what effect that might have had on the British and French empires.
Does Charles de Gaulle save the Third Republic in this scenario?
 
Does Charles de Gaulle save the Third Republic in this scenario?

I think that in order for this scenario to be pulled off, you would need a larger force then he commanded. So it probably indicates that Gamelin guessed exactly right instead of exactly wrong and Gamelin becomes the hero. For decades afterwards war colleges talk about the need for meticulous planning and "operational intuition" in order to win a war.
 
Best case scenario: Successful counter-attack in 1940 leads to 4 panzer divisions get cut off in northern France without fuel. German generals launch coup against Hitler and negotiate a truce by Christmas out of fear of the looming soviet threat to the east. Decades later nerds on the paradox forums debate whether the Second Entente War could have lasted longer and what effect that might have had on the British and French empires.

If alien space bats (any french attack above brigade strength) are allowed then the Battle of Bzura... the mighty Polish Army pushes aside the Wehrmacht and reaches Berlin October 1939.

More honestly... the best chance the Allies had is politics. A well timed and executed flip of Romania led to the collapse of the Southeast. If Hungary can pull of the same during the Battle of Debrecen

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debrecen

than the christmas of 44 begins the siege of Vienna and not Budapest (if such a blow could be absorbed at all)

Similarly if the Italians did a better job at defecting and keeping at least Rome/guarding Mussolini better then the Allies had been given months of advance.
 
I could see a year earlier, with no sideshow in Italy, invasion in 1943 and a capitulation some time 1944, but not much earlier.
That would be wrong as Operation Dragoon wouldn't have been able to take place, as Italian and elite German divisions would have been moved to the South of France from Italy, therefore D-Day itself would be put at greater risk. Rundstedt/Rommel plus Kesselring's forces would have devastated the Allies in France. Also Italy was still a fascist threat that needed to be taken out of the war period either by capitulation or overthrowing Mussolini for the war to end.

The only area where the Allies would have saved some time would have been not carrying out Anzio in the way they did and somehow shortening the siege of Monte Cassino. Which is rather difficult.
 
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That would be wrong as Operation Dragoon wouldn't have been able to take place, as Italian and elite German divisions would have been moved to the South of France from Italy, therefore D-Day itself would be put at greater risk. Rundstedt/Rommel plus Kesselring's forces would have devastated the Allies in France. Also Italy was still a fascist threat that needed to be taken out of the war period either by capitulation or overthrowing Mussolini for the war to end.

The only area where the Allies would have saved some time would have been not carrying out Anzio in the way they did and somehow shortening the siege of Monte Cassino. Which is rather difficult.

Or doing it more agressively... 24/07/1943 Mussolini dismissed... 08/09/1943 the German occupation of Italy begins. The Allies had a good month to prepare for the takeover of Italy. They could have held Rome from Automn 43 thus no need for the Anzio Landing and the Battle of Monte Cassino.
 
If alien space bats (any french attack above brigade strength) are allowed then the Battle of Bzura... the mighty Polish Army pushes aside the Wehrmacht and reaches Berlin October 1939.

More honestly... the best chance the Allies had is politics. A well timed and executed flip of Romania led to the collapse of the Southeast. If Hungary can pull of the same during the Battle of Debrecen

https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Debrecen

than the christmas of 44 begins the siege of Vienna and not Budapest (if such a blow could be absorbed at all)

Similarly if the Italians did a better job at defecting and keeping at least Rome/guarding Mussolini better then the Allies had been given months of advance.
You're being unfair on the French, even if they did make a bad show.

They absolutely had command and control capable of deploying divisions and armies to specific spots. Mind, it would require them blundering into exactly the right spot (a timeline I read assumes an Escaut plan followed by one of the Escaut corps moving east to reinforce the Sedan area in response to the initial German attack, only to be so slow as to have the German panzers already past that point, thus hitting a weak point; mind, I think they also had some British division along), but that's not impossible.

An alternative, though not sure how well that could be done from 1939, is to just leave Belgium & the Netherlands entirely to their fate (or only reinforcing with second rank divisions), and accidentally leaving the core reserves right in the path of the Panzers; they'd be chewed up, sure, but might hold long enough to prevent any breakthrough. And any week the French have to figure out what they're doing is another one where they get vastly better at fighting - and the Germans run further deficits in their one-shot-settles-it 1940 campaign.
 
You're being unfair on the French, even if they did make a bad show.

They absolutely had command and control capable of deploying divisions and armies to specific spots. Mind, it would require them blundering into exactly the right spot (a timeline I read assumes an Escaut plan followed by one of the Escaut corps moving east to reinforce the Sedan area in response to the initial German attack, only to be so slow as to have the German panzers already past that point, thus hitting a weak point; mind, I think they also had some British division along), but that's not impossible.

An alternative, though not sure how well that could be done from 1939, is to just leave Belgium & the Netherlands entirely to their fate (or only reinforcing with second rank divisions), and accidentally leaving the core reserves right in the path of the Panzers; they'd be chewed up, sure, but might hold long enough to prevent any breakthrough. And any week the French have to figure out what they're doing is another one where they get vastly better at fighting - and the Germans run further deficits in their one-shot-settles-it 1940 campaign.

They had serious issues with marching in good order and/or execute an attack with the forces planned at the time planned.

Sure they were good as long as the battle was about holding a line (that was demonstrated by the second phase with the Weygand line). However as long as there is a meeting engagement they have as good chances as a snowball in hell.

No matter how was their initial deployement... they had at least 4 days to pull back something for the defense of Amiens/Abbeville. They did not managed to do instead they made some hasty counters by at most division strength units.

edit: Leaving Belgium alone means they have a longer front to defend with less forces. The Dyle-plan was a good idea, the Dyle-Breda probaly not, but given how reliable the left flank composed of the Belgian Army and the BEF was... the 7th Army was where it was needed the most, at least according to the original concept
 
Sure they were good as long as the battle was about holding a line (that was demonstrated by the second phase with the Weygand line). However as long as there is a meeting engagement they have as good chances as a snowball in hell.

Considering that there was one such battle and the French won it...
 
Have the Belgians agree to allow the allies to take up their planned defensive positions before the spring invasion. Even if the panzers punch through the Ardennes the allied response is much less pressured, possibly enough to recover. The Belgians knew the Germans were coming ever since the plans for the invasion were captured. I read somewhere that I can't recall that this was very nearly granted at one time, so not too far fetched.


Option #2, never capture the plans in the first place and face the Germans in a winter 1940 offensive right into the Dyle like hitler wanted. Probably even better results.
 
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Simply allow George Elsner's bomb to explode 20 minutes earlier on November 8, 1939. You would have cut the head off the snake, the only man who could control the Nazi party was Hilter, the rest all hated each other too much to get along. You would solve the problem once and for all.
 
Considering that there was one such battle and the French won it...

That's why the scattered remnants of the Panzer Korps melted away in the defense of Moenchengladbach.
Wait it was the scattered remnants of the Cavalry Corps melted away in the defense of Lille.
Apparently priouxic victory is damn more costly than pyrrhic victory.
 
France survives in 1940. All that requires is a better disposition of forces and average luck. From there you're waiting a year, maybe two, as the Allies build strength and the German war machine eats itself.

Otherwise one might try a landing in France in 1943. The Italian Campaign gets a very bad press, certainly compared to its achievements, but this doesn't mean it was the only option. A 1943 landing in France (probably have to be instead of Sicily, with the decision made before Tunis falls) would run into some issues with greater German airpower and a lack of the same preparations, but benefits from other factors such as lighter defences; a beachhead is certainly possible, whether one sees the same spectacular collapse of German fighting power as was historically seen is another question.

If Market Garden didn't suffer from the numerous, completely avoidable setbacks that plagued the otherwise well-planned and well-fought operation, it could have allowed the Allies to smash the Germans against the Rhine, or at least put them in a very good position to end the war sooner.

Before then, I don't know if they really could have done things significantly better. It took a lot of hard work and a bit of luck to get to where they were in late 1944.

Market Garden was just a bad plan from the ground up to be honest. These weren't completely avoidable setbacks, so much as structural flaws in the entire idea. One might still pull it off (indeed, I've a few ideas myself), but even then I don't see it resulting in earlier success; the issue is that even if one reaches Arnhem and crosses the Isjell, you are still left with a precarious supply line, existing logistical overstretch, and a long way to go before the Germans lose anything vital. Really the big effect there is an earlier liberation of Holland, with substantially less suffering there as a result.

Or doing it more agressively... 24/07/1943 Mussolini dismissed... 08/09/1943 the German occupation of Italy begins. The Allies had a good month to prepare for the takeover of Italy. They could have held Rome from Automn 43 thus no need for the Anzio Landing and the Battle of Monte Cassino.

A Rome landing was considered, but was out of the range of aircover. Moreover, people seem to have confused their chronology and missed the fact that Allied forces were still engaged in Sicily at the time Mussolini fell.

Option #2, never capture the plans in the first place and face the Germans in a winter 1940 offensive right into the Dyle like hitler wanted. Probably even better results.

This is another possibility.