First off, two recommendations on some very good books on Byzantium:
The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025, Mark Whittow
A very interesting book, it explains the transition of the Empire from an cosmopolitan Eastern Roman Empire to a more Greek oriented Byzantine Empire. Excellent chapters on strategic geography of the region, the outlook of the empire in 600, what went wrong during the Arab invasions, how the Empire survived, later thrived and went on the counter offensive in the 900's.
Byzantium and Its Army, 284-1081, Warren Treadgold
An excellent study of neglected subject. It explains the history, manpower, pay, organization, relationship to the society/state, etc. The most interesting part is near the end, where the author convincingly explains what went wrong after 1025, considered the peak of Byzantine power.
Related to this, a poster elsewhere stated that if the game were realistic the Byzantines should have a lot of trouble with the Seljuks. Treadgold above would disagree. According to Treadgold, after the death of Basil II in 1025, his successors were not interested in really expanding the empire, most were not warlike and they let part of the army decline.
The key problem was the army was too large for a pure defensive force and part of it needed to be demobilized due to expense. However, a large part of the army had been garrisoning Anatolia for decades, had never fought and was unlikely to fight. Yet if demobilized they would be expected to start paying taxes - yet why should they pay taxes when they hadn't been fighting anyway? This would cause a political uproar. So one of the Byzantine Emperors instead decided to disband the Armemian armies, who were very well trained veteran troops (they had defeated the Seljuks as recently as 1048!), who could reasonably be expected to pay taxes in lieu of the fighting they had been doing.
The problem was the Anatolian units were in no shape to fight and to defend the Armenian frontier. This left the "backdoor" open, and after Manzikert in 1071, the Seljuks poured into Anatolia from Armenia, an area never considered a real area of threat by the Empire - the Persians and Arabs had never attacked through Armenia in all the centuries of warfare in the East. Interestingly enough, the "frontdoor" in Syria/Mesopotamia, where the Byzantines always worried and strongly defended, held out for years after Manzikert. You had the odd situation of Seljuks controlling most of Asia Minor (taking Nicea in 1081) while the Byzantine armies in the East held out in Antioch until 1084, Edessa in 1086, and Cilicia was held by Armenian troops and was never taken by the Seljuks!
There was really no reason why the Empire had to collapse in 1071. It was strong, it's armies still powerful (they took Edessa in 1031, defeated the Seljuks in 1048 and its Armenian allies destroyed a Turkish raiding army in 1057). The Seljuks were not invulnerable. Romanus could have beaten them at Manzikert if his reserves had advanced to catch the Seljuks in the rear as they attempted to surround his advance force, instead of being betrayed by political opponents in his army. The Empire just demobilized a large portion of its veteran troops at the wrong time - and paid dearly for it.
Grifman
The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025, Mark Whittow
A very interesting book, it explains the transition of the Empire from an cosmopolitan Eastern Roman Empire to a more Greek oriented Byzantine Empire. Excellent chapters on strategic geography of the region, the outlook of the empire in 600, what went wrong during the Arab invasions, how the Empire survived, later thrived and went on the counter offensive in the 900's.
Byzantium and Its Army, 284-1081, Warren Treadgold
An excellent study of neglected subject. It explains the history, manpower, pay, organization, relationship to the society/state, etc. The most interesting part is near the end, where the author convincingly explains what went wrong after 1025, considered the peak of Byzantine power.
Related to this, a poster elsewhere stated that if the game were realistic the Byzantines should have a lot of trouble with the Seljuks. Treadgold above would disagree. According to Treadgold, after the death of Basil II in 1025, his successors were not interested in really expanding the empire, most were not warlike and they let part of the army decline.
The key problem was the army was too large for a pure defensive force and part of it needed to be demobilized due to expense. However, a large part of the army had been garrisoning Anatolia for decades, had never fought and was unlikely to fight. Yet if demobilized they would be expected to start paying taxes - yet why should they pay taxes when they hadn't been fighting anyway? This would cause a political uproar. So one of the Byzantine Emperors instead decided to disband the Armemian armies, who were very well trained veteran troops (they had defeated the Seljuks as recently as 1048!), who could reasonably be expected to pay taxes in lieu of the fighting they had been doing.
The problem was the Anatolian units were in no shape to fight and to defend the Armenian frontier. This left the "backdoor" open, and after Manzikert in 1071, the Seljuks poured into Anatolia from Armenia, an area never considered a real area of threat by the Empire - the Persians and Arabs had never attacked through Armenia in all the centuries of warfare in the East. Interestingly enough, the "frontdoor" in Syria/Mesopotamia, where the Byzantines always worried and strongly defended, held out for years after Manzikert. You had the odd situation of Seljuks controlling most of Asia Minor (taking Nicea in 1081) while the Byzantine armies in the East held out in Antioch until 1084, Edessa in 1086, and Cilicia was held by Armenian troops and was never taken by the Seljuks!
There was really no reason why the Empire had to collapse in 1071. It was strong, it's armies still powerful (they took Edessa in 1031, defeated the Seljuks in 1048 and its Armenian allies destroyed a Turkish raiding army in 1057). The Seljuks were not invulnerable. Romanus could have beaten them at Manzikert if his reserves had advanced to catch the Seljuks in the rear as they attempted to surround his advance force, instead of being betrayed by political opponents in his army. The Empire just demobilized a large portion of its veteran troops at the wrong time - and paid dearly for it.
Grifman
