Who were the Hakkapeliittas?

[Jopa79]

During the time of King Gustav II Adolf and the Thirty Year's War it was a common way in Sweden that farmers or peasants could register a cavalryman to service under the crown. The registration included a man, a horse, protective equipment for the man, a sword and two pistols. After the completion of the registration the farm owner received a tax exemption.

The recruitment as described was carried out also in the Swedish Österland, present day Finland and partly Russia. The Finnish men, the Hakkapeliittas presented over 50% of the total strenght of the Swedish cavalry during the Thirty Year's War.

Riding with the Finnhorse, the Hakkapeliittas' introduced completely new cavalry tactics and it led to remarkable results in the battlefields. Well trained Finnish light cavalry men exceeded sudden and savage attacks in full gallop, only lightly armored the charge was their advantage, firing the first pistol at twenty paces and the second one in five paces, then they draw the sword. This tactic was far more succesful than the earlier cavalry tactics, known as caracole. Hakkapeliitta-tactics could break the defense of the entire battle. One of the most well-known battles with Hakkapeliittas' presence was the battle of Lutzen in 1632.

But what about the origins of the name of Hakkapeliitta. Well, like all the armies and nations, the Finns had their own battle-cry, Hakkaa päälle! or Hakkaa päälle, Pohjan Poika! (Cut them down! or Cut them down, Men of the North!) Foreigners of the Holy Roman Empire translated this battle-cry and gave the form Hackapelit, Hackapell.

 

[Henry IX]

The Swedish use of cavalry was a classic example of making an asset out of a problem. Sweden was too poor for the state to arm and supply heavy cavalry (cuirassiers), even by indirect means such as tax exemptions, and the Swedish nobility tended not to join en-mass like their French counterparts. Hence, Gustavus Adolphus was forced to rely on medium/light cavalry that lacked the staying power for extended engagements against their German counterparts. So the Swedish used shock tactics to break their opponents quickly.

The idea that caracole was inferior to a headlong charge is somewhat more debateable. Even after the end of the 30 years war tactics that used firepower rather than shock remained common. A good example of this was the New Model Army cavalry, which was briefly considered as some of the best in Europe, generally attacked at the trot and also skirmished with firearms. Even during the wars of Spanish Succession cavalry generally favoured fire over shock. Even Marlborough, who limited ammunition to his cavalry to 3 shots in order to force them to attack with cold steel, usually performed attacks at the trot rather than the gallop.

The Swedish also used their cavalry interspersed between infantry formations, rather than massed on the wings as was traditional. This allowed a high degree of mutual support between the infantry and cavalry, compensating for the relative fragility of the Swedish cavalry as well as providing immediate support for the infantry. This innovative use of combined arms allowed the Swedish to exploit local conditions far more effectively than their opponents, although at the cost of not being able to sweep their opponents off the field in a single massed charge.

The Swedish, taking their cue from the Dutch, were one of the first modern armies to use infantry as their primary arm and the cavalry as a support force. They deployed to maximise infantry manoeuvrability and firepower with the cavalry providing flank protection, counter attacks and exploitation forces rather than the general European model of cavalry being the dominant arm. Once again, this is an example of making as asset out of a problem. The Swedish could not afford to supply the masses of cavalry required to make French style tactics work so they relied on cheaper infantry as their primary arm. As the battle of Breitenfeld showed infantry now had sufficient firepower to defeat cavalry charges, particularly if it is supported by friendly cavalry.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Afaik Adolhpus banned the use of caracole tactics which is weird in this context tho. That said it was considered cowardly by many.

 

[Henry IX]

The caracole was banned by Adolphus because the Swedish cavalry was not available in sufficient numbers and not heavily enough armoured to win that style of engagement. By mounting charges supported and in support of the infantry formations they were able to nullify a significant amount of their numerical and equipment disadvantages.

 

[Geriander]

The caracole was banned by Adolphus because the Swedish cavalry was not available in sufficient numbers and not heavily enough armoured to win that style of engagement. By mounting charges supported and in support of the infantry formations they were able to nullify a significant amount of their numerical and equipment disadvantages.

Wouldn’t deficient armour be a greater problem in the melee of a charge rather than in the caracole?

 

[Henry IX]

Oddly, not really at this point in history. Charges are usually won by the shock of impact and if one side is charging and the other is skirmishing the skirmishing side will usually end up losing. As the mass of enemy cavalry saved their charges for wavering or broken enemies the Swedish cavalry could gain an advantage by aggressively charging earlier on. If both sides were charging each other the more heavily armoured would have an advantage, but due to the tactics adopted by the imperial cavalry the Swedish could gain advantage by charging.

In addition, most cavalry of this period used pistols (or sometimes carbines) which fired a low velocity, fairly small ball. The armour of the time was capable of deflecting this ammunition most of the time, giving a significant advantage to cuirassiers (heavy cavalry) in this style of warfare. This is in contrast to muskets, which fired a massive (0.5 -0.8 calibre) ball, which rendered armour fairly useless. As such heavy cavalry was usually used on the flanks where they could overwhelm individual infantry formations rather than in direct support of the infantry.