One Confederacy Moment - Gone at Shiloh

[Jopa79]

Another front in the American Civil War is better known as the Western Theater. The Union experienced the western waterways on the River Mississippi vital because of the communications and commerence for the South, the river was also a link to the Confederate states of Louisiana and Texas. Mississippi Valley Campaign was a series of campaigns and battles fought in the American Civil War for the control of the Mississippi River and Mississippi Valley, which would be crucial to the outcome of the war.

Along tributaries, down the Tennessee River the Union Army of Tennessee had proceeded further south, but was surprised by the presence of the Confederate Army of Mississippi near steamboat docking place, known as Pittsburg Landing. Here, the Battle of Shiloh was fought April 6-7, 1862.

The Confederacy had the favoring odds in the pre-days of the Battle of Shiloh, it was aware of the approaching Union Army, but the Federal scouts reported only light Confederate skirmishers to be present near Shiloh. The Confederate intention based on this, the battleplan was to drive the Union forces away from the riverbanks, away from cannon-range of the steamboats. The Union Army was to be destroyed in the nearby swamps of Owl Creek before the anticipated arrival of Union Army of Ohio. However, the South lost greatly this advantage due to the bad, rainy weather. The Southern Army had to organize again its attacking formation, while regiments wandered in the woods and muddy roads.

Although, on the early morning attack, April 6, the Confederate forces surprised the Union forces, some of them still in the camps and tents. The Confederates achieved a sudden victory around the Shiloh church area. The Yankees were on retreat. Still, this was a disadvantage for the South as well. Because of this quick breakthrough, there was plenty of food, refreshments, alcohol, supplies and ammunition in the Yankee left-behind camps. Temptation was overwhelming for the southern boys, actually some of them never returned to the line, looting and drinking, leaving the battlefield. Furthermore, the Union troops retreated towards the river, not to northwest, towards the swamps as the Confederartes had planned and they couldn't turn this to their favor anymore 'cause of the confusion in the lines. In the view of the South, second precious moment was lost.

The Hornet's Nest was an Union defensive position they managed to organize after the fall of the lines near Shiloh church. In this peach orchard field, along the 'Sunken Road' the Union forces defended braverly against the charging Confederate troops. It was not until the evening, this line fell after seven hours of fierce fighting and remaining Union soldiers surrendered. This was again a major setback for the Confederacy, not only valuable time was lost again, but the bulk of the Union Army of Tennessee had retreated near the Pittsburg Landing and established a strong defensive line there, more bad news for the Confederates, their commanding general A.S. Johnston was mortally wounded during the Hornet's Nest and shortly died after this.

Mistakenly thinking that the Union Army could be easily swept out Pittsburg Landing in the next day, the Confederacy commanders ended the first day attack nearing the night approaches. The Union lifeline was about to arrive across the river. During the evening and the night the Union Army of Ohio arrived on the other side of the Tennessee River and was ferried across to the Pittsburg Landing.

The next morning, April 7 came, as too confident, or even foolhardy, the Confederates hadn't established a line of battle, nor their troops were fully resupplied during nightime. With the Army of Ohio, the Union outnumbered the Confederates roughly 45,000-20,000 in troops. But it was something the southerns didn't know, to their surprise the Union Army started to move towards the weak line and at the dawn launched massive counter-attack against them. During the morning hours the Confederate Army was driven back to the Shiloh church, from there some counter-attacks were launched on the Union line, but without any success. With the initiative lost, the Confederacy started to retreat towards Corinth. Yesterday's gains were gone as fast as they came.

Regarding the losses, the casualties and suffering, the Battle of Shiloh was terrible. The two-day battle was costliest in the American history upon that day. Of the total 100,000 of forces nearly 25,000 were losses and casualties and the outcome of Shiloh Battle is at least contradictory. According historians and researchers Shiloh is considered as an Union victory, but it could be inconclusive as well. The Union war effort in the Western Theater didn't make a headaway regarding the outcome of Shiloh Battle, the Union couldn't break Confederate supplylines, commercial or communications in the western riverways. In the view of Confederacy Shiloh wasn't a success either. The Union Army of Tennessee wasn't destroyed and therefore the North outnumbered the South still in the West. The Battle of Shiloh didn't give any advantage for the Confederacy in the fight of the control of the Mississippi Valley. Maybe, during the Shiloh, there were certain moments for the South to take an advantage, but they were lost either by mistakes or random effects. Because of so many unfortunate events and not using the moments some even say, Shiloh is part of the Lost Cause of Confederacy(an ideological movement, describes the Confederate effort as a heroic one against great odds despite the defeat). Eventually despite of Shiloh, the campaigns and battles were fought in the Western Theater until the end of the American Civil War.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Johnston was irreplacable. I also cant see what the Confederacy accomplished here while the Union kept the status quo (barely) calling this a draw is far fetched but not without any reason imo.

 

[Sarmatia1871]

Behold! - https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...-moderator-threadmark-before-posting.1064988/

 

[olm]

Behold! - https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/foru...-moderator-threadmark-before-posting.1064988/

Megathreads suck anyway.

 

[Jopa79]

Johnston was irreplacable. I also cant see what the Confederacy accomplished here while the Union kept the status quo (barely) calling this a draw is far fetched but not without any reason imo.

"The finest general officer in the Confederacy" -Jefferson Davies

Well, he said that before Lee was adopted for Davies' favorite one

 

[Eusebio]

I've always wondered what would have happened if the Confederates had been more decisive in their first-day attack and swept the Union army into the Tennessee river, which was a real possibility. For one both Grant and Sherman would have had their careers severely damaged by a decisive defeat, who would have ended up leading the Union army in 1864 in their stead?

 

[Jopa79]

I've always wondered what would have happened if the Confederates had been more decisive in their first-day attack and swept the Union army into the Tennessee river, which was a real possibility. For one both Grant and Sherman would have had their careers severely damaged by a decisive defeat, who would have ended up leading the Union army in 1864 in their stead?

When I was a kid late in the 1980s or early in the 1990s I received this strategy game, Grant's Trial in the West. I played it for hours and hours again. It was so cool if you ask me and the game manual was awesome, at the end of it there was a background story and a description of this historical Shiloh Battle, it was so interesting, I re-read it so many times I could repeat it from word to word. Since then I have been absorbed by the Battle of Shiloh.

Controversy whether South would have won in Shiloh if Beauregard wouldn't have called off the assault against Union line in Pittsburg Landing after Johnston's mortally wound started right after the American Civil War amongst the former Southerners. Many veterans maintained their opinion, that the Confederate soldiers encouraged by the flush of victory after the Hornet's Nest fell would have easily defeated the Union in the final assault.

Beauregard made his decisions in his HQs, some miles away from the frontline. The place was also fully crowded by the wounded, casualties, all kind of misery. This was a clear sign of confusion in the Confederate line and actually the men were exhausted by the never-ending battle of the Hornet's Nest. Secondly, the Union was given time by this same battle and they were able to re-organize a new defensive line around Pittsburg Landing. Terrain favored the defender here and it was backed up with some 50 cannons. The Confederate Army should have charged against the final line at night and taking into account these circumstances it hardly would have been a success.

I think there was a real possibility for the Confederacy to achieve a major victory at Shiloh, but the opportunity to do so was gone already earlier. Maybe the most important effect was the bad weather. The Confederate Army would have taken the Union by a total surprise, but because the weather, the attack was called off for two days. During the Confederate immidiate success on April 6 the Union soldiers fled the battlefield. This time the Confederacy wasn't able to use the moment for a bigger score, because the men were so keen and eager to loot the Union camps. Now, the Union organized the defense of the Hornet's Nest and later on Pittsburg Landing. If the Confederate Army would have remined disciplined and stick in the original battleplan they could have forced the routing and shattered Union Army to retreat towards the Owl Creek swamps and destroy the remnants there.

If the Union had lost badly in Shiloh, it would have had far-reaching consequenses. Without the Army of Tennessee and Ohio Union would not be able to stop Southern invasion. The Confederacy would have road open to cities like Cincinnati, St. Louis and Chicago. Probably new states would have joined for the Confederate cause and this would have poured in the recruitment. However, none of this happened, the moment was gone for good at Shiloh.

 

[Kovax]

The destruction of the Union Army of Tennessee would have given the Confederacy an advantage in the West, but the Army of Ohio still had to be contended with. Considering the number of casualties which the first engagement would still have inflicted, the Confederates would have had a significant but not a decisive advantage over the remaining Union forces, meaning that there was no "open road" to Cincinnati, Saint Louis, and Chicago. They would have had to fight their way forward.

In other words, it would have made a difference, but in my opinion probably not a huge enough difference to affect the eventual outcome of the war. Three or four such major changes and the outcome could very well have favored the Confederacy, but one lucky break wasn't enough.

It's one thing to look back and say "If only THIS had been different", while ignoring all of the other things which collectively led to defeat.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Dunno but St Louis or Missouri would have been within reach. I dont remember major Union fortifications within that area.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

The destruction of the Union Army of Tennessee would have given the Confederacy an advantage in the West, but the Army of Ohio still had to be contended with.

Also Pope's Army of the Mississippi, at the time of Shiloh reducing Confederate defenses at Island No. 10 together with Western Flotilla. And that flotilla shouldn't be ignored either.

In fact, seeing how many men Union brought to Siege of Corinth after Shiloh (up to 150,000 effectives) it's likely Union would still outnumber the would be Confederate attackers even after disastrous Shiloh. Rosecrans would probably rise to leading role in West, in case Grant's career is ruined.

Dunno but St Louis or Missouri would have been within reach. I dont remember major Union fortifications within that area.

I doubt the Union would give up the strategic town of Cairo without a fight.

I found this useful map on Wiki:

New Madrid, Bowling Green and Nashville have fallen to Union by time of Shiloh. That railway through Bowling Green was the only north-south one in the west and Confederates apparently damaged the rail infrastructure when they withdrew. Union controls the rivers up to whatever riverside fort Confederates still have and will continue to do so.

Overall, it's not a very good situation for bold offensives into Illinois let alone across Ohio river. Retaking forts Donelson and Henry as defensive delaying measure would probably be the best bet.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Oh right they lost their forts already.

 

[Director]

The battle was lost, in my opinion, by the battle plan. Johnston was in command but Beauregard drew up the plan of attack, and no-one on either side realized how much damage a Civil War army could take or how quickly it could recover. The idea of railroading-in troops from all over the central and southwestern Confederacy was a good one, but the time required to do it led to the loss of western and central Kentucky, and central Tennessee including Nashville. With its horses and locomotive manufactury, and with its immense stocks of supplies, the loss of Nashville was a terrific blow - equal to or greater, I think, than the later loss of New Orleans.

The army was composed of four different groups (corps), drawn from different areas, that had never worked together before. These were commanded by Hardee, Breckinridge, Bragg and Polk. Instead of arranging these side-by-side (with perhaps one corps as a reserve), Beauregard strung each corps out over the entire width of the battlefield and arranged them in ranks behind each other.

The terrain was rolling, with some steep areas toward the streams and river, and heavily wooded with cleared areas for farms. This made forward progress difficult except at the cleared areas, which became killing grounds.

Confederate units became intermixed almost immediately, leading to loss of control of the battle for the Confederates except at the most local level. Johnston's shocking death early in the battle came as he attempted to resolve one such local 'knot' and get the advance moving again. What was intended as a 'turning' movement against the Union right (west) flank became instead a series of bloody frontal assaults.

The Union army was not entrenched because Grant and Sherman were using the time to drill their relatively raw new divisions. The Union troops actually were scouting and did receive some warning but were pushed from the open areas around Shiloh church into the woods. Grant had positioned Lew Wallace's (author of 'Ben Hur') division to the north. Had it not backtracked, believing it was on the wrong road, it would have marched out onto the open Confederate left (west) flank and likely wrecked their advance. Grant did leave Prentiss' division, set as a delaying force, too long and much of it was overcome.

Grant had assembled his artillery reserve and retreating troops on a ridge overlooking a ravine, just before the point where the ground slopes down to the Tennessee River. It is an immensely strong position, and an evening assault by tired and disorganized Confederate troops would likely have been a disaster. Forrest did want to make the attempt, and he may have been the only Confederate commander who could have pulled it off.

Early on the next morning, reinforced by with Wallace's division and one division of Buell's army, Grant launched a counterattack that basically rolled the Confederates all the way back to their starting point. Officers on the ground observed that Confederate formations were very close to collapse; Beauregard followed their advice and retreated to Corinth.

Confederate troops were about as surprised on the second day as the Union had been on the first; casualties were roughly equal and the armies ended up in their beginning positions, though with Buell's troops in hand the Union army was a good bit stronger. Had the Union force been defeated it could have retreated north or across the river (depending on time), but the evidence of other Civil War battles argues against it being destroyed.

The casualties were horrific by the standard of the day: this one battle produced more dead and wounded than the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812 and the Mexican War combined and the early attacks on Grant resulted in his nearly being removed from command. There is no evidence he was impaired, drunk or sloppy during the battle; instead he managed the defense pretty well, kept his hand on his generals and didn't loose control or cool. Sherman famously expressed concern that night; Grant's reply was, "Lick 'em tomorrow."

Overall the Union did better out of it; the Confederate troops stripped from Deep South garrisons like New Orleans and Mobile were not easily replaced since Beauregard held the army at Corinth. New Orleans, the Confederacy's largest, wealthiest city and a critical manufacturing center, was taken by Union forces as it had been left pretty much undefended. So overall I rate Shiloh as a tactical draw and a Union strategic victory. It did convince Grant that the South would not quit, making for a long and bloody war.

 

[Yakman]

I've always wondered what would have happened if the Confederates had been more decisive in their first-day attack and swept the Union army into the Tennessee river, which was a real possibility. For one both Grant and Sherman would have had their careers severely damaged by a decisive defeat, who would have ended up leading the Union army in 1864 in their stead?

eh... it looks like that on a map.

The reality is that they'd just bottle up a bunch of soldiers at the river - who still had leadership and organization. They'd stand and fight rather than run into the Tennessee. The next day Rosecrans shows up anyway.

 

[Director]

@Yakman - perhaps you mean Buell rather than Rosecrans?

The Confederates were very spread out on the morning of the second day, and Grant got rolling before they could get men back into formation. But if the Confederates had made a charge that morning they would have run into the army artillery reserve plus every other gun Grant could gather in, and it would likely have been worse than Malvern Hill or Cold Harbor.

I do agree that even if the Confederates had been better organized on the first day and moved even faster than they actually did, Grant could have retreated north (the routes Lew Wallace used to come south) or across the river. A Confederate push for Nashville would have been foiled by Union control of the rivers and the breaking of the railroad bridges over the rivers in Tennessee and northern Alabama.

 

[Yakman]

@Yakman - perhaps you mean Buell rather than Rosecrans?

The Confederates were very spread out on the morning of the second day, and Grant got rolling before they could get men back into formation. But if the Confederates had made a charge that morning they would have run into the army artillery reserve plus every other gun Grant could gather in, and it would likely have been worse than Malvern Hill or Cold Harbor.

I do agree that even if the Confederates had been better organized on the first day and moved even faster than they actually did, Grant could have retreated north (the routes Lew Wallace used to come south) or across the river. A Confederate push for Nashville would have been foiled by Union control of the rivers and the breaking of the railroad bridges over the rivers in Tennessee and northern Alabama.

yes, Buell. I was just going off the top of my head.

Again, while I think the Confederates might have done better, a lot of this is mythologizing the CSA at the expense of the Union. The Union forces did retreat, but they weren't in a rout, and weren't like... going to be jumping into the Tennessee to escape. Grant's soldiers had gotten back into fighting form, and the next day, bolstered by reserves - and no longer surprised - they marched out and beat the rebels.

I don't really see it going any other way barring some titanically bad luck for the Union. They outnumbered and outgunned the rebels significantly.

 

[gagenater]

If you read Grant’s memoir’s (available for free online and highly recommended for anyone looking to study the civil war) it’s pretty clear that as far as he was concerned the theory that Yakman puts forth pretty much has to be correct. On the downside, Grant was concerned about the potential loss of large #’s of soldiers isolated on the wrong side of the landing - a loss that wound up not taking place to a great degree. On the upside, Grant was hoping they would get organized and hold without requiring reinforcements allowing him to land elsewhere and trap the majority of the confederate army between them. That would have made a massive union victory if he had succeeded. Even the worst case scenario for the Union doesn’t change the strategic situation for the confederates, because Grant’s army on the other side of the river still outnumbered them, he holds the forts controlling the river crossings, and he’s got a powerful riverine naval force at his disposal also. It would represent a delay for his strategy in the west but not a change in its viability or overall objectives.

 

[Sanny]

In my own opinion, it was a defeat for both sides due to the casualties and mistakes made (this is why it sometimes referred to as a draw). Some memoirs and letters from soldiers do mention the fact that it would be insanity to call the battle a victory for any side. However, strategically and tactically it was an outright victory for the Union. And the Confederates should have fought defensive battles where ever they could, they took a gamble to destroy Grant's Army and lost. As others said, a victory for the Confederates potentially would have had great effect on the rest of the war. I don't think the War in the East could have been won without successes in the War in the West.

 

[Director]

Johnston's strategy was to disperse his units in a 'picket line' across Tennessee. This changed when Polk took it on himself to violate Kentucky neutrality to occupy the formidable position at Columbus in western Kentucky. Other units moved north to Bowling Green, but the Confederates didn't have time to fortify anything in the center: Forts Henry and Donelson were just over the border in Tennessee, guarding the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.

His strategy was to respond to any serious Federal movement by laterally shifting troops over the rail line. This failed when Grant captured the forts, broke the rail bridge nearby and let the Union ironclads rampage up the rivers to Mussel Shoals, Alabama, breaking rail bridges as they went. Johnston had to abandon everything in Kentucky, abandon Nashville and backpedal all the way into northern Mississippi (Corinth, on the remaining east-west rail line) to regroup. His drive to battle was motivated partly by military factors and somewhat by political considerations. He had intended all along to make a counter-attack, and it seemed likely he could fall on Grant's army before Buell could come up.

I don't see what else he could reasonably have done; waiting three to six months to train his troops wasn't possible because those garrisons were needed at the points they had been drawn from (this would lead directly to the loss of New Orleans). The South had a strategic dilemma in that they could not be strong enough to oppose Federal forces at every point the Federals could threaten. And they soon realized they had a tactical problem: decision in battle was very hard to come by, and too often the decision was against the Confederates.

To win, the Confederacy needed a series of crushing victories, early and often. They got an inconclusive win at Manassas and then a long series of disasters or stalemates in the west...

Grant wanted to keep pushing after Henry/Donaldson; it was Halleck who held him back. There is no telling how far he would have gotten if left on his own - Corinth and its irreplaceable railroad, almost certainly. He was not stationary at Corinth by choice, but because of Halleck.


Grant's memoirs are recommended most highly. Grant was said to have a gift for writing clear, concise and specific orders, and this book is clearly and plainly written, exhaustively documented and absolutely compelling in its narrative. It is the best single military memoir I have ever read. Grant does not spare himself or other officers from critique but never ventures into outright criticism. Where he faults an officer (like McClernand, Rosecrans or Thomas) he says why, plainly and without rancor. If you have not read either the long version (which takes up his whole life) or the short (Civil War only), you have missed out on a masterpiece. How good is it? Critics assumed his friend Mark Twain must have written it - it is that good.

And of course he wrote it while dying of throat cancer, finishing it just days before his death. He was an odd little man, incapable in most things but supremely talented at running an army. I know of no other general quite like him.

 

[Yakman]

Johnston's strategy was to disperse his units in a 'picket line' across Tennessee. This changed when Polk took it on himself to violate Kentucky neutrality to occupy the formidable position at Columbus in western Kentucky. Other units moved north to Bowling Green, but the Confederates didn't have time to fortify anything in the center: Forts Henry and Donelson were just over the border in Tennessee, guarding the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.

His strategy was to respond to any serious Federal movement by laterally shifting troops over the rail line. This failed when Grant captured the forts, broke the rail bridge nearby and let the Union ironclads rampage up the rivers to Mussel Shoals, Alabama, breaking rail bridges as they went. Johnston had to abandon everything in Kentucky, abandon Nashville and backpedal all the way into northern Mississippi (Corinth, on the remaining east-west rail line) to regroup. His drive to battle was motivated partly by military factors and somewhat by political considerations. He had intended all along to make a counter-attack, and it seemed likely he could fall on Grant's army before Buell could come up.

I don't see what else he could reasonably have done; waiting three to six months to train his troops wasn't possible because those garrisons were needed at the points they had been drawn from (this would lead directly to the loss of New Orleans). The South had a strategic dilemma in that they could not be strong enough to oppose Federal forces at every point the Federals could threaten. And they soon realized they had a tactical problem: decision in battle was very hard to come by, and too often the decision was against the Confederates.

To win, the Confederacy needed a series of crushing victories, early and often. They got an inconclusive win at Manassas and then a long series of disasters or stalemates in the west...

Grant wanted to keep pushing after Henry/Donaldson; it was Halleck who held him back. There is no telling how far he would have gotten if left on his own - Corinth and its irreplaceable railroad, almost certainly. He was not stationary at Corinth by choice, but because of Halleck.


Grant's memoirs are recommended most highly. Grant was said to have a gift for writing clear, concise and specific orders, and this book is clearly and plainly written, exhaustively documented and absolutely compelling in its narrative. It is the best single military memoir I have ever read. Grant does not spare himself or other officers from critique but never ventures into outright criticism. Where he faults an officer (like McClernand, Rosecrans or Thomas) he says why, plainly and without rancor. If you have not read either the long version (which takes up his whole life) or the short (Civil War only), you have missed out on a masterpiece. How good is it? Critics assumed his friend Mark Twain must have written it - it is that good.

And of course he wrote it while dying of throat cancer, finishing it just days before his death. He was an odd little man, incapable in most things but supremely talented at running an army. I know of no other general quite like him.

the memoir, iirc, doesn't really go past the war. He doesn't discuss his presidency or his role as supreme military commander of the occupied South, much less his retirement or time on Wall Street.

Not that one can criticize, he was dying of throat cancer when he wrote it. Mark Twain completely disavowed being a ghost writer on the manuscript, btw, which is pretty believable.

Nonetheless, I concur with your post.

 

[Yakman]

Dunno but St Louis or Missouri would have been within reach. I dont remember major Union fortifications within that area.

St. Louis was a major city. And while there were sympathetic slavers who'd tried to take over, they'd been overpowered by local anti-slavery factions, including a band of German militia who may or may not have been led by men who'd been exiled following 1848's liberal disaster (i can't recall the specifics right now).