The issue with a lot of military literature and strategy is that they simply tend to describe how something happened, as opposed to
why specific actions happen. For example, most historians lionise Manstein's brilliant sickle cut in 1940. However, what is lesser known and totally outside of Manstein's prediction was that the Allies had to constantly predict where
was the main spearhead's true intention (encircling Maginot line like WW1, or Paris or towards channel). This was made worse by the fact that Luftwaffe had complete air superiority because
French Air Force had been balkanised over 20 years of demilitarisation and the RAF's bomber force was designed to attack a target sized of a city not tanks, whereas the Reichswehr had been secretly moulding their "virtual air force" specifically for ground support for 20 years (they even had radios en masse so tanks and Luftwaffe could communicate in real time). Had Allies had air superiority, Manstein's trickery could have been reduced to Battle of the Bulge.
Most historians also credited the German tank doctrine that allowed tankers to be independent and concentrated into a single division. However, as the war progressed, Germans' enemies began to
equip themselves AT down to battalion level which costed the German more and more of their precious tank crews. Of course they could have just return to infantry tank to conserve the manpower, however it was their doctrine to give birth to the mentality of a heavy breakthrough tank like the Tiger.
Come here to learn some war stuffs from the modders as they are actual NCOs not just armchair generals:
https://www.reddit.com/r/WarCollege/
