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False. Germany in 1938-41 had access to almost all of the international imports it would need (rubber being a notable exception) through its ally in the USSR.

A couple of points. Early war (say over Czechoslovakia) means that the Germans and the Soviets don't share a land border to get all of these imports, and large parts of the Baltic freeze during winter. Plus, war at Munich means that the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact hasn't even been signed. Secondly, the Germans had to pay for those Soviet imports - often with military technology, industrial staples that could otherwise be used for the war effort (machine tools, locomotives, etc.), and hard currency, of which Germany had a limited supply (a large amount from plundering various treasuries, but not infinite).

Take a moment and imagine if Berlin had said, in early 1941, we've conquered the greatest prize in world history - which they had - and said that this is enough.

The rest of the 20th century takes a dramatic turn.

Alright, I'll take the bait. Britain continues the war. The United States joins at the end of 41 due to its alliance with Britain over Pearl Harbour. Even if Germany refrains from declaring war, Roosevelt finds a justification to enter (likely related to the ever-expanding Pan-American Security Zone, where US ships were escorting Allied ships and helping hunt German U-boats). Axis suffer serious setbacks in Africa. Germany is being heavily outproduced. Allies use their naval superiority to capture Sicily, Italian government collapses, forcing German intervention. Unlike our timeline, Germany actually has the forces to potentially force a stalemate in Italy.

Allies potentially look for other "soft underbelly" targets like Greece or Norway.

Soviet army continues rearmament. Depending on how strong/weak they feel Germany is, eventually they will either 1) launch a massive surprise attack against Germany or 2) test Germany's sphere of influence - say with further demands against Romania or Finland, or 3) put further pressure on Germany by restricting exports. So long as Germany doesn't succeed in actually making peace with the West, the bear is going to smell blood and prepare to attack. The only question is when this happens.

The events are different, but the result is the same.

There was no structural reason which compelled the Soviets and the Nazis to go to war. Babarossa was entirely born in the minds of a small cabal of men in Berlin.

Well, there were a few things which did mean the two were likely to be enemies sooner or later. Opposing governing ideologies, paranoia of leadership on both sides, running out of intermediary territory to split between them without stepping on each others' toes, aggressive foreign policies of both sides, German reliance on Soviet imports leaving them vulnerable, and massive military buildup by the Soviets which the Germans would not be able to indefinately match, meaning that delay would only see their foe grow stronger (similar dilemma to German pre-WWI).
 
Also eastern europe expansions would make no difference for naval production as there was little to no baltic naval IC except leningrad.

There was Gdynia which had some of the most then-state-of-the-art shipyards, which the Germans promptly turned into a major base.
 
A couple of points. Early war (say over Czechoslovakia) means that the Germans and the Soviets don't share a land border to get all of these imports, and large parts of the Baltic freeze during winter. Plus, war at Munich means that the Molotov Ribbentrop Pact hasn't even been signed. Secondly, the Germans had to pay for those Soviet imports - often with military technology, industrial staples that could otherwise be used for the war effort (machine tools, locomotives, etc.), and hard currency, of which Germany had a limited supply (a large amount from plundering various treasuries, but not infinite).



Alright, I'll take the bait. Britain continues the war. The United States joins at the end of 41 due to its alliance with Britain over Pearl Harbour. Even if Germany refrains from declaring war, Roosevelt finds a justification to enter (likely related to the ever-expanding Pan-American Security Zone, where US ships were escorting Allied ships and helping hunt German U-boats). Axis suffer serious setbacks in Africa. Germany is being heavily outproduced. Allies use their naval superiority to capture Sicily, Italian government collapses, forcing German intervention. Unlike our timeline, Germany actually has the forces to potentially force a stalemate in Italy.

Allies potentially look for other "soft underbelly" targets like Greece or Norway.

Soviet army continues rearmament. Depending on how strong/weak they feel Germany is, eventually they will either 1) launch a massive surprise attack against Germany or 2) test Germany's sphere of influence - say with further demands against Romania or Finland, or 3) put further pressure on Germany by restricting exports. So long as Germany doesn't succeed in actually making peace with the West, the bear is going to smell blood and prepare to attack. The only question is when this happens.

The events are different, but the result is the same.



Well, there were a few things which did mean the two were likely to be enemies sooner or later. Opposing governing ideologies, paranoia of leadership on both sides, running out of intermediary territory to split between them without stepping on each others' toes, aggressive foreign policies of both sides, German reliance on Soviet imports leaving them vulnerable, and massive military buildup by the Soviets which the Germans would not be able to indefinately match, meaning that delay would only see their foe grow stronger (similar dilemma to German pre-WWI).

I disagree. This is just chock full of assumed war that I do not see if other circumstances change. Pearl Harbor into a formal German declaration against the USA makes no sense when the Germans aren't hoping for Japan to invade the USSR and instead are hoping for a peace conference. Non-Barbarossa Germany should expect continued soft support (eg industry) from the USA but not warm bodies.

The whole USSR invading the west thing is cold war fearmongering. It's possible, but hardly inevitable. Repeated failed offensives are a good way to end the hold of the communist government and they know it - they came to power off of war weariness. The west is also not their friend yet in this case and instead the dire possibility that invading causes them to make peace with Hitler and even support Germany for the sake of balance of power against the USSR.

Poking former Russian Empire territory is a world of difference from an unprovoked invasion and hostile annexation. The soviets were not planning to invade Western Europe when surprise attacked, and should not be just assumed to eventually make said plans if not attacked.
 
The USSR was inevitably going to invade Europe narrative is dross.

We know now that Soviet war planning was predicated on being attacked and then responding with overwhelming force. (which happened, although both the Soviets and the Nazis misunderstood the apocalypse which happened )

Stalin was never planning a war like what happened in 1944-45.

Seriously though, assume that Germany is friends with the Soviets through 41. Assume that Berlin is run by a non insane person (or that the insane person who was in charge doesn't decide to pick a fight with the most powerful country in the world) there is a serious probability that the UK has to accept a German hegemony over the Continent.

Yes, it is possible that the USA gets involved despite all of these things. But if Germany can direct its resources (and all of Europe's resources) against an Atlantic campaign... Well... I dunno.

I do believe that if Babarossa hadn't happened that the Germans would have won in Africa, and probably in the Mediterranean as well by the end of 1942.

I am sure that if unsinkable aircraft carrier which was Malta had fallen - which is possible if the enormous amounts of resources which were dedicated to the East are instead dedicated to war against the UK - well... Does that make an invasion of Italy almost impossible?

Sorry if this is way OT.
 
What are your opinions, could the British appeasement policy in WW2 have succeeded?

We tend to think it was doomed to fail because it did so historically. But was it really?

Appeasement policy was about driving the course of events towards a German-Soviet war without direct Western involvement, sparing the West from another world war.

In my opinion it could have succeeded in case the West sacrificed Poland just like it did Czechoslovakia before. In reality probably Chamberlain did not have enough political power for this and also the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact made continuing the strategy look pointless.

Nevertheless i think if it went so tensions between Germany and the USSR would have soon escalated just like it historically did after the fall of France, leading to Barbarossa.

In such a case i think the West would have supported the side whoever is the actual underdog by extensive arms exports, leading to enormous profits, a huge economical stimulus, maybe possible even to drag the West out of the Depression just like WW2 historically did but without direct war involvement.

Edit: small adjustment for the history forum
The Czechs Would Have Bounced

The cognitive dissonance no one notices is that the Hawks compared Vietnam to what should have been done at Munich. Rather than the simple-minded conclusion that Munich wasn't like Vietnam (one critic said that Vietnam was like the Spanish Civil War instead), an equally logical conclusion could be that if the Allies hadn't appeased at Munich, they would have suffered what the U.S did in Vietnam.
 
The British felt that Hitler would have been crushed by the Communist fanatics in Russia even if he had no Western Front. Then Stalin would have had easy conquests over all Eastern and Central Europe. The Capitalists didn't trust their workers at home not to fall for Marxist promises after all those Soviet victiories, which threat they didn't feel about workers turning into pro-German fascists. Ceding territory to Hitler seemed the better policy, as long as he didn't lose his military power by invading Russia.

There might be truth in this but question is then why the Allies have changed their mind for Poland. We have some talk about this already a bit earlier.
 
False. Germany in 1938-41 had access to almost all of the international imports it would need (rubber being a notable exception) through its ally in the USSR.

There were a number of crucial metals as well, the most important being chromium. The two main sources for chromium in Europe in the '40s were Spain and Turkey. The British purchased all of the production of both nations, mainly to prevent the Germans from getting it. The Germans lacked the hard currency to outbid the British and so they had virtually no access to it.

Chromium is essential in steel production, and running out is a big problem. Trade with the Soviet Union solved some of Germany's shortages but it was not a panacea
 
There were a number of crucial metals as well, the most important being chromium. The two main sources for chromium in Europe in the '40s were Spain and Turkey. The British purchased all of the production of both nations, mainly to prevent the Germans from getting it. The Germans lacked the hard currency to outbid the British and so they had virtually no access to it.

Chromium is essential in steel production, and running out is a big problem. Trade with the Soviet Union solved some of Germany's shortages but it was not a panacea
perfidious albion.
 
The treaty to partition Poland was as disillusioning about that strategy as it was to some American Communists from the opposite perspective.

Problem with this is that the MR-Pact is probably only a consequence of Western threats of war. Without Western support of Poland the MR-Pact was probably never made.
 
The Czechs Would Have Bounced

The cognitive dissonance no one notices is that the Hawks compared Vietnam to what should have been done at Munich. Rather than the simple-minded conclusion that Munich wasn't like Vietnam (one critic said that Vietnam was like the Spanish Civil War instead), an equally logical conclusion could be that if the Allies hadn't appeased at Munich, they would have suffered what the U.S did in Vietnam.

While the war may have been less popular in the west if it had been over Munich (especially in the dominions), I fail to see how it would have at all resembled the guerilla conflict of Viietnam. Arguably, Allied behaviour during the phony war did indeed demonstrate France and Britain were not particularly interested in an all-out conflict in order to defend Eastern Europe, but once war propaganda starts rolling and war fever hit, I doubt either is likely to be forced out of the war due to war exhaustion anytime soon. After all, both countries had survived the much more gruelling and stalemated WWI.

Problem with this is that the MR-Pact is probably only a consequence of Western threats of war. Without Western support of Poland the MR-Pact was probably never made.

Molotov-Ribbentrop is also partly a consequence of appeasement though. The Soviets saw that the West wasn't ready to stand up to the Germans and weren't willing to meaningfully support their allies in Eastern Europe. Thus cutting a deal with the Germans became much more attractive to Soviet leadership (especially when attempts to ally against Germany proved fruitless - largely over probably justified concerns that if Soviet troops were allowed into Poland they would never leave).
 
Molotov-Ribbentrop is also partly a consequence of appeasement though. The Soviets saw that the West wasn't ready to stand up to the Germans and weren't willing to meaningfully support their allies in Eastern Europe. Thus cutting a deal with the Germans became much more attractive to Soviet leadership (especially when attempts to ally against Germany proved fruitless - largely over probably justified concerns that if Soviet troops were allowed into Poland they would never leave).

Sure there's truth in this too. From Soviet side the previous appeasement has somewhat catalized the alliance with Germany while from German side the Western threats of war over Danzig/Poland (so the abandoning of appeasement) was the main catalizing factor.
 
Appeasement would have succeeded if it would have been followed through with more determination.

"Danzig or War" in real history was much more differentiated and reasonable than in HoI. Hitler never demanded annexation of Danzig, but mere transit rights to Eastern Prussia.
It has well been documented that Hitler never saw territorial expansion in the west and thus wasn't interested in war with France and the UK.
Before anyone disregards this argument, first research the actual proposal that Hitler offered in the Danzig crisis. It was actually fairly reasonable and might as well have been the final demand.

However, when Hitler annexed the rest of the Czech territory, he lost all credibility and trustworthiness. The reasonable offer in the Danzig crisis thus didn't seem credible anymore and it is understandable that appeasement ended right there.

------------------

Ironically, WW2 could have been avoided in 2 cases:
1. 0 appeasement
2. 100% appeasement

@Secret Master
I read "Mein Kampf", the most boring book ever, and I think you put too much emphasis on the sore loser in some German prison on a rant. Twitter rages are much worse than that book. The MR-pact was Realpolitik and completely contradictory to "Mein Kampf". Hitler wasn't a complete loon. Even Barbarossa wasn't set in stone. On the contrary, it was a consequence of the diplomatic dilemma with the UK, not an inevitable event. Hitler was a rather modern Hillary Clinton-esque politician (the term "national socialism" alone is a vintage Hillary move).
 
Appeasement would have succeeded if it would have been followed through with more determination.

"Danzig or War" in real history was much more differentiated and reasonable than in HoI. Hitler never demanded annexation of Danzig, but mere transit rights to Eastern Prussia.
It has well been documented that Hitler never saw territorial expansion in the west and thus wasn't interested in war with France and the UK.
Before anyone disregards this argument, first research the actual proposal that Hitler offered in the Danzig crisis. It was actually fairly reasonable and might as well have been the final demand.

What are your sources for claiming that Danzig might have been the final demand? Large portions of Poland were historically and sometimes even ethnically German, so it was a 'logical' target for expansion. More to the point, my understanding is that, by 1939, the German economy was so over-geared for war that it was in danger of collapse without fresh influx of plunder, so someone was going to be attacked.
 
More to the point, my understanding is that, by 1939, the German economy was so over-geared for war that it was in danger of collapse without fresh influx of plunder, so someone was going to be attacked.
Afaik this stuff from Mason was already debunked in the 80s

That said I agree the Nazis propably would not have stoped if the Poles had given them what they wanted.
 
The MR-pact was Realpolitik and completely contradictory to "Mein Kampf". Hitler wasn't a complete loon. Even Barbarossa wasn't set in stone.

A permanent and lasting peace was simply not a long term goal of Hitler's foreign policy toward any country in the area he considered a part of German lebensraum. Now, he didn't anticipate a (the?) war starting in 1939 and involving France and Britain. When that happens, it changes everything in the short and midterm.

I'm not in the "Hitler was a complete loon in 1935" camp. Despite mistakes and flaws in his analysis of foreign policy and the overall nature of the project he wanted to undertake (the real demonstration of how stupid National Socialist ideas about the economy and lebensraum were is how well Germany's economy did post war despite not getting any of that land he thought it needed), he had something akin to a rational roadmap to achieve his stated aims. He just got off track when war erupted with the Brits and French.

But any agreement or peace with the Soviets was temporary. He wanted the land, and he wanted to colonize it with Germans and to Germanize it.
 
the real demonstration of how stupid National Socialist ideas about the economy and lebensraum were is how well Germany's economy did post war despite not getting any of that land he thought it needed

IIRC they wanted to transform Germany from an industrial powerhouse into an industrial-agrarian powerhouse and for the agrarian part they needed the Eastern European lowlands. Also i remember like Hitler considered the villager-agrarian lifestyle as superior to the citizen-industrial lifestyle and envisioned a future Germany where the bigger part of the population would be living in smaller village communities.

Rather funny that Stalin wanted the same but from the other direction, transforming the USSR from an agrarian superpower into an industrial-agrarian superpower, idolizing the industrial way of life.
 
Germany actually had transit rights. They had the right to operate rail traffic on three railroads without any impedance from Polish authorities. Sealed trains rolled between Reich proper and Eastern Prussia throughout the interwar period.

Hitler's demands towards Poland aimed at cutting Poland off its access to the sea. He demanded a transfer of a belt of Polish territory for the purpose of building an autobahn and a plebiscite on the sovereignty over the whole of Polish Maritime province. The plebiscite would be conducted under German auspices, so the final result would be a foregone conclusion even before the vote would even start.

But the main factor for the rejection of the demands was, as it was already pointed out, the fact that Hitler has already shown that he never intended to keep his ends of bargains. German seizure of Prague made the war inevitable.
 
I have wondered, what would have happened in a completely hypothetical scenario where Germany occupies Danzig Free City area, but doesn't invade any of the main Polish territory. Would war start all the same, or could Allies and maybe even Poles still consider backing down?
 
Well, since Danzig was technically not Polish, although administered by Poland, the UK and France could possibly have used the technicality to avoid going to war at that point. Not sure how well that would have gone over on the political side of things, but it would at least have given them a legal excuse to step away until they were a bit better prepared, or at least until Hitler's next demand.
 
I have wondered, what would have happened in a completely hypothetical scenario where Germany occupies Danzig Free City area, but doesn't invade any of the main Polish territory. Would war start all the same, or could Allies and maybe even Poles still consider backing down?

IIRC Poland secretly offered Germany Danzig already in 1920s on face-saving terms (such as economic rights and Polish sovereignty over some historical monuments) in exchange for Germany abandoning any further irredentism. Germany was quite uninterested, mainly because the main issue was with Poland, well, existing at all. A completely hypothetical scenario in which Poland loses Danzig but keeps all territories under its direct administration, together with Germany abandoning any claims to it, would in fact be entirely acceptable to Poland. Danzig was rapidly losing its economic importance owing to the rapid development of seaport in Gdynia.