The fate of routing units

[SirNat]

The notion of routing men is well known within military history and the general principle behind it makes logical sense. The unit losses its will to fight and breaks from the fight looking to save their own lives, albeit occasionally being rallied back into the fight.

What usually happened to routing units from the battlefield through history? Did they usually simply run back to camp if in hostile territory or even just go back home if they would have known the way?

Also is there some sort of correlation between how infeasible running from the battlefield would have been to compared to simply surrendering. I am just hypothesizing on this given how increasingly rare outright routing has become in current generations e.g. you may as well just surrender because trying to the run away from mechanized troops is simply futile.

 

[SeekTruthFromFx]

@SirNat, you've forgotten that anyone can outrun mechanized troops with enough of a head start.

During the 2003 Iraq War, many Iraqi soldiers just went home before the battle because they thought that fighting the Coalition would be suicidal. IIRC sometimes their officers lead this (i.e. drove off with in the battalion lorry, leaving the troops to walk to the nearest highway and hitchhike), some (good????) officers officially gave the whole unit leave, and sometimes troops changed into civilian clothing just as their officers urged them to move out. The Americans reported seeing suspiciously large numbers of people walking away from battlefields in civvies and military boots.

There was plenty of surrendering, but it was often seen as a second-best option because your officers or Ba'athist militias might disagree violently with your decision to surrender.

I've not read an account, but I assume the fall of the Taliban was similar. And I think this would have happened to Argentine conscripts in the Falklands War if the Atlantic Ocean hadn't been between them and home.

Looking much further back, my reading of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Bible suggests that in the bronze and iron ages, the default option was not fighting. The names of some leaders (Joshua, David, Liu Bei) have echoed down the centuries because it was extremely difficult to persuade men to risk getting skewered for someone's else benefit (or for a small share in a larger cause); those who did so were truly exceptional. I once read a post somewhere on these forums about how the greatest development of 20th century warfare was persuading ~100% of each unit to fully commit to battle; before industrial-scale nationalism, most armies were rather fragile affairs.

 

[Ming]

Looking much further back, my reading of the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and the Bible suggests that in the bronze and iron ages, the default option was not fighting. The names of some leaders (Joshua, David, Liu Bei) have echoed down the centuries because it was extremely difficult to persuade men to risk getting skewered for someone's else benefit (or for a small share in a larger cause); those who did so were truly exceptional. I once read a post somewhere on these forums about how the greatest development of 20th century warfare was persuading ~100% of each unit to fully commit to battle; before industrial-scale nationalism, most armies were rather fragile affairs.

I remember reading on this forum something along the lines that the US army determined that during world war 2 only 40% or so of riflemen were actively engaged in attempting to kill the enemy, while the rest just kept their head down. Using new training and psychological methods this was increased to ~60% by vietnam. Those were both conscript armies in the age where obligation to fight and die for the was accepted. By contrast the all volunteer army of Desert storm was over 90%, IIRC.

 

[epicmemory]

I remember reading on this forum something along the lines that the US army determined that during world war 2 only 40% or so of riflemen were actively engaged in attempting to kill the enemy, while the rest just kept their head down. Using new training and psychological methods this was increased to ~60% by vietnam. Those were both conscript armies in the age where obligation to fight and die for the was accepted. By contrast the all volunteer army of Desert storm was over 90%, IIRC.

The often-repeated idea that only something like 80% of soldiers aren't actively aiming to kill their enemy (tends to change with every telling!) is largely a steaming pile o'crap published by S.L.A. Marshall, whose 'research' on the subject was effectively zero and followed zero standards for any sense of academic integrity. Grossman's "On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society" is based on Marshall's research.

The most common statement regarding this is that 'only 15-20% of soldiers in WW2 fired at the enemy', and people take this to mean that only 15-20% of soldiers in WW2 even tried to kill the enemy, and the remaining 80% just sort of...fired in the air, not wanting to kill, or ditched their ammo to make it look they did, or missed on purpose. It's a bunch of nonsense, backed up by zero real evidence. The actual claim by Marshall is far more specific and nuanced, and is something along the lines of "only 15-20% of American riflemen fired their personal weapons at enemy combatants exposed in the open" or something like that, which excludes crew-serviced weapons, ignores artillery, ignores suppression fire, ignores fire in the general direction of the enemy but where the enemy is concealed....the list goes on.

"It seems most probable that Marshall, writing as a journalist rather than as a historian, exaggerated the problem and arbitrarily decided on the one-quarter figure because he believed that he needed a dramatic statistic to give added weight to his argument. The controversial figure was probably a guess. If First Lieutenant Frank Brennan’s experience accompanying Marshall on after-action, group interviews in Korea in 1953 is typical, however, even if more of Marshall’s field notebooks are found, they probably will not contain the kind of data necessary to substantiate the controversial assertions of Men Against Fire" (from S. L. A. Marshall’s Men Against Fire: New Evidence Regarding Fire Ratios by John Whiteclay Chambers)

There's a lot to be said for the ideas behind this sort of research, but the execution of it, particularly with regards to Marshall's, is just too poor to make it particularly believable. Battlefield psychology is absolutely fascinating, but Marshall's research isn't reliable (at all) and shouldn't be taken particularly seriously. With zero statistical analysis of his work available, with no data sets around, and generally...well, zero research methodology besides "open, informal interviews", it's pretty safe to disregard much of what he says.

Now, all of that said, it was a groundbreaking work and I do think there is a lot of merit to the sort of training done by the military in the post-Marshall and Grossman era. I think they may have inadvertently stumbled upon some valid points, points that would be addressed by the military over the course of future wars, but overall, Marshall's claims are largely bogus and I'd be really hesitant to throw any weight behind them.

 

[DoomBunny]

I remember reading on this forum something along the lines that the US army determined that during world war 2 only 40% or so of riflemen were actively engaged in attempting to kill the enemy, while the rest just kept their head down. Using new training and psychological methods this was increased to ~60% by vietnam. Those were both conscript armies in the age where obligation to fight and die for the was accepted. By contrast the all volunteer army of Desert storm was over 90%, IIRC.

There's some doubt about this.

http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/articles/03autumn/chambers.pdf

Basically it would appear that the evidence for Marshall actually asking the question in the first place is somewhat sketchy, as are any results he might have gained had he asked it.

I suspect there may be an element of truth in that most soldiers will not shoot to kill, but rather I think this is misinterpreted. Certainly soldiers may not be firing aimed shots, or even in the vicinity of the target, but this is probably due to a desire to do something rather than to do nothing. In a conscript army, one is probably seeing a lot of firing that is simply for the sake of making noise and feeling useful, added to the normal weight of unaimed suppression fire and the odd shot intended to actually kill the enemy, part of the problem being observation, the other part being that whoever makes the most noise tends to be scariest, and if the enemy runs away that's all dandy.

 

[Kovax]

Contrast these assertions with the lackluster performance of US troops in the earlier stages of the Spanish-American war, where US doctrine was to use only aimed fire to reduce ammo expenditure. At some point, it became apparent that suppression was very useful, and several of the early Gatling guns were hastily employed in that impromptu role. Eventually, infantry doctrine caught up, and progressively higher rates of rifle fire (along with weapons designed for that role) became preferable to saving on ammo at the cost of lives.

Since then, most soldiers do not "shoot to kill", but contribute fire in the general direction of the enemy. Occasionally, that fire may actually hit someone, but its primary purpose appears to be to pin down the enemy to prevent them from taking aimed shots at you, while your artillery does the killing.

 

[D Inqu]

The often-repeated idea that only something like 80% of soldiers aren't actively aiming to kill their enemy (tends to change with every telling!) is largely a steaming pile o'crap published by S.L.A. Marshall, whose 'research' on the subject was effectively zero and followed zero standards for any sense of academic integrity. Grossman's "On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society" is based on Marshall's research.

I am not sure about Marshall's research, but when the Soviets studied their own units WW2, they reached the same conclusion "many riflemen not using their weapons". This was backed up by ammo expenditures of infantry. One of the reasons the transition to the to the simple but short-range and relatively inaccurate PPSh during WW2 was that it allowed infantry fire to have some effect (suppression), even if they did not aim at the enemy.

This was late translated into post-war tactics of suppression, which assumed by default that many soldiers would only fire in the direction of the enemy to pin him down, while only a few would be shooting to kill.

 

[Dracolithfiend]

So many variables exist. In short though I find the percentages given in such studies to be absurd and misleading. Was a 40 year old conscript who never made it within 300km of the front counted? What about the rifleman assigned to load ammo in an MG? A soldier confronted in the open by a tank and taken prisoner? A shellshocked Lt that survived a 48 hour bombardment? A conscript handed only ammo and told to cross the Volga?

To many x factors. Even specified replies would have holes in the results. They were on to something that modern training clearly helps address but again those percentages are manipulated to build a case.

 

[gagenater]

My 2 cents - not having been been in the infantry or other front line combat arms, but knowing MANY who were and are in my immediate family or circle of coworkers who have been including my wife (USMC field radio operator 4 years various ops in FSU during the transition after 1991) , her ex husband (22 yrs USMC rifleman then sargeant, then warrent officer, 2 tours Iraq, special duty in afghanistan and 2 other afghanistan tours, field intelligence) (father of her first child so we maintained contact with him) my brother in law (20 years airforce, several covert type ops - location middle east), my wife's uncle (army reserve, then active duty, sergeant for rifle platoon 3 tours 2 Iraq, 1 Afghanistan) , my nextdoor neighbor (army, 2 tours as rifleman in Iraq) and many others, I would say that the VAST majority of rifleman and others on the front lines DO or would like to shoot the enemy directly and personally, and certainly try to do so, but opportunities to do it are few and fleeting. You can spend 15 minutes in an urban firefight or among some rocks in Afghanistan (which is an eternity to be fighting under fire by the way) and through the entire thing maybe glimpse an actual person on the opposing side for a few seconds total . The rest of the time you are shooting in the direction their shots are coming from, trying to move and not actually looking at/towards the enemy, aiding others, carrying ammo, etc. There are simply very few opportunities to see someone on the other side, and then shoot them. By contrast, you will probably have a pretty good idea of around about where they are, so if you can direct artillery, an air strike, mortar fire, etc. into the area, you will probably wind up killing them, wounding them, or forcing them to retreat.

This is of course ALL from the era of volunteer armed forces for the USA, so make of it what you will. Of all of them, only one of them was unsure if he was/would/did fire directly at the enemy if he had the chance to do so. He was a guy in the army national guard who specialized as a mechanic repairing vehicle air conditioning equipment, and spent ~ 10 years as a civilian before he got called to active duty and imediately tossed into rifleman duty doing house to house street clearing in Fallujah in 2003 and 2004. After the 1st week, he made up his mind that shooting the enemy was better than dying or seeing his buddies killed and was ready to do whatever he had to.

 

[Pyoro]

So now that we've cleared up the fate of fighting units, does anyone actually know anything about routing ones? ;p

I haven't come across that topic often, I have to say. It's occasionally mentioned in a sort of "...and then they were pursued and destroyed" kind of afterthought to a battle but I don't know about anything more in-depth about reforming routed armies in pre-industrial times. It'd assume militia, drafted peasants and such would indeed just try to make their way home (assuming that's doable), while professionals might actually try and reorganize, but who knows?

 

[DoomBunny]

My 2 cents - not having been been in the infantry or other front line combat arms, but knowing MANY who were and are in my immediate family or circle of coworkers who have been including my wife (USMC field radio operator 4 years various ops in FSU during the transition after 1991) , her ex husband (22 yrs USMC rifleman then sargeant, then warrent officer, 2 tours Iraq, special duty in afghanistan and 2 other afghanistan tours, field intelligence) (father of her first child so we maintained contact with him) my brother in law (20 years airforce, several covert type ops - location middle east), my wife's uncle (army reserve, then active duty, sergeant for rifle platoon 3 tours 2 Iraq, 1 Afghanistan) , my nextdoor neighbor (army, 2 tours as rifleman in Iraq) and many others, I would say that the VAST majority of rifleman and others on the front lines DO or would like to shoot the enemy directly and personally, and certainly try to do so, but opportunities to do it are few and fleeting. You can spend 15 minutes in an urban firefight or among some rocks in Afghanistan (which is an eternity to be fighting under fire by the way) and through the entire thing maybe glimpse an actual person on the opposing side for a few seconds total . The rest of the time you are shooting in the direction their shots are coming from, trying to move and not actually looking at/towards the enemy, aiding others, carrying ammo, etc. There are simply very few opportunities to see someone on the other side, and then shoot them. By contrast, you will probably have a pretty good idea of around about where they are, so if you can direct artillery, an air strike, mortar fire, etc. into the area, you will probably wind up killing them, wounding them, or forcing them to retreat.

This is of course ALL from the era of volunteer armed forces for the USA, so make of it what you will. Of all of them, only one of them was unsure if he was/would/did fire directly at the enemy if he had the chance to do so. He was a guy in the army national guard who specialized as a mechanic repairing vehicle air conditioning equipment, and spent ~ 10 years as a civilian before he got called to active duty and imediately tossed into rifleman duty doing house to house street clearing in Fallujah in 2003 and 2004. After the 1st week, he made up his mind that shooting the enemy was better than dying or seeing his buddies killed and was ready to do whatever he had to.

If anyone wants a distant glimpse (i.e., minus the actually almost dying) view of why this is the case, try playing something like Red Orchestra or Armed Assault without dying. Basically you spend the entire time finding yourself a wall to cower behind, peeping over the top of it for a second at a time, and squeezing the occasional shot off in the general direction of the enemy. It's by no means the same thing, but it gives an idea of why so few shots actually hit.

 

[Easy-Kill]

If anyone wants a distant glimpse (i.e., minus the actually almost dying) view of why this is the case, try playing something like Red Orchestra or Armed Assault without dying. Basically you spend the entire time finding yourself a wall to cower behind, peeping over the top of it for a second at a time, and squeezing the occasional shot off in the general direction of the enemy. It's by no means the same thing, but it gives an idea of why so few shots actually hit.

It is more to do with the overall tactics and the effect you are trying to achieve. You are not trying to kill the enemy, you are trying to DESTROY* him. If you take the 'advance to contact' objective, you are aiming to move into a position where the enemy will engage you, so that you can destroy his force, or destroy his position. The theoretical 'section attack' is that an 8 man section will be engaged, all 8 men return fire. The section splits into fire team with one aiming to suppress the enemy wile the other fire team flanks. The section commander then leaves a fire pair at a 45 degree angle and carries on moving around. He and a grenadier will then move to 90 degrees, and crawl into position, posting (note not throwing) a grenade and then moving into the position. (Either that or they call in Apache or CAS support).

What is normally the case is that the force which engaged the section will usually push out of their position when they have the weight of 4 or even 6 men from the fireteam putting fire down. The position is DESTROYED and 6/8 men were shooting 'towards' the enemy, but nobody really killed them. This generally scales up on platoon/company/batallion sized engagements.

* NATO STANAG 2287 defines this as 'Damage an object or an enemy force so that it is rendered useless to the enemy until reconstituted.'

Also, the potential to die is what makes it really ... well a unique experience.

 

[Geriander]

Also is there some sort of correlation between how infeasible running from the battlefield would have been to compared to simply surrendering. I am just hypothesizing on this given how increasingly rare outright routing has become in current generations e.g. you may as well just surrender because trying to the run away from mechanized troops is simply futile.

Running away was often quite futile anyways as the enemy cavalry would cut you down. Prior to the 20th century most battlefield casualties happened in the rout. It didn't matter that it was futile since it wasn't a rational act by the soldier but rather the effect of panic.

I would speculate that a lot of the decrease in routs in modern warfare has to do with the difference between close formation warfare and modern skirmishing warfare. When someone is shooting at you the natural instinct is to take cover rather than run away if the latter puts you in the open. In the past when you were expected to stand in a tight formation and fire or stab at the enemy without any cover the result of panic would be running away rather than digging in.

 

[Kovax]

In traditional linear warfare, the phrase "the devil take the hindmost" comes into play. The first to panic and run away stands a better chance of survival, while the few that hold their ground until the last tend to die. Once a rout began, it quickly became a matter of survival to avoid being on the tail end and getting skewered by the opposing cavalry.

As pointed out, with modern day firearms and tactics, it pays to take cover, and if necessary, make a fighting withdrawl under whatever cover you can manage, rather than risk a panicked rout in the open. Armies more often "fall back", rather than "rout".

Historically, routed units could rally around the unit flag or standard, which was problematical if that emblem fell to the enemy. Without that, the men would either have to "tag along" with another unfamiliar unit, or else make their own way home or back to some base camp.

Note that Roman units whose standards were taken by the enemy were "disbanded", meaning that all of the soldiers' back pay, share of spoils, and accrued time until retirement were forfeited to the state. Essentially, you started over at the bottom with another unit, so particularly for those with a decade or two of time invested, it was literally a "fight to the death" to protect that standard. One rarely puts one's life on the line over a flag in a losing situation, but when 20 years of pensions and seniority are on the line, that's another matter.

 

[kaoss]

And to ensure that, the standard-bearer was also the guy in charge of accounting pensions.

 

[krieger11b]

Routing units were also total cavalry fodder. Without unit cohesion there was almost no defense against cavalry until repeating rifles.

 

[AegonVLLI]

That really depends. There is a huge difference between a Roman legion deep in Germany, a medieval warband defending their home, a Landsknecht during the 30-Years-War or a French soldier in Russia under Napoleon. Furthermore, routing isn't some strategy, just a mass panic. As soon as the units cohesion broke, most of the fleeing soldiers were killed anyway. The survivors would have to improvise completely depending on their situation.
If you are able to survive in the wilderness or in your own country, trying to get home is probably your best deal. If there still are some of your army's units nearby, you could try to join them. Joining with others and becoming bandits also often happened.
As for why there were more routs than today, apart from the points already mentioned, there was no guarantee of survival while surrendering. If you weren't worth a ransom, you would probably be killed or tortured by the victors, or used and/or sold as a slave. Today, if you're not fighting ISIS etc., you can just surrender and expect to come out of the war with a decent chance of survival.

 

[Henry IX]

At least during the Napoleonic wars it was very common for units to break and flee from fire. Unless the rout became general or the unit was in an exposed position it was common for them to reform under their officers and they often returned to the fight. The extent to which this occurred largely depended on the quality of the unit.

Line infantry units tended to run back to cover/out of the position they were getting pounded in then reformed and were often able to counter attack within short(ish) periods. Militia units often dissolved and fled the battlefield. Sometimes they returned back to their units over the next few days and sometimes they threw away their uniforms and returned to civilian life. All three possibilities were displayed by the Austrian army during the 1809 campaign. The line infantry (Grenzer) formations seemed to reform quickly and could often be recommitted to the same battle. The Landwehr (reserve) formations seem to survive setbacks and tend to report fairly good strengths a few days after a rout, particularly those that had undergone better levels of training, but tended not to rally on the field as often. True militia units such as the Hungarian Insurrection often dispersed after a defeat and sometimes vanish entirely from the OOBs of the army.

When the army as a whole maintains its discipline units tended to reform and recover from routing. One of Charles' greatest achievements as a commander was the fact that even after two significant defeats against Napoleon the Austrian army was still on the field and functional, which forced a relatively mild treaty from Napoleon.

When the army as a whole collapsed the cavalry pursuit was often sufficient to cause the complete destruction of the force. In such cases most the routing army usually survived by dispersing and hiding in the countryside but the army could rarely be reconstituted after this and the individual soldiers either returned to their homes or took up new lives in the area they found themselves. It is hard to put numbers on this as all we know is the size of armies before and after - the fate of individual soldiers is rarely recorded. However, there are a large number of known cases of soldiers becoming members of the communities they found themselves in. Given the general shortage of agricultural labour cased by mass conscription it is perhaps not that surprising that fit young men could find a role in these communities.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Of relevants

 

[JodelDiplom]

Running away was often quite futile anyways as the enemy cavalry would cut you down. Prior to the 20th century most battlefield casualties happened in the rout. It didn't matter that it was futile since it wasn't a rational act by the soldier but rather the effect of panic.

I would speculate that a lot of the decrease in routs in modern warfare has to do with the difference between close formation warfare and modern skirmishing warfare. When someone is shooting at you the natural instinct is to take cover rather than run away if the latter puts you in the open. In the past when you were expected to stand in a tight formation and fire or stab at the enemy without any cover the result of panic would be running away rather than digging in.

"running away was futile" - I don't believe that for a second. Of course most casualties happened during pursuit, but that's not the way to look at it if you are a soldier on the losing side of a battle. In fact most soldiers who rout could survive and that would not contradict the statement "most casualties happen during rout"...

From the perspective of a common soldier, once the battle goes badly and the enemy starts to get into your line's rear, he has to consider where he is more likely to die - in the failing battle line, with his officers (who unlike him will can surrender to the enemy and expect to be treated well), or on the road / in the hills / in the forests away from the enemy sabers and lances. The decision to bail and run would in most cases be the better decision.