"The Ottoman Age of Exploration"

[Afonso de Albuquerque]

I recently came across this book, "The Ottoman Age of Exploration" by Giancarlo Casale, which focuses on the expanding horizons of the Ottomans in the 16th century, and in particular the struggle for supremacy in the Indian Ocean against the Portuguese.

I wasn't very familiar with the Ottoman perspective of those events, and I think the book does a good job of documenting it (though it is clearly very biased towards the Ottomans, but the bias is transparent enough that it is easy to compensate for it). I thought I might share with the forum some of the main points from the book that I wasn't previously aware of or which I found interesting (and I hope you find this post interesting as well!)

- In the west we tend to think of the Muslim world as a monolithic block, and that the knowledge of geography was commonly shared between all Muslim countries. In reality, the author argues there is no evidence that the Turks were much more knowledgeable about the Indian Ocean than the Europeans, and it was only as they began to expand and placed Egypt in their sights (and went for the claim of global Caliphate), that they began to seriously research and explore the wider world (hence the title of the book);

- One of the major causes for the fall of the Mamluks were the Portuguese actions in the Indian Ocean. The loss of revenue from the blockading of the spice trade, the loss of prestige as Defenders of the Holy Cities when the Christians started raiding deep in the Red Sea, and finally the massive expenditure of outfitting an Indian Ocean fleet (which counted with the help of the Ottomans, that would very soon be attacking them!) to fight the Portuguese and ended up being destroyed -- all of these together left the Mamluks in an extremely fragile position, ready to be steam-rolled by the Ottoman juggernaut;

- After taking Egypt and claiming the title of Defenders of the Holy Cities, the Ottomans took the lead in the fight against Portugal. The struggle against Portugal was a major concern in the court in Istanbul. There was a significant fear that Portugal might raid Mecca and Medina, so taking control of the Red Sea and Yemen became a major priority. They managed to stop the advance of the Portuguese and would eventually succeed in turning the Red Sea into an Ottoman Sea;

- Yemen was a constant headache to whoever controlled it;

- The survival of Christian Ethiopia was extraordinary;

- The biggest obstacle for the Ottomans to fighting the Portuguese was not technology, tactics, able commanders, etc. (they won plenty of engagements that showed that was not the case), it was a simple matter of basic economics -- building a large fleet in their main bases in the Red Sea was prohibitively expensive due to the complete lack of wood and other naval supplies, which all had to be imported from elsewhere in the Empire. It is also what led to repeated attempts to construct a Suez Canal, which all failed;

- The Ottomans successfully created a giant network of influence across the Indian Ocean during the 16th century, using diplomacy, military support, the prestige from the title of Caliph, and the common Portuguese enemy. For certain periods, I don't think it would be inaccurate to consider Gujarat, Kolkata, Aceh, the Maldives, Mombasa, Mogadishu, etc. as tributaries of the Ottomans. They used this Muslim league in the second half of the 1500s to launch coordinated attacks against the Portuguese (which mostly failed), and to re-route the spice trade and bypass the Portuguese blockade (which was a huge success);

- The initial priority for the Ottomans for the spice trade was to restore the free trade in the Indian Ocean that the Portuguese had restricted, as can be seen by several peace deal proposals made to Lisbon. However, as they consolidated their control of the Red Sea and Mesopotamian land trade routes, they quickly shifted to Imperial monopolies, which proved immensely profitable;

- For a while, the Ottomans entertained the imperial ambition of controlling the entire Indian Ocean. To cut off the Portuguese and other Europeans, they planned to attack all the way down the East African coast and take control of the Mozambique channel. The book even implies that part of these plans involved coordinating with the French, who were to send corsairs to intercept in the Atlantic the annual Portuguese Indian Armadas;

- When Portugal fell under the Spanish Habsburgs, the Ottomans became paranoid, afraid that Spain, their main rival in the Mediterranean, would add its strength to the Portuguese and deal a decisive blow in the Indian Ocean. This precipitated their plan to attack the Portuguese in East Africa and establish a forward base in Mombasa, which ended in catastrophic failure. However, the Spanish actually had no intention of helping the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, the orders of Philip II were in fact to stop all offensive activity and dig in (he was preparing his invasion of England instead);

- The rise of the Mughals in India would put an end to Ottoman influence in India; the fall of Baghdad to Persia would cut off the Ottomans from Basra, which had been disputing the Persian Gulf with Portuguese Hormuz; the disaster in Mombasa would end influence in the Swahili coast; and palace coups, wars in Europe and Persia, etc. would end up fully consuming the attention of the Ottomans, so as the 17th century started they would no longer be able to project power in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously the state of war with England (who helped Persia take Hormuz for example) and the United Provinces (that would became the main power in the Indian) that came as a result of the Iberian Union and lack of support/exhaustion from Portugal proper would lead to the fall of Portuguese India, which would from then on be more of a burden for the crown than a source of profit;

OK, that's a lot for now. I would be very interested in the perspective of other forum members, especially those more familiar with Turkish and Arabic history. Was my interpretation of the events correct? Is the book giving an accurate portrayal of what happened in the Indian Ocean in the 1500s from the Ottoman perspective? Are there major "plot points" that I missed? What about the Shia Persian perspective (something that the book makes no mention of)?

I think the history of the Indian Ocean in the 16th century is a really interesting topic, that is somewhat overlooked since at the same time in the Atlantic an entire New World was being discovered. So I look forward to your thoughts and thanks for reading!

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

I am aware of all of these particulars, although I never came across a modern book that tied them together. Sounds very interesting. Thanks.

I am aware of Italian and Portuguese sources for most of this, but I have rarely seen anyone draw on Turkish sources.

As for coordination with French corsairs ... mmm, that sounds a little exaggerated. The French crown didn't have much sway over them.

 

[Kazanov]

I recently came across this book, "The Ottoman Age of Exploration" by Giancarlo Casale, which focuses on the expanding horizons of the Ottomans in the 16th century, and in particular the struggle for supremacy in the Indian Ocean against the Portuguese.

I wasn't very familiar with the Ottoman perspective of those events, and I think the book does a good job of documenting it (though it is clearly very biased towards the Ottomans, but the bias is transparent enough that it is easy to compensate for it). I thought I might share with the forum some of the main points from the book that I wasn't previously aware of or which I found interesting (and I hope you find this post interesting as well!)

- In the west we tend to think of the Muslim world as a monolithic block, and that the knowledge of geography was commonly shared between all Muslim countries. In reality, the author argues there is no evidence that the Turks were much more knowledgeable about the Indian Ocean than the Europeans, and it was only as they began to expand and placed Egypt in their sights (and went for the claim of global Caliphate), that they began to seriously research and explore the wider world (hence the title of the book);

- One of the major causes for the fall of the Mamluks were the Portuguese actions in the Indian Ocean. The loss of revenue from the blockading of the spice trade, the loss of prestige as Defenders of the Holy Cities when the Christians started raiding deep in the Red Sea, and finally the massive expenditure of outfitting an Indian Ocean fleet (which counted with the help of the Ottomans, that would very soon be attacking them!) to fight the Portuguese and ended up being destroyed -- all of these together left the Mamluks in an extremely fragile position, ready to be steam-rolled by the Ottoman juggernaut;

- After taking Egypt and claiming the title of Defenders of the Holy Cities, the Ottomans took the lead in the fight against Portugal. The struggle against Portugal was a major concern in the court in Istanbul. There was a significant fear that Portugal might raid Mecca and Medina, so taking control of the Red Sea and Yemen became a major priority. They managed to stop the advance of the Portuguese and would eventually succeed in turning the Red Sea into an Ottoman Sea;

- Yemen was a constant headache to whoever controlled it;

- The survival of Christian Ethiopia was extraordinary;

- The biggest obstacle for the Ottomans to fighting the Portuguese was not technology, tactics, able commanders, etc. (they won plenty of engagements that showed that was not the case), it was a simple matter of basic economics -- building a large fleet in their main bases in the Red Sea was prohibitively expensive due to the complete lack of wood and other naval supplies, which all had to be imported from elsewhere in the Empire. It is also what led to repeated attempts to construct a Suez Canal, which all failed;

- The Ottomans successfully created a giant network of influence across the Indian Ocean during the 16th century, using diplomacy, military support, the prestige from the title of Caliph, and the common Portuguese enemy. For certain periods, I don't think it would be inaccurate to consider Gujarat, Kolkata, Aceh, the Maldives, Mombasa, Mogadishu, etc. as tributaries of the Ottomans. They used this Muslim league in the second half of the 1500s to launch coordinated attacks against the Portuguese (which mostly failed), and to re-route the spice trade and bypass the Portuguese blockade (which was a huge success);

- The initial priority for the Ottomans for the spice trade was to restore the free trade in the Indian Ocean that the Portuguese had restricted, as can be seen by several peace deal proposals made to Lisbon. However, as they consolidated their control of the Red Sea and Mesopotamian land trade routes, they quickly shifted to Imperial monopolies, which proved immensely profitable;

- For a while, the Ottomans entertained the imperial ambition of controlling the entire Indian Ocean. To cut off the Portuguese and other Europeans, they planned to attack all the way down the East African coast and take control of the Mozambique channel. The book even implies that part of these plans involved coordinating with the French, who were to send corsairs to intercept in the Atlantic the annual Portuguese Indian Armadas;

- When Portugal fell under the Spanish Habsburgs, the Ottomans became paranoid, afraid that Spain, their main rival in the Mediterranean, would add its strength to the Portuguese and deal a decisive blow in the Indian Ocean. This precipitated their plan to attack the Portuguese in East Africa and establish a forward base in Mombasa, which ended in catastrophic failure. However, the Spanish actually had no intention of helping the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean, the orders of Philip II were in fact to stop all offensive activity and dig in (he was preparing his invasion of England instead);

- The rise of the Mughals in India would put an end to Ottoman influence in India; the fall of Baghdad to Persia would cut off the Ottomans from Basra, which had been disputing the Persian Gulf with Portuguese Hormuz; the disaster in Mombasa would end influence in the Swahili coast; and palace coups, wars in Europe and Persia, etc. would end up fully consuming the attention of the Ottomans, so as the 17th century started they would no longer be able to project power in the Indian Ocean. Simultaneously the state of war with England (who helped Persia take Hormuz for example) and the United Provinces (that would became the main power in the Indian) that came as a result of the Iberian Union and lack of support/exhaustion from Portugal proper would lead to the fall of Portuguese India, which would from then on be more of a burden for the crown than a source of profit;

OK, that's a lot for now. I would be very interested in the perspective of other forum members, especially those more familiar with Turkish and Arabic history. Was my interpretation of the events correct? Is the book giving an accurate portrayal of what happened in the Indian Ocean in the 1500s from the Ottoman perspective? Are there major "plot points" that I missed? What about the Shia Persian perspective (something that the book makes no mention of)?

I think the history of the Indian Ocean in the 16th century is a really interesting topic, that is somewhat overlooked since at the same time in the Atlantic an entire New World was being discovered. So I look forward to your thoughts and thanks for reading!

Thats interesting, i'll look for that book, also, we need a thread to recommend historical books

 

[Sarmatia1871]

It's only tangentially related to the subject of the thread, but this discussion about expanding horizons of early-modern Islamic empires in the Indian Ocean has reminded me of this delightful picture by the Mughal artist Ustad Mansur of a dodo, which was kept in the menagerie of the Mughal emperor Jahangir.

 

[Eusebio]

and to re-route the spice trade and bypass the Portuguese blockade (which was a huge success)

Any more detail on this? How was the spice trade re-routed if the Portuguese controlled the ocean and points of production in the spice islands?

 

[Afonso de Albuquerque]

Any more detail on this? How was the spice trade re-routed if the Portuguese controlled the ocean and points of production in the spice islands?

The Portuguese didn't control the points of production, they controlled centres of trade, and the ocean is a big place, it was a matter of finding sea lanes that the Portuguese couldn't easily patrol (the book mentions in particular that the Maldives played a part in serving as a waypoint to the Spice Islands without going through Portuguese controlled waters in India). The key factor though was after the Ottomans consolidated their control of the Red Sea, the Portuguese could no longer pursue the ships breaking the blockade. In the early 1500s, the Portuguese would without much trouble follow the ships in the narrower Red Sea and eventually catch up to them, but Ottoman activity meant they could no longer do this safely. Here is a passage from the book, taken from the Portuguese chronicler Diogo do Couto, about events in 1562:

"While [the Portuguese] remained there [outside the Bab al-Mandab], which was for
over a month, they saw more than sixty different [Muslim] vessels without ever being
able to reach even one of them. This was because [the Portuguese vessels] were near the
shore, and [the merchant ships] came in from the sea with the wind fully at their
backs. It was therefore impossible either to catch them or to follow them inside [the
mouth of the Red Sea], for [the Portuguese] dared not enter the straits for fear of risking
the loss of their own ships."

On the other side, in the Persian Gulf, the Portuguese authorities were unable or unwilling to completely stop the trade between Hormuz and Basra, it was simply too valuable for them. I found this observation in the book particularly funny, it mentions that by 1581 the Venetians were running a regular postal service through Aleppo to Hormuz:

"The firm guaranteed its clients delivery of letters from Venice to Hormuz in three months
or less, and it expected its agents to travel from Aleppo to Hormuz in just forty days,
charging 260 ducats for the trip with 1 ducat subtracted for every day late."

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Any more detail on this? How was the spice trade re-routed if the Portuguese controlled the ocean and points of production in the spice islands?

Portuguese never controlled all points of production. And the Indian Ocean is big. Re-routing was possible, e.g. sailing through the Maldives rather than putting in at Kerala. Portuguese also never managed to put an effective stopper on the Red Sea - they consistently failed to control Aden. And by capturing Basra, the Ottomans reopened the route between the Levant and the Persian Gulf.

P.S. I do think it is inaccurate to regard the role of Gujarat, Calicut, Aceh, etc. as "tributaries". Ottomans were drafted into an already-existing Indian Ocean coalition against the Portuguese - a coalition that had drawn the Mamelukes in there first. And now drew in the Ottomans.

Ottomans actually played their diplomatic cards rather poorly and alienated their allies. Ottomans misunderstood their role. They were supposed to come in as "dumb muscle" for the coalition, tried to play lord, and were rejected after 1538. The Indian Ocean powers continued their operations without them (although they did recruit Turkish mercenaries and armaments, they did not take Ottoman direction; local powers, like Bijapur, were much more important).

As a result, the Ottomans under-performed. Their reach was limited - they secured dominance of the Red Sea and played to-and-fro in the Persian Gulf. That was enough to keep the alternate routes open. But not enough to go on the offensive in the Indian Ocean - when they tried, it failed.

 

[Afonso de Albuquerque]

P.S. I do think it is inaccurate to regard the role of Gujarat, Calicut, Aceh, etc. as "tributaries". Ottomans were drafted into an already-existing Indian Ocean coalition against the Portuguese - a coalition that had drawn the Mamelukes in there first. And now drew in the Ottomans.

Ottomans actually played their diplomatic cards rather poorly and alienated their allies. Ottomans misunderstood their role. They were supposed to come in as "dumb muscle" for the coalition, tried to play lord, and were rejected after 1538. The Indian Ocean powers continued their operations without them (although they did recruit Turkish mercenaries and armaments, they did not take Ottoman direction; local powers, like Bijapur, were much more important).

As a result, the Ottomans under-performed. Their reach was limited - they secured dominance of the Red Sea and played to-and-fro in the Persian Gulf. That was enough to keep the alternate routes open. But not enough to go on the offensive in the Indian Ocean - when they tried, it failed.

Interesting, the book definitely plays up the role of the Ottomans in building the coalition, providing detailed descriptions of diplomatic missions by the Ottomans to places like Aceh, and with some Ottoman grand viziers being portrayed as the masterminds of the entire thing. (but as I said in the OP, I wouldn't be surprised to find that the author has overstated the Ottoman case.)

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Interesting, the book definitely plays up the role of the Ottomans in building the coalition, providing detailed descriptions of diplomatic missions by the Ottomans to places like Aceh, and with some Ottoman grand viziers being portrayed as the masterminds of the entire thing. (but as I said in the OP, I wouldn't be surprised to find that the author has overstated the Ottoman case.)

The coalition already existed. Venetian agents were already in the region, emissaries from Calicut, Gujarat, Swahili coast, etc. were in Cairo coordinating action already in 1503. Mamelukes were initially uninterested - it took a lot of prodding from the coalition to rouse them. The digging out of the port of Jeddah, assembly of the Mameluke Red Sea fleet and the Battle of Diu (1509) wouldn't have happened without them. Ottomans just picked up where the Mamelukes left off.

I am sure there was a lot of missions & communication, and I am sure Ottoman viziers may have had grand schemes in mind. But these grand schemes wouldn't necessarily have been interesting to Indian Ocean powers who had plans of their own. These states were on the front-lines, and had been fighting the Portuguese for longer, shouldn't the Ottomans be listening to them? It was hardly endearing for Ottoman emissaries to insist on treating them in a high-handed fashion as some kind of subordinates. Why should they accept Ottoman plans or leadership? What does Constantinople know? Ottomans were half-a-world away, and yet to prove themselves. The debacle of 1538 pretty much settled that question.

It is good to have an Ottoman POV volume. But maybe there needs to be more research from the Indian side to get a more balanced picture.

 

[th3freakie]

Just subscribing to the thread here.

 

[Yakman]

It is good to have an Ottoman POV volume. But maybe there needs to be more research from the Indian side to get a more balanced picture.

i'd definitely read it.

too many of these histories of the portugese empire-building in the indian ocean kinda frame it as a secondary front to the mediterranean. if you were a local indian power - and they were the ones most concerned with the portugese intrusion - this was the front line.

and it's a fascinating time in indian history as well.

 

[Afonso de Albuquerque]

Why should they accept Ottoman plans or leadership? What does Constantinople know? Ottomans were half-a-world away, and yet to prove themselves.

iirc the book suggests that the Ottomans derived a lot of influence from their religious authority and being guardians of the pilgrims to the holy cities. Do you know how important that was in practice? Did the people of Sumatra care at all who claimed to be Caliph on the other side of the planet?

And regarding the anti-Portuguese coalition, do you know how deep that alliance was? Were there plans for how to organise a post-Portuguese Indian Ocean (maybe with Bijapur recognised as the primary power?), or was the aim simply to return to how things were before? I am referring specifically to the wars in the 1570s, since by then I would think it should already be clear that the world had permanently changed...

It is good to have an Ottoman POV volume. But maybe there needs to be more research from the Indian side to get a more balanced picture.

I agree, that's one of the things I was hoping to get in this thread! I already knew the European (especially Portuguese) perspective and a bit of the Indian POV (from some of the works of Sanjay Subrahmanyan), and now this book introduced me to the Turkish side. But clearly there is still a lot missing.

 

[Galaahd]

The coalition already existed. Venetian agents were already in the region, emissaries from Calicut, Gujarat, Swahili coast, etc. were in Cairo coordinating action already in 1503. Mamelukes were initially uninterested - it took a lot of prodding from the coalition to rouse them. The digging out of the port of Jeddah, assembly of the Mameluke Red Sea fleet and the Battle of Diu (1509) wouldn't have happened without them. Ottomans just picked up where the Mamelukes left off.

I am sure there was a lot of missions & communication, and I am sure Ottoman viziers may have had grand schemes in mind. But these grand schemes wouldn't necessarily have been interesting to Indian Ocean powers who had plans of their own. These states were on the front-lines, and had been fighting the Portuguese for longer, shouldn't the Ottomans be listening to them? It was hardly endearing for Ottoman emissaries to insist on treating them in a high-handed fashion as some kind of subordinates. Why should they accept Ottoman plans or leadership? What does Constantinople know? Ottomans were half-a-world away, and yet to prove themselves. The debacle of 1538 pretty much settled that question.

It is good to have an Ottoman POV volume. But maybe there needs to be more research from the Indian side to get a more balanced picture.

Abdul do you know of any book expanding on Venetian penetration and diplomatic activities in the Indian ocean?

 

[mayorqw]

Great thread so far, subscribing as well

 

[MarsUltor]

I'll definitely buy the book next month.

Neither Portuguese nor Turkish historians tend to write about that era becuase;
a) Portuguese basically lost every part of their colonial lands to others
b) Turks couldn't beat Portuguese and in Turkey, we don't talk much about wars we lost .lol

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Nearly forgot about this nice thread.

iirc the book suggests that the Ottomans derived a lot of influence from their religious authority and being guardians of the pilgrims to the holy cities. Do you know how important that was in practice? Did the people of Sumatra care at all who claimed to be Caliph on the other side of the planet?

Not all were Sunni Muslim, e.g. Calicut was Hindu.

Commitment matters more than prestige. That was the big concern.

Mamemlukes were the guardians before. And the Mameluke record was particularly disheartening. Their first instinct was to evacuate their nationals and withdraw. Sure their treasury revenues were hurt, but they initially pinned their hopes on resolving it diplomatically - imagined they could get the Pope to reign in the Portuguese and get them to behave, by threatening to hand out the same kind of treatment on Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land that the Portuguese were doing to Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

Of course, this served the Indian Ocean powers not at all. They wanted to drive the Portuguese out of the ocean entirely, regain control of their coasts, restore their own commercial traffic. The Mamelukes couldn't care less about these distant coasts, they had no vested interest there, and it didn't affect them directly.

So the great Indian fear was that the Mamelukes would just cut some deal with the Portuguese on pilgrims & spices and leave their allies to hang. And the Portuguese, consciously or subconsciously, did play a bit to that end. They terrorized Meccan shipping enough to make a defensive deal seem worthwhile.

So the coalition had to cajole, push, urge, finance, to rouse the Mameluke giant to take a more offensive posture. This was not easy.

In the early years we hear reports (e.g. from Varthema), that the Mamelukes were almost written off, that Venetian officers and Muslim jihadis, hoping to take the fight to the Portuguese, had to make their way to India on their own, and offer their services directly to Indian sultanates.

And even after the Mamelukes were roused to action, they were never reliable. Time and again, we hear of, e.g. Calicut, mobilizing their army and fleet, only to hear that the Mamelukes were not coming after all. Coordination of the coalition was already difficult enough. Mameluke flakiness put their allies in an exposed and vulnerable position, allowing the Portuguese to retaliate and defeat them separately in detail.

So if the Mameluke precedent is any indicator, the big worry is that the Ottomans would only ever be half-engaged. The Ottomans, like the Mamelukes before them, straddled both sides, the Mediterranean and Red Sea. They were far away, their attentions and interests were divided, and could not really be counted on. Once bitten, twice shy.

All their prestige and promises mean nought, if they are not believed or trusted. Until the Ottomans actually prove their commitment to the Indian Ocean, and register some success, Indian powers have the right to be suspicious of grand Ottoman promises.

Of course, they will accept from the Turks what they desperately need - technology, armaments, manpower, etc. But leadership? They would rather pin their hopes on local powers, closer to the frontlines, like Bijapur or Siam.

And regarding the anti-Portuguese coalition, do you know how deep that alliance was? Were there plans for how to organise a post-Portuguese Indian Ocean (maybe with Bijapur recognised as the primary power?), or was the aim simply to return to how things were before? I am referring specifically to the wars in the 1570s, since by then I would think it should already be clear that the world had permanently changed...

I can't answer that. All I have is speculation, from reading between the lines. And, to be honest, I haven't really kept close track as far as the 1570s. So I'm extrapolating a bit. Although if their reactions viz. the Dutch arrival in the early 17th C. are any indicator, they were inclined to cut tentative deals but still rather wary of throwing their lot in with any distant power with big talk.

The Portuguese, of course, were not without local allies, and did play divide and rule all the time, to keep potential enemies off-balance and prevent coalition from re-forming, e.g. the Portuguese secured the protective sheath of Vijayanagara, by guaranteeing their horse-trade with Persia (essential for Indian cavalry). That complicated any contemplated action by Bijapur. So coalition powers also have a myriad of local threats and concerns that have to be accounted for before any action is agreed to. It was not clear that the distant Ottomans would be aware of all these local details in formulating their plans.

In short, for the Ottomans to succeed, they would have to win the trust and confidence of Indian Ocean powers. But the Indian powers have every reason not to trust them. At least that's what it seems to me.

Anyway, all this is surely worth researching further. And I should really read that Casale book first before continuing with speculations.

I agree, that's one of the things I was hoping to get in this thread! I already knew the European (especially Portuguese) perspective and a bit of the Indian POV (from some of the works of Sanjay Subrahmanyan), and now this book introduced me to the Turkish side. But clearly there is still a lot missing.

Subrahmanyan is great. Although he also has to rely a lot on "reading between the lines" to get a sense of the Indian position. But he is certainly blazing the path here.

 

[Afonso de Albuquerque]

I'll definitely buy the book next month.

Neither Portuguese nor Turkish historians tend to write about that era becuase;
a) Portuguese basically lost every part of their colonial lands to others
b) Turks couldn't beat Portuguese and in Turkey, we don't talk much about wars we lost .lol

I'm not sure this is true of the Portuguese, the XV and XVI centuries are probably some of the most popular topics, there are plenty of books for wide audiences about them. The problem is that they are generally biased towards the Portuguese viewpoint (not necessarily on purpose, but just because foreign sources are harder for the authors to access).

Nearly forgot about this nice thread.



Not all were Sunni Muslim, e.g. Calicut was Hindu.

Commitment matters more than prestige. That was the big concern.

Mamemlukes were the guardians before. And the Mameluke record was particularly disheartening. Their first instinct was to evacuate their nationals and withdraw. Sure their treasury revenues were hurt, but they initially pinned their hopes on resolving it diplomatically - imagined they could get the Pope to reign in the Portuguese and get them to behave, by threatening to hand out the same kind of treatment on Christian pilgrims to the Holy Land that the Portuguese were doing to Muslim pilgrims to Mecca.

Of course, this served the Indian Ocean powers not at all. They wanted to drive the Portuguese out of the ocean entirely, regain control of their coasts, restore their own commercial traffic. The Mamelukes couldn't care less about these distant coasts, they had no vested interest there, and it didn't affect them directly.

So the great Indian fear was that the Mamelukes would just cut some deal with the Portuguese on pilgrims & spices and leave their allies to hang. And the Portuguese, consciously or subconsciously, did play a bit to that end. They terrorized Meccan shipping enough to make a defensive deal seem worthwhile.

So the coalition had to cajole, push, urge, finance, to rouse the Mameluke giant to take a more offensive posture. This was not easy.

In the early years we hear reports (e.g. from Varthema), that the Mamelukes were almost written off, that Venetian officers and Muslim jihadis, hoping to take the fight to the Portuguese, had to make their way to India on their own, and offer their services directly to Indian sultanates.

And even after the Mamelukes were roused to action, they were never reliable. Time and again, we hear of, e.g. Calicut, mobilizing their army and fleet, only to hear that the Mamelukes were not coming after all. Coordination of the coalition was already difficult enough. Mameluke flakiness put their allies in an exposed and vulnerable position, allowing the Portuguese to retaliate and defeat them separately in detail.

So if the Mameluke precedent is any indicator, the big worry is that the Ottomans would only ever be half-engaged. The Ottomans, like the Mamelukes before them, straddled both sides, the Mediterranean and Red Sea. They were far away, their attentions and interests were divided, and could not really be counted on. Once bitten, twice shy.

All their prestige and promises mean nought, if they are not believed or trusted. Until the Ottomans actually prove their commitment to the Indian Ocean, and register some success, Indian powers have the right to be suspicious of grand Ottoman promises.

Of course, they will accept from the Turks what they desperately need - technology, armaments, manpower, etc. But leadership? They would rather pin their hopes on local powers, closer to the frontlines, like Bijapur or Siam.



I can't answer that. All I have is speculation, from reading between the lines. And, to be honest, I haven't really kept close track as far as the 1570s. So I'm extrapolating a bit. Although if their reactions viz. the Dutch arrival in the early 17th C. are any indicator, they were inclined to cut tentative deals but still rather wary of throwing their lot in with any distant power with big talk.

The Portuguese, of course, were not without local allies, and did play divide and rule all the time, to keep potential enemies off-balance and prevent coalition from re-forming, e.g. the Portuguese secured the protective sheath of Vijayanagara, by guaranteeing their horse-trade with Persia (essential for Indian cavalry). That complicated any contemplated action by Bijapur. So coalition powers also have a myriad of local threats and concerns that have to be accounted for before any action is agreed to. It was not clear that the distant Ottomans would be aware of all these local details in formulating their plans.

In short, for the Ottomans to succeed, they would have to win the trust and confidence of Indian Ocean powers. But the Indian powers have every reason not to trust them. At least that's what it seems to me.

Anyway, all this is surely worth researching further. And I should really read that Casale book first before continuing with speculations.



Subrahmanyan is great. Although he also has to rely a lot on "reading between the lines" to get a sense of the Indian position. But he is certainly blazing the path here.

Thank you for the very informative post! I have been looking around online a bit more about this topic, and it is really surprising from my completely layman perspective that there appears to be a very lively debate in the History community about some of this stuff. According to a paper I found by Nicola Melis

"At the present time, there is a very strong disciplinary division in Ottoman studies regarding the attitude of the central government towards the maritime trade and power between those overwhelmingly and ardently concerned with ranking the Ottoman Empire among the maritime empires of the Age of Discovery and those who totally reject this position.

This sharp division is clearly made for methodological convenience and is oversimplified. There are no parties that are wholly for or against either of the two theses. Some scholars emphasize the Ottomans’ role as a maritime power with a project of expansion towards the Indian Ocean. In this group we find historians as Halil İnalcık, Palmira Brummet, Şerif Tekindağ, etc. Among them, Giancarlo Casale is perhaps the most enthusiastic proponent, writing that “the growth of Ottoman intellectual interest in the Indian Ocean during the course of the 16th century closely mirrors, both qualitatively and chronologically, developments in Europeat the same time”.

Among the “sceptics”, we may include, to varying degrees, scholars like Svat Soucek and Colin Imber, to name but two."

Indeed, reading the bits of "The Portuguese and the Turks in the Persian Gulf" by Svat Soucek that Google Books allows me, he seems to argue the exact opposite of Casale, that the Ottoman effort in the Indian Ocean was very half-hearted and/or "pathetic" (his words!), which seems to be closer to the points you have been making. For instance, he states that despite big official pronouncements by the Sultans and their Admirals that they would soon drive out the Portuguese entirely from the East and extend Ottoman influence all across the Indian Ocean, the naval efforts they put in place always came late and under-resourced. He points out that there was never any serious attempt to establish major naval bases in Aden and Basra comparable to the one in Suez.

But I also wonder, how feasible would that have been? How strong was Ottoman control of those provinces at the edges of the empire? I know very little of how Ottoman administration worked, but it seems to me that they can't have been that capable of asserting their authority so far away, given that Aden was often collapsing into revolt and the rulers of the provinces in the Persian Gulf would often mount military expedients by themselves completely independently of the wishes of Istanbul. In which case, building major naval bases there would have required an extraordinary effort by the central authorities, no?

It is also remarkable to me that despite the orders of magnitude of difference in size between Portugal and the Ottoman empire (in terms of population, available resources, etc.), that they could never dislodge the Portuguese. Even though the Portuguese were much further away from the Indian Ocean, in a sense they had an easier time sending resources there than the Ottomans, which really shows how significant and revolutionary ocean-faring maritime power projection had started become.