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EUG_MadMat

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Mar 1, 2017
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Let’s focus today on the 21st Army Group‘s best division in North-Western Europe: the 15th (Scottish) Infantry Division
https://www.eugensystems.com/steel-division-normandy-44-15th-scottish-infantry/

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AFAIK, LAH didn't have Panzer III, or if so only a handful as Bef.Panzer.
I don't recall which Panther variants they had, but I doubt they had all three. If I recall, 12. SS-Panzer was the one best-doted with G, then I guess LAH had D or A, and maybe received only a handful of G as reinforcements.
Yet, as most old SS divisions, it had its own StuG-Abteilung, hence you can add quite a few StuG III G.
Tank strength was 50x Panzer IV, 38x Panther & 45x StuG III on June 1st. For the whole campaign, the division used 103x Panzer IV, 72x Panthers & 45x Stugs.

Regarding infantry, LAH was notoriously lacking transports, especially h/t. It only had 1/4 of its overall transports at D-Day, and ZERO h/t!
It received a few h/t during the campaign, but never had more than ~30 at hand. So, one of the division's feature should be very restricted in h/t-borne infantry, and only available in latter phases.

Several elements of the division remained in Belgium, including:
* it's Werfer-Abteilung, save one battery (
* 5,/SS-Flak-Abteilung 1 (hence cut the number of 37mm Flak)
* III./SS-Artillerie-Rgt. 1 (that's were all the >150mm big guns are, hence no 150mm off-map artillery support?)
* 1,/Panzeraufklärungs-Abteilung (hence cut the number of scouts in SdKfz 250 in half)

I'm not sure the division ever got Jagdpanzer IV ...

Wittmann & Tigers make sense, since s.SS-Panzer-Abteilung 101 was attached to I. SS-Panzerkorps, of which LAH was part as 12. SS-Panzer.

Air ... well, anyone knowing me would tell you I'm not the one to ask any advice about planes. I let the GDs deal with that, they're much morknowledgeablele than I am on that aspect. :)
 
Quite aware of that...also quite aware of his performance.

What of his performance? My understanding was that he was an excellent commander with a successful career, with the exception of Market garden, although to be fair it was quite ambitious (which is quite unlike Monty) and he's not an Airborne Commander.
 
What of his performance? My understanding was that he was an excellent commander with a successful career, with the exception of Market garden, although to be fair it was quite ambitious (which is quite unlike Monty) and he's not an Airborne Commander.
He made for a good divisional commander, but he was out of his depth beyond that.

At Alamein, he took a plan which was already formulated, and failed to develop any follow up plan for once a breakthrough was achieved. He failed to drive his armour forward, and utterly failed in the pursuit.

In Normandy, he virtually ignored the US front, and the one serious strategic offensive on the Brit/Canadian sectors was a 600 tank suicide run that failed in a matter of hours...after that he settled down to the tactics he used at Alamein, being a series of grinding attrition battles.

In Market-Garden, he failed to oversee the plan development, and implementation. He failed to ensure that the tactical and strategic air forces were used in any coherent manner, and in fact this failure led to the germans having air superiority for the entire battle. He failed to actually fight the battle, with the result that the main ground force assault generated further and further down the chain of command so that decisions impacting on the entire army group offensive devolved to the battalion/company commander level.

I will also point out that Montgomery was given his opportunity to progress the 'single thrust' offensive he had been advocating, and utterly failed.

In summary, Montgomery was a clown, and an embarrassment to the Brit Army. Largely detested by the Empire troops who had the misfortune to serve under him. To that extent, the Australian 9th Division association held a yearly re-union on the anniversary of Alamein, and despite inviting German commanders from the battle as guests, never had Montgomery, to the best of my knowledge.

Non-Australians don't realise the level of animosity towards Churchill and to a lesser extent Montgomery that former servicemen hold for those two.
 
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He failed in the pursuit? He advanced 2000 km in 3 months, and by the end of it the battle of medenine happened which demonstrated how changed the british army was under him, while not only Rommel, but also Auchinleck and Wavell, failed to reach the end of their advances with a steady force and not suffer setbacks that reversed their whole advance, while his further advance from Medenine to Sousse and enfidaville in tunisia was the decisive event that made the tunisian campaign end when it did, as seen in the difference of these two maps

https://historicalresources.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/tunisia-situation-22-april-1943.jpg

And no, there was no plan for El alamein formulated. Aunchinleck tried to argue that the plan for Alam el halfa was already formulated. The plan for El Alamein, and the changes done to the strategy as the battle was occuring, were all due to Montgomery. So much "fails" in a 2 week battle the british suffered 12.000 casualties and the germans and italians 70.000, with some 20.000 germans managing to go back to Tunisia simply because they literally stole italian vehicles and etc.

In normandy he did not ignore the US front at all, he had constant meetings with Bradley and Dempsey, and his job was to coordinate them both, and he did that quite well, Montgomery's hand is as much as in Cobra as in Goodwood. (and Goodwood is a singular operation simply because it cant be thought without the main point, that is it was an operation to continue the pressure on the british sector BUT to relieve the infantry divisions and give them some rest, hence why it happened as it did, though note that even in the horrible "disaster" that is goodwood the germans suffered some 3.000 soldiers captured, some 2.000 casualties, while the british overall were 3.000, double standards indeed.)

Oh and, come again, after Goodwood, in mid july, the british switched to the tactics in el alamein? (not to mention that if el alamein is grinding attrition battles its one that causes 7 times as casualties to the opponent?).

Though yes, Montgomery did settle down to the tactics used in El Alamein, because they worked. And he did that from week 2 of the normandy campaign to the end, basically doing limited attacks on the german lines, then preparing these new grounds quickly for the expected german armoured counter attack, planning to diminish the german tank numbers by the use of AT guns, and not have sidi rezegh type battles, but Outpost Snipe all over again.


Market garden is a different thing, rushed indeed, but then it all went down because of the failure of the 82nd to capture the nijmegen bridge quickly, and forcing the guards armoured division to get engaged there instead of just going through. Certainly montgomery could have had a tighter control of the plans, but the context of that period is important. Though, no, market garden is absolutely NOT the single thrust that montgomery was advocating, he was advocating a 40 division thrust in there with 2 army groups, his and bradley's, and not just a few 2nd army divisions and the 3 airborne divisions.


Oh and again, no. 8th army troops, and specially 2nd army troops, loved Montgomery. British and commonwealth troops were well cared for under him, trained, well fed, and etc.


Still, to put things in perspective, montgomery lost 13.000 in market garden. Bradley lost 35.000 in hurtgen forest, Patton 40.000 in Metz and lorraine, and these are at the same period. I mean, it took the americans 100.000 casualties to inflict 70.000 casualties on the germans in the bulge when the germans were in the offensive ffs, Montgomery only needed 13.000 in el alamein, but he is the clown yep. And it is even more funny when saying that the british had to do attrition tactics in normandy, when the british had much LESS casualties than, not only the germans -proportionally too-, but the americans themselves in normandy, and that is while they were fighting the main german opposition, all the tiger tanks and most of the panzer divisions, for the main defensive position the germans prioritized, Caen. So not only did the british suffer the least casualties in normandy, but they also inflicted the most in the germans between june, july and mid august, while after the breakthrough, the british also captured way more germans than the americans.

Imagine if any of the american generals had the record of Montgomery. He would be seen as Napoleon probably.

Though, this is all bloody off topic.
 
He failed in the pursuit because he didn't pursue...he simply followed. The offensive that crushed the Italian army a year or so earlier took a number of fortified encampments, then charged across the desert south of Cyrenaica through a massive khamsin to cut off the withdrawing Italians...Montgomery didn't even consider that, simply because he had no, read that as NO, plan for what happened after his battle was won...that is half-arsed officering, let alone generalship.

Montgomery's battle changes in Alamein were made because his original plans failed, and when his jury-rigged plans failed he then resorted to the last option...pushing Aust 9th through to the sea to draw off the bulk of the remaining armour. Years later Montgomery himself admitted that was why the battle was won...it was simply the quality of that division that allowed it to pivot in place, and launch a reinforced brigade forward with a day's notice, without armour support, into two regiments of infantry (pzr grenadier and bersaglieri, and a mixed kampfgruppe of armour).

Montgomery gave no plan to his US commanders to execute, he let them flounder through the bocage while he focussed on the Brit/Canadian front. He specifically stated in Jan '44 that he would have no centralised or unified breakthrough/breakout armoured corps, basically forcing army and corps commanders to fight an Army Group battle...a trait he showed at Alamein, and mastered in Market-Garden.

Brit troops might have loved him, but Empire troops, certainly the Australians and Kiwis, detested him...

The ground force losses for MG are somewhat disingenuous...you won't lose many troops when you are pushing an armoured corps up a road with a frontage of one tank to one troop of tanks.

If the US had a Montgomery, they would have had a second Fredericksburg or Cold Harbour.

More than happy to debate on a specific thread with you...
 
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Actually, Montgomery's advance from El Alamein to el agheila was ten times faster than O'connor's in compass. The difference is that Rommel was a little bit smarter than graziani and the italian generals in 1940/41. El Alamein had ended in 3 november 1942, and by 20 november Benghazi was in british hands. While the great victory in compass started the pursuit in December 10, 1940, and reached beda fomm in ... the start of february, 1941. Clearly the opponent is the factor between the difference of the two pursuits. Double standards indeed.

So now Montgomery didnt win El alamein because he used Auchinleck's plan, but because he made succesful corrections to his own plan during the battle which resulted in the end of it and the rout of the afrika korps, and he is a bad general for that? Lol ok.




Montgomery indeed give plans to Bradley to execute, though it was done in coordination with Dempsey too. So instead of having his two armies doing whatever they wanted, he actually coordinated their operations, unlike what Bradley did with his 3 armies later on. His plan laid out in April 7 1944 was mostly followed by the american army, while of course the switch to first focus entirely on Cherbourg (when Bradley realized it woudnt be captured quicky) and only then prepare for Cobra, was a suggestion by Bradley that Montgomery accepted. His june 30, 1944, directive clearly shows (and the constant meetings with bradley and dempsey) how he was doing his job as Army Group commander and fully coordinating his armies. Bradley later on had no idea what Simpson and Hodges were doing while Patton simply disobeyed his orders, but sure that is the perfect army group leader.