Chapter Three: Een bloode hond word zelden velt
Fortune favours the bold
Uniting the lowlands was not as simple as annexing each of the minor counties in turn. The larger two, being the Prince Bishopric of Liege, and the Duchy of Brabant, sought hegemony in the region, proclaiming guarantees and defensive alliances with the Counts of Frisia, Guelderland and the Bishop of Utrecht. So too were the German princes of the Holy Roman Empire on the far side of the Rhine involved, including the Spiritual Electors of Cologne and Trier, as well as the counts of Münster, Oldenburg, Braunschweig, Lüneburg, Anhalt and Cleves.
Astute in his plans, Eberhard recognised the biggest threat to his ambition was the field army of the Duchy of Brabant, and the Bishopric of Liege. In order to assure their dominance over lowland affairs (while dynastic disputes kept Burgundian eyes away), had promised military aid to any defensive campaign in the lowlands. Eberhard saw opportunity in this though. While the minor Lords and Bishops were guaranteed, the Duke and Bishop were deeply distrustful of one another, and arrogant in their assumption of hegemony had only concluded a unilateral defensive agreement against Burgundy. This was the wedge Eberhard decided to exploit, isolating the Duke of Brabant.
The Arms of the Prince Bishop and Duke, as well as the complex diplomatic situation
Reminiscent of Alexander millennia before, Eberhard took to solving this Gordian Knot via simple solution; with a sword. However, he employed the strategy of another General from antiquity to achieve his aim. Having first read Gaius Julius Caesar’s Commentarii de Bello Gallico as a youth, he was deeply intrigued by Caesar’s diplomatic manoeuvring amongst the Gallic tribes to ensure Roman domination. Specifically of course, this meant Divide et Impera, a maxim not lost on the impressionable young man.
Caesar’s diary of the Gallic Wars, and the Legend of Alexander and the Phrygian Gordian Knot
A minor Noble Godfried Loewen had seized the Duchy for himself, murdering Duchess Jeanne in the process. His malevolent tendencies and reputation for brutal and cruel suppression as he sought to centralise power for himself ironically led to another uprising two years later in the Brabant area, while Godfried was in Limburg. Another pretender, Jean Leschwein, revolted thereby isolating the Duchy as it descended into civil war.
September 1422; Eberhard had raised a host of 7000 men for his invasion of Brabant. This was easily managed through “donations” from the burghers of Amsterdam and Middleburg who were promised lucrative licences for the cloth industry in Breda and Brabant, and the ironworks in Limburg. Riding at the head of the army of three thousand mounted knights and four thousand men at arms, Eberhard formally declared war on the Duchy, the casus belli being his legitimate and rightful claim to the province of Brabant itself, and secondly, that by familial link to the murdered Jeanne, he was rightful ruler of the country, and that both Loewen and Leschwein were usurping his legal title.
Eberhard’s Steward meets with an Amsterdam Burgher
Abandoned by Allies to its fate, the usurpers battle unaware of their coming destruction
October 1, 1422: scouts reported that Loewen and Leschwein had met in battle at the gates of Eupen. Eberhard did not hesitate, his two enemies turning on each other and ignoring the menace of the Hollandish army positioned on the western border. Advancing on the Duchy’s capital, des Hertogen bosch (literally: The Duke’s Forest*), Eberhard detached a host of one thousand to besiege the city, positioning his other six thousand men to the south east so as to intercept the retreating army from the battle of the two usurpers, as it came to be known. Ten days later the remnants of Loewen’s army were routed towards Leuven in the Brabant Province, and Eberhard manoeuvred to set an ambush some miles from the city.
October 18, 1422: Eberhard arranged his men at arms across the road and fields leading to Leuven where Loewen sought safety in the city walls that were still loyal to him. Illustrating a tactical proficiency that contrasted with his lack of military experience, Eberhard sent two thousand cavalry to encircle the retreating army, holding one thousand as a mobile reserve behind his entrenched men at arms. At the sight of the disciplined ranks of footmen, and the appearance of the cavalry on their flanks and rear, the peasant army of Loewen fled, only his household guard staying by his side. Eberhard allowed the fleeing remnants to scatter, and the brutal encirclement and slaying of Loewen’s guard commenced. Loewen soon capitulated, pitifully throwing himself at the feet of Eberhard begging for clemency, but perhaps reminded of Jeanne’s brutal murder, Eberhard dismissed the pleas, and the self styled Duke who had reigned for barely four months was beheaded then and there. Not wasting time, Eberhard began the siege of Leuven, awaiting an attempt by Leschwein to attack, allowing van Oranje to employ his favourite tactic, a brutal counter blow.
The clash of Eberhard and Leschwein was soon to come, due to the reckless arrogance of Leschwein as a commander. Eberhard had carefully invested both -s Hertogenbosch and Leuven with lines of circumvallation and contravallation, a tactic inspired by Caesar’s Siege of Alesia against Vercingetorix. Splitting his infantry into two between the major cities, Eberhard encamped between the two cities outside of Tilburg with his cavalry, ready to fall upon the rear of any attempt to lift the sieges of the cities.
Positioning of the Dutch Armies
1 May, 1423: Leschwein ponderously moves towards –s Hertogenbosch, Dutch scouts shadowing the armies progress from Limburg. Eberhard decamps, aiming to envelope Leschwein in a decisive encounter.
11 May, 1423: Unusual for late spring, a cold and rainy day sees several skirmishes as Leschwein is perplexed at the contravallation employed outside the city. The muddy ground prevents the manoeuvrability Eberhard desires, and Leschwein is able to withdraw in relatively good order back towards Limburg, neither commander being able to clearly seize the initiative. Both see around a quarter of their forces missing, captured or slain. As the siege still progresses and Leschwein withdrew, it is a minor tactical victory for Eberhard, and a larger strategic one. However, the dangerous splitting of his forces could very easily have turned to disaster had Leschwein arrived earlier, and he mere hours later.
A minor tactical victory, the siege not being raised
16 May, 1423: Outside Maastricht, Eberhard reaches the Meuse River before Leschwein, holding the bridge there, cutting both his enemies line of supply, and retreat. The result is ignominious for Leschwein. After an attempt to punch through the Dutch line fails, Eberhard’s cavalry falls upon the flank of the rebels, rolling up the line, the ill-disciplined rebels fleeing en masse, thousands slaughtered. Leschwein’s body is never recovered.
Following the skirmish of 11 May, the 16th sees Leschwein’s army defeated in detail outside Maastricht
Detaching cavalry to support the ongoing sieges of –s Hertogenbosch and Leuven, Eberhard is readily reinforced by more Men at Arms, besieging Maastricht itself.
Under total siege, the cities fall quickly, the provinces of Breda and Brabant fully under Dutch control by July 1423, and Limburg January 1424.
Brabant is wholly occupied within two campaign seasons
Holland c. 1424
Count Eberhard I van Oranje (
ADM:7 DIP:9 MIL:5)
Treasury: 13.6 million pfennigs (136 ducats)
GDP: estimated 42.1 million pfennigs (421 ducats)
Army: 3,000 Cavalry (Latin Knights), 4,000 Infantry (Men at Arms)
Navy: 8 Carracks, 4 Cogs
Discipline: 108.0%
Tradition:
Army:10.60% Navy:0
Prestige: Third (64)
Reputation:
Honourable (0)
Legitimacy:
100
*The Duke being Henry I, Duke of Brabant