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I would like some of this implemented in the game, no that I have many hopes though


LOGISTICS IN PREINDUSTRIAL ARMIES

1) SUPPLY
There were 3 different ways to supply forces in the field, many times armies used all of them in a campaign.

a) Supply depots and supply trains
Several months before a given campaign (generally during the winter), supplies had to be gathered and supply depots to be established in the campaign area. Armies would operate based on a net of depots and supply trains, usually not farther away than a week march. Supply trains usually stopped every 3 days to resite ovens and bake fresh bread. Armies could establish new depots to extend their supply lines, this was especially plausible for locations connected by sea/river to the original supply depot net.
-Advantages
This system allowed to keep together large forces, concentrated ready for battle, also allowed to operate in poor or underpopulated areas.
-Disadvantages
Considerably restrained movement, as armies were all dependant on supply lines and roads. Very expensive

b) Subsisting from the countryside
There were several ways to do that. Foraging parties to supply horses were always required, even when acting from well-filled magazines. Requisitioning and levying war taxes were other possibilities, and of course it was plain plundering, some times used as a war tactic. For instance, it was a rule of war invade enemy territory to make it pay for war as much as possible, and to follow an indirect route of invasion and retire through a direct route plundering the countryside and so preventing the enemy from pursuit. For instance in 1644 the Imperial army under Gallas was forced to retire to Bohemia following their own route of invasion, the result was the loss of 17.000 out 18.000 men.
Advantages
It was easy to do, inexpensive, and allowed greater freedom of movement to armies
-Disadvantages
Armies had to be small, only some areas in Europe could support regular size armies without supply trains, so there was a danger that armies could be destroyed piecemeal by a concentrated enemy. Armies were further weakened by the detachment of many foraging parties Discipline relaxed.

c) To carry their own supplies
This was used very much by Roman armies, each soldier could carry about 15 day rations, so armies could march without the burden of a supply train for 15 days until they reached a supply depot to replenish supply. Those depots were previously established in the projected route of march, so a Roman army could cover a long distance in relatively short time.
-Advantages
It was less expensive than supply trains and allowed more freedom of manouver to armies.
-Disadvantages
Soldiers had to carry heavy loads, tiring them and limiting their war equipment. Food was many times short. In all, a very disciplined force was required for this method to be successful.

Many times an army mixed all this system in campaign, for instance keeping a main field army supplied and several small armies foraging, and then on some occasions delivering 3-5 day rations to the soldiers for fast movements.


2) BAGGAGE
This was composed by camp followers, servants, traders, etc, providing some services to the army, like cooking, washing, and many others presently assumed by the armies but then left to the private sector. The army baggage could be very big (sometimes numbering as much as 50% of the army strength) and to provide protection to it was always a concern to army commanders, and as those baggage trains usually can only travel by roads, they also had to be protected.




3) WAR EQUIPMENT

There are references for ancient and medieval armies that some spare equipment was carried in wagons behind the army, spears, shields, arrows and crossbows, and of course spare mounts. Fire arms increased very much the requirements of the armies, powder and ammunition, but overall artillery train straining the supply requirements, as many more horses were required to draw the guns and ammunition wagons.


It is interesting to see the order of march of the French in times of Louis XIV

After the army itself
1) Royal Baggage
2) High Officers Baggage
3) Artillery train
4) Cavalry Baggage
5) Infantry Baggage
6) Ammunition Wagons
7) Vivandières (camp followers)
8) Supply train
 
Not sure how important it will be in the game or how it will be implemented. But there are some examples I can think of.

During German invasions of Hungary, a riverine fleet usually followed the imperial army down the Danube from Regensburg.

For German campaigns in Italy, the Lombard cities were required to send "fodrum" for the imperial army. They usually complied if only to keep the Germans from ravaging their contado.

English campaigns in Scotland were usually accompanied by a supply fleet up the east coast.

Some of the examples you give are later than the CK timespan. I think generally medieval armies were forced to forage for supplies. So maybe like the EU2 system where each province can only support so many troops?
 
In CK timespan Byzantine armies relied heavily on supply depots, also English armies campaigning in Scotland acted from a net of supply depots in the border with Scotland. In general they could be an advantage over those enemies unable to use it by lack of organization.
 
It will be interesting to see how it is handled. But I have one query from teh above - I'm not sure how much in teh way of supplies will be available in winter. I'd have thought this was when starvation was most likely and surpluses at their lowest.

[Edit: thinking about northern climes in particular]
 
Actually, winter campaigns weren´t uncommon in Medieval Scandinavia. One reason is that the main harvest comes quite late in the year - say august/ september rather than may/ june as in the Mediterranean.

Also, the main period for slaughtering the animals were in the late autumn, say october/ november.

This means that autumn would be a good time to provision an army.

Winter also means snow and ice which means easy transportation through the use of sleighs and skiis - often the same waterways used by ships in summer were used by sleigh in winter.

Cheers,
Vandelay
 
Winter campaigns were in fact very common in medieval scandinavia. A famous example from the saga of Sverre has the infantry riding in sledges at the rear of the column, also carrying supplies, and the cavalry screening them in shifts.

The "no campaigns in winter" story is growing a bit old.

EF
 
Originally posted by Endre Fodstad
Winter campaigns were in fact very common in medieval scandinavia. A famous example from the saga of Sverre has the infantry riding in sledges at the rear of the column, also carrying supplies, and the cavalry screening them in shifts.

The "no campaigns in winter" story is growing a bit old.

EF
The winther "reysa" is also well known from the Baltics. It was one of the two main campaign seasons the Teutonic Order used.
 
I bet there'll be nasty penalties for fighting wars during winter, anyway.

Endre, as far as I've been taught, Sverre was a bit of an innovator in warfare in the Nordic countries. In what way? I've read that he used cavalry a lot more than others, but were there other ways too?
 
Yes Teutonic order campaigned in winter because then the terrain in the baltics was more favourable to them: in winter the boggy ground (which was common there) was frozen hard giving cavalry (and as such couched lance charges) better efficiency.
In summertime the Lithuanians always tried to fight the Teutonic knights on boggy/swamp like terrain, winter deprived them of this tactic.

(Hi Aryaman btw)
 
Well the winter didnt help them at Lake Peipus... :p
 
Originally posted by Norgesvenn
Endre, as far as I've been taught, Sverre was a bit of an innovator in warfare in the Nordic countries. In what way? I've read that he used cavalry a lot more than others, but were there other ways too?

Not really my fav period, but:

Sverre's main contribution to norwegian warfare is that he concentrated on directing his men in battle instead of personally participating in the fighting. This goes for both land and naval battles and seems to have worked like a charm. His strategic ability was also quite superior to his opponents. I've never seen Sverre described as an especially heavy user of cavalry, though-where did you read that?

EF
 
Originally posted by BarbarossaHRE
Well the winter didnt help them at Lake Peipus... :p

In which the order, according to their own sources which seem to love describing defeats and expounds on their own losses, lost under 20 knights(anyone got Christensen? I can't remember the precise numbers) killed. Truly one of the most hyped battles in history: Eisenstein spesifically said he choose it for his movie because the sources were so bad he could make up whatever he liked. David Nicolle will languish in the historian's limbo forever for his libertinian treatment and freewheeling writing in the Lake Peipus Osprey book. Check out this review:

Lake Peipus, 1242 or 1939?
This is arguably the poorest of Osprey's Campaign series. The author is clearly not familiar with the subject area, and as a result the book is marred by a considerable number of errors, especially in references to matters peripheral to the battle. For instance, on the map on p.26 the Finnish 'tribes' (Suomi and Hame (Rus. Jem/'Em/Emi), who were, contrary to the book's information, farmers) are in the wrong areas of Finland, 'Murman' become a Finnish tribe when the Russian name meant 'Norwegian', and a mysterious people called the Ugri inhabit the Ural region near the Mansi and Khanty (both of which constituted the Ugrian-speaking group of Finno-Ugrian speakers). There was no such person as 'Earl Karl Birger': presumably this is an error for Birger (Jarl) Magnusson, who possibly led a Swedish crusade to Finland (for which the only evidence is Erik's Chronicle, a rhyme chronicle written 50-70 years after the event). As regards the battle of 1242 itself, the poor sources are interpreted very freely. There is no good evidence that there were horse archers there, or that Mongols were fighting in Russian armies as early as this. The reference to attacks by archers on the Danes (king's men) might equally refer to foot archery, yet the horse archers become the key to victory in this account. The account is in any case confusing and full of baseless speculation, such as the idea that Novgorod chronicle tales of intervention by angels and saints from the heavens may have been a memory of showers of arrows. The number of knights at the battle must have been very small, since the total number of Sword Brothers in 1230 was about 120, 49 had been killed at Saule in 1236, others must have been in garrisons and the Teutonic Knights had not yet exerted their control over Livonia. The epic tale presented here seems to derive as much from Eisenstein's propaganda film as anything else, with Alexander Nevsky the hero. There are, however, a lot of nice pictures in the book, and if it inspires interest in the area it has some value.

(from http://www.hallofeuropeanhistory.com)

Argh. Sputter. etc.

EF
 
Originally posted by Endre Fodstad
In which the order, according to their own sources which seem to love describing defeats and expounds on their own losses, lost under 20 knights(anyone got Christensen? I can't remember the precise numbers) killed. Truly one of the most hyped battles in history: Eisenstein spesifically said he choose it for his movie because the sources were so bad he could make up whatever he liked. David Nicolle will languish in the historian's limbo forever for his libertinian treatment and freewheeling writing in the Lake Peipus Osprey book. Check out this review:

Lake Peipus, 1242 or 1939?
This is arguably the poorest of Osprey's Campaign series. The author is clearly not familiar with the subject area, and as a result the book is marred by a considerable number of errors, especially in references to matters peripheral to the battle. For instance, on the map on p.26 the Finnish 'tribes' (Suomi and Hame (Rus. Jem/'Em/Emi), who were, contrary to the book's information, farmers) are in the wrong areas of Finland, 'Murman' become a Finnish tribe when the Russian name meant 'Norwegian', and a mysterious people called the Ugri inhabit the Ural region near the Mansi and Khanty (both of which constituted the Ugrian-speaking group of Finno-Ugrian speakers). There was no such person as 'Earl Karl Birger': presumably this is an error for Birger (Jarl) Magnusson, who possibly led a Swedish crusade to Finland (for which the only evidence is Erik's Chronicle, a rhyme chronicle written 50-70 years after the event). As regards the battle of 1242 itself, the poor sources are interpreted very freely. There is no good evidence that there were horse archers there, or that Mongols were fighting in Russian armies as early as this. The reference to attacks by archers on the Danes (king's men) might equally refer to foot archery, yet the horse archers become the key to victory in this account. The account is in any case confusing and full of baseless speculation, such as the idea that Novgorod chronicle tales of intervention by angels and saints from the heavens may have been a memory of showers of arrows. The number of knights at the battle must have been very small, since the total number of Sword Brothers in 1230 was about 120, 49 had been killed at Saule in 1236, others must have been in garrisons and the Teutonic Knights had not yet exerted their control over Livonia. The epic tale presented here seems to derive as much from Eisenstein's propaganda film as anything else, with Alexander Nevsky the hero. There are, however, a lot of nice pictures in the book, and if it inspires interest in the area it has some value.

(from http://www.hallofeuropeanhistory.com)

Argh. Sputter. etc.

EF

Hehe. David Nicolle has alot more to answer for than just that title. He waves around his PhD like it means something, but his dates and facts are consistently and garishly wrong, especially his stuff on the medieval German empire.

Regardless, he didnt specify that there were Mongols present, he only gave some guesses as to who the mysterious "horse-archers" may have been. But even that clouds the facts; the important thing was simply that the Danes were struck in flank by archers. Whether they were mounted or not is irrelevant.

I wont defend Eisenstein since his work obviously doesnt belong in any historical discussion of the battle anyway...and if Osprey books are your main sources for anything, then youve got problems that go way beyond Nicolle. :p

But what any of that has to do with my post, I have no idea. :D
 
My opinion on Osprey books was high-when I was 12. They're good as a very brief introduction when you're totally unknowing on a subject but at the present they irritate me more than they enlighten me...when I bought the Kalka Book a few years ago I came to the section where Nicolle discusses weapons and armour - a subject he is supposed to be very knowledgeable about. I wonder where he got the idea that western straight swords are somehow heavier than turkish-style sabers, and that the saber-form somehow improves handling by having a "different centre of gravity". Yes, it's got a different center of gravity, all right - farther out the blade! Dorsal tapering, anyone?

EF
 
Originally posted by Endre Fodstad
My opinion on Osprey books was high-when I was 12. They're good as a very brief introduction when you're totally unknowing on a subject but at the present they irritate me more than they enlighten me...when I bought the Kalka Book a few years ago I came to the section where Nicolle discusses weapons and armour - a subject he is supposed to be very knowledgeable about. I wonder where he got the idea that western straight swords are somehow heavier than turkish-style sabers, and that the saber-form somehow improves handling by having a "different centre of gravity". Yes, it's got a different center of gravity, all right - farther out the blade! Dorsal tapering, anyone?

EF

I like the artwork. :D Angus McBride especially.

If youre into the military side, theyre still useful, if just for the artist composites from various sources. But theyre lean on actual history. I thought the Agincourt, Qadesh, Hastings, and Hattin ones were ok, but again, mainly for the artwork. I also like the photos of the battlegrounds. So even if you throw out the text altogether, theyre still fun to flip through IMO...but dont use them as a source for papers and such. :p
 
Well, I found Agincourt particularly bad, just a repetition of old views. In page 12 the author is happy to say that Burne computed the French army between 20.000 and 30.000, 60% of them men at armas, the rest "trained garrisons", mercenaries and feudal levies, no room for militia. In page 24 he says that the "common foot" soldier (later we learn he is talking about the militia of the northern regions of France) numbered around 20.000.
I think it is time someone says the truth about Agincourt and forget all that Shakespearian mithology. The French fighting force was actually outnumbered by the English.
BTW if you want to see Nicolle´s imagination fully in display read Yarmuk.
 
Originally posted by Aryaman
Well, I found Agincourt particularly bad, just a repetition of old views. In page 12 the author is happy to say that Burne computed the French army between 20.000 and 30.000, 60% of them men at armas, the rest "trained garrisons", mercenaries and feudal levies, no room for militia. In page 24 he says that the "common foot" soldier (later we learn he is talking about the militia of the northern regions of France) numbered around 20.000.
I think it is time someone says the truth about Agincourt and forget all that Shakespearian mithology. The French fighting force was actually outnumbered by the English.
BTW if you want to see Nicolle´s imagination fully in display read Yarmuk.

I dont have the Yarmuk title; like I said, the German one is bad enough, as is the Medieval Warfare Sourcebook, which wasnt an Osprey title (or was it?).

Like I said, though, I like Agincourt because of the artwork and photos. Same is true for the rest of them, although I have to admit, Ive never bought an Osprey later than the Middle Ages, so I have no idea what the Napoleonic/modern ones are like. But as in the case of Peipus, yes, the text might suck, but its cool to see photos of the lake from all sides, etc...since Im not rich enough to visit the battlefields in person... ;)
 
There are also sometimes problems with the artwork. As an off-hand example, just about every knight in the Bannockburn book is 10-15 years too modern(those 10 years are very important armour-wise in the early 14th century) and the footsoldiers are mostly free-running imagination.

Of course that one is not by Nicolle.

EF