HOI4 Dev Diary - News from the Eastern Front

[Crecer13]

The Germans didn't have the logistics in the East for another, particularly not at the Stalingrad region where the Germans were having to pullback some of their forces just to be able to supply them (the 6th Army had to send it's horses back to Rostov in order to get the feed out to them, which left their artillery effectively immobilized). Even then, the lack of mobile reserves for the 6th Army was a result of the decision to commit too many of his forces to the city battle and failing to hold back an adequate reserve, rather then any sort of overall lack of forces. Given the aforementioned logistical difficulties and the fact that the Germans didn't expect the Soviets to launch a major offensive in the Stalingrad region, those 120,000 men would likely wind up deployed to the wrong point of the front as the Germans had many other weak points they wanted shored up on what was, as you yourself pointed out, a vast frontline for which they had inadequate forces to man.


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Many people forget, do not know, ignore the battle for Voronezh, it was a major battle at the level of the Battle of Stalingrad. after operations "Small Saturn" and a number of other operations, the troops of the Voronezh Front defeated the 2nd German, 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian armies. In this case, the loss of German troops amounted to 320 thousand soldiers and officers. 26 German divisions were defeated near Voronezh, and the number of prisoners was more than at Stalingrad.

 

[Zwirbaum]

Many people forget, do not know, ignore the battle for Voronezh, it was a major battle at the level of the Battle of Stalingrad. after operations "Small Saturn" and a number of other operations, the troops of the Voronezh Front defeated the 2nd German, 8th Italian and 2nd Hungarian armies. In this case, the loss of German troops amounted to 320 thousand soldiers and officers. 26 German divisions were defeated near Voronezh, and the number of prisoners was more than at Stalingrad.

Are you sure about the numbers? Because from what I recall second Voronezh battle (Jan 1943) brough about ~91k losses. In fact Axis forces/participating in it counted 327k troops

 

[Crecer13]

Are you sure about the numbers? Because from what I recall second Voronezh battle (Jan 1943) brough about ~91k losses. In fact Axis forces/participating in it counted 327k troops

So say all the official data, this is the loss figures, together with the Hungarian (Hungarian troops were completely destroyed) and the Italian troops.

 

[Frank+Frei]

Soviet forces usually do not take Hungarian prisoners. Everyone knew what they were done with civilans and prisoners from soviet side.

Just getting nosey. Can you tell me more about that or you have something where I can read about it?

 

[permanently_afk]

The loss ratio that you cited shows refers to relative loss, not absolute. For example, the USSR lost 20,500 tanks in the 1941 campaign while Germany lost 2,850. This gives a ratio of 7.2: 1.

But did the USSR have a chance to create 7 times more tanks in real history (even with foreign assistance)? Not. Because the ratio of 7.2: 1 was temporary and later on it decreased.

The same goes for infantry losses. For example, some researchers say that the USSR had no chance in a war of attrition against Germany because its infantry loss ratio in 1941-1943 was higher than the difference between the total number of mobilized population of Germany (18-20 million) and the USSR (34-35 million). Even if we deduct the mobilization resource of Germany for the west (~ 30%) and add German allies for the east, the ratio of human resources will be 2:1 in favor of the USSR (perhaps a little more).

Thus, if we use linear logic, we will make an erroneous conclusion that the USSR lost the war of attrition because it lost more people in 1941-1943 than in the 2:1 ratio. The answer here is that the loss ratio shows relative losses, not absolute ones. For example, in one local battle, the USSR could lose 5,000 people against 1,000 in Germany. This is a fivefold difference, but the USSR does not have 5 times more people than Germany in real life. Thus, the loss coefficient shows only relative losses and changes over time.

As for the loss of armored vehicles and aviation, it must be borne in mind that the Soviet losses had a greater percentage of non-combat losses (breakdown) as a result of the technical lag behind Germany. But even if we take into account the losses of 2.94:1 as real, then for the USSR it was not a problem, because it had the worst coefficients earlier. In the case of an alternative history, the duration of the war would be longer and production rates are higher than in real life.

Well, thanks for demonstrating how to not to pay attention to the escalating advantage. Or rather, how to be guilty of linear thinking while accusing someone else of it.

If the WAllies twiddle their thumbs, the Nazis will have more stuff to blow up Soviet AFVs. And the Soviets will have even less and worse AFVs, because the Nazis will move faster and kill more (especially tank crew). In short, the average given by @hkrommel averages the good and bad times for both sides. That means the ratio will stay nearer at 7.2 than on 2 - and the Soviets will be able to produce less, due to lack of various things (machine tools, time, space...)

 

[hkrommel]

I'm afraid that my knowledge of various statistics of the war are insufficient to make a serious evaluation of the suggested scenario, i.e. a German-Soviet war without other participants (if I'm not mistaken and it's an axis-soviet war that is proposed?).

Acquiring such statistics and the insights needed to draw conclusions from them is not a reasonable use of my time and resources. But, if you still care to indulge me:

This is all fine, and we're in what-ifs anyways so there's no way to actually measure to an extent necessary to make some sort of objective claim. I'll do my best to reason through the rest. Thanks for engaging with the points by the way.

Russian geography is not a variable. Notoriously bad roads, different rail gauge, rasputitsa and so on. This is certainly one of the main relevant factors.

Agreed, though remember rasputista works both ways and is actually a benefit in terms of replacements and rail conversion, as it means the lines aren't moving far and there's little combat. It's terrible for trucks though if the rails aren't close enough to the destination of supplies.

Rails and rolling stock – Deutsche Reichbahn incorporated rolling stock and rails from occupied Europe. I don't know the ratio of German/foreign railway carriages used during the war, but I would be surprised if the capture of such materiel wasn't a significant net gain for the axis. What do you think?

I think it would be significant but I also think the diversion of production to things used to fight the Allies and the damage to rail stock factories is important. Further, the Germans had a relatively competent rail stock manufacturing industry if memory serves (plus whatever the Italians had), which could be fully dedicated to the Eastern Front. So essentially you're looking at a one-time early boost followed by long-term detriment vs. long term benefit with possibly less on-hand to begin with. Given that the limitation early on wasn't lack of rail stock, but lack of converted rail, this doesn't seem like too much of an issue.

Also, in my understanding, Barbarossa was a huge priority logistically. Therefore I think it's wildly unreasonable to assume that troops on garrison duty in Europe historically took the same toll on logistical capacity as the forces deep into Russian territory. If we assume that I'm right and extrapolate to our solo-soviet-scenario, we would have more men and equipment on the eastern front, but with a smaller corresponding growth of transport capacity in terms of trucks and rolling stock. And we would still be limited by the same god-awful infrastructure that confronted the Germans historically. Have you accounted for that?

Everyone needs trucks and trains, and the Luftwaffe in the west needed a lot of fuel, to say nothing of the U-Boats. We can't fall into the land combat only trap, the Luftwaffe's production was always disproportionately sent West. Further, truck production wouldn't be hampered by strategic bombing. You also seem to be forgetting the massive construction efforts on the Atlantikwall, the U-Boat pens, the various airbases, etc. I think that's enough to call this variable into serious question, though without hard statistics it's difficult to say exactly how much of a difference this would make.

Supplies – Once again I wold assume that forces on garrison duty requires less supplies than forces in active combat areas. So again, yes, we would have more divisions on the eastern front, but is it really clear that there was enough supplies and munitions for them to be combat effective in an offensive role? Without sacrificing other equipment? And, if there was, can the supplies get to the front at an acceptable rate?

Again I would remind you of the Luftwaffe, the Kriegsmarine, etc. It's also not necessarily true that there would be many more divisions. Without the need to garrison the coasts I highly doubt all those divisions would be transferred directly to the East. More likely they wouldn't be raised in the first place, and that manpower would be kept in the civilian population until needed. Their equipment would still be produced, and their supplies would still be available, but they would be sent to existing formations. There would be some more divisions, but it's not like the Germans didn't know about the logistical problems and would flood the front with divisions they couldn't support. Essentially they would end up with a few more divisions and a lot of extra trucks, rail capacity, supplies, and equipment. Even in terms of armored and motorized divisions, I think it would be more likely that, if the Germans believed the network couldn't support more divisions, the equipment would be used to replenish the depleted divisions already on the front, and the manpower used to raise new divisions for when the supply situation improved.

One interesting what if is whether the Germans would have more rail construction battalions in this scenario. Historically they had a lot, but that number increased significantly in the winter of 1941. If that happened earlier the supply situation would have been much better.

Regardless, there absolutely would be enough production to maintain the German forces in the east, and once the rails were converted it was just a matter of truck conservation, which the Germans were actually quite good at. The issues arise during Rasputista and during the late winter, but during combat months the Germans were well-supplied generally as long as they were decently close to rail lines.

Nutrition – the food shortages would have been even worse without the seizing of 80% of French food production. How would that affect production numbers?

Trade, I presume. Without the blockade the vast agricultural markets of South America are open, for one, including Argentina which was not opposed to Germany.

Various plundering – I'll grant the Germans the Czechoslovakian armor, its gold reserve and the Skoda-Werk, since the capture of those didn't provoke a war with the allies. But, would you, or anyone else for that matter, contest that all German production numbers between september 1939 and 1945 are inflated by resources stolen from the rest of Europe? Yet, you use these inflated numbers as basis for you scenario. Or am I missing something?

I believe that taking away strategic bombing and opening trade more than make up for that. You didn't see French factories churning out Panzers, and there was relatively little use of French armaments on the front lines (limited to armored cars and some B2s converted into specialty AFVs IIRC). Beyond France there wasn't much of note in terms of industry that the Germans took. The Benelux was hardly a military industrial hub, and Norway was seized to secure the trade route for Swedish iron.

You should also note that the numbers are inflated for the Soviets due to lend-lease. Even accounting for lend-leased AFVs and removing those, lend-lease of trucks, locomotives, etc. allowed the Soviets to forego those industries (almost entirely, in the case of locomotives) and instead focus their production on fewer areas, like AFVs. So even if the German numbers are inflated, so are the Soviets'.

One last thing is that you mustn't forget the huge increase in experienced pilots available from not fighting the Battle of Britain. That cannot be ignored.

 

[Emren]

And that's why, of over 2.8 million German PoWs in the Soviet Union, the vast majority survived and returned home after the war.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_prisoners_of_war_in_the_Soviet_Union

Let's not mention the millions of Soviet PoWs in German captivity starved to death, shot, put in concentration camps, worked to death as slaves...

Don’t continue that discussion, or the thread will be locked... see the forum rules.

 

[Meglok]

Wow, this discussion went off the tracks.

 

[Zoetermeer]

I started to read this and got excited because it seems we are finally getting that long-sought improvement to the AI's controversial front-management behavior. Also happy to see that perhaps the Soviet AI will be smarter about defending along longer and more complex fronts.

But as I kept reading I really had a hard time resolving the goals here with respect to the German-Soviet balance with reality. If you read really any of the work published over the past 25 years about this conflict it is quite clear, at least to me, that the Germans simply could not have pulled it off. After thinking a lot about this I really don't think they had a chance to win that war, taken by itself and in isolation. While it's true there may have been more manpower available to invest on the Axis side, and perhaps better decisions made about things like production and planning for a prolonged campaign, I think it's ultimately insignificant because the conditions in Russia at that time and the German logistical apparatus were not at all conducive to total Axis victory. Some people mention the Germans investing more troops there, as Guderian suggests in his memoir for example that 38 divisions were left in the west in 1941. Add another panzer group or army to the east, are you going to instantly be able to supply and sustain your whole front better, on terrible roads and low-capacity rails through mud and/or snow? Maybe Leningrad and/or Moscow become realistic targets in 1941, but will taking them end the war and are the Soviets finished? If the Axis cannot somehow "win the war" in 1941 it's over. If the Germans are still fighting the Soviets in 1945 they should be done for. Even by Typhoon the Germans had hopelessly lost the ability to advance simultaneously on multiple axes. I really just don't see any realistic path to victory for German in the east, historically. What makes this theater interesting is there is a tendency to mistakenly associate territorial gains with "progress" and some corresponding degradation in the Soviet capacity to continue to wage war.

What was sort of a turning point in my thinking about this was Stahel's book "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East". Think about that title and what it suggests. While only a single source, just by reading that book it is obvious that as early as July '41 the Germans had really no idea how they should proceed to win the war in the East. Why is that? Read the Stahel books, and the Glantz books on '41 and '42, and perhaps even some of the unreliable-narrator German field commander memoirs and you get a clear and somewhat consistent picture, in my view.

But maybe that is all somewhat irrelevant because the goal remains, as always in Paradox games, some sort of middle ground between historical accuracy and playability/fun and/or balance.

I understand the intent here in terms of balance, and the need to impose some sort of requirement upon the non-Soviet allies to do something to help win the war. I guess I look at it in terms of needing to somehow simulate the "moral" obligation on the part of the western Allies and their strong determination to engage in the fight with Germany, that goes above and beyond the pure need to "help out" to make the war winnable against the Axis. So maybe this is the best path forward to achieve that. I guess you also have to factor in somehow the need to resolve the fact that a reasonable AI, given enough information, should conclude that as Germany invading the Soviet Union is a "bad idea", against the fact that there were forces at work in the German high command/leadership that were motivating the decision to go ahead with it regardless of any warning signs. Couple that with the fact that these decisions were based on inaccurate information and hopelessly optimistic prewar estimates. Most people likely want to see AI Germany turn east at some point if they like their games to retain some historical flavor.

I think overall I'll probably be happy with what the developers decide to do here because they spend a lot of time thinking these things through and are no doubt aware of the historical realities. Part of the fun of these games is that we get to play out all of these what-ifs and have these lively debates.

 

[BeauNiddle]

But maybe that is all somewhat irrelevant because the goal remains, as always in Paradox games, some sort of middle ground between historical accuracy and playability/fun and/or balance.

Yep this.

Germany just managing to get a late victory is the most playable since there is something to do for all 3 sides. It allows the player to answer the war time poster of "What did you do in the great war?"

There are more historical games that base victory on does Germany do better or worse than historical timelines, whilst still enforcing the loss, but these are usually more niche than Paradox games.

 

[Black5Raven]

At first they should completely rework SU/France and only then thinking about *Unbeatable Germany and Axis vs SU/France and other European countries which exist for one simple reason - be a punching bag*.

How these game should be balanced ? How in real life - with Germany, which took the risk and slowly loses the war under the great pressure of the Allies and the USSR.

 

[hkrommel]

There are more historical games that base victory on does Germany do better or worse than historical timelines, whilst still enforcing the loss, but these are usually more niche than Paradox games.

It's worth noting that even in War in the East it's possible to win as Germany, you just need to play extremely well since there's little room for error after 1941. If you're not at Kuybyshev-Kazan by the end of 1943, you're in trouble (unless the Soviet player screwed up factory evacuation, then you're fine).

 

[Zoetermeer]

It's worth noting that even in War in the East it's possible to win as Germany, you just need to play extremely well since there's little room for error after 1941. If you're not at Kuybyshev-Kazan by the end of 1943, you're in trouble (unless the Soviet player screwed up factory evacuation, then you're fine).

I was wondering if this would come up. As a veteran player of this game and having followed closely since the launch, it suffers from similar issues, although there is smaller margin for error. I am not alone in saying that either -- see http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=4524089 as an example. I love the game and hate to criticize, but it is very generous to the German side especially on the logistics front.

Although I think you were pointing this out not in the sense that we should use WITE as a source of truth regarding Germany's chances, but rather as an example of another game that is looking for some degree of balance at the possible expense of extreme authenticity. If even the niche-grognard games take some creative license then why not Hearts of Iron also.

 

[hkrommel]

I was wondering if this would come up. As a veteran player of this game and having followed closely since the launch, it suffers from similar issues, although there is smaller margin for error. I am not alone in saying that either -- see http://www.matrixgames.com/forums/tm.asp?m=4524089 as an example. I love the game and hate to criticize, but it is very generous to the German side especially on the logistics front.

Although I think you were pointing this out not in the sense that we should use WITE as a source of truth regarding Germany's chances, but rather as an example of another game that is looking for some degree of balance at the possible expense of extreme authenticity. If even the niche-grognard games take some creative license then why not Hearts of Iron also.

I was using it to point out the latter, though for German "chances" you need to be more specific. Chances of what? Of reaching the Urals? Obviously not. Of fighting the Soviets to a stalemate or political collapse a la WWI? Definitely possible given a different situation (like the Allies not being involved, in which case stalemate or political collapse by the Soviets is more likely than not, in my opinion), but varying degrees of likelihood depending on the situation.

On the broader point regarding WITE's "issues," that thread is from pre-1.0. Patches have gone back and forth between the Germans and Soviets being too strong (remember the one where the Soviet attrition losses were minimal?), and the current consensus as I understand it, is that it's only ahistorically lenient to the Germans if you game the rules, which you can hardly blame the game for.

 

[Rudawitz]

It's worth noting that even in War in the East it's possible to win as Germany, you just need to play extremely well since there's little room for error after 1941. If you're not at Kuybyshev-Kazan by the end of 1943, you're in trouble (unless the Soviet player screwed up factory evacuation, then you're fine)

I should really learn to play WIE. Too bad I got a college education to un-fuck. Thanks for your thoughts in the other post btw.

 

[Zoetermeer]

I was using it to point out the latter, though for German "chances" you need to be more specific. Chances of what? Of reaching the Urals? Obviously not. Of fighting the Soviets to a stalemate or political collapse a la WWI? Definitely possible given a different situation (like the Allies not being involved, in which case stalemate or political collapse by the Soviets is more likely than not, in my opinion), but varying degrees of likelihood depending on the situation.

On the broader point regarding WITE's "issues," that thread is from pre-1.0. Patches have gone back and forth between the Germans and Soviets being too strong (remember the one where the Soviet attrition losses were minimal?), and the current consensus as I understand it, is that it's only ahistorically lenient to the Germans if you game the rules, which you can hardly blame the game for.

I think I was basically agreeing with you and I don't really want to turn the thread into a WITE discussion but that thread started in August of last year and the game came out in 2010. By "chances" I meant whatever metrics you are using for "win as Germany" as you said before. But in any case this sort of debate still goes on in those forums even in the upcoming WITE 2 discussions. That's what I love about this theater though -- there are all sorts of what-ifs there and fun to debate over. The question of balance vs. authenticity for it is such a difficult one. There isn't really a single right answer for that nor is there really one for the question of "could Germany have won that war", really regardless of your definition of winning.

Personally for me as I said I can't envision any realistic circumstances that would have avoided the Soviets ending up in Berlin at some point. But that is all based on the circumstances as they actually were on June 22 '41. If the rest of the world is idle for those five years, maybe something changes, who knows. My money is still on the Soviet side even when you go down that road. But it doesn't really matter does it?

We ask for some degree of plausibility and I trust the developers to do it as well as is possible.

 

[Coozer]

I know the east is hard to balance but I also feel like Russia does not get harder the more you push into it as Germany. In reality I feel like its more what German planners expected in 1941. You destroy the armies at the front and then roll through before the Soviets can recover. HoI3 had issues but three ways I have seen this balance is:
1) German logistics becomes really difficult as they push
2) The soviets get buffs as places like Minsk, Kyiv, Rostov fall (HoI4 I think it would be better to do it with surrender progress)
3) The Soviets get waves of reinforcements at different times or triggers

Obviously the last two are not the most organic so are not ideal but they are why I found Hoi3 blackice Barbarossa really fun. The lack of control you had over logstics in Hoi3.. not so much.

 

[Codename 539]

I rarely if ever comment on "historical debate" stuff but I simply couldn't help myself. And I wouldn't throw around "revisionism" when making statements like the one you did.
To be fair, the total losses on the Eastern front eclipsed the Italian and Normandy front (even if you add up 39-41 and North Africa it's still dwarfed) but on the Divisional scale the German losses on the Eastern Front weren't more gruesome than they were on the Western Front. Several prominent historians have even showed the opposite to be true. There were simply a lot more divisions involved for a much longer duration in the East which meant the total figures were much larger.

In the battle of Kursk in '43 (following Citadel) the Germans suffered some 100-120k losses which are about the same figures as they did in Normandy one year later (that is up to mid-July 44, before Falaise).
In Normandy the Germans had between 300-400k troops in total (in the AO depending on date) while they numbered between 800-950k (AO) at the start the Battle of Kursk.

The battles and Area Of Operations are different but they're interesting to study due to comparative scaled differences in size, duration and force-composition. Normandy June-July was approximately 50 by 100km and Kursk 100 by 200km.
Fewer involved forces, smaller area but (in terms of percent of the total force involved) losses almost twice as high as those at Kursk one year prior.

Dude, study history before you are writing the nonsenescence things.

 

[NormieCamo]

 

[DerGrößteRitter]

This is GREAT news!