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Lt. General
Jan 20, 2003
1.224
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www.ekaros.ca
I'm planning to run through the Winter War with Finland in the 1939 scenario and post summaries of the daily action.

Be warned, contrary to the usual practice with AARs I'm not going to create much of a storyline -- no hilarious portrayals of Stalin in a rage, shooting his remaining Field Marshals, no dramatic staff conferences with Baron Mannerheim committing his last reserves to hold a line outside Helsinki. This is more typical Math Guy stuff, analyzing the combat results and logistics. However, I will try to present the information in real-world terms rather than HOI terms, e.g.

1 manpower point = 1,000 men
1 air wing = 100 planes

There will be screenies presently. Today I just want to get the prewar preparations laid down, and diary entries for the first five days.

I hope some folks find this entertaining, or at any rate useful. I figured since I was collecting the information anyway, why not write it up.
 
Prewar plans in Finland

Played using 1.05b with picture pack, no mods.

Immediately upon outbreak of war, Sep 1 39, Finland began work on the following:

-- one research item (basic submachinegun, #1401)

-- three new militia divisions

-- fortifications in Joensuu, Mikkeli, and Helsinki (mainly anticipating use in the Continuation War, as they will not be ready until Mar-Jun 40)

This was sufficiently expensive that we ran short on supply by about 14 per day, dipping into the 2,000 stockpile until the militia divisions were complete.

Historical note: Finland apparently had 30 to 45 days' ammunition supply stockpiled in 1939, which would be closer to 1,000 rather than 2,000.

By mid-October 1939, the militia had been deployed and existing units had been slightly rearranged to achieve the following:

Petsamo, Kajaani and Joensuu -- one division-sized "Ryhmä" each
Sortavala -- IV Corps (2 regular & 1 militia division)
Viipuri -- II Corps (4 regular & 1 militia division)
-- III Corps (2 regular & 1 militia division)
Mikkeli -- strategic reserve, Mannerheim (4 regular divisions)

Anticipating heavy pounding from Soviet air, and lacking any fighters, construction was then started on a militia division with attached AA brigade, expected completion Jan 3 40. This was only slightly more expensive than a regular infantry division with no AA (640 IC versus 570) and had 4 AA points instead of 2. II, III and IV Corps got the available divisions with AA brigades attached, while the strategic reserve (held back in hopes it would not be bombed) all had artillery brigades attached.

Elsewhere, Poland made a valiant effort but resistance collapsed Oct 17 39. Germany shifted forces west and declared war on the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg in early November. Estonia and Latvia crumbled under Soviet demands and were absorbed.

At 0:00 on Nov 14 39, the Soviets presented the expected demands and were refused. The war was underway.
 
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Nov 14 - 17 diary entries

Nov 14 39

The front was strangely quiet. No evidence of Soviet movement during the first 24 hours, no air raids or naval sorties. Snow was falling almost everywhere except directly opposite Leningrad.

Soviet forces already deployed were evidently not large. We observed only five divisions in Leningrad and one or two per province elsewhere. We felt a momentary temptation to rush Leningrad, but given that city's level-5 fortifications, even five divisions were still more than we could deal with.

And many more were sure to come soon . . .

Nov 15 39

The first air attack fell on the division-sized formation around Joensuu -- 100 SB-2 bombers from Leningrad, escorted by about 300 I-16 fighters, and led by Air Marshal Novikov. In the heavy snow and early morning darkness, the bombing was completely ineffective, while the minimal AA resources available did no damage.

Still no sign of Soviet ground movement. As a precaution in case the air attacks signalled the direction of the Soviet thrust, one division was detached by Mannerheim and sent on strategic rail movement to be ready to reinforce Joensuu or locations farther north.

Nov 16 39

Novikov's attack force made an early start, striking at the Kajaani garrison before first light, losing one SB-2 and one I-16 but missing their targets. They returned in the afternoon, losing a second SB-2 but killing several dozen troops and wounding several dozen more.

A second attack force, also of about 100 SB-2 and 300 I-16, attacked Joensuu again in daylight, and despite the snow managed to kill or injure upwards of 150 troops, escaping without loss.

Apart from some minor movements by one or two divisions in Leningrad, there was still no sign of a Soviet ground attack. It seemed likely to us at this point that the necessary invasion force was en route by rail, and would be at least a week in arriving. Every day the invasion was delayed had to be regarded as a minor victory.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,200, with 3 aircraft shot down.
Total Finnish losses: approximately 250-300

Nov 17 39

The focus of Soviet air attacks shifted south to Viipuri and the eight divisions of II and III Corps. 700 aircraft arrived in several waves, the bombing lasting all day. Losses were 4 SB-2, 2 I-16, and 2 unidentified, in exchange for about 50 Finns killed or wounded. Concentrating our limited AA resources in the Isthmus was clearly paying off.

Another 300 raiders hit Kajaani, without effect, and 200 at Joensuu lost 2 SB-2 and 1 I-16 but went home empty-handed as well.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,200, with 11 aircraft shot down.
Total Finnish losses: approximately 50 killed and wounded

At midnight on the 17th, after an anxious day of continual if not too damaging raids, we received welcome news: a division of volunteers, and 4 to 6 weeks of ammunition and spares, had arrived by rail from Sweden. Prompt delivery service indeed!

More disappointing was the news that a full-scale intervention had been rejected by the Swedish cabinet, but few had believed this would happen in any case.

On that comforting note, the High Command retired for a few hours sleep. But before dawn on the 18th, we were awakened by ominous news: an estimated 26 divisions of Soviet troops had suddenly appeared in Petrozavodsk, opposite Sortavala, marching north and west. The necessary rail movements had clearly begun days before the Soviet ultimatum had been sent -- or worse still, the forces had been assembled in an adjacent province, out of reach of our intelligence services, and had immediately marched into attack position.

Either way, a violent confrontation would not be long in coming.
 
Originally posted by Frankie
Looks interesting, I'll definitely follow this one. BTW, not to be a nitpick, but its Ryhmä, not Rhyma.
Click to expand...

Fixed, thanks. I didn't know where to get the special ä character, but now I've borrowed yours.
 
Plans and decisions, Nov 18 39

It was clear from intelligence reports that Joensuu and Sortavala were both threatened, although it was impossible to be sure of numbers.

The dilemma was that any units put in the front line would very likely be beaten down to a low level of organization, and forced to retreat -- a retreat that would turn into a rout unless there was a second line of fresh troops to fall back on.

After much debate, High Command elected to move three divisions to meet the threat.

-- the unit already dispatched northward would go to Joensuu by rail, making a total of two there

-- the Swedish volunteers would go directly by rail to Sortavala, and one division from the strategic reserve would march there as well, making a total of five

This left just two divisions in the strategic reserve.

Apologetic note: although I have made several "screenies," I can't host them on the web. So no pictures or maps at present.
 
Diary for Nov 18 - 20

Nov 18 39

Despite the ominous news in the early hours, Nov 18 saw minimal action.

A force of 400 air raiders hit Kajaani, causing more than 50 casualties for the loss of one bomber. The position at Kajaani was proving very exposed, and casualties would be heavier here than anywhere else in coming days.

The raid on Viipuri was strangely small, only 200 aircraft, and the damage to the defenders (another 50 casualties) could scarcely have been worth the destruction of 18 planes -- a catastrophic 9 % loss rate.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 600 aircraft, 19 lost
Total Finnish losses: about 100

Nov 19 39

The morning brought a break in the weather -- clear skies over the entire southern front, with snow falling only at Petsamo. The Red Air Force made an all-out effort.

At Kajaani, 700 raiders killed or wounded close to 400 of our troops at no loss to themselves, the increasingly frustrated ski and border guard regiments unable to do much more than crouch in shallow dugouts and curse the lack of Finnish fighter cover.

At Joensuu, 200 attackers used the clear skies to inflict another 50 casualties and departed untouched.

Along the Viipuri front, the morning's results did not match the previous day's successes -- just 7 out of 800 planes downed in exchange for between 150 and 200 casualties.

The High Command braced for a second wave, and an hour before dusk it arrived, another 300 raiders at Kajaani, 600 at Joensuu, and 700 at Viipuri. But just at sunset, patches of snow and rain swirled back in to cover the battlefields again, leaving the attackers to blunder for several hours over our handful of AA guns. One plane fell at Kajaani, two at Joensuu, and 16 at Viipuri, while the Red bombing runs were rendered completely ineffective.

A pattern was emerging that was hardly surprising -- clear weather meant effective bombing and difficulties for our AA, while night and cloud left the enemy vulnerable and unable to find our positions.

Record casualties were experienced on both sides this day. Our submarine flotilla began a patrol into the Gulf of Finland, to guard against the unlikely event of an amphibious assault. (We had no divisions to spare to guard Turku or Vaasa, or even Helsinki.)

It also became clear that the division marching to Sortavala would not arrive in good time, requiring as much as two weeks for the trip, so they were sent by rail instead.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,400, 26 aircraft lost
Total Finnish losses: about 700

Nov 20 39

The Red Air Force again threw its customary two waves of attackers at our positions, but observers noted that the past few days of heavy combat had begun to leave ragged holes in the formations of air regiments -- collectively, each wave of attacks was at least 20 to 30 planes short of full strength.

Because of the mixed and changeable weather, the morning attack was neither as brutal nor as costly for the Reds compared with the previous day. About 700 raiders at Kajaani delivered another 250 to 300 casualties unscathed, while 400 at Joensuu came up empty and lost one of their own. At Viipuri a token raid of 200 planes was hammered with 14 losses and accomplished nothing.

The Reds decided to avoid Viipuri that afternoon, sending 700 raiders back to Kajaani and losing one, while somewhat short of 600 raiders tried their luck at Joensuu, trading one bomber for 50 ground troops.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 2,550, 17 aircraft lost
Total Finnish losses: at least 300
 
The first week of the war

There was cause for concern and for satisfaction at the High Command after the first week.

On one hand, the Red Air Force had already lost 76 aircraft, including a disproportionate number of precious and expensive SB-2 twin-engined tactical bombers, to our relatively primitive AA guns. Out of 9,450 sorties, this represented a 0.8 % loss rate. To Soviet pilots making between 1 and 2 sorties per day, this meant that their chances of surviving for 30 days were no better than 70 %. Our morale was generally high, and preparedness at the end of the first week was far better than it had been in the first hours of the war.

We could look forward to large-scale deliveries of the Suomi submachinegun within about two weeks, which would provide a tremendous boost to squad-level firepower. Seeing the calm, orderly reaction of the Finnish public to the reality of war, the High Command had also ordered more callups, a second militia division to be ready in early January.

On the other hand, we had lost 1,400 casualties in the first week of the war -- more than 100 dead or permanently injured per day, and another 100 taken out of the fighting line for at least several weeks.

More than half our losses had been among the exposed regiments of the Pohjois-Suomen Ryhmä at Kajaani, who as a result were close to being combat ineffective. A determined Soviet ground push in that sector would almost certainly break through within hours, and without increased AA firepower, the situation was unlikely to improve.

Meanwhile, the Soviets still had close to 1,700 combat aircraft, as well as close to forty divisions on our borders, and a clear willingness to take casualties to accomplish their mission.

With the prospects of Western intervention slim at best, the most that could be hoped for was to inflict such serious losses on the Soviets that they would drop their demands and settle for a stalemate. Whether this was even possible, no one could say for sure.

But all the same, we had survived for a week. That had to count for something.

One staff officer at the High Command put up a calendar with the date January 2 circled in red. When asked why, he said, "The Poles lasted 47 days against the Germans. For the sake of Finnish honor we need to last at least 48 against Stalin."
 
The wider picture

The Second World War swung into high gear during the first week of Finland's Winter War.

Luxemburg was quickly overrun and annexed to Germany, Belgium was overrun but its forces made a fighting withdrawal into France. A small enclave of Dutch troops held out in Amsterdam until the 23rd, then collapsed. Metz also fell to the Germans but a week later no further progress had been made against the main line of French resistance.

Italy and Hungary joined the Axis, and British troops promptly drove into Libya and captured Tobruk. A few days later an Italian countermove isolated the British there. Italian East Africa also began to slowly disintegrate under British pressure.

In the chaos of world events, Finns felt more isolated than ever.
 
Nov 21 - 24 diary entries

Nov 21 39

After the waves of air attacks on the 19th and 20th, the High Command was braced for heavy blows when the weather cleared on the 21st. Astonishingly, none came. Soviet air was completely inactive. The defenders used the time to reorganize, particularly in the battered Kajaani position.

Nov 22 39

The weather remained favorable for the next few days, and our losses were accordingly heavy. In the Kajaani sector, 700 bombers hit in the morning, losing 1 but killing 150-200 troops. An afternoon wave of 400 bombers did no damage and lost a second aircraft.

At Joensuu, 300 bombers came and went in two waves, losing 1 aircraft in the morning attack and accomplishing nothing.

At Viipuri, the morning attack of 600 bombers was sharply repelled with 11 losses, though there were 150-200 casualties. The afternoon wave of 750 planes also lost 11, but inflicted a further 50-100 killed and wounded.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 3,050, with 25 shot down
Total Finnish losses: 400-500

Meanwhile the High Command was mystified but delighted to hear from our sub flotilla, still patrolling off Leningrad, that it had sunk one ship from a Soviet supply convoy. "Where the hell can they be going?" -- a question no one could answer.

Nov 23 39

Attacks were sporadic on this day with only Kajaani receiving the full treatment, two waves of 700 that left 100 to 200 casualties and one plane shot down from the afternoon attack.

In Viipuri, a morning attack by about 550 planes meant that II and III Corps suffered minimal losses of 50 to 100 and shot down 12 attackers.

In Joensuu, the same attack group (less a dozen planes) showed up just after noon and lost one more to no effect.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 2,500, 14 planes lost
Total Finnish losses: 200 to 300

Nov 24 39

Just after midnight the sub flotilla reported in with another sinking, as well as detailed reconnaissance reports that had pinpointed Soviet air bases in what was formerly Estonia. The total air force opposing us was now estimated at 2,000 planes, if not more. The division sent to reinforce Joensuu detrained and dug in, much to the relief of the local garrison.

Then two hours before first light the bombing resumed at Kajaani, a wave of 700 leaving the customary 150 to 200 casualties, and one crashed I-16. Observers noted with dismay that recent losses had been made up, the formations again operating at full strength. Meanwhile at Viipuri another of the Red Air Force's occasional senseless "mini-raids" employing a mere 100 I-16s escorting 100 SB-2s was given a hot reception, losing 16 planes and scattering bombs uselessly across the landscape. There were now more than a hundred Soviet aircraft wrecks scattered in the narrow plain of the Isthmus, or on the ice of Ladoga and the Gulf.

In the afternoon, Kajaani was pounded again by 300 planes -- the 14th raid it had received so far -- and one more I-16 crashed, bringing the total wrecks in that area to 8. Recently reinforced Joensuu was hit by 400 raiders and downed 2, at a cost of 50 to 100 dead or injured.

Total Soviet sorties for the day: 1,800, losing 20
Total Finnish losses: 200 to 300

Late in the afternoon the port admiral at Helsinki reported that our sub flotilla had been forced to seek safety there after encountering the entire Soviet fleet. Opinion remained divided as to whether the Soviet Navy had simply been reacting (or over-reacting, as the sub commander insisted) to the recent convoy sinkings -- or was engaged in some kind of operation.

Surveillance of the Soviet land forces had continued ever since the massive forces had emerged near Petrozavodsk on the 18th, and the Soviet intentions were becoming very clear. Late in the day on the 24th a staff conference was called to develop a plan to counter the Soviet invasion thrusts . . .
 
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Bug fix

During the last period in the diary, I went back to my ministers' display to see if there were any changes I could make in preparation for the Soviet assault.

To my surprise, under Chief of Staff and Chief of Army I now had "none". Previously I had had K. L. Oesch and Hugo Osterman.

I knew the Winter War event was supposed to assign these two positions to Mannerheim, so I had a look and sure enough the event is bugged. See my report if you're curious. It's easy to fix by editing the event file, and the Finnish army needs the extra edge Mannerheim gives, so I recommend this fix to all do-it-yourselfers.

More diary entries soon.
 
Realistic to the point where planes go down....I mean, planes are already too easy to replace
 
Historical note about flak in the Winter War

Readers may find it interesting to compare the performance of HOI Finland with the real Finland.

Between November 28, 1939 and the end of hostilities on March 13, 1940, the Red Air Force flew about 44,000 sorties into Finland. These included 2,075 recorded attacks on civilian targets, which would have had to represent at least 5,000 sorties (2-3 planes per attack) and perhaps as many as 15,000 or 20,000. I will take up the question of how to model the strategic bombing of Finland in a later post, after we see if the Soviet AI employs any strategic bombing in this game.

The remaining 24,000 to 39,000 sorties were tactical bombing and escorting, fighter sweeps, recon, or very rarely an interception mission against the handful of Finnish bombers available. The heaviest bombing effort by far was against the Mannerheim Line, south and east of Viipuri.

Finnish AA batteries are estimated to have destroyed between 314 and 444 Soviet aircraft -- counting only actual wrecks on Finnish territory, not aircraft written off on return to Soviet bases.

Using the lower figure the AA batteries of the real Finland inflicted a loss rate of 0.71 to 1.01 % per sortie. So far HOI Finland has eliminated 115 planes on 14,800 sorties, or 0.78 %.

However, there are two points to remember. First, the HOI figure represents ALL aircraft lost to flak in the game, whereas the real-world Finnish figures would need to be boosted by as much as 50 % to include aircraft that were written-off on return to base.

Second, the order of battle for Finland is not entirely realistic. It shows the correct number of divisions and their names, but Finland was painfully short of AA guns and did not have a half-dozen AA brigades to spread around in support of the various corps. At 3 points of AA per brigade, and 2 points of AA per division, this gives HOI Finland in this case close to 50 % more flak than a game played with a strictly historical OOB would.

This is one of the reasons I chose to play out this particular campaign -- because we have precise numbers on Soviet losses, we can use them to start making a case to tweak the standard AA ratings and the benefits available to AA through tech, making them more realistic. In a previous playtest run by Soapy Frog, German losses to Polish fighters and AA in the September 1939 campaign were less than half their historical level. We're seeing the same result here -- base AA values for infantry divisions do seem to need to be higher.

It's also worth noting that so far the campaign has lasted 11 days, and Finland has endured 14,800 tac bombing-related sorties, or more than 1,300 per day from a force of about 2,000 aircraft. In the real world the Soviets had 2,500 aircraft but delivered their 44,000 sorties in 116 days, average 379 per day -- and not all of these were tac bombing.

There may be a lull in bombing if the first wave of Soviet ground attacks is repelled. Another possibility is that the declining org values of the Red Air Fleet may force a lull -- I have observed the daily sortie rate in strategic bombing by the Allies decline by two thirds as the org level of the bombers fell. However, at present the Finns are coping with far heavier levels of attack than the historical average for the campaign.

Finally, there is the nagging question of what has happened to the Finnish air force. The Finns started with about 60 fighters and with foreign aid ended the war with more than 100. They shot down a confirmed total of 240 Soviet planes, losing only a handful (one source cites 26 although I can't reconcile that total with individual reports). I would think at least one fighter wing (deployed at 60 % strength to start) would make sense in the Finnish OOB.

More about all this after some more diary entries.
 
The Soviet plan & the Finnish response

The sub flotilla sortied again from Helsinki late on the 25th, and soon sent back critical information -- in addition to a total of 8 divisions now in Leningrad, the Soviets had a further 15 divisions marching through Estonia en route to Leningrad. This would give them nearly 3 to 1 odds against the forces defending the Mannerheim Line. Historical note: Scandinavians and history buffs will be rolling their eyes at all this naval activity. During the Winter War, ice in the Gulf of Finland closed Helsinki to all traffic. This isn't simulated in HOI.

Meanwhile, the feared attack at Sortavala had not materialized. Instead, the bulk of the 26 divisions spotted a week earlier were now marching past Joensuu, apparently aiming to attack Kajaani. The remainder were already marching directly for Joensuu.

It was the logical thing to expect, given the bombing targets of the past 11 days, but now the missing piece of the puzzle was apparent. The Soviets were massing to attack Viipuri, Joensuu, and Kajaani, with approximately 50 divisions in all.

However, knowing where the blow would fall was not the same as avoiding it. Whenever the Soviets felt ready to attack the Line, they would need only 2 or 3 days to advance to contact, and the terrain would not form much of a barrier. Either the existing forces plus the fortifications would stop them, or they wouldn't.

The key in the north was not numbers, but preparedness. The Soviet attacks on Joensuu and especially Kajaani would be hampered by the loss of organization during the long approach march through wilderness terrain, and having lost so much organization, would move even more slowly once they entered Finnish territory. No matter how many divisions the Soviets brought, they would stand only a poor chance to break through if we had 2-3 divisions already in place and at full organization. This was the tricky part -- the Joensuu garrison of two divisions had held up reasonably well under bombing and was growing in preparedness, but at Kajaani, the sole division was battered and desperately unready.

Two divisions -- all that the Finnish rail net could carry -- were on the way, and would probably arrive in time, although not at full org levels. One more division from Sortavala would be sent to Joensuu, bringing that garrison to three as well, and possibly one from the strategic reserve would be held ready on board trains to be rushed to block the path of any breakthroughs. This was all that could be done with the forces available: the Isthmus garrison could not be weakened further.
 
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