Sparta as a Major Power

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Posted by Greven:

I some more discussion then... Your basic premiss is not that strong though. As Sparta had no problem with manpower on the contrary its situation was about as some of the countries you mention namely Rome and Macedonia, I will also add Thebe and Athens to this. Persia of course had the greatest manpower of them all, but it doesn't seem to have helped them in the end. Now what do I mean with manpower??? Well all of these countries was to small to base their armed forces on the own 'national population pool' this goes for Sparta, Rome, Athens and Macedonia. Instead the core element was a part of something bigger - an alliance. All the countries above used alliances where weaker states configured around the more powerful like moons around planets. And Sparta and well as Rome had a lot of them. The second element was the 'epikouroi' (mercenaries would be perhaps acceptable term, even as these men where mostly much more loyal than the later versions). These very used in very large proportions, and that the Manpower for Great Imperialism existed in Hellas long before Alexander can be portraited by Kyros the Youngers ten-thousand man strong army that reached Babylon in a effort to dethrone the Persian King Artaxerxes. It lost, but it was tactical blunders not resource management the let Artaxerxes sit untouched on his throne.

So if the Peleponnesian League (under the leadership of Sparta) had beaten Epaminodas (most unlikely though when thinking of the most brilliant general ever produced, IMHO) It would not even have needed the Thracian silvermines, as they would have the attican mines and a new ally Athens firmly controled by Athens former allies. Athens would have been the very important production and trade center of the New Empire. Then maybe turning against Persia... Well I do not think that would have been a large problem than for Alexander (and it was of course).Hellas, united, was a rich land, in my opinion Macedonia was no unique country but THE country that got the opportunity to unite Hellas and thus got resources to expand.

A last comment... You say that Spartan hegemony was built almost purely upon military prestige and gunboat diplomacy. YES YES!!! And that is exactly what Macedonia was built upon. It was why the battles of Kaironeia and Granikos was so important to Fillip and Alexander. The victories made their enemies alliances to start to crumble. Second Granikos made it possible for Alexander to start pludering and getting the resources he needed to go after Darius. The fortunes of war was more important for a quick campaign than the silver mines of Macedonia, even as they where probably needed to beat the Athenians and the thebans earlier on.

/Greven "the Disagreeing"

A short reply (if I can ever achieve such a thing ).

Manpower - The difference btw Sparta and the other nations lies in the Citizen manpower, which is the essential ingredient in any empire-building state (cf. Machiavelli). Rome's was huge (Rome+Latium+ eventually all of Italy), Macedonia's was pretty sizable as well. Sparta's was miniscule.

Yes - manpower for great imperialism existed in Hellas, but it was always fragmented. Consider that none of the many attempts to unify Greece between 800 BC and 140 BC lasted more than a generation until the Roman conquest. The important difference between Sparta (or any other Greek state) and the real imperial powers was that Sparta would have had to rely on subject soldiers - Persia during its rise, as well as Rome and Macedonia built their empires using troops that were citizens of that empire.

Therein lies the difference, IMHO.

Macedonian diplomacy - I'd give Philip V and Alexander greater credit than that. No doubt that decisive victories were important to conquor Persia and keep Greece at rest, but Macedonian means of dealing with the Greeks were somewhat more subtle than Spartas (even if not much more successful). In addition, they successfully integrated Thessalia, Epirus, and numerous other tribes into the Macedonian hegemony.

 

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Thermopylae ?

Surely the sacrifice made by Leonidas et all (including various militia units from other Greek cities), went a long way to actually unifying Greece against the Persian aggressor.

Yes, previously they were all at war or allied to each other at one stage or another. This though was the turning point.

I'm currently reading (for the 2nd time), an utterly fantastic book called "Gates of Fire", by Steven Pressfield, which is probably the most descriptive account of this period of history that I've come across.

 

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Actually, No. The Greek idea of liberty was always that they should have the liberty to fight amongst themselves; a trait which both Persian and later Macedonian monarchs exploited ruthlessly. Barely 70 years after the Persian invasion, Sparta and Athens waged the war (27 years long) that in essence ended the golden age of Greece.

What followed were a number of humiliating years, were Persia skillfully played off one state against another almost at will, and dictated peace treaties. And there had been numerous wars in the interval (besides, all Greece did not fight the Persian invasion - Thebes had been on the Persian side).

Gates of Fire - don't get me started on the tons of errors in that book.

 

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Originally posted by strategy
Gates of Fire - don't get me started on the tons of errors in that book.

Go on, I'd be interested to hear your opinion ?

 

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Originally posted by strategy
Posted by Greven:


A short reply (if I can ever achieve such a thing ).

Manpower - The difference btw Sparta and the other nations lies in the Citizen manpower, which is the essential ingredient in any empire-building state (cf. Machiavelli). Rome's was huge (Rome+Latium+ eventually all of Italy), Macedonia's was pretty sizable as well. Sparta's was miniscule.

Just wanted to chime in with Strategy here. AFAIK, the Spartan manpower was very small, since the military class was a rather thin caste, while the slave caste - the helots - were unreliable*. Compare to South Africa, if you will.

Others may know this better, if they do I apreciate being corrected. Anyway, I've always gotten the impression that this was the factor behind their reticence to go to war.




*Which I also would be in their position.

 

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MHO,

Spartan society was divided into three main classes. At the top was the Spartiate, or native Spartan, who could trace his or her ancestry back to the original inhabitants of the city. The Spartiate served in the army and was the only person who enjoyed the full political and legal rights of the state. Below the Spartiates were the perioeci , or "dwellers around or about." These were foreign people who served as a kind of buffer population between the Spartans and the helots. Because of this vital function, they were accorded a great deal of freedom. Most of the trade and commerce carried out in Sparta were performed by the perioeci . At the bottom, of course, were the helots.

When they conquered their neighbor, Tegea, they set up a truce with them rather than annex their land and people. They demanded instead an alliance. Tegea would follow Sparta in all its foreign relationships, including wars, and would supply Sparta with a fixed amount of soldiers and equipment. In exchange, the Tegeans could remain an independent state. This was a brilliant move on the part of the Spartans. In a short time, Sparta had formed alliances with a huge number of states in the southern part of Greece (called the Peloponnesus), and had become the major power in Greece when the Persians invaded in 490 BC. Their power eclipsed that of even their powerful neighbor in the north, Athens.



Spartiate: The word used to refer to a full citizen of the polis of Sparta, who had gone through the AGOGE and was serving in the Spartan military (also his female relatives). Not every Spartan was a Spartiate. The total number of Spartiates was never more than 9,000 in a population of 225,000+ Lacedaemonians and subjects. By the 4th cent. B.C. the number was down to around 750. The Great Earthquake (ca. 465) and the Great Peloponnesian War (432-404) had a great deal to do with this.

PERIOIKOI: `Those dwelling round about': natives of Lacedaemonia who did not have full citizen rights; farmers and merchants mostly perioikoi.

HELOTS: conquered subjects used as serfs, both in the Eurotas valley and in Messenia to the west; legally they were enemies of the State and subject to arbitrary brutal treatment. They were the property of the Spartan State.

The lakedaimonians kept their army strength and structure as secrets, if you know this things your on your way to beating them, we do know that they were called up in age classes, so if a summons went out to report to the 35th year of liability x amount of men responded. Then they are organised into Lochoi, later this was a Morai( Morai had integral cavalry) to fight the campaign, in addition to Spartiate Lochoi their were others made up of PERIOIKOI who were also called along with Skiritai who were the most favoured of the periokoi, this was the spartan army that went to war. The actual number of full Spartiates was often very small, but the PERIOIKOI were nearly as good as its here that those who lost the stutus of full Spartiate ended up, so the power base of excellently trained troops is wider than you may think.

Grevens point i believe is that Rome from its initial manpower base was able to expand its sphere of control through alliances/treaty more effectivly than a Sparta was able to do so, a difference of concept, in Rome you had a chance of joining at the top level and being equal(or at least close to), in Sparta you could never join them at the top, only ever be second or 3rd.

Hannibal

 

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Originally posted by Johan43
Just wanted to chime in with Strategy here. AFAIK, the Spartan manpower was very small, since the military class was a rather thin caste, while the slave caste - the helots - were unreliable*. Compare to South Africa, if you will.

Others may know this better, if they do I apreciate being corrected. Anyway, I've always gotten the impression that this was the factor behind their reticence to go to war.

In addition to the reason for their somewhat unstable foreign diplomacy line.

GK - here's a review that mentions some of the incongruities in the book. Quite funny, too, IMO. Review

Of course, it IS damnably hard to write a historical novel that is correct in all details, and at the same time write an entertaining story. Many feel that McCullough's books are too dry, for example (and they also contain historical errors - e.g., Jewish artists/sculptors are described in Aurelia's insulare - though Jews are forbidden to make images) - it all depends on where your treshold for correctness lies, and how many errors you're willing to forgive in order to enjoy a good story. For me, Gates of Fire crosses that treshold.

For a really great description of Hellenistic society in this age, read "The Last of the Wine", by Mary Renault. It's about an Athenian youth growing up during the Peloponesian wars. Then read her wonderful books on Alexander the Great: "Fire from Heaven", "The Persian Boy", and "Funeral Games".

 

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Originally posted by Hannibal Barca
Grevens point i believe is that Rome from its initial manpower base was able to expand its sphere of control through alliances/treaty more effectivly than a Sparta was able to do so, a difference of concept, in Rome you had a chance of joining at the top level and being equal(or at least close to), in Sparta you could never join them at the top, only ever be second or 3rd.

A very crucial difference, and exactly my point - namely that Rome had by 340 enfranchized almost all of Latium and the Campanian nobility - a massive power base. Rome had a system based on city alliances - Sparta consistently tried to destroy cities and dissolve Polis'es, in order to prevent such centers of opposition from existing.

The other point is that Greeks were not interested in being enfranchized by other city states - e.g., you'd never get an Athenian to be a good Spartan; why should he - he *knows* that his own city's culture is superior. This innate belief in their own superiority was common for all of the Greek states. The only exception was Athens, who was culturally and morally the leading light of Greece after Salamis, and might have forged an empire - their moral claim was however destroyed during the Peloponesian wars due to the barbarities committed.

Building a permanent power base on Greece was a near impossibility, due to these constant "cultural" tensions (corresponding to rampant "nationalism" in EU, if you will) - note that neither the Athenian, the Spartan, the Thebian or the Macedonian hegemony over Greece lasted much more than a generation. By the time Rome formally annexed Greece, she was completely unchallengable - even then, revolt were attempted.

Of course, one can argue that Sparta could have changed its historical methods. My only question then is, what point in playing Sparta in a game, if you're not Spartan?

 

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Strategy said:
A very crucial difference, and exactly my point - namely that Rome had by 340 enfranchized almost all of Latium and the Campanian nobility - a massive power base. Rome had a system based on city alliances - Sparta consistently tried to destroy cities and dissolve Polis'es, in order to prevent such centers of opposition from existing.


Greven said:
Well... 'enfranchized' here actually means war. Rome relentlessly fought every italian people that did not follow the lead of ROMA. Second your point on Sparta is only partial true. It is true that Spartas main strategy in winning wars was to destroy polis', but you here forget to remember that Sparta was allied with many countries, among them Boetica,and believe it or not 'Macedonia'.

Secondly I relentlessly refuse to accept that empire building means you need a large population. Macedonia did not, and Alexander's three successor-states was all greek lead for hundreds of years. What you need is the supply of large bodies of men, as Hellas did and which Filip and Alexander used.

Third on enfranchisment how do you know that athenians could not go up in a spartan-hellenic empire? Both Spartans and Athenians alike became good roman citizens didn't they?

Fourth I do not believe in the thesis that the conflicts in Hellas was cultural. I believe they were political. Even at the greatest hours of Epaminondas theban aristocrats tried to strike a deal with the Spartans.

/Greven

 

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Bold text originally posted by Greven:
Well... 'enfranchized' here actually means war. Rome relentlessly fought every italian people that did not follow the lead of ROMA.

True - but once they had fought them, they cleverly bound them to them through alliances which allowed those same people a large degree of self-government - and in large measure allowed those peoples to become full citizens of Rome (it was only later that Roman citizenship became an exclusive thing). This contrasts very sharply with the very exclusive citizenship of all the Greek states - but especially Sparta.

Keep in mind also that the Spartan Kings who tried to reform the state tended to have bad endings - usually at the hands of their own citizens (though Kleomenes ended up in Egypt instead).

Second your point on Sparta is only partial true. It is true that Spartas main strategy in winning wars was to destroy polis', but you here forget to remember that Sparta was allied with many countries, among them Boetica,and believe it or not 'Macedonia'.

And 9 years after the Peloponesian war, Sparta was at war with Boeotia, Athens (supported by Persia), Corinth and Argos - thanks to high-handed Spartan meddling in all of their allies spheres of interest (and their total inability to keep Athens subjugated).

Secondly I relentlessly refuse to accept that empire building means you need a large population. Macedonia did not, and Alexander's three successor-states was all greek lead for hundreds of years. What you need is the supply of large bodies of men, as Hellas did and which Filip and Alexander used.

I obviously disagree - every sizable, viable empire in the Ancient world had a substantial manpower base to draw upon.

Macedonia did have a quite large population (though that of all Greece was of course larger) otherwise, they would have been incabaple of fielding the 37,000 Macedonians that were mobilized at the time of Alexander's crossing into Persia. Add to this the Thessalians, who were for all intents and purposes Macedonians at this point.

Neither Phillip nor Alexander made any substantial use of Greek allied manpower: some were left in garrisons, and the rest were sent home. Mercenaries were used (up to 60,000 according to G. Griffith), but 90% of those were on garrison duty - not expected to fight. 26,000 were settled in the Eastern satrapies by Alexander and promptly rebelled.

The latter Successor states cleverly gave citizenship in the "New World" to all the Greeks who emigrated (plus settling their mercenaries on crown land), and thus created a large manpower reserve of Greco-Macedonian-Anatolian citizens, on whom their armies was based. This allowed them to maintain their position - but note how swiftly these empires fell apart (it hardly took 100s of years). The Macedonian Greek hegemony barely outlasted Alexander; the Seleucid empire started gradually falling to pieces a generation after it had been put together (from 270 BC, first Bactria, then Pergamon, Armenia, Parthia and the rest of the Far East became independent). Note that the places were Seleucid control lasted, corresponded exactly with the areas were the Greek-Macedonian colonies had been established. The Ptolemies were the most successful, but there again we see the pattern of strong Greco-Roman colonies patterned all over the empire - and multiple dangerous revolts of the native populace that significantly weakened the monarchy. For its last 100+ years, it was only sustained by Roman support and hired mercenaries.

Third on enfranchisment how do you know that athenians could not go up in a spartan-hellenic empire? Both Spartans and Athenians alike became good roman citizens didn't they?

Because this isn't how the Spartan (or in general the Hellenistic) social system worked. Even Xenophon, a man who admired everything that Sparta stood for - whose sons fought (and died) in Spartan service - trusted friend of King Agesilaus II, moved back to Athens as a Citizen before he died. No matter how long he stayed there (and despite having a house in Sparta), he remained a resident alien rather than a citizen. The whole "class-struggle" process which Rome had put behind it in 450BC, had still not been resolved in Greece (and was not resolved until the Romans took over).

Fourth I do not believe in the thesis that the conflicts in Hellas was cultural. I believe they were political. Even at the greatest hours of Epaminondas theban aristocrats tried to strike a deal with the Spartans.

Which basically just exemplifies why the Greek states could not have built an Empire. Rome, Phillip or Alexander would have taken the opportunity to crush the opposition utterly, and thereafter ensured that the enemy was no longer a threat.

The Ancient Greeks would beat each other up, and then go home to fight another day. Witness the 50 indecisive years of war between Sparta and the Achaian league.

Obviously - you can always theorize that Sparta somehow managed to reform itself, and hit upon a system that adequately bound together the Hellenistic world (despite the fact that none of the Greek states managed to do this during their 600 hundred years of more or less independence).

Of course it could have happened. My point is simply that it is extremely unlikely that it would have happened, and thus my consigning that sort of speculation to the world of fantasy. Naturally, such a classification depends on where you draw the line between Alternate History and Fantasy. Me - I like my historical wargames to be at least a little bit historical.

And sometime, I've simply got to learn how to write shorter posts...

 

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Originally posted by strategy


Strategy said:
True - but once they had fought them, they cleverly bound them to them through alliances which allowed those same people a large degree of self-government - and in large measure allowed those peoples to become full citizens of Rome (it was only later that Roman citizenship became an exclusive thing). This contrasts very sharply with the very exclusive citizenship of all the Greek states - but especially Sparta.Keep in mind also that the Spartan Kings who tried to reform the state tended to have bad endings - usually at the hands of their own citizens (though Kleomenes ended up in Egypt instead).

Greven said:
Yes true, but you also have to remember that after the Peloponnesian War Sparta had the upper hand in Hellas, Thebe was an ally and Athens was in ruins. So she strove for supremacy... Now the allies became vary against the imperialism as you say...Thebe, Epaminondas, well... Good commander he was. But it does not matter, because right at this point the Balance of Power system in Hellas had utterly failed, tilted by Sparta from the beginning. If I am have to be a bit deterministic here I would say that Hellas was doomed at this point to be united in one way or the other. If we look at the political constellations against Sparta, and Macedonia they were 'democratic' and loosly allied. It took a monarchy to bring Hellas under one boot. Filip managed this where Sparta failed. Yes indeed, but if Sparta had not succumbed to Thebe and laid Hellas under her boot she would have to reform as the minisculous Spartan National Army could not possible occupy all of Hellas with any effectivity. Nations seem to change over time and circumstances that is why it is so unrealistic to say that Spartan society was this or that and then say that they could never have changed. It all depends on the circumstances...

Strategy said:
And 9 years after the Peloponesian war, Sparta was at war with Boeotia, Athens (supported by Persia), Corinth and Argos - thanks to high-handed Spartan meddling in all of their allies spheres of interest (and their total inability to keep Athens subjugated).

Greven said:
Yes and No. I say that the meddling should be interpreted as an imperialistic grab for supremacy in Hellas. these so-called allies of course had their own agendas and had to defy any tilting of Balance of Power. There fattest mistake was to tilt it together with Sparta in the first place.

Strategy said:
I obviously disagree - every sizable, viable empire in the Ancient world had a substantial manpower base to draw upon.

Macedonia did have a quite large population (though that of all Greece was of course larger) otherwise, they would have been incabaple of fielding the 37,000 Macedonians that were mobilized at the time of Alexander's crossing into Persia. Add to this the Thessalians, who were for all intents and purposes Macedonians at this point.

Neither Phillip nor Alexander made any substantial use of Greek allied manpower: some were left in garrisons, and the rest were sent home. Mercenaries were used (up to 60,000 according to G. Griffith), but 90% of those were on garrison duty - not expected to fight. 26,000 were settled in the Eastern satrapies by Alexander and promptly rebelled.

Greven said:
First I count the Macedonians as Hellenes, a term that actually was not really conceptualized until after Alexander. Secondly this only underscores my argument that the control of the Greece populations was a necessity for winning Granikos, which was a necessity for further expansion into Persia. And it also underscores my point that a large national population was not a necessity. It is interesting what you say...that most greeks were used as garrison,which implies that most of the army must have consisted of Easterlings another underscoring...And even more interesting it is to see that even the Macedonians used such large proportion of their army for garrisoning subject areas, precisely as the spartans did.


Strategy said:
Which basically just exemplifies why the Greek states could not have built an Empire. Rome, Phillip or Alexander would have taken the opportunity to crush the opposition utterly, and thereafter ensured that the enemy was no longer a threat. The Ancient Greeks would beat each other up, and then go home to fight another day. Witness the 50 indecisive years of war between Sparta and the Achaian league.

Greven said:
Yet again we talk past eachother I think. First, with Greek state I definitely include Macedonia as its monarchy was more or less culturally greek, Alexander had aristotle as a teacher as an example. Second you again treat the polis' as they had been before and during the Pelopennesian War, but a Sparta, for example, that had conquered all of Hellas would be a polis-state no more.

Strategy said:
Obviously - you can always theorize that Sparta somehow managed to reform itself, and hit upon a system that adequately bound together the Hellenistic world (despite the fact that none of the Greek states managed to do this during their 600 hundred years of more or less independence). Of course it could have happened. My point is simply that it is extremely unlikely that it would have happened, and thus my consigning that sort of speculation to the world of fantasy. Naturally, such a classification depends on where you draw the line between Alternate History and Fantasy. Me - I like my historical wargames to be at least a little bit historical.

Greven said:
Ehh he! Well I do not view your belief as especially 'historical' and my view as alternative or fantasy. I view both our beliefs as historical. The difference IMHO is that your is embedded in a considerable concrete block of determinism....

/Greven

 

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Bold text originally posted by Greven
Yes true, but you also have to remember that after the Peloponnesian War Sparta had the upper hand in Hellas, Thebe was an ally and Athens was in ruins. So she strove for supremacy...

Ehm - why should she struggle for something she already had? Besides - Athens was very far from being in ruins.

If I am have to be a bit deterministic here I would say that Hellas was doomed at this point to be united in one way or the other. If we look at the political constellations against Sparta, and Macedonia they were 'democratic' and loosly allied. It took a monarchy to bring Hellas under one boot. Filip managed this where Sparta failed.

I must disagree with you. Yes - Greece was temporarily almost united (though Sparta was not a party to the league of Corinth), but this "union" lasted less than 20 years (and with revolts in between) - after which Greece led a fragmented life of independence under the shadow of the Successors. Unity of Greece wasn't to be achieved until Rome bound the city-states into their treaty network.

Nations seem to change over time and circumstances that is why it is so unrealistic to say that Spartan society was this or that and then say that they could never have changed. It all depends on the circumstances...

But history has also shown that change often destroys societies. And this is the single point where I consider things to be very deterministic - Spartan society was doomed to be destroyed.

There fattest mistake was to tilt it together with Sparta in the first place.

Well before then, the balance was tilted in favor of Athens, so they didn't have much. And afterwards, they destroyed Sparta, so I can't see what was their mistake.

Secondly this only underscores my argument that the control of the Greece populations was a necessity for winning Granikos, which was a necessity for further expansion into Persia.

I don't understand your point. My point was that he did not make use of the Greek Citizen population.

And it also underscores my point that a large national population was not a necessity.

I'd count a nation capable of raising 40,000 men of good quality troops a large national population, at least in ancient times. Few ancient "nations" were capable of raising more than 15,000 combat worthy troops - the useful core of the huge Persian armies rarely exceeded that number.

It is interesting what you say...that most greeks were used as garrison,which implies that most of the army must have consisted of Easterlings another underscoring...

There is a distinction here - the ALLIED greek citizen soldiers (who were most likely along primarily as hostages) were used as garrisons. In addition to those, a huge amount of Greek mercenary soldiers where out of a job after Darius's defeat, and some of those were definitely with the army (and were settled all over the place in Alexanders many colonies). Eastern troops were only available after the death of Darius in the campaigns in Bactria, Sogdia and India - and were primarily cavalry. Given that Alex's cavalry at the Hydaspes numbered only 7000, and that at least 3000 were the Companions, the army can hardly be said to consist of Easterlings...) At all times, at least 60% of the army (and often more) consisted of his Macedonian/Thessalian/Illyro-Thracian countrymen. The were most likely primarily Greek hoplite and peltast mercenaries, brought along to leave in garrisons (the 26,000 Greeks colonists who revolted + the large Greco-Bactrians colonies that remained must have come from somewhere).

Of course Alex latter attempted to build an all-Iranian phalanx - which shows that he at least knew the necesity for building an empire on a solid body of citizen soldiers.

And even more interesting it is to see that even the Macedonians used such large proportion of their army for garrisoning subject areas, precisely as the spartans did.

This was pretty typical - and yet another reason why Sparta was in big trouble in 400 BC.

Yet again we talk past eachother I think. First, with Greek state I definitely include Macedonia as its monarchy was more or less culturally greek, Alexander had aristotle as a teacher as an example.


Except that it was Monarchial - a large and important difference - namely that a monarch has sole control (and is usually much more vindictive) than an oligarchic or democratic government were conflicting interests must be balanced. Even Sparta did not have a true monarchy.

Second you again treat the polis' as they had been before and during the Pelopennesian War, but a Sparta, for example, that had conquered all of Hellas would be a polis-state no more.

Exactly - its polis would have been unable to stand the strain of maintaining an empire and Spartan society would have broken down, resulting in the speedy end of its "empire", IMHO. Just look at the convulsions that Rome went through between 90-30 BC. Witness the simmilarly very strong resistance against Alexander's attempted "enfranchizement" of the Persians - a "reform" that did not outlast his death.

Rome, miraculously survived its changing society - basically because its original system was very sound to begin with, and because its subject states knew that regardless of the outcome, the Roman state would still be frighteningly strong. Spartan society was not sound, and Sparta itself was not particularly strong (despite its reputation).

The difference IMHO is that your is embedded in a considerable concrete block of determinism....

Not exactly - but I do subscribe to Polybius's view that there is an underlying cause behind everything (with appropriate respect to Lady Fortuna). So in effect, before you can convince me that Sparta - as it was in 400 BC - could suddenly have risen to become a world power, you need to convince me how it would tackle and solve the very considerable problems that we know were in its way.

 

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Thanks for the discussion btw, it always helps with clarifying one's views to write them down and/or discuss them with someone else. Even if one cannot convince the other guy of the error of his ways.

Also interesting to see where my philosophy of game design differs from yours - though some of that was of course already apparent to me from playing EU (though I still wonder how much of that comes of "copying" the board game).

And of course, there is always the possibility with the ancient world, that you may be right and I may be wrong, since we rarely have enough information to base our hypotheses on.

I'm still convinced though that Sparta was almost doomed to a swift decline. I'm far from convinced that Greece was doomed to unification - though it might have been interesting to see what would have happened if Epaminondas had not died at Mantinea. Thebes and Athens though exemplifies the constant shifting and jockeying for position that ensured Greece's terminal state of disunity - bitter enemies until 404 (Thebes suggested that Athens be razed to the ground), allies in 395-392, enemies again in 382, allies in 379-371, enemies again after that but again fought with Athens against Philip.

 

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Originally posted by strategy
Thanks for the discussion btw, it always helps with clarifying one's views to write them down and/or discuss them with someone else. Even if one cannot convince the other guy of the error of his ways.

Also interesting to see where my philosophy of game design differs from yours - though some of that was of course already apparent to me from playing EU (though I still wonder how much of that comes of "copying" the board game).

And of course, there is always the possibility with the ancient world, that you may be right and I may be wrong, since we rarely have enough information to base our hypotheses on.

I'm still convinced though that Sparta was almost doomed to a swift decline. I'm far from convinced that Greece was doomed to unification - though it might have been interesting to see what would have happened if Epaminondas had not died at Mantinea. Thebes and Athens though exemplifies the constant shifting and jockeying for position that ensured Greece's terminal state of disunity - bitter enemies until 404 (Thebes suggested that Athens be razed to the ground), allies in 395-392, enemies again in 382, allies in 379-371, enemies again after that but again fought with Athens against Philip.

Thank you yourself Strategy. These discussion are not only fun and intruiging, but also very useful for designing a game that would last for a thousand years. I fully concede to all your points here. I even concede to the point that Sparta was almost doomed to swift decline. The difference between us is probably that I stress 'almost' more than you do. On game design... Well I do not know actually. I looked at your Imperium game (oh I love these 'Republic of Rome' types of games. Thrilling!)and I do not think my philosophy depart that much from yours. But there will always be different strategic design decisions to face if you design a game with a limited scope and a thousand-year game. Different games need different types of games. But I do say that I prefer overarching mechanisms (domestic and foreign policy, war, economic, trade etc) that creates the historic feeling that strapping the player into a strait-jacket saying 'this or that could NEVER have happened. Mostly because I do not believe in it.

/Greven

 

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Originally posted by Greven
But I do say that I prefer overarching mechanisms (domestic and foreign policy, war, economic, trade etc) that creates the historic feeling that strapping the player into a strait-jacket saying 'this or that could NEVER have happened. Mostly because I do not believe in it.

Oh, I agree entirely with you there. The trick - as in all strategy game - lies in creating mechanisms that makes the player confront some of the important problems that faced his "alter ego" in history as well as teaching him a thing or two about simple logistical and demographic facts. Make them too overarching (like IMHO some of the mechanisms in EU), and you'll soon get players running amok down extremely fantastic timelines.

That is actually what has been my concern in the Imperium game engine which is actually rather generic and could - I believe - easily encompass the whole time frame from 400 BC to 1500 AD (at least that has been a design goal from the start). Personally, though, the idea of playing rise and fall don't appeal to me as well as also increasing the scope of the project; one should realize one's limitations . I'd like to get the game completed within this decade...