There were also times where it was very convenient for the folk in charge of the nation to be able to put said royal-to-peasant back in charge. In the late Joseon dynasty of Korea, for instance, the Andong Kims had an iron grip on power for much of the mid-19th century. After the then-king died without an heir in 1849, they found a distant relative whose closest link to the ruling dynasty was his great-grandfather Crown Prince Sado. The family had fled court to rural Ganghwa island after losing big in dynastic intrigues, to gloss over the matter, and the major point is that by the time the Andong Kims found Cheoljong, the 25th king of Joseon, his entire family lived in what was termed "wretched poverty." In spite of the pride in education among the yangban as part of the Confucian roots, he couldn't even read, had no idea how to act in court, and generally was the perfect puppet for the Andong Kims to maintain their rule due to his ignorance.
The above story, to tie it back to the thread, actually is indicative of a trend in Korean history in this era, which marked a growing increase in "fallen yangban" nobles who could no longer sustain the means of being noble in Joseon Korea. The fundamental reason is not entirely identical to the gavelkind rules of Europe noted in the thread, but it does boil down to the same thing: a growing lack of means. The gradual degradation of the state organs of governance meant that corruption was on the rise, with a concomitant rise in local taxation to cover the cost of bribes that squeezed not only the peasantry, but also landholders. As well, the growing monopolization of power by a few major families ever since the 18th century meant that many other families were frozen out of the old offices of government. This forced them to eke out a living based solely on their land rather than on the traditional salaries permitted to government officials, and many had only trivial estates to begin with. A growing permissiveness regarding the hiring of the illegitimate children of yangban families who couldn't keep their affairs in their pants also increased competition for posts from ostensible peers. Finally, one must also note that the era also marked growing social power by non-"noble" classes from the chungin, a hereditary class of technical specialists such as traders, physicians, scientists, and lesser government clerks, a further source of competition. In short, many yangban families were squeezed out from above, alongside, and below all at once.
