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Well in terms of performance against those respective groups.

We have to keep in mind the Iraqi insurgent groups spent as much time killing each other as they did even trying to kill the coalition forces,and even then the local Iraqi collaborators took the bulk of the casualties.

In Afghanistan it seems to me like the Taliban are really half-arsed about it,my gues is there is some back-room bribery going on with the various warlords to keep the situation somewhat stable.

We saw what happened in Iraq when all the Sunni insurgent groups banded together,we got ISIL which steamrolled everything that wasnt ready to die fighting.

In Afghanistan i really think the Taliban could do a lot more damage if they actually tried,right now they seem content to play cat and mouse untill the US just ragequits.
 
In Afghanistan it seems to me like the Taliban are really half-arsed about it,my gues is there is some back-room bribery going on with the various warlords to keep the situation somewhat stable.

Not really, they just realised very very quickly that they die very very quickly whenever they try to engage coalition forces. Infact, they tend to die a fiery death from the air when they do something which marks them out as being an insurgent.
 
In Afghanistan i really think the Taliban could do a lot more damage if they actually tried,right now they seem content to play cat and mouse untill the US just ragequits.

Well, duh. Good guerillas read Mao and Ho Chi Minh.
 
Generally speaking, the best soldiers are volunteers of good physical health, keen intellect, and mental stability. On top of this one needs to add proper training, the more realistic and large-scale the better, and proper maintenance of morale (i.e., frequent breaks from combat, good food, good relaxation, etc...), as well as an ability to actually win the battles they fight (i.e., not issuing them with weapons that don't work/are ineffective or engaging in suicide attacks).

Under most conditions, this is what you'd probably aim for. The problem comes in that this often isn't achievable. Volunteer systems can only go so far, and even in conscript systems it tends to be the infantry who ends up getting the short straw as far as recruits go. The reasons for this are obvious; smart people are needed in other more technical arms, people are less likely to volunteer for the infantry/army in general, and the infantry (particularly as regards officers and to a lesser extent NCOs) has the highest turnover of manpower.
 
How would you (as in 2nd person plural) rate the importance of cohesion within the squad?
 
Not really, they just realised very very quickly that they die very very quickly whenever they try to engage coalition forces. Infact, they tend to die a fiery death from the air when they do something which marks them out as being an insurgent.

Given how devestating ISIL has been in a fraction of the time with the suicide attacks,snipers and ambushes i honestly cant believe the Taliban are utterly incapable of better performance.

Then again maybe im expecting to much from semi-literate mountain peasants.

How would you (as in 2nd person plural) rate the importance of cohesion within the squad?

If the men are properly trained and have a decent leader they can be a very flexible and effective unit.

If they arent well trained then they might still be lead in very basic tactics like assault-enemy-position-head-on and sit-on-your-arse-and-shoot-at-anything-coming-at-us.

If the men are untrained and the leader pathetic then they are just cannon fodder who's only tactical utility would be as distractions or to overwhelm the enemy through sheer mass of numbers.

There is of course the 4th option where the men are more capable than the guy leading them,in which case it usually ends in a lot of fun Vietnam War style adverts offering cash for fragging.
 
Given how devestating ISIL has been in a fraction of the time with the suicide attacks,snipers and ambushes i honestly cant believe the Taliban are utterly incapable of better performance.

Then again maybe im expecting to much from semi-literate mountain peasants.
Yeah, but they never fought against even mediocre armies. I'm quite sure the Turkish or Jordanian armies would have cut them to pieces in any form of engagement and that is even more true for western troops, like the ones Taliban faces in Afghanistan. And even if the Taliban were capable of conquering the whole country, do they want to? The last 15 years showed that it is pretty much impossible to end this insurgency campaign of theirs. But maybe waning Western interest would increase again, once the Taliban would be back into power. Just biding their time is safer, has worked before and is less expensive in terms of ressources and manpower.
 
Under most conditions, this is what you'd probably aim for. The problem comes in that this often isn't achievable. Volunteer systems can only go so far, and even in conscript systems it tends to be the infantry who ends up getting the short straw as far as recruits go. The reasons for this are obvious; smart people are needed in other more technical arms, people are less likely to volunteer for the infantry/army in general, and the infantry (particularly as regards officers and to a lesser extent NCOs) has the highest turnover of manpower.

This is generally a bit of a misconception that the 'infantry' are the 'dumb' arm. You tend to have to 'want' to join the infantry as opposed to being told you are going into the infantry. Units such as Cavalry, Guards, Paras and Marines tend to have much stronger intellectual selectiveness than you might expect. If I remember an anecdotal statistic, about 25% of Royal Marine lower ranks are degree educated. People tend to join the army in order to gain a trade, whereas people join the marines/paras/cavalry/guards to have a bit of adventure and the opportunity to shoot other people in the face.
 
Yeah, but they never fought against even mediocre armies. I'm quite sure the Turkish or Jordanian armies would have cut them to pieces in any form of engagement and that is even more true for western troops, like the ones Taliban faces in Afghanistan. And even if the Taliban were capable of conquering the whole country, do they want to? The last 15 years showed that it is pretty much impossible to end this insurgency campaign of theirs. But maybe waning Western interest would increase again, once the Taliban would be back into power. Just biding their time is safer, has worked before and is less expensive in terms of ressources and manpower.

In terms of ISIL combat ability.

I dont find Turkish sources very reliable so im under the impression ISIL has been beating the loving cr*p out of them in Al Bab.

I also dont believe the FSA makes up that much of the Turkish force since the FSA has ceased existing long ago,and whatever mercenaries they are using must have been trained in Turkish doctrine anyways to even be able to coordinate with the tanks and artillery.

As for Afghanistan,i gues that half-arsing it untill the west gets bored is a viable strategy for a faction that has zero regard for prosperity or living.
 
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How would you (as in 2nd person plural) rate the importance of cohesion within the squad?

It is an absolute must ... most SF units will fail (or force them to voluntarily withdraw) because their face doesn't fit. If you are going to be sat in a covert OP for days at a time with somebody, you have to hope that they aren't a massive screamer (i.e. someone who claims that having a Masters degree means that their opinion should be held above others ... if you know what I mean).
 
Given how devestating ISIL has been in a fraction of the time with the suicide attacks,snipers and ambushes i honestly cant believe the Taliban are utterly incapable of better performance.

Against an Iraqi army which was smaller, less well equipped, less capable and with lower morale than the Iraqi forces which were roflstomped by the west in an even smaller fraction of the time.
 
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This is generally a bit of a misconception that the 'infantry' are the 'dumb' arm. You tend to have to 'want' to join the infantry as opposed to being told you are going into the infantry. Units such as Cavalry, Guards, Paras and Marines tend to have much stronger intellectual selectiveness than you might expect. If I remember an anecdotal statistic, about 25% of Royal Marine lower ranks are degree educated. People tend to join the army in order to gain a trade, whereas people join the marines/paras/cavalry/guards to have a bit of adventure and the opportunity to shoot other people in the face.

I'm not so sure about things nowadays. However, I wouldn't say the infantry was ever entirely stupid, rather that your average rifleman in the periods I study tends to be less well educated as a general rule. That does however owe a lot to the historical educational gap and other factors, etc...
 
This is generally a bit of a misconception that the 'infantry' are the 'dumb' arm. You tend to have to 'want' to join the infantry as opposed to being told you are going into the infantry. Units such as Cavalry, Guards, Paras and Marines tend to have much stronger intellectual selectiveness than you might expect. If I remember an anecdotal statistic, about 25% of Royal Marine lower ranks are degree educated. People tend to join the army in order to gain a trade, whereas people join the marines/paras/cavalry/guards to have a bit of adventure and the opportunity to shoot other people in the face.

Interesting.

In my country,at least back when we had conscription,the idea was to press as many of the less-educated people into the ground army as possible leaving the college educated ones in more specialist roles or simply not bothering them at all.

Then again my nation did have to prioritise its losses seeing as the population was small and we were in an existential war.

Against an Iraqi army which was smaller, less well equipped, less capable and with lower morale than the Iraqi forces which were roflstomped by the west in an even smaller fraction of the time.

Except ISIL hasnt just been wrecking the Iraqi's.

They have also been wrecking Kurds,Turks,Syrians as well as special detachments of Iranans,Americans and Russians.

I remember a long time ago when i read some US special forces mission near Mosul had to be aborted because they were being showered with to much firepower from the ISIL guys.

I really dont get why people underestimate ISIL.

If their commanders really are what is left of the old Saddam Army then these men have survived decades of warfare,if they are still alive they are clearly competent.

Not to mention their ground forces have proven incredibly willing to die fighting and i think we can safely say no "modern army" has displayed that level of suicidal persistance.

All their tactics point to a force that is making the most out of what it has to work with.
 
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In what way do you mean?
Does a squad need internal social cohesion or can any number of trained individuals just be sent to fight and expected to be doing reasonably well together?
Is social cohesion in a squad important at all or does the will to fight derive from other things/places?
etc.
 
Except ISIL hasnt just been wrecking the Iraqi's.

They have also been wrecking Kurds,Turks,Syrians as well as special detachments of Iranans,Americans and Russians.

I remember a long time ago when i read some US special forces mission near Mosul had to be aborted because they were being showered with to much firepower from the ISIL guys.

I really dont get why people underestimate ISIL.

If their commanders really are what is left of the old Saddam Army then these men have survived decades of warfare,if they are still alive they are clearly competent.

Not to mention their ground forces have proven incredibly willing to die fighting and i think we can safely say no "modern army" has displayed that level of suicidal persistance.

All their tactics point to a force that is making the most out of what it has to work with.
Don't get me wrong, they are not ineffective. But again, their opponents weren't that good either. The Iraqi army sometimes didn't even engage them, their morale and often their equipment was terrible. And after several spectacular defeats, many units just fled or deserted outright. The Syrians were embroiled in a fierce civil war years before encountering Daesh forces, plagued by desertion, losses and combat fatigue. The Kurds don't a have a standing army but only a militia, a well experienced and equipped one, but still. And they managed to fight them to a stalemate, long enough to allow other factions join the fight.
As for special forces, these are often high-risk operations, hoping for surprise and stealth carrying the day. So, I wouldn't use those failed missions as any indicator of how they would have fared in a "serious" fight.
Ignoring things like the Geneva Convention and using human shields, suicide bombers etc. of course also helps.
But while they are doing quite well with what they have, they only have so much. Their infantry may be more motivated and experienced, maybe even better trained than many of their opponents, but that alone isn't enough. In modern warfare, the infantry can't win on its own. They need joint fire support, artillery and air strikes, armored support etc. etc.
 
Does a squad need internal social cohesion or can any number of trained individuals just be sent to fight and expected to be doing reasonably well together?
Is social cohesion in a squad important at all or does the will to fight derive from other things/places?
etc.

That depends.

In terms of forming a unit in the first place, no. It is entirely possible to form units from men of different backgrounds and still have an effective unit.

In terms simply slamming men together in the middle of combat (i.e., grabbing a platoon from each division and forming a company), certainly. In part efficiency is hampered because they aren't used to working together, in part because the inherent loyalties developed are broken.

However, in this latter regard it is important to note that the damage isn't necessarily crippling, and that new loyalties will most likely be formed.
 
Don't get me wrong, they are not ineffective. But again, their opponents weren't that good either. The Iraqi army sometimes didn't even engage them, their morale and often their equipment was terrible. And after several spectacular defeats, many units just fled or deserted outright. The Syrians were embroiled in a fierce civil war years before encountering Daesh forces, plagued by desertion, losses and combat fatigue. The Kurds don't a have a standing army but only a militia, a well experienced and equipped one, but still. And they managed to fight them to a stalemate, long enough to allow other factions join the fight.
As for special forces, these are often high-risk operations, hoping for surprise and stealth carrying the day. So, I wouldn't use those failed missions as any indicator of how they would have fared in a "serious" fight.
Ignoring things like the Geneva Convention and using human shields, suicide bombers etc. of course also helps.
But while they are doing quite well with what they have, they only have so much. Their infantry may be more motivated and experienced, maybe even better trained than many of their opponents, but that alone isn't enough. In modern warfare, the infantry can't win on its own. They need joint fire support, artillery and air strikes, armored support etc. etc.

Actually they got quite a lot of armor and artillery to go around.

The suicide trucks seem to be a sort of improvised tactical strike which admittedly is just as effective if not more than an air strike.

How they are able to posses so much in the way of tanks and guns despite being bombed for years idk.
 
How they are able to posses so much in the way of tanks and guns despite being bombed for years idk.
1. The US Air force is not very good at hitting any that is not an obvious enemy on flat ground
2. If you start hitting pickups collateral damage is gonna spiral out of control
3. Guns are easily hidden, so are tanks. Tank -> building. Presto.
 
1. The US Air force is not very good at hitting any that is not an obvious enemy on flat ground
2. If you start hitting pickups collateral damage is gonna spiral out of control
3. Guns are easily hidden, so are tanks. Tank -> building. Presto.

1.Hitting any convoy of 30+ vehicles or a tank in ISIL controlled territory is a safe bet.
2.I never got the impression they cared.
3.Tanks might be hidden in a building but you cant hide a dozen tanks and a whole artillery battery active in combat.
 
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