HoI 4 Dev Diary - Japan Rework

[Patriot]

If you go through one of the civil war paths will the other Japan go down a separate path of the focus tree or will it just resort to using the default focus tree? (ie. If I go through the Democratic side of the tree will Japan in Manchuria go down the Kodoha or Anti-Kodoha path or will it use the focus tree for countries without a custom one?)

 

[pizzapicante27]

They didnt join the war with the Soviet Union not because of a lack of cooperation with Germany but because after the Soviets kicked their asses at Kalkin Gol they became effectively afraid of the Soviets, in fact many modern historians postulate that the actual reason Imperial Japan surrendered at all was the Soviet invasion and not the deployment of the Nuclear Weapons.

 

[Pyro157]

They didnt join the war with the Soviet Union not because of a lack of cooperation with Germany but because after the Soviets kicked their asses at Kalkin Gol they became effectively afraid of the Soviets, in fact many modern historians postulate that the actual reason Imperial Japan surrendered at all was the Soviet invasion and not the deployment of the Nuclear Weapons.

While the Soviet invasion was a massive threat, it's still widely agreed among many historians that the final straw was the threat of an Allied/Soviet invasion, the Allied firebombings and finally the nukes. The Red Army was mighty but it had little experience in amphibious landings, unlike the Allies.

Meanwhile, think about the initial reaction to nuclear weapons. For all the Japanese knew, the Americans could now erase cities in a flash of blinding light. Japan could survive firebombing after firebombing raid, but no amount of bushido is going to stop America's new bomb. All the anti-aircraft in the world, as far as the Japanese were concerned, wouldn't stop it. And the damage! The horrific wounds inflicted, never seen before, the sheer devastation, people burned into walls - that alone is convincing enough. Plus, which city would be next to be erased? Osaka? Nagoya? Tokyo? The firebombing had already reduced the land into a wasteland and people struggled to grow onions in the ruins, living in huts built with tin and spare lumber. But at least there were survivors. And of course, the entire Pacific War had shown Japan that they had pissed off the Americans enough that their government would not stop until all of Japan was smoking rubble.

So Hirohito decided it was time to give up.

TL;DR: It's WW2, most things were a team effort, unlike what certain people think. There was multiple factors leading into Japan's surrender, and never just one. Whoever believes that it was one factor that lead to the surrender is not looking at history correctly.

 

[pizzapicante27]

While the Soviet invasion was a massive threat, it's still widely agreed among many historians that the final straw was the threat of an Allied/Soviet invasion, the Allied firebombings and finally the nukes. The Red Army was mighty but it had little experience in amphibious landings, unlike the Allies....

You dont really have to "imagine" it, there are plenty of records, thing is, the bombings werent actually the most devastating attack of the war, the Tokyo bombing using conventional bombs was.

Now Im reading this off the internet right now, but according to what they say, Nagasaki/Hiroshiuma werent even the most devastating attacks either in terms of life, morale or infrastructure loss: Oita, Hiratzuka, Numazu, Kuwana, Fukui, Ichinomiya, all of these were hist a lot harder, were more public and had higher rates of civilian deaths.

Besides it wasnt Hirohito's desicion to begin with, he was a puppet without the actual authority to order it, sure, he announced it, but the desicion was made by the Supreme Council, not by the Emperor, and as Im reading apparently surrender wasnt even in the cards until after they learned of the soviet invasion, or at least thats what some reports I've been reading are saying.

 

[Moishe Greenblatt]

Noone ever have given a f*ck about "real communism". You do what you have to do, not what some dead guy has wrote a century ago. Because they were writing their works in completely different conditions, for completely different society.

Marx and Engels would never even think about possibility of socialism/communism in Russia. Such regime in Japan would have been treated as a bad joke too.

That discussion started on another thread where people were discussing the ideological possibility of Japanese Communists supporting the existence of the Imperial House. So yes plenty of people DO care about what real Communism is and how game mechanics should represent the Japanese Communists.

 

[Moishe Greenblatt]

You dont really have to "imagine" it, there are plenty of records, thing is, the bombings werent actually the most devastating attack of the war, the Tokyo bombing using conventional bombs was.

Now Im reading this off the internet right now, but according to what they say, Nagasaki/Hiroshiuma werent even the most devastating attacks either in terms of life, morale or infrastructure loss: Oita, Hiratzuka, Numazu, Kuwana, Fukui, Ichinomiya, all of these were hist a lot harder, were more public and had higher rates of civilian deaths.

Besides it wasnt Hirohito's desicion to begin with, he was a puppet without the actual authority to order it, sure, he announced it, but the desicion was made by the Supreme Council, not by the Emperor, and as Im reading apparently surrender wasnt even in the cards until after they learned of the soviet invasion, or at least thats what some reports I've been reading are saying.

Yeah, far more people died and far more damage was done in the Dresden and Tokyo firebombings than the nuclear drops. The nuke drops were just real world tests. Totally not necessary since conventional bombing was doing far more to bring the Japanese to surrender than any wonder weapon

 

[Orlunu]

They didnt join the war with the Soviet Union not because of a lack of cooperation with Germany but because after the Soviets kicked their asses at Kalkin Gol they became effectively afraid of the Soviets

That's an interesting take on it. You ever taken a look at the numbers for Khalkhin Gol? The Soviet far eastern command were terrified of Japan and with good reason right up to '44. The Japanese didn't attack the Soviets because their agreements with Germany didn't require them to and because there was no coordination to that effect with Germany - to the extent of Germany literally not telling them that it was going to happen.

 

[Moishe Greenblatt]

That's an interesting take on it. You ever taken a look at the numbers for Khalkhin Gol? The Soviet far eastern command were terrified of Japan and with good reason right up to '44. The Japanese didn't attack the Soviets because their agreements with Germany didn't require them to and because there was no coordination to that effect with Germany - to the extent of Germany literally not telling them that it was going to happen.

https://gyazo.com/7b0086d0b7cbb3075808029a63b0ce2d
This is a screenshot of the stats of the battle according to wikipedia. (dubious source, I know) If we go off of this then the Soviets out numbered and out gunned the Japanese by a significant margin in every capacity. It also shows the Japanese side inflicting more damage in every capacity to the Soviets than the Soviets did to the Japanese.

It states that the Japanese learned several things from the battle, namely the disparity in equipment with the Soviets, they increased tank production and increased the size of the main gun on their Chi-Ha tanks. They also added a sanitation unit to Japanese divs since about 30% of the Japanese casualties were from dysentery. The Japanese also found their rations to be unsatisfactory in terms of packaging and nutritional value. Seems this battle didn't really deter the Japanese as much as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact did which prevented Japan from making any further aggression against the USSR or its puppets like Mongolia. Tokyo was very upset with the Kwantung Army not so much for their defeat but, because the whole conflict was started without official authorization from the high command back home.

Of course the Mongolians were using horses and camels in this battle.

 

[Moishe Greenblatt]

They didnt join the war with the Soviet Union not because of a lack of cooperation with Germany but because after the Soviets kicked their asses at Kalkin Gol they became effectively afraid of the Soviets, in fact many modern historians postulate that the actual reason Imperial Japan surrendered at all was the Soviet invasion and not the deployment of the Nuclear Weapons.

From just looking at the forces committed to the battle and the forces lost in the battle, Japan was outnumbered a lot in every way, tanks, men, aircraft, artillery and trucks, and did more damage in all areas to the Soviets than the Soviets did the Japanese. It certainly would be hard to conclude that the Japanese were afraid of the Soviets as a result of this battle. Seems like the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact protected the Soviets against the Japanese more than the results of this battle.

I'm not saying Japan could have taken on the Soviets in a prolonged war but, in this battle specifically, despite the Japanese Sixth Army being defeated, they did far more damage to the Soviets and they did it with far less than what the Soviets had. If anything, it could be concluded that the Soviets would become scared of the Japanese if looking at this battle alone and not looking at the whole military-industrial capacities of the two countries or the greater geo-political situation.

 

[Orlunu]

https://gyazo.com/7b0086d0b7cbb3075808029a63b0ce2d
This is a screenshot of the stats of the battle according to wikipedia. (dubious source, I know) If we go off of this then the Soviets out numbered and out gunned the Japanese by a significant margin in every capacity. It also shows the Japanese side inflicting more damage in every capacity to the Soviets than the Soviets did to the Japanese.

It states that the Japanese learned several things from the battle, namely the disparity in equipment with the Soviets, they increased tank production and increased the size of the main gun on their Chi-Ha tanks. They also added a sanitation unit to Japanese divs since about 30% of the Japanese casualties were from dysentery. The Japanese also found their rations to be unsatisfactory in terms of packaging and nutritional value. Seems this battle didn't really deter the Japanese as much as the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact did which prevented Japan from making any further aggression against the USSR or its puppets like Mongolia. Tokyo was very upset with the Kwantung Army not so much for their defeat but, because the whole conflict was started without official authorization from the high command back home.

Of course the Mongolians were using horses and camels in this battle.

Pretty much the case, although the narrative about the Soviets eternally BTFO'ing the Japanese is even less true than these numbers indicate - 253 tanks destroyed vs 42 tanks destroyed or crippled, for instance, is 253 tanks destroyed vs 13 tanks destroyed. It taught the Japanese a few good lessons, although they didn't learn them that well, but the general takeaway on both sides was that the Japanese forces were solidly superior man to man despite their vastly inferior material situation in the battle. It wan't a formative event in Japanese foreign policy, and, if anything, they responded to it far less than they should have.

The accounts of the time show that the Soviet military was very much concerned by the idea of a war with Japan, and they only very briefly dipped below one million men in the forces deployed along the border. I do remember - though don't ask me to find the source - one story of the commander of the far east forces going white in the face when asked how he thought a war against Japan would go.

The turning point which prevented a Japanese war with the Soviet Union was the 2-26 Incident, which stopped them from doing it of their own initiative, and they were never pushed to do it by their allies.

 

[Moishe Greenblatt]

Pretty much the case, although the narrative about the Soviets eternally BTFO'ing the Japanese is even less true than these numbers indicate - 253 tanks destroyed vs 42 tanks destroyed or crippled, for instance, is 253 tanks destroyed vs 13 tanks destroyed. It taught the Japanese a few good lessons, although they didn't learn them that well, but the general takeaway on both sides was that the Japanese forces were solidly superior man to man despite their vastly inferior material situation in the battle. It wan't a formative event in Japanese foreign policy, and, if anything, they responded to it far less than they should have.

The accounts of the time show that the Soviet military was very much concerned by the idea of a war with Japan, and they only very briefly dipped below one million men in the forces deployed along the border. I do remember - though don't ask me to find the source - one story of the commander of the far east forces going white in the face when asked how he thought a war against Japan would go.

The turning point which prevented a Japanese war with the Soviet Union was the 2-26 Incident, which stopped them from doing it of their own initiative, and they were never pushed to do it by their allies.

Yeah that narrative is only pushed by Red Army fetishists in diametric opposition to the reality of the stats from the battle where Japan did far more with far less against the Soviets.

 

[pizzapicante27]

That's an interesting take on it. You ever taken a look at the numbers for Khalkhin Gol? The Soviet far eastern command were terrified of Japan and with good reason right up to '44. The Japanese didn't attack the Soviets because their agreements with Germany didn't require them to and because there was no coordination to that effect with Germany - to the extent of Germany literally not telling them that it was going to happen.

If that was true the Japanese would've continued their expansion into Asia instead of focusing their efforts on the Pacific, Kalkin Gol closed that possibility I think.

 

[Pyro157]

If that was true the Japanese would've continued their expansion into Asia instead of focusing their efforts on the Pacific, Kalkin Gol closed that possibility.

Once the costly defeat at Khalkin Gol occurred, the IJA realized that this meant their whole idea of Northern Expansion was basically doomed and the government would refuse to see it through.

Then they panicked as they realized now that their immense power within the government had been compromised and the Navy now had all the prestige, and the Southern Expansion would be the main focus of the Japanese war effort.

While the IJA still held influence, there were a lot more Navy officers in the cabinet after Khalkin Gol.

 

[pizzapicante27]

From just looking at the forces committed to the battle and the forces lost in the battle...

Oh, Im sure the (edited) believed themselves superior to the Red Army man to man... but they werent man to man, where they? and both sides knew that.
It was one thing for the Soviets to sustain heavy but easily repleaceable losses at Kalkin Gol (losses they attributed to "leadership" anyways), it was an entirelly different thing for the Japaneseto lose an entire army at Kalkin Gol, the rates they could sustain were nowhere near each other.
And the Supreme Command knew that, I think, because basically the day after Kalkin Gol the faction that favored expansion into Asia lost the political fight, maybe Im giving too much credit to a single battle, but the fact remains that after that one battle the Japanese Empire decided it was better to risk confrontation with the entire Allied warmachine than to risk another confrontation with the Red Army, which was after all my original point.

 

[Orlunu]

If that was true the Japanese would've continued their expansion into Asia instead of focusing their efforts on the Pacific, Kalkin Gol closed that possibility I think.

Well, if you completely ignore that the emperor literally had the members of the "expand into Asia" party in Tokyo rounded up and shot before Khalkhin Gol happened, that Khalkhin Gol and the other border skirmishes happened directly against the orders of the goverment, and most of the other facts about the situation, sure, it looks kinda like that.

Oh, Im sure the Japs believed themselves superior to the Red Army man to man... but they werent man to man, where they? and both sides knew that.

No, they weren't. Around 1941 was when the Soviets were starting to dip down around a million with their forces east of the Urals, and the Kwantung Army + Manchukuoan forces in Manchuria added up to a million and a half.

It was one thing for the Soviets to sustain heavy but easily repleaceable losses at Kalkin Gol (losses they attributed to "leadership" anyways), it was an entirelly different thing for the Japs to lose an entire army at Kalkin Gol, the rates they could sustain were nowhere near each other.

Quite aside from the previous point, it's a bit assinine to refer to most of a division as "an entire army".

And the Supreme Command knew that, I think, because basically the day after Kalkin Gol the faction that favored expansion into Asia lost the political fight, maybe Im giving too much credit to a single battle, but the fact remains that after that one battle the Japanese Empire decided it was better to risk confrontation with the entire Allied warmachine than to risk another confrontation with the Red Army, which was after all my original point.

All of that was the case before Khalkhin Gol. And before the previous battle in Khalkhin Gol, and the one at the Ussuri, and the one over the islands in the Amur... These were not sanctioned by high command.



The Japanese did not attack the Soviets because that was not what their internal politics favoured, and they were not pushed to do so by their diplomatic ties. Pragmatically, they would almost certainly have been better off doing so, but they weren't to know that since Germany didn't let them know that a pincer war against the USSR was even an option.

 

[Wraith11B]

@pizzapicante27 not to get terribly preachy about things, but the slang you used is a pejorative word for those of Japanese decent, you should reevaluate your language.

 

[AjayAlcos]

This would be true of basically every single front.

That depends. By all accounts Shirō Ishii makes Josef Mengele look like an amateur in comparison.

 

[Wraith11B]

Just go back to the post and edit in the appropriate word (Japanese)... I understand that you weren't aware but we don't like to see slurs here.

 

[pizzapicante27]

Well, if you completely ignore that the emperor literally had the members of the "expand into Asia" party in Tokyo rounded up and shot before Khalkhin Gol happened, that Khalkhin Gol and the other border skirmishes happened directly against the orders of the goverment, and most of the other facts about the situation, sure, it looks kinda like that.
No, they weren't. Around 1941 was when the Soviets were starting to dip down around a million with their forces east of the Urals, and the Kwantung Army + Manchukuoan forces in Manchuria added up to a million and a half.

Okay then, you're right, the Emperor was scared of the Soviet army even in its diminished state, I kind of liked my interpretation more, but whathever that one also works.

Quite aside from the previous point, it's a bit assinine to refer to most of a division as "an entire army".

Japanese officials reported it as the "Japanese Sixth Army" (第6軍 Dai-roku gun), refered to it as a defeat of the "Japanese Sixth Army", penalized the officers of the "Japanese Sixth Army" and registered as a conflict with the "Japanese Sixth Army", so err... take it up with them?

All of that was the case before Khalkhin Gol. And before the previous battle in Khalkhin Gol, and the one at the Ussuri, and the one over the islands in the Amur... These were not sanctioned by high command.

Yes, everytime I read about how dissorganized the Japanese armies in the mainland were, how much resources the military had at their disposal there and how little they actually obeyed Tokyo Im reminded of the Senogku Jidai, I wonder if the Soviets didnt actually make the Japanese a favor by wiping those forces out?

The Japanese did not attack the Soviets because that was not what their internal politics favoured, and they were not pushed to do so by their diplomatic ties. Pragmatically, they would almost certainly have been better off doing so, but they weren't to know that since Germany didn't let them know that a pincer war against the USSR was even an option.

True, they attacked the Mongol army, they only decided to suspend all further operations after the devastating Soviet counterattack they suffered.

 

[Orlunu]

Japanese officials reported it as the "Kwantung Army", refered to it as a defeat of the "Kwantung Army", penalized the officers of the "Kwantung Army" and registered as a conflict with the "Kwantung Army", so err... take it up with them?

it was an entirelly different thing for the Japs to lose an entire army at Kalkin Gol

Oh, they said that the Kwantung Army had been entirely lost in the battle, did they? They called the 23rd Division the Kwantung Army? No. This is an absurd attempt at recovering from having advanced a clearly incorrect claim.

They also said that Japan had lost the battle, so I guess it would be accurate to say that the Soviets had wiped out an entire country at Khalkhyn Gol...

Yes, everytime I read about how dissorganized the Japanese armies in the mainland were, how much resources the military had at their disposal there and how little they actually obeyed Tokyo Im reminded of the Senogku Jidai, I wonder if the Soviets didnt actually make the Japanese a favor by wiping those forces out?

Well, seeing as a very large proportion of the people in the Kwantung Army were sent there to get them out of the way - largely because, as has been pointed out several times, they had lost the internal political struggle in Japan years before this - yes, they were seen as pretty expendable.

True, they attacked the Mongol army, they only decided to suspend all further operations after the devastating Soviet counterattack they suffered.

Go and actually read some actual sources. This is such a low-effort claim that I'm sorely tempted to just not answer it, but I will; the attack was not approved by the IJA's Tokyo headquarters and was against the standing orders of the units engaged, they ordered that it stop in June when the Japanese forces were still enormously on top, and this is merely the last one of a whole long line of such border skirmishes which were not approved or supported by Tokyo despite their results, be they defeats or decisive victories (both of which were had). The decision you are claiming they made late on in this battle was explicitly made, never changed, and repeatedly reiterated for years before hand. You don't know what you're talking about - which claim I'm not basing on your conclusions, but on your continued use of counter-factual "evidence" to support them - so either try and get a well founded way of arguing your case, or stop arguing it.