The current modeling for the Soviet Union is not realistic.
Every game I have played, as Japan, Germany, The United States and the Soviet Union, have all resulted in the same outcome. The USSR is defeated in a span of under 8 months.
I tweaked the settings in the events files to push the GDE to 1.00, then 1.2 to see if this was the issue. No effect, the Soviets still get steamrollered.
I edited out the events that kick off if Soviet manpower goes over 420. Again no effect.
My thoughts, long, I added a table of contents to help.....
1. Historical Outcomes: What was possible.
2. German Logistical Issues
a. Supply trucks
b. Rail Engineers
3. Soviet Capabilities
a. Stalin's bias for attack
b. True Soviet defensive capabilities
c. Inability of Soviet units to operate large scale units due to the purges.
4. Possible Solutions in Game Modeling.
a. Modeling the Logistical issue for the Germans
b. Accurately modeling the Soviet GDE
c. Modeling the Soviet large unit leadership issues.
d. Stalin's hand.
Part I:
Historically, the Germans had no chance of defeating the Soviet Union in 1941. Even if they had started on May 10th as planned, they still would not have conquered the USSR in the first year. Hitler believed that conquering Moscow would cause Soviet capitulation, but this was not the case, and the current system of requiring multiple objectives deep in Soviet territory to force a peace agreement is probably an accurate modeling of the situation. The current game issue is that the Germans can achieve the objective in the first year.
The issue the Germans confronted was logistical. The supply system of the German Army could not support more then one deep penetration into the USSR at the range of Moscow without the railroad being used for supplies.
Part II:
The rail network in the Soviet Union was 1.52meters gauge (Wide Gauge), while the Germans used 1.435 meters gauge (Standard Gauge). the rail gauge between the German front lines and Leningrad was Standard Gauge, meaning that the German Army Group North could advance all the way to Leningrad using the existing rail network to move supplies for the advance.
Army Group Center and Army Group South had to rely on the road network for supplies, as all of the rail network in their sectors used the Wide Gauge. Supplies coming from Germany had to be unloaded from the trains and loaded onto horse carts or trucks and moved to the front. Normal operations yes, but for the Central and Southern Army Groups, the distance between the railhead and the front was measured in hundreds of miles, not a few dozen miles.
The German Army planned for the supply issue the different rail networks created, and did two things.
1.) After the fall of France, the German army acquired all possible heavy trucks they could from occupied France, using captured English and French vehicles, as well as some civilian vehicles, and their own Opal "Blitz" trucks to create a special supply train capable of extending the range of the German army several hundred miles past the rail heads. Combined these supply units were capable of extending the range of the German Army about 600 miles past the rail network, assuming they were used for a single extension supporting only one Army Group. The special supply units were split between all three Army Groups, most going to Central and Southern Army Groups.
2.) The German Army created 6 brigades of special Railroad Engineers who were specifically trained and equipped to re-gauge the rail network. Under ideal conditions, these 6 brigades could re-gauge over 50 miles of track a week if used on a single continuous line. However the units were divided between Central and Southern Army groups.
The supply units listed above were in addition to the already existing supply units attached to the German Army, and the Railroad Engineers were in addition to the several dozen pioneer brigades tasked to repair and maintain the tracks and roads as part of normal German Army operations.
If you do the math you will realize that taking Leningrad was very possible, and should have occurred.
Taking Moscow was also possible, if the Germans had focused on the task of extending the supply network from Warsaw through Minsk and on to Moscow. The Germans did not devote 100% of the supply effort in Central Front however.
Taking Stalingrad in 1941 was not possible with the existing German Supply system in 1941, and Baku or anything past the Urals would have been impossible.
Part III:
The second and bigger issue is the current events the drop the Soviet GDE to 40%, then slowly raise it to a max of 80%. This is done as a series of events in the MOD34 files.
While I understand the intent was to attempt to model Stalin's aggressive "Attack at all cost" mentality, and the resulting lack of defensive positions, minefields and other works prepared in June 1941 by the Soviet Army, the simple truth is no one was better at defending ground then the Russians, should their "Man of Steele" allow them to do so.
The first occurrence of the Soviet Army being allowed to dig in and defend was Leningrad. Once the Soviets made the decision to hold Leningrad, and Zhukov arrived to organize the defense, Leningrad held for 900 days against vastly superior numbers.
Zhukov was able to do what no other Soviet Office was able to do at this time, gain Stalin's confidence enough to allow him a free hand in planning a battle.
The defense in front of Moscow was even more intensive. Hundreds of miles of anti-tank ditches and defense positions were prepared, and elaborate minefields were laid. Zhukov waited for the German Army to be fully committed, then went to the attack.
But that attack would never have occurred if the line had not held. The successful defense of Moscow was a combination of the extensive and successful defense positions, and the German Army reaching the extreme limit of the supply network that had run hundreds of miles past the nearest railhead.
Stalingrad, rinse and repeat. The Soviets prepared extensive positions in the ruins of the city, fortifying every possible position and holding out against everything the Germans had. And again, when ready, and the Germans were stretched thin, Zhukov went to the attack. But that attack would never have occurred if the Soviets had not been able to hold the line and defend the city.
Kursk was the greatest defensive system built by the soviets. Complex minefields and interlacing kill zones dozens of miles deep and stretching for over 100 miles. The German Army attacked with 900,000 men and were so badly mauled they never went on the offensive again on the Russian front. Again, the Soviet defense were remarkable, and again, once the Soviets made up their mind to hold ground, they held ground.
The battles for Odessa and Sevastopol were also examples of excellent Soviet defense capabilities. Both required the Germans to lay siege to the cities and invest time and resources away from the advance. While the Soviets lost both cities, an examination of the battles shows that the Soviets were remarkably effective at defense.
The real issue for the Soviets was Stalin. In early 1941 Stalin refused to allow Soviet units to dig in and prepare defenses. No minefields were laid, no kill zones were registered, and all units were pulled back to their barracks and motor pools. Through the Summer of 1941, Stalin repeatedly ordered units to attack. Units that either no longer existed, or no longer, or never had the capability to attack, were sent piecemeal into Battle. Soviet Units who had been decimated of leadership by the purges, starved of replacements and spare parts, were treated as being fully trained and organized units by Stalin, and any office who failed to follow orders, no matter how insane, were recalled to Moscow and shot.
Even in Early 1942, Stalin overrode his officers and ordered a major offensive at Kharkov, and the results were disastrous.
Due to Stalin's purges Soviet units in 1941, and into 1942 simply did not have the experienced senior offices at the divisional and higher level to effectively command units in the attack. But attack was what Stalin wanted.
Part IV:
The first issue with the game is accurately creating the supply situation for the German Army operating in Soviet territory.
First, allowing 'Full IC takeover" effectively means the Soviets have no chance, as the resulting IC base of the Germans by Spring 1941 will be large enough to allow units to reach deep into the Soviet Union with 30% or better ESE all the way to the Urals and Baku. Players who wish to accurately model the issues facing the Germans should never play on Full IC takeover.
Second, German units operating inside of the Soviet territorial boarders of September 1939 should be penalized for supply. This penalty should be severe enough to prevent the Germans from putting any meaningful forces past a North - South line drawn at Moscow.
the effect should be to model the issues faced by the Germans in moving supplies using a dirt road network from railheads hundreds of miles from the front.
One way to do this is to fire an event every time a German Unit takes a province in the 1939 Soviet boundaries that cuts the Infrastructure by a percentage, requiring a period of time to repair, and permanently removing a small percentage to reflect the need to re-gauge the rail network.
While the Soviet union has the largest tank army in the world, with over 50% of the worlds tanks in existence at the time, over half of these tanks were T26 light tanks, and most of the rest were a mix of BT5, BT7 and T28 tanks. Only 300 or so T34 and KV1 tanks had reached the front line units by June 1941, of about 1,000 manufactured. None of these were in full brigade, much less division, sized formations, so no Soviet Division in Spring 1941 should be a T34 or KV1.
Over 25% of all Soviet tanks were not mechanically functional in May of 1941 due to lack of parts.
To reflect this, set all Soviet units to not allow upgrades until an event after the start of the war, and set the strength to 75%, and again do not allow them to re-enforce till after the start of the war.
Also, to reflect Stalin's "Attack at all cost" mentality, set the Soviets to not allow "Units can Dig In" until after the war starts, then set the "Units can Dig in" flag by event.
This will accurately model the situation the Soviets faced in Spring 1941.
the inability of the Soviets to organize large scale offensive operations is already modeled by the purges.
Soviet GDE should be set to 1.2 or 1.1. The simple truth is that Soviet units excelled at the defense. Setting the GDE to .8 does not accurately reflect the issues facing the Soviets in early 1941.
The German offense into Russia should be the rout that the game models today, with a major exception. When the Russians make a stand, the defense should be strong and significant. More importantly, German units operating more then 50 miles past the 1939 Soviet Borders should be severely penalized for supplies, so much so that operations as deep as Stalingrad in 1941 should not be an option.
The disaster the Soviet army faced in 1941 is real, and should not be changed. What should be changed is the ability of the Germans to operate large military units 1,400 miles from the nearest supply rail-head at the former borders of Poland (Brest to Sverdlovsk.)