Political comissars in Red Army

[Kupr]

In modern Russian and West history political comissars considered as bad idea. Same time them considered as bad soldiers and bad people.
I read very many memoirs and my own impression below:

Political comissars were most motivated and millitary educaded officers in Red Army in 1941. Many times they divided units with commanding officer helping him to command. They were personally brave and participated directly in battlefield. I almost didn't read bad about them from soldiers fought in 1941. For example:


Today publicated firstly memoirs from Grigoriy Lazarevich Bruk.

He was soldier in 1941. His opinion about comissars in 1941:

Интервью с ветераном ВОВ Григорий Брук: на войне от звонка до звонка - Артиллеристы | Я помню

На четвертый день в атаку в пешем строю послали всех кого смогли набрать по тылам: артиллеристов, ездовых, саперов, связистов, обозников, штабную челядь вместе с «придурками», и все равно – бесполезно. От нашего дивизиона послали в первую цепь атакующих все взводы управления, часть орудийной прислуги и...

iremember.ru

Google translation:
"There is one factor I must mention. The millitary school had excellent politruks, commissars who knew how to convince and raise morale, and set up for battle. By the way, the entire political staff of the school went into attacks with the cadets, and, as far as I know, none of our commissar survived."

So they were good professional officers and patriots. Most from them died in battles in 1941-1942. Small part survived. I do not think that many survived were
bests ones. After reforms in 1943 most millitary educated comissars fastly reeducated in commanding officers (time of educations 1-2 months). So Red army was whitout millitary educated comissars (low and middle level officers) by 1943.
Commissars in Red army in 1943-1945 were political workers from civil life. They weren't millitary educaded and couldn't fight properly. So most from them prefered to do political agitation and return in staff leaving battlefield and trying survive. Most survived soldiers of Red army are soldiers of 1943-1945. So they had very bad impression about commisars. Same impression is main in history. Same time commisars in 1941-1942 and commisars in 1943-1945 are completely different peoples.

Commisars of 1941:

Tank of Battalion commisar Heifez Abraam Hileevich. KIA 06.10.1941 near Mzensk.

In this battlefield German 35 tank regiment lost 10 tanks.
Red army lost 6 tanks T-34.

 

[Kupr]

I ended to read Bruk's memoirs now and found else his info about commisars:

Google translation:

"
- Next question. As in the text of the song - "Zampolites, political instructors, but still commissars." What would you like to tell you about them? Were they needed at the front or not? What is your personal opinion?

- You also can't answer in monosyllables. Everything depended on the personal qualities of the political worker. The first two years of the war, commissars were necessary, especially in the rifle divisions, where they cemented the defense with their courage and self-sacrifice and were the first to rise to the attack. The commissar's star on the sleeve of his tunic obliged him to lead people into battle, not to surrender and fight to the end. Ordinary Red Army men saw and appreciated this, and it was not for nothing that every German leaflet dropped from the sky began with the phrase: "Kill the Jew-political leader." Although, as they write now, according to statistics, Jews were only three percent of political workers. Commissars going on the attack with a rifle or pistol in hand, along with ordinary Red Army men, was a common occurrence. But only in the infantry and up to the regiment level, not higher. I have seen infantry political workers dozens of times in battle. Battalion commissars, Komsomol organizers and party organizers of rifle regiments are people who personally took part in battles. But there is one thing ... Real commissars, political instructors died in many thousands or were maimed in battles in the first two years of the war, and after the crossing of the Dnieper, let's say, it was already a completely different people. Not everything, of course, but the character and style of behavior at the front among political workers changed, they began to hang out more in the rear, to fight from dugouts, because no one wanted to die. It was felt, because, for example, I personally had someone to compare with, I remembered our heroic political instructors DAU, and in 1942 it was the company political instructor who raised me to the attack towards death….

And then a rhetorical question. And in other parts of the Red Army, except for rifle regiments and tank battalions, why was this apparatus of political workers needed? Especially after the forty-third year, when one-man command was introduced and the institution of commissars in the army was abolished. Why is a political officer in an air regiment if he is not flying? Why would a commissar go to an artillery regiment if he was in battle not in a firing position, but in a headquarters dugout? Yes, they were engaged in propaganda, in charge of supply issues, and who of them had a conscience, they helped the families of the fighters in the rear, wrote petitions, but there were so many of these agitators that the question arose - maybe they should be sent in platoons to a rifle company to command , where two officers in a company were already considered a front-line luxury. After all, when you spend some period of time on the front line, walking around with death in your arms, then you look completely differently at those who are behind you, in the near or far rear. The question arose - what is the use of him at the front, how and how he helps me to fight. So to speak. The artillery master repairs my crippled weapon, the cook feeds me, the railroad worker takes me to the front with everything I need ... but what of a political worker? In battle, I don’t feel it ... To enlighten our dark souls with "strong Bolshevik words" at the turn of the war was no longer necessary, we already knew perfectly well what we were fighting for ... I don’t know, honestly, how to formulate the final answer to your question."

 

[Henry IX]

The commissars in Soviet forces were not a monolithic thing. They had benefits and disadvantages. Certainly they had a key role in motivation and front line leadership, particularly in the 300 numbered divisions raised in 1941, which had weak leadership, even by Soviet standards.

However, dual command is generally considered a mistake as it slowed the decision making process and increased the amount of political meddling in what should be military decisions. This one of the many factors sited in reducing the combat effectiveness of Soviet formations in the first part of the war. Certainly, the improvement in Soviet combat effectiveness coincided with the ending of dual command.

 

[Kupr]

However, dual command is generally considered a mistake as it slowed the decision making process and increased the amount of political meddling in what should be military decisions. This one of the many factors sited in reducing the combat effectiveness of Soviet formations in the first part of the war. Certainly, the improvement in Soviet combat effectiveness coincided with the ending of dual command.

I don't thing that it was real problem in low and middle level of management of units. Anyway if comissar took command directly he was responsible for commanding. Comissars 1941-1942 mostly were millitary educated officers. So one millitary educated officer changed other. On high level it sometimes was a problem. Most known example is tradegy of spring 1942 in Crimea (Kerch).

Lev Zakharovich Mekhlis (Deputy People's Commissar of Defense and Head of the Main Political Directorate of the Red Army. Former People's Commissar of the State Audit Office):

Though he was so high rank leader of USSR - So front commander just couldn't command against him. It was mistake, because Mekhlis was not milltary educated officer. Both Mekhlis and Front commander Kozlov lost own career, because of tragedy in Kerch.


P.S. Recent russian movie is showing typical place of low and middle level comissars on battlefield in 1942:

By the end of the battle commander of company commanded directly company and soldiers around him in one place. Comissar commanded soldiers around him in other place of the battle - it is logical and effective situation.
Comissar (Politruk) here is officer with white officer's greatcoat with stars on his arms:

German fastly recognised officers because of white greatcoats so it was changed later. Comissars had stars on arm so germans recognised them fastly too :

 

[Henry IX]

I don't thing that it was real problem in low and middle level of management of units. Anyway if comissar took command directly he was responsible for commanding. Comissars 1941-1942 mostly were millitary educated officers. So one millitary educated officer changed other.

I don't think we have any serious disagreement here. However, the problem with dual command was not so much that one military educated officer replaced another as that both officers were equal in authority. Hence there was no way to resolve a disagreement other than appeal to commanding officers. Given the shocking lack of effective oversight in 1941 even contacting ones superiors could be a problematic process.

When the officers and commissars in a formation had a good working relationship they certainly improved the combat effectiveness of their formations. However, if they had a poor relationship they could ruin an otherwise effective formation.

 

[Jopa79]

Aroused already in 1917, during the February Revolution and the October Revolution, Leon Trotsky imposed the formal political officers. These officers were almost immediately tasked with an order to ensure the loyalty of the Red Army.

To my knowledge - and please correct me if I'm wrong - the political commissars in the Soviet Union were trained and educated by the Cheka, not by the Red Army, but the Cheka introduced the commissars for the army.

Working not only with the military, the commissars worked also the other fields of the Soviet New Economic Policy, like a Bolshevik and a member of the Cheka, Naftaly Frenkel. Arrested by Cheka's precursor, GPU, Frenkel was sentenced to a 10-year-penalty at the Solovetsky Islands, came to be known as the first camp of the Gulag. Frenkel's many life stages still remain as mysteries, like how he rapidly rose from a prisoner to a staff member and eventually the commandant at the Solovetsky Islands.

Later Frenkel was named chief of construction in Soviet projects like the White Sea-Baltic Canal and the Baikal-Amur Mainline. Frenkel's methods were quickly adopted as the standards of the Gulag industry.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Hm. They're not nearly as pretty as the fighters in the Worker Peasant Red Army.

 

[Kupr]

When the officers and commissars in a formation had a good working relationship they certainly improved the combat effectiveness of their formations. However, if they had a poor relationship they could ruin an otherwise effective formation.

I agree in whole thinking same many years. But now I understand that it was only choice of directions of managment of troops with positive and negative effects in each one.

For example, good relations between officers is negative effect for:
1) Control from government (divide and rule)
2) Arbitrariness of officers over soldiers.

 

[Kupr]

Aroused already in 1917, during the February Revolution and the October Revolution, Leon Trotsky imposed the formal political officers. These officers were almost immediately tasked with an order to ensure the loyalty of the Red Army.

To my knowledge - and please correct me if I'm wrong - the political commissars in the Soviet Union were trained and educated by the Cheka, not by the Red Army, but the Cheka introduced the commissars for the army.

But cheka didn't have training shcool :}

1. After taking power communists formed cheka mostly from party members.... as organisation for special services.
2. Russian army was in chaos. Forming Red Army Lev Trotskiy had to use imperial officers, actually they were most proffessional military men. Main part from them were from simple population, because during WWI Imperial army had to have very many officers. So many officers supported communists. Same time communist party had to do control over officers. They preffered to do political comissars . Comissars were taken from members of communist party or people of authority among workers (soldiers).

So party ruled cheka and comissars using own members. Or local power men during civil war.

During chaos of civil war local groups (very often criminal ones) took power over regions. Communists later recognized them as fighters against "counterrevolution" legitimizing them as soviet officials.

As example from movie, meeting of the revolutionary committee of region in Sibir region.

Survived ones will be rule revolutionary committee after meeting.

 

[Kupr]

Reading next memoirs I understand that Communists did most effective system of managment of Red Army. For example, veteran of 1941-1945 battlefield reconnaissance of Red army. After years of war most his problems he was used to solving by force - killing enemy or offenders from own soldiers. How to control him?

Kreynzin Mikhail Isaakovich

Red army"s designation of injury (Red -severe injuries. Yellow - light wound):

He worked in avia factory in Moscow so he must be out of army. During evacuation from Moscow he was offended that Jews are first to evacuation so he decided to go as volunteer of 3rd Communists division of Moscow workers. After hospital young patriotic wounded soldiers were sent to officers school in Kremlin for 6 months eduaction. But because of bad situation they were sent in front after 5 months of education as sergeants. He ended war in Eastern Prussia.

Google translation:

"
- Did you get into the penal company there? Do you want to tell about it?

- There is no particular desire. In short, it was like this. I grappled with two of the artillery reconnaissance regiment. They were from the "Nevels" replenishment. Both are from Kharkov, Ukrainians, one is an criminal, and the other is in his arms. Sergeant Fedulov and I were at our forward OP from mortarmen, and these were located nearby, they had their own observation post for a control platoon from the 300th artillery regiment. They collided on ethnic grounds, they touched me by ethnicity.

One, identifying a Jew in me, says to his comrade, and in my presence, without fear: “Look, Zinchenko, what a brave Jew went today. Or bad. His whole gang is hanging around in Tashkent, and this Abrashka is pinned to the front! "... I wanted to kill them right away, but there were several people from the infantry around, and why do I need witnesses. I just told them: “You bitches, you won't live with me until the next morning. I'll stab you today! ”... Matom, of course, said ...


At night, it was in our sector of defense that there was heavy shooting, like a German reconnaissance group was spotted in a swamp, and in the morning signalmen from a platoon of control of the 300th artillery regiment came to check why there was no connection with the NP, and these two were killed. And a couple of hours later a soldier from the infantry crawled up: "Sergeant, our battalion commander is calling you, let's go to the headquarters." I go there, and here a special officer from the artillery regiment is already waiting for me: "Did you kill?" - “No, not me, which I regret. I did not leave the NP at night. Squad leader Fedulov will confirm. " - “So he is in business with you. Leave your weapons here. Follow me". He took me to the headquarters of the regiment, just in case he took a soldier for my escort"

****

"Two weeks later I left the hospital myself to join my regiment, but it's good that I guessed to take a certificate, that I was recovering from my wound, which means I redeemed it with blood. First, it was necessary to appear at the regiment headquarters, to the PNSh for personnel registration, so that he would be included in the lists. On the way, several guys they know: Mishka, but we were told that you were killed! Regimental scouts are standing. I was on good terms with the eldest of them, with Shubin and with Kupavtsev. He approached them: "Georgy Georgievich, will you take me to your platoon?" - “I’ll talk to Berezhny, I myself cannot decide. After all, you are now a celebrity. Couldn't kill two of them without noise? .. "


***
"
Have you encountered anti-Semitism at the front?

- In war, on the front line, not really, so, on trifles. When I was there, there were often conversations about Jews in Tashkent without hesitation. Outwardly, I didn't look like a Jew very much. Fair-haired, blue eyes, so those who did not know me could easily start speaking on the topic: We are shedding blood here, and the Jews ... without looking back and without fear.

I have never forgiven for the "Jew" at the front. I was shot in the back only once - a "Westerner" from a reinforcement, but the shooter missed, and I didn't.

There were different things, but you see, on the front line, the national question is quickly removed from the agenda. You and a person eat from the same pot, go into battle together, die for a common cause with him, and soon he doesn't care what nation or faith you are. Front-line friendship did not distinguish between nationalities, the main thing is that you are a loyal, reliable and courageous comrade."

Word Jew here is offensive word - "Jid".
"Westerner" - man mobilisated from western Ukraine.


Photo after war:

 

[Kupr]

As soldiers since 1941 he also aproved comissars:

Google translation:

"
What is your attitude towards political workers?

- Normal. The army resembled a model of civil society. If the factory shop had its own Komsomol organizer and party organizer, so the rifle battalion had the same structure. I have the best attitude to the political workers of the 3rd ICSD - they were wonderful brave people.

I saw real commissars near Demyansk, an example - the same Boltaks or Major Knyazev in our 348th rifle regiment in the 51st SD.

I firmly believed in the party, I joined its ranks in 1943 at the call of my heart, before the battle.

At the end of the war, political workers on the front lines appeared mainly in a lull, but no one tried to directly accuse them of unwillingness to fight. It's just that the war has changed, and so have people. They went about their business - political work. In 1945 I don't remember them in battle.

Party organizers of companies and battalions gathered communists before serious battles, but the conversation was calm, without pathos and chanting slogans - everyone knew perfectly well that the communist had to go first in the attack. The battalion commander could walk through the trenches on the front line, say a few words. I have no complaints about them. By the end of the war, by the way, there was much less jingoistic patriotism and propaganda, and the political staff understood that the fighters had matured in the war, were themselves focused on battle, our desire to take revenge on the Germans was stronger than any other.

In the attack, the fighters rose in silence or with obscene words.

Nobody, anywhere, ever shouted "For Stalin!" - this is blatant nonsense, an invention of political workers. Only they, the political instructors, according to the instructions, could shout such a thing, and to an ordinary Russian person - an ordinary Red Army soldier - when he goes to his death, Comrade Stalin is not needed in any way and is not remembered."



About German battlefield reconnaissance:

Google translation:

"
- And how did the German intelligence officers show themselves in this area near Demyansk? Did they have the same difficult conditions for conducting searches? Our defense was steel there too.
- German intelligence was no worse than ours. They knew how to work like real professionals. It's just that no one wants to admit this fact - we won, so why do we need such a truth of war. And not some specially trained saboteurs from the Brandenburg regiment, but simple German divisional intelligence officers showed us until the very end of the war that they also knew how to work and were not bastards. In June 1942, we from the platoon commander went to the regiment headquarters with a report and to approve the search plan, and at this time German intelligence went to our rear and threw grenades at the dugout and the reconnaissance platoon's cab. All died ...
In the 51st Infantry Regiment I had a good acquaintance - platoon lieutenant Sukhov from the 23rd Infantry Regiment. In March 1944, when the front in Byelorussia stood motionless and both sides "barricaded themselves" in defense, the following incident occurred.
German scouts, about forty, crawled very close to our first trench. The Red Army men noticed them, but apparently thought that it was ours from the divisional reconnaissance company returning from the search, and did not open fire. This was followed by a short, precise artillery attack, the Germans burst into the trench, the rifle platoon commanded by Sukhov was massacred, and three soldiers were taken prisoner, taking with them another Maxim machine gun.
At the same time, in the spring, German intelligence at night killed half of the regimental mortar battery 120-mm, on which I served as an artillery reconnaissance at that time. I was at that moment on the forward OP, and the battery was at positions two kilometers from the front line.
Another incident occurred just before the start of our January offensive in East Prussia. The German reconnaissance company, reinforced with flamethrowers, conducted reconnaissance in force, and as usual everything went according to the hackneyed German scenario: after an accurate artillery attack on our positions, the Germans, pressing close to the barrage of fire, burst into the trenches, captured the line of trenches, instantly pulled up another two hundred reinforcements, and in the end, two of our rifle companies were completely killed, and fourteen people were taken prisoner. For this incident, the commander of the 23rd joint venture, Major Kolesnikov, an honored combat officer, the best in the division, was temporarily removed from office. How the Germans pulled this off, we learned in detail from a German intelligence officer who had been captured by us a few days later, who took part in that reconnaissance in force.
The Germans knew how to fight - they were excellent fighters, and their intelligence acted at a high professional level. Of course, the Germans also had mistakes and unsuccessful searches, and they often ran into ambushes and were blown up by mines in neutral, but such are the costs of the scout's work. Once a German reconnaissance company, which went out in a night search, ran into our scouts - the group of Sergeant Major Shubin - right in the no-man's land, head to head. And Shubin with only nine of his scouts gave them a "reception". And there is no more German intelligence ...
In the penal company with me was one sergeant, an orderly of the chief of staff of the regiment, who "slept" when his commander was captured by German intelligence officers. For this he went to the penalty area.
In our 51st Infantry Division, the famous intelligence officer Georgy Georgievich Shubin served - a living legend, an intelligence ace, he was worth one whole battalion. For pilots, for example, a symbol of skill and heroism is Pokryshkin, for scouts such a person was Sergeant Major Shubin. Or the scout Karpov could become a Hero of the Soviet Union. And the question is, did the Germans most likely have their own intelligence officers of the same high level?"

 

[Kupr]

Hm. They're not nearly as pretty as the fighters in the Worker Peasant Red Army.

It was terrible war for USSR. Movie above is showing most difficult period of war - 1942. Due of losts of western part of state USSR had problems with weapon and ammunition. Later war was looking mostly like here:

Look only first 10 minutes of it. Later movie is fantastic and not so interesting (for me) like first 10 minutes.

 

[JodelDiplom]

As soldiers since 1941 he also aproved comissars:

Google translation:

"
What is your attitude towards political workers?

- Normal. The army resembled a model of civil society. If the factory shop had its own Komsomol organizer and party organizer, so the rifle battalion had the same structure. I have the best attitude to the political workers of the 3rd ICSD - they were wonderful brave people.

I saw real commissars near Demyansk, an example - the same Boltaks or Major Knyazev in our 348th rifle regiment in the 51st SD.

I firmly believed in the party, I joined its ranks in 1943 at the call of my heart, before the battle.

At the end of the war, political workers on the front lines appeared mainly in a lull, but no one tried to directly accuse them of unwillingness to fight. It's just that the war has changed, and so have people. They went about their business - political work. In 1945 I don't remember them in battle.

Party organizers of companies and battalions gathered communists before serious battles, but the conversation was calm, without pathos and chanting slogans - everyone knew perfectly well that the communist had to go first in the attack. The battalion commander could walk through the trenches on the front line, say a few words. I have no complaints about them. By the end of the war, by the way, there was much less jingoistic patriotism and propaganda, and the political staff understood that the fighters had matured in the war, were themselves focused on battle, our desire to take revenge on the Germans was stronger than any other.

In the attack, the fighters rose in silence or with obscene words.

Nobody, anywhere, ever shouted "For Stalin!" - this is blatant nonsense, an invention of political workers. Only they, the political instructors, according to the instructions, could shout such a thing, and to an ordinary Russian person - an ordinary Red Army soldier - when he goes to his death, Comrade Stalin is not needed in any way and is not remembered."



About German battlefield reconnaissance:

Google translation:

"
- And how did the German intelligence officers show themselves in this area near Demyansk? Did they have the same difficult conditions for conducting searches? Our defense was steel there too.
- German intelligence was no worse than ours. They knew how to work like real professionals. It's just that no one wants to admit this fact - we won, so why do we need such a truth of war. And not some specially trained saboteurs from the Brandenburg regiment, but simple German divisional intelligence officers showed us until the very end of the war that they also knew how to work and were not bastards. In June 1942, we from the platoon commander went to the regiment headquarters with a report and to approve the search plan, and at this time German intelligence went to our rear and threw grenades at the dugout and the reconnaissance platoon's cab. All died ...
In the 51st Infantry Regiment I had a good acquaintance - platoon lieutenant Sukhov from the 23rd Infantry Regiment. In March 1944, when the front in Byelorussia stood motionless and both sides "barricaded themselves" in defense, the following incident occurred.
German scouts, about forty, crawled very close to our first trench. The Red Army men noticed them, but apparently thought that it was ours from the divisional reconnaissance company returning from the search, and did not open fire. This was followed by a short, precise artillery attack, the Germans burst into the trench, the rifle platoon commanded by Sukhov was massacred, and three soldiers were taken prisoner, taking with them another Maxim machine gun.
At the same time, in the spring, German intelligence at night killed half of the regimental mortar battery 120-mm, on which I served as an artillery reconnaissance at that time. I was at that moment on the forward OP, and the battery was at positions two kilometers from the front line.
Another incident occurred just before the start of our January offensive in East Prussia. The German reconnaissance company, reinforced with flamethrowers, conducted reconnaissance in force, and as usual everything went according to the hackneyed German scenario: after an accurate artillery attack on our positions, the Germans, pressing close to the barrage of fire, burst into the trenches, captured the line of trenches, instantly pulled up another two hundred reinforcements, and in the end, two of our rifle companies were completely killed, and fourteen people were taken prisoner. For this incident, the commander of the 23rd joint venture, Major Kolesnikov, an honored combat officer, the best in the division, was temporarily removed from office. How the Germans pulled this off, we learned in detail from a German intelligence officer who had been captured by us a few days later, who took part in that reconnaissance in force.
The Germans knew how to fight - they were excellent fighters, and their intelligence acted at a high professional level. Of course, the Germans also had mistakes and unsuccessful searches, and they often ran into ambushes and were blown up by mines in neutral, but such are the costs of the scout's work. Once a German reconnaissance company, which went out in a night search, ran into our scouts - the group of Sergeant Major Shubin - right in the no-man's land, head to head. And Shubin with only nine of his scouts gave them a "reception". And there is no more German intelligence ...
In the penal company with me was one sergeant, an orderly of the chief of staff of the regiment, who "slept" when his commander was captured by German intelligence officers. For this he went to the penalty area.
In our 51st Infantry Division, the famous intelligence officer Georgy Georgievich Shubin served - a living legend, an intelligence ace, he was worth one whole battalion. For pilots, for example, a symbol of skill and heroism is Pokryshkin, for scouts such a person was Sergeant Major Shubin. Or the scout Karpov could become a Hero of the Soviet Union. And the question is, did the Germans most likely have their own intelligence officers of the same high level?"

That's all good but what does this random war story about military intelligence have to do with political commissars?

 

[Kupr]

That's all good but what does this random war story about military intelligence have to do with political commissars?

1. For me it was interesting part of it. Level of truth from veteran's describing enemy.

2. I just wanted to note again if soldier saw war in 1941-1942 he almost always had good impression about political comissars. He saw other political comissars, who mostly died or were maimed in battles before 1943.

Also in his memoirs I noted else additional information I didn't know before about comissars:

Before strong orders regarding German civil population in april 1945 there was violence. Kreynzin noted that exactly political comissars always stopped it.

Интервью с ветераном ВОВ Михаил Крейнцин: я - разведчик - Разведчики | Я помню

У нас было всего десять-двенадцать человек, хотя по штату положено двадцать шесть разведчиков, но нас просто не успевали пополнять, такие были потери… Все добровольцы. Каждый месяц из-за высоких потерь у нас личный состав взвода полностью обновлялся, но я смог продержаться четыре месяца, получив два ра...

iremember.ru

Google translation:

"- Let's go back to East Prussia. I will formulate the question in a neutral way - “Relations with the local German population”.

- I understand what exactly you are asking. It was. Anything ...

I will not tell the whole truth.

At first, we did not see civilian Germans - they were resettled from the front line.

Then, in February, closer to Koenigsberg, we ran into them at every step.

The Germans were mortally frightened by rumors that the Red Army was destroying everyone without exception, Goebbels' propaganda worked to its fullest. I personally saw a couple of times how whole families lay dead in their houses, having taken poison right before our arrival.

There was violence, I do not deny it. This was done either by the penalty box, which was a dime a dozen in Prussia at that time, or by the rear. When they attacked in the area of the port of Rosenberg, there were about a hundred of us from the whole regiment, and next to them were three penal companies, brought together into one combat group, who were given a drink before the attack, whoever they wanted.

Ordinary infantry could foolishly burn down a farm, some kind of manor, but no one shot civilian civilians in ditches. This was not the case. It didn’t come to that ...

Just imagine a simple soldier of the 51st Infantry, who survived in the hell of the front line, went through fire without copper pipes, dozens of battles from Rzhev to Konigsberg, all wounded, which he saw all the time, on the long miles of his war, only ours were burned, ruined, towns and villages in the Smolensk region, in Belarus, lost dozens of comrades in battles, and in the war all his brothers were still killed or maimed, and in the rear for the fourth year in a row, exhausted from the hardships of the war, his wife and children are starving. And here in front of him is completely untouched by the war, well-groomed, beautiful German rural village or manor: two-storey stone houses, tiles and electricity, excellent agricultural equipment, rich decoration, furniture, etc., and in the barn of any and different livestock, it stands immensely, in the basements food supplies are enough for the whole company for a five-year plan. And it just started to infuriate - everyone understood that it was all robbed, it was all on our blood. But even here the fighters held on, only clinked their tongues in surprise, shouted at what they saw and frowned. They were frustrated, I myself saw how this happens, when suddenly the gaze stopped at the family photographs of the owners of this house or estate, displayed in a row, and there - the smiling sleek faces of the sons in SS or officer uniform. And immediately the soldier began to crumble with bursts of PPSh everything in a row - from furniture to a chandelier. And then they fired these houses for nothing.

It also depended if the village was taken with or without combat. Even a seemingly empty farm or village could turn out to be a trap, where machine gunners or stupefied Volkssturmists with faust patrons were waiting for us in ambush. Moreover, every door is mined - pulled the door handle ... and straight to the next world. Such a fight could end with the fact that everything behind our back then burned, as they say, with a blue flame.

The hatred of the German nation was fierce. The very long war, bloody to the point of madness, and the articles of Comrade Ehrenburg did a good job on our feelings.

We no longer had a single drop of pity for anyone. There were excesses with women, but again, I repeat, this was mainly done by drunken penalty boxers, former criminals or individual scum from the rear fraternity ... For normal decent people, the very idea of violence against a woman aroused disgust. If the officers saw such a thing and were not afraid of drunken fighters, they usually intervened and prevented the "continuation of the banquet", and the political officers, as they generally immediately took the pistol out of their holster, did not allow this to take on the character of mass revenge.

We were not the horde of Genghis Khan, but we had the right to revenge.

Only each took revenge in different ways. Someone - only in battle, someone - only "on the German".

And in April, in general, the commanders and special officers tightened the nuts all the way, no one touched the civilian German women - for this they were immediately sent to the tribunal."

 

[Henry IX]

Most sources I have read tend to agree that the main perpetrators of war crime on the German population were from rear area forces. The frontniki (front line forces) tended to pride themselves on their professionalism. They certainly looted and vandalised property, but the rear area forces were generally responsible for most of the rape and murder. This is also attested to by German civilian survivors.

The role of the party and the commissars in those crimes is, as ever in an institution of the size of the Red Army, complex. The Party, through its publications and the lectures and teaching of the commissars, did much to stoke the hatred of the Germans (in no small part assisted by the horrors inflicted by the Wehrmacht on the Soviet Union). The inevitable consequence of stoking hatred of Germans and dehumanising the enemy were seen in East Prussia.

However, the commissars also played a vital role in maintaining discipline and controlling the excesses of the soldiers under their command. Particularly as the campaign in Germany continued, the Soviet authorities began to pay more attention to maintaining functional relationships with the German populace, which is nearly impossible in the conditions of mass war crimes. As such, the message to the soldiers was changed and tighter discipline enforced. All of this helped to reduce the scope and extent of Soviet war crimes, although it never eliminated them. The commissars were once again the main method by which the Party expressed its will in the army and they took a lead role in restraining the behaviours of the soldiers, using the usual combination of example, instruction and brutality.

 

[Kupr]

Yesterday memoirs of one comissar were firstly published. Interesting info from it.

Short video:

Интервью с ветераном ВОВ Василий Каленский: я - политрук - Артиллеристы | Я помню

Так вот, как только стемнеет, я с этими газетами шел к расчетам, к пушкам. Там стояла маленькая землянка, которая отапливалась печкой. Приходишь. Все садятся, кроме ночного наблюдателя: он все равно стоит. Печка горит. Я начинаю читать газеты, рассказываю, мне задают вопросы, а я отвечаю. То есть вот т...

iremember.ru

If shortly, Ukranian. Vasiliy Ivanovich Kalenskiy. Mother died from starving during Holodomor. Familiy moved in Сrimea because of it. Soviet power brought up and trained him to be an agronomist. He was recomended in communist party in village (before joining of party it was period of testing for each member).

He was drafted into the Red army in 1939. He started to help comissar in company so later as experienced soldier he was recomended for political military school. He ended it in the beginning of 1942. His first and last battle was in august 1942.

Google translation:

"
We concentrated near the Volga for the offensive. There the division was on the defensive after the fighting, and our division took up positions there. It was August 3, 1942. At three or four o'clock in the morning we were fed. On August 4, at six o'clock, artillery preparation began. Everything is buzzing, smoke is all around. We rose from the trenches. The artillery preparation went on for an hour. I heard the Katyusha for the first time. They stood behind at the edge of the forest. After the end of the artillery barrage, the fire was moved inland, and we went on the offensive, on the attack. Ninety people were in the company. The company commander was on the right flank, and I was on the left. Three platoon commanders were: two were junior lieutenants, one was a lieutenant. Basically, all the mobilized commanders, like the soldiers, were young. The company commander was killed right on the right flank. He could not even get up from the trench. I took command, although I was already in charge of the company. We went on the attack. I remember there was unmown rye, sown in the fall, but it could not be harvested, because it was in a no-man's land between the Germans and ours. So, we walked along the overripe rye. As a result, the Germans remained alive. Both mortars and cannons were firing. I saw how, without having time to shout, one person fell, the second, the third ...

We reached the river Derzha. The Germans were already firing there. The beach was high. Where we crossed the river, the depth was neck-deep. The water is cold. I reached the middle of the river. In addition to the revolver, I had a machine gun. On the other side was a German firing point, on which I had to use up the entire disc of the machine gun.

We crossed over to the other side. The bank is steep there, overgrown with small bushes. We stuck in there, and there was a German barbed wire. I had to chop it with shoulder blades. Overcome the obstacle. The trenches were destroyed by our artillery, there were wounded and killed Germans. On the right, there was a German dugout, also heaped up. From there came the groan of the Germans. We went through the trench, overcame it. I still ran fifty or sixty meters. Now a shell, then a mine flew. I felt a blow on the head, fell on my left side, in my eyes there are white stars. His head rang, the helmet hung on a strap. I lie on my left side, salty in my mouth - it turned out to be blood. A shrapnel hit me right under the earlobe and stopped, tore my ligaments. The blood got there through the mouth. My orderly began to bandage my head, and I saw that he had no finger on his right hand, only the white bone was visible. Then another soldier jumped up, and the sniper punched through his arm above the elbow. The orderlies ran up, some more soldiers, then they bandaged me as a wounded man. A soldier ran up to my orderly, began to bandage his arm, and then the Germans opened fire. We dived into the nettles. Hid from the enemy. We were picked up and back across the river to the first-aid post, from there to the medical battalion, and then to the hospital. I lay there for sixty days. I was cured."



Later he was comissar of artillery battery. After reforms of 1943 comissars of level below regiment were sent for education as millitary officers only . After education he worked in staff in Moscow. IMHO, rather careerist.

Some interesting from his memoirs:


Google translation:

About repressions of 1937.

"
By 1937, life was getting easier. The father never married again. This year's depression did not affect the poor at all. There was no repression either. In 1937 or 1938, the Crimea was overtaken by a drought. In the spring of 1939, I was already working as an agronomist. I sowed seven hundred hectares of oats on my plot. But since he did all this on horses, and not on tractors, he sowed it with a delay. Spring has begun. Late sown bread in semi-dry soil. My oats have risen. It began to grow, but there is no rain. He was on the vine and died due to drought. Wheat and barley were also sown in the Crimea in winter, so they also died. The bread that grew, wheat, was mainly transported to the station by cars thirty-five kilometers from the state farm. I remember that then part of the grain was stolen: one amount was weighed on the state farm, and another was delivered. They said that this was the work of the drivers, but I don't understand then where the leadership was looking.

This is what happened to the sheep. The heat was intense. A large number of ticks have developed on the sheep due to the flies. We bathed the sheep in arsenic solution, but it didn't help. Over the summer, two thousand sheep died, having become infected with piroplasmosis. The cattle died very quickly: in the morning they fell ill, in the evening they had already died. The director is to blame for this, the senior agronomist is to blame, the veterinarian is to blame, the senior livestock technician is to blame. They came to us in autumn in August from the NKVD and were taken to the area just before the holiday of the October Revolution. They were put on trial. As a Komsomol member, I was obliged to assist the police in protecting criminals. They were all put in the club, and I came across a senior agronomist. But I was once his assistant, and now I stood with a small-bore rifle and guarded him. They were all convicted, and the head of the political department was also imprisoned. Before that, he was an employee of the embassy in Iran, as if British intelligence had recruited him. They were all given ten years and taken away. In March, everyone returned, except for the head of the political department. They say he was shot. Of course, the positions of some of them have already been taken by other people. Only the chief, the senior agronomist, took his place, the veterinarian took his place, the director was given a place in another state farm. This is such a repression."


****

- What was your role as a commissioner?

- My task was to educate the fighters, to raise their morale by conducting political information, reading newspapers (Krasnaya Zvezda, Pravda, Izvestia). When one of the soldiers received a letter from home, I allowed him to read the letter out loud in front of everyone, so that everyone would know what was going on in the rear. I lacked a little experience in conducting political work, so I did not hesitate to turn to more experienced political workers in other units. They told me what and how best to do.

- How did your relationship with the commander develop?

- Fine. The battery commander was a smart guy. He wore an overcoat wide open, then put on a Kubanka with a red top instead of a budenovka. I told him that you shouldn't do that. He understood everything. With the commander, we understood each other well. He was more experienced, because he served in the units longer than me. He graduated from an anti-aircraft school somewhere in Evpatoria in the Crimea.

****

- Was your task to instill hatred of the Germans among our soldiers?

- Yes, that was the main task. He fostered in them hatred of the enemy as an occupier. He is the enemy! I loved to read, there were many articles from Orenburg. I read them to the soldiers, they loved to listen. I read how the Tambov collective farmers raised a sum of money and built a tank column on them. Then the Saratov beekeeper Golovaty bought a second plane at his own expense.

The battery was under the front line: maybe three or four hundred meters from the front line in disguised form. Forest. Dugout for people and horses. There was a kitchen. It was impossible to move during the day, because the German sniper would shoot immediately. As soon as it gets dark, you can. As a political worker, I received newspapers regularly, every day. These were: Pravda, Izvestia, Krasnaya Zvezda, as well as the divisional newspaper Za Rodinu. So, as soon as it gets dark, I went with these newspapers to the calculations, to the guns. There was a small dugout that was heated by a stove. You come. Everyone sits down, except for the night observer: he is still standing. The stove is on. I start reading newspapers, I tell them, they ask me questions, and I answer. That is, this is how I conducted political work directly. I read about how people collect money for the army, for weapons. We considered the example of the foreman of our battery Parakhin, a miner near Moscow.

****

- Have you ever encountered SMERSH?

- I had to twice. The first time in the rear in the Urals came to me, but I already knew him by sight. He began to talk to me about the battery commanders. He also hinted to me that political work should be carried out not only with the soldiers, but also with the commanders.

The second time I met with a special officer directly at the front. We were on the defensive on the Ugra, and since I was in light anti-tank artillery, it was carried by horses. I had an orderly, but the platoon leader did not. When I arrived at the calculation, I left the horse with the orderly, and I myself talked with the soldiers. My orderly was a young guy (nineteen years old) from Donbass. I didn’t know that he had a habit of collecting German leaflets. And then he showed them to the soldiers. I just didn't know about it. And then one day we were on the defensive. A special officer came to me and said that my orderly was picking up German leaflets and agitating Russian soldiers. I promised to be more attentive to my soldier in the future. The special officer approached the orderly and said that if he did not stop agitating others, he would be arrested and he would go to court. The guy became all pale. Then the special officer told him to take off his pants and beat him with a belt three or four times.
"

 

[Kupr]

Then the special officer told him to take off his pants and beat him with a belt three or four times.

For understanding. In Russian peasant culture it was like behavior of father to son. For example, for my very bad misdeeds my father did same way to me. My grandfather did same way to my father.

 

[JodelDiplom]

For understanding. In Russian peasant culture it was like behavior of father to son. For example, for my very bad misdeeds my father did same way to me. My grandfather did same way to my father.

So, it's a way of punishing the soldier in a stem but paternal way? Punishing him so he will remember it, but not report him? Weird that an adult would suffer such a degrading punishment.

 

[Kupr]

So, it's a way of punishing the soldier in a stem but paternal way? Punishing him so he will remember it, but not report him? Weird that an adult would suffer such a degrading punishment.

Alternative punishment was - tribunal (millitary court). According war laws two choices: penal company or public execution. I think soldier was very very happy of "father's execution".

Around 100 years ago difference between West and Russian peasant culture:
West - individualism.
Russia - collectivism, rural community. Survive in bad weather conditions of Russia is possible only together. So head of rural community ("Obshina" in Russian language) like father or very often directly father/grandfather. So it is not weird punishment from father (or head of community).

 

[Kupr]

Regarding using force in high command of Red army. In recent memoirs it is clear that many soviet generals just used personal force and violence.

I remember memoirs of General Gorbatov. Who wrote that as soldier in Russian imperial army he hated violence from officers so he didn't use violence.

In recent memoirs of officer of penal battalion Gorbatov is remembered as general with a stick which he sometimes beat others:

А.В.Пыльцын. Штрафной удар, или Как офицерский штрафбат дошел до Берлина

Google translation:

"After some very short time to our common formation
a group of big chiefs — generals and officers — arrived in the Wilis.
It turns out that the Commander of the 3rd Army, Lieutenant General Alexander has arrived to us.
Vasilievich Gorbatov. This means that we moved from the 48th Army
General P. L. Romanenko in the 3rd Army of Gorbatov. Tall, handsome, this
general quite clearly, but somehow not in a general's soft, almost paternal way
told about the essence of the combat mission that we had to accomplish. I
drew attention to the fact that for some reason the commander relied on a large,
strong wood gnarled stick. Thought he probably hadn't recovered yet
from injury. It was only later that I heard either a legend or a story about how
The famous general "taught fools" with this stick.
In his short, highly emotional speech, the general said that
we are faced with a combat mission of extraordinary complexity and responsibility
penetration into the rear of the enemy and active operations there. And he hopes that
we will fulfill this task with honor. And the nature of the task, he stressed,
testifies to the great confidence that such a battalion has,
like ours, the command of the Front and the Army. By the way, he said that since yesterday
days, that is, from February 17, our Belorussian Front began to be called the First
Belarusian. At the same time, he promised that if the task at hand would be
executed in an exemplary manner, then all penalties who have proved to be staunch fighters,
regardless of whether they are wounded, "shed blood", free from
further stay in the penal battalion, will be restored to their previous ranks,
and the most distinguished, in addition, will be presented to the government
awards.

***
For the successful completion of the combat mission, as promised by the Army Commander,
the whole variable composition (penalty box) was, as they would say now,
rehabilitated, many were awarded military awards: the Order of Glory III
degrees, medals "For Courage" and "For Military Merit". They were heroes from
feats of which they deducted their blame, but even after that there were enough
also for awards. I must say that the penalty box did not enjoy the Order of Glory.
The fact is that it was a soldier's order in status, and officers did not
were awarded. And, of course, many wanted to hide their stay in the Penalty battalion in
as privates, and this order was a testament to this.

***

The period of our stay in the 3rd Army of General was already ending.
Gorbatov. Perhaps, until the very end of the war, we had a pleasant
the impression of what a sincere commander he was. They even talked about
the fact that he, like Rokossovsky, was therefore humanly related to
to penalty boxers who themselves were once unjustly deprived of their liberty. Well it
only guesswork.
Probably, it is appropriate here to cite either a true story, or a legend about
General Gorbatov.
They said that after the capture of Rogachev through the already broken
and the fragile ice of the Dnieper, sappers urgently sent for the crossing of troops and
light equipment temporary wooden bridge. In its width, it allowed
the movement of equipment only in one direction, and therefore the commandant of the crossing was
Gorbatov's order was given to let through cars with
ammunition, food, artillery and other light equipment and only in
side of the front.
When there were many cars at the crossing, going to the front line, on another
the shore also gathered a considerable number of them, including several
"wilis". The commandant of the ferry, a strong and tall major, following the order, did not
let them go to the bridge. After all, for this it was necessary to stop the flow of cars to
front. General Gorbatov came out of one "jeep" and demanded urgently
miss his car. The major, referring to the order, refused to do so.
Angry at the disobedient commandant, the general suddenly hit him with his, all
famous stick.
The major's reaction was extraordinary: he turned sharply and hit
general, who, rather from surprise, lost his balance and rolled over
through the low rail of the bridge into the snow. What started here! From the car
the commander and accompanying "Willis" jumped out several officers.
Some rushed to raise the general, others, drawing their pistols, grabbed
Major and twisted his arms.
The general, shaking off the snow, went up to the major, ordered to release him
and ordered to bring his flask. *** Gorbatov personally unscrewed from an unusual flask
a glass lid, filled it with vodka, presented it to the stunned major with
words: "Well done, Major! Have a drink, consider this as my apology and personal
reward. How many fools did he teach and educate with this stick, the first smart
met. Continue your service, but the real reward will not work. "
This is an unusual legend about General Gorbatov, but I so wanted to believe in it.
reality. Or maybe not a legend at all, maybe everything was so? After all,
a person with a kind soul and good deeds."