I'm interested in seeing a good argument against their use, since it seems to me like Truman had no realistic alternative.
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One argument I've heard but am unsure of is that Japan was going to surrender either way. Fear of communist occupation following the DOW by the Soviets supposedly made American occupation preferable and this outweighed fear of nukes.
The argument against the use of the atomic bombs is, the war was already over.
The japanese economy was almost at standstill. They didnt have enough fuel for their planes or ships and their ammunitions situation was similar. Their industrial situation was at the brink of extinction. This was specially true for the home islands, there were some storages still in some bigger bases like truk and others but no means to access them.
All in all capitulation was at the door.
The counter argument is, that the japanese would have fought like hell for their motherland costing approx. 500.000 allied soldiers lives.
I tend to see some sense in the first argument, but its hard to deny the second one completly.
Those things were build to be used, as every weapon is and such they were used.
Not only for the military reason but also for the political one as demonstration of power.
I am sometimes afraid they might be used again.
Intentionally massacring non-combatants is never a good choice. There were plenty of alternatives, it's not as if every war needs to end with unconditional surrender.
It also bears looking at the alternative.
Even OTL Japan suffered from a famine in '45-'46. And that was with american grain coming in and the war over. The plan from the US command was to during late '45 switch from bombing cities (who were mainl bombed out at this point anyway) towards food production. Even without an invasion chances are the resulting famine would have killed hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of people.
So the question isn't just "Would the japanese have surrendered anyway?" (which is far from sure) but "How many more people would have starved while the japanese government made up it's mind?" (and remember, even the post-nuke surrender lead to an attempted coup)
I've never bought the 'Soviet occupation' theory. Manchukuo and the Kwangtung Army were lost causes, but how is Stalin supposed to float a Guards Tank Army over to Japan? The Soviets had little to no sealift capability in-theatre and couldn't realistically threaten the home islands with invasion. The atomic bombings were necessary to extract the unconditional surrender. The Japanese had sent out feelers prior to the bombings but wanted to dictate the conditions of their surrender. In any event, they got to keep the Imperial family.
Soviet occupation was never likely, but neutral Soviets mediating a negotiated settlement to keep Japanese colonies intact and the US away from the Soviet Far East was the last remaining avenue available to Japan. The Soviet intervention put paid to Japanese hopes not by threatening an invasion of Honshu, but by closing the door on Moscow as an intermediary.
I don't agree that the atomic bombings were necessary to an unconditional surrender, but I believe they were the cheapest option in terms of lives lost. Even if we set aside Operation Downfall entirely and suppose that the US instead maintained a close blockade in the hopes of starving the Japanese out, how many Japanese civilians would have died of starvation before the government came to terms? In 1946 alone, the US sent $92 million in food aid to Japan, which rose to $287 million in 1947 and $351.4 million in 1948 as the program really got into gear. Would the loss of life due to a continuation of the war have been more than 200 000? I'd personally guess at least a million and likely more could easily be lost in Japanese civilian lives alone before the government fell. Even as late as August 9, people were still arguing for continuing the war in the face of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Without either, I could see the war continuing in the hopes that the Americans would be drawn into a bloodbath on the Home Islands (likely) that would bring out the "fundamental weakness and lack of determination inherent in their society" and force them to accept Japanese terms (unlikely).
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I don't agree that the atomic bombings were necessary to an unconditional surrender, but I believe they were the cheapest option in terms of lives lost. Even if we set aside Operation Downfall entirely and suppose that the US instead maintained a close blockade in the hopes of starving the Japanese out, how many Japanese civilians would have died of starvation before the government came to terms? In 1946 alone, the US sent $92 million in food aid to Japan, which rose to $287 million in 1947 and $351.4 million in 1948 as the program really got into gear. Would the loss of life due to a continuation of the war have been more than 200 000? I'd personally guess at least a million and likely more could easily be lost in Japanese civilian lives alone before the government fell. Even as late as August 9, people were still arguing for continuing the war in the face of both Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Without either, I could see the war continuing in the hopes that the Americans would be drawn into a bloodbath on the Home Islands (likely) that would bring out the "fundamental weakness and lack of determination inherent in their society" and force them to accept Japanese terms (unlikely).
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True, but remember that the last big example of a war that ended in a negotiated settlement on everyone's minds was World War One. The last thing anyone wanted was to fight Japan twenty years later, and the conditions desired by Japan raised precisely that spectre: that they maintain the position of the Emperor, that they conduct their own disarmament, that they conduct all punishments for their own war criminals, and that there be no occupation of Japan under any circumstances. Not every war needs to end with unconditional surrender, but even without the Potsdam Declaration, a conditional surrender still requires the conditions to be acceptable.
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Firstly - the Japanese position, contrary to much of what is reported in the Western press, is that the atomic bombing while terrible was simply part of the overall war that they started. Only a small minority deny Japan's complicity in the war. Indeed, it's interesting to note that survivors of the Tokyo firebombings actually sued the Japanese government in the early 2000s for "failing to stop the war when the situation was clearly hopeless" rather than blaming the Americans. The Japanese do in fact blame their own government for the bombings to a large extent.
That said, what Japan and the Hiroshima memorial folks clearly don't like is the narrative in the West that the bombings were "necessary".
Quite simply, the oft-quoted figure of 600,000 Allied dead in an invasion of Japan was a lie. The real figure, as discovered by American historians, was closer to 30,000 dead based on the original Army estimates. Yet somewhere along the line - perhaps up to Truman himself - the figures were constantly revised upwards. All this seems to indicate that the figure was deliberately increased in order to justify the bombing.
Secondly, they are also rather adamant that the bombings were at least partially motivated by the impending rivalry with the Soviet Union. Quite simply, the US dropped the bombs in order to make sure that Japan surrendered to the US rather than the Soviets, especially as the Soviets were about to obliterate Japan's Kwantung Army which would have likely triggered a Japanese unconditional surrender regardless. And there's plenty of US government and army documents to make the case that "intimidating" the Soviets was part of the intent.
I would note that the idea of using bombing to "intimidate" the Soviets is unfortunately a recurring theme in the thinking of many Allied air force generals. A big reason why Dreden became controversial for instance was that British memos indicated that they were bombing Dresden to "show the Soviets what they could do", which then morphed to the Soviets "requesting" that Dresden be bombed after controversy erupted (which proved to be untrue, leading the Soviets to use Dresden as part of their anti-Western propaganda).
In short, quite a lot of the controversial actions that occurred near the end of the war - such as Dresden and the atomic bombings - were at least in part motivated by a desire to shape the post-war situation rather than actual military necessity. Indeed, it's the continued muddling of the two issues that was the cause of the controversies to begin with.
The mistake is thinking that Japan wasn't close to surrendering to begin with.
Basically everyone in Japan except a handful of generals and junior officers knew that the war was already hopelessly lost, but the surrender was not possible because those officers still commanded substantial forces within the Home Islands. Indeed, some of these officers were so insane that a couple launched a coup to try and prevent the surrender even after the dropping of two atomic bombs and the obliteration of the Kwantung Army
However, the powerbase of those holdouts were in fact the Kwantung Army. It was the most prestigious post in the Army and was heralded as Japan's shield against communist domination. The credibility of those holdouts were destroyed when the Kwantung Army was obliterated, which pretty much opened the door for the surrender.
Japan was in fact a deeply divided society during the war where no one was entirely sure who was in charge. The Army and Navy literally were not on speaking terms. Junior officers - rather than evil old men of Saturday morning cartoon caricature - often wielded power beyond their supposed authority by threatening or even outright assassinating pacifist elements.
To demonstrate, look up the career of Kanji Ishiwara. He technically started the whole damn war against his own government's wishes by instigating the Mukden Incident when he wasn't even a general yet. Despite that by the end of the war he was known as a fierce opponent of Tojo and thought everything they did after 1939 was stupid and everything from 1941 onward was outright insane. He ended up not being prosecuted for war crimes.
Modern Japan - particularly its lively history scene - is actually acutely aware of this chaos and indecision; but it's basically unknown in the West which is why there is this incorrect assumption of a monolithic military dictatorship that was capable of holding out indefinitely.
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Worth remembering that quite a few in the American military at the time thought it was an unnecessary and barbaric act. Ike, MacArthur, Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy and more all made statements to that effect.
Check out around page 25 on. Official government surveys of the subject were aware of this, and you'll find members of the state department and military acknowledging a similar assessment. It's strange that later popular history tends to forget this.
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm
Check out around page 25 on. Official government surveys of the subject were aware of this, and you'll find members of the state department and military acknowledging a similar assessment. It's strange that later popular history tends to forget this.
http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm
Let's see... what about responding positively to Japanese surrender proposal in July? If the Emperor remains anyway the US could have accepted it a month earlier.
One should note that potential casualties of Downfall is not a full picture. There were also active fronts elsewhere like China where casualties would also continue, and conditions of civilians in large areas still under Japanese occupation were getting worse as Japanese logistics collapsed.
While "The emperor remaisn" was usually considered tnhe sticking point, it really wasnt. THe July surrender proposal had all sorts of other conditions on the japanese side that were unacceptable to the allies. (I think they even demanded to keep at least Taiwan)
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Korea and Manchuria as well. By accepting the US would have broken the Potsdam agreement with their Allies.
Korea and Manchuria as well. By accepting the US would have broken the Potsdam agreement with their Allies.
It's just popular to hate and despise the west and demonize anything and everything they ever did. It's very simple to me. Japan was willing to fight to the very last bullet on the mainland. Civilians had already been brainwashed into throwing themselves off cliffs when the Americans were close.
The choice was invade Japan and see millions of American soldiers and Japanese civilians dead, or drop a couple of bombs and be done with it. Both terrible choices to have to make with terrible consequences for people on the ground but there you go. Japan had no problems making terrible decisions with terrible consequences in places like Nanking or Unit 731.
The choice was invade Japan and see millions of American soldiers and Japanese civilians dead, or drop a couple of bombs and be done with it. Both terrible choices to have to make with terrible consequences for people on the ground but there you go. Japan had no problems making terrible decisions with terrible consequences in places like Nanking or Unit 731.
Hey, if we can release wild statements without facts, then I will say that it was a popular idea to "punish" Japanese because they dare to attack America and to show the Reds who was the man. No matter how many (insert racial insult here) die. They had it coming.
Done.
Done.
When juging Truman with the benefit of hindsight we should also consider how imperfect his information was.
Germany had just fought on without surrendering when Berlin itself came under attack so ”crazy facists will fight till the end” may have seemed like a reasonable conclusion.
Likewise the revanchism displayed by Germany in the recent past may have motivated the US to want a more active hand in post-war Japan, making unconditional surrender necessary.
Germany had just fought on without surrendering when Berlin itself came under attack so ”crazy facists will fight till the end” may have seemed like a reasonable conclusion.
Likewise the revanchism displayed by Germany in the recent past may have motivated the US to want a more active hand in post-war Japan, making unconditional surrender necessary.
I'm surprised, FU, I'd have bet money on you asking why they justified, not why they are unjustified...
Some people just like to disagree when hindsight is on their side.
Japan had fatalistic attitude at war: they would not surrender and would rather commit suicide. When US invaded island holding Japanese civilians they committed mass suicides to avoid capturing, soldiers preferred to die as well and some of them pretended to surrender to kill more US troops and this lead US soldiers not taking any prisoners.
Okiwana was likely the ugliest scene US faced against Japan and gave some taste of mainland invasion: from 33% to 66% of local population died. Had US invaded Japanese Japan as a civilization would not have recovered due to massive casualities. Note that US only used nuclear bombs only after Japanese navy was decimated, home islands were blockaded, major cities firebombed and Okiwana captured.
Saying US committed crimes against humanity sounds unforgivable if you completely ignore fact that Japanese high command was ready to drive Japanese civilization off the clift.
Hindsight can work two ways. And "future" and "possible" deaths of US soldiers weigh nothing against real Japanese dead civilians.
Because, as it has been said previously, not all the high Japanese command and government were keen on suicidal resistance. The same Isoroku Yamamoto knew that they had nothing to do after the first six months of war. And he was shoot down on vengeance. Who knows what could've happen had Yamamoto lived?
Because, as it has been said previously, not all the high Japanese command and government were keen on suicidal resistance. The same Isoroku Yamamoto knew that they had nothing to do after the first six months of war. And he was shoot down on vengeance. Who knows what could've happen had Yamamoto lived?
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