Main Military Soviet 16 July 1941
As ever with the USSR, surface events hid more than they illuminated, and future historians have drawn particular attention to a, more than usually, secret meeting of the Main Military Soviet early on 16 July.
Some historians, less favourable to comrade Stalin's legacy, suggest that the strange time of the fateful decision (3am) was more due to a vodka fuelled session of STAVKA the previous evening, than the complexity of the decision.
It is now clear that in sacking Molotov, the Soviet leadership was in fact seeking to place the blame for their previous policy of passivity in International affairs on his shoulders.
Instead, emboldened by their hard won successes in the May and June fighting, the Soviet Union was planning to revert to the goals of 1921 - if the International Proletariat would not rebel against imperialism, the Red Army would do it for them.
Two main options, appeared to the Soviet leadership. To try and grab (& of course, liberate) territories of the fast declining British Empire, where it was felt a quick offensive in both India and Iraq would yield quick gains. The difficulty with this plan was the current deployment of the RKKA was on the Soviet-German border and the campaigns in Finland and Rumania had given the STAVKA a deep respect for the problems of fighting in logistically poor terrain.
Equally, although the Germans had not reacted to either Bela-Kun or the reduced SIBTS, it was felt to be dangerous to reduce Soviet forces on the Western border.
This then led the Soviet leadership to consider that, as their armies were arraigned to deter a German attack, why not attack on that sector themselves?
In terms of organisation, the Infantry armies in Hungary and Rumania were being built up, 4 Tank would be fully operational at the end of September and a 4th Shock Army was in production.
Thus was born the basic idea of 'Operation Zapad' (Zapad=West, as in Stalin's slogan at the start of Bagration -- "Na Zapad" - to the west).
This meant a considerable reorganisation of the STAVKA reserve to bring that close to the front. In turn, a new military organisation was created in the RKKA's Order of Battle - the concept of a 'Shock Front'. 2 were initially designated. The first consisted of 1 Shock Army, 1 Tank Army and 3 Tank Army (with its KV1 heavy tanks) and was allocated to Zhukov's Minsk District. When ready the 4th Shock Army would be added to this formation.
The 2nd Shock Front, consisted of 2 & 4 Tank Armies and 2 & 3 Shock Armies, and was allocated to Kirponos. However, 3 Shock would probably operate with the Ukrainian MD to give that formation some offensive force.
The lessons of May on concentration, echelons and reserves were to be applied in the operational planning, especially about the commitment of the Shock Fronts. Whilst the Soviet leadership expected to significantly outnumber the German formations in Poland and Slovakia, they had little doubt that the Luftwaffe would dominate the skies - at least in the early phases.
This led Soviet planners to identify mid-November as a possible start date. Zapad was envisaged as an two pronged breakthrough with the goals of pocketing many German troops on the border by joining up the offensive on a line from Krakow-Lodz-Danzig. The second phase would then see Soviet troops enter Germany proper.
