Was Patton Ignorant?

[Andre Bolkonsky]

This is correct. However, the Soviet army was far more dependent on railway transport than the Western Allies, due to a far lower truck lift, including both as a % of total needs and on a per unit basis. The Americans could function at a far greater distance from railheads for a far longer time than the Soviet forces.

Everyone, well most everyone who knows WWII logistics, knows the Red Ball Express. Only the die hards know of the 'Toot Sweet Express'.

This is a story worth telling. The tremendous work done by the ROBs, the Railroad Operating Battalions, which were sponsored and created by individual US rail services and their employees, where well trained rail operators and crews were given military training and the supervisors made officers and formed into a military unit. Then there is the skill required to offload super-heavy locomotives and additional rolling stock using a hinged bridge to increase offloading from 2 locomotives a day under ideal circumstances to many a day. Not to mention rebuilding all the tracks destroyed by US tactical air and the retreating Germans. And the speed and rapidity with which it was done is rather amazing. American ingenuity harnessed in a good cause, those were the good old days.

 

[Henry IX]

Everyone, well most everyone who knows WWII logistics, knows the Red Ball Express. Only the die hards know of the 'Toot Sweet Express'.

This is a story worth telling. The tremendous work done by the ROBs, the Railroad Operating Battalions, which were sponsored and created by individual US rail services and their employees, where well trained rail operators and crews were given military training and the supervisors made officers and formed into a military unit. Then there is the skill required to offload super-heavy locamotives and additional rolling stock using a hinged bridge to increase offloading from 2 locamotives a day under ideal circumstances to many a day. Not to menion rebuilding all the tracks destroyed by US tactical air and the retreating Germans. And the speed and rapidity with which it was done is rather amazing. American ingenuity harnessed in a good cause, those were the good old days.

Thanks for that. The Americans were GOOD at logistics.

 

[Grandpa Maur]

Yes, generals like Budyenny (spelling?) showed amazing insights as to how to kill off hundreds of thousands of men in a matter of weeks, too bad it was their own men. Granted, many generals learned as the war went on, but so did some of the allied leaders in the much shorter time they had to do so.

Maur,new correctly points out the vital importance of rails for any operation at a significant distance from its supply sources. The US managed it on a different continent, with the limitations of the captured ports, and having to transfer supplies from ship to rail, then to truck.

As i said, compare Dneper and Rhine.

The second-to-last allied offensive stalled at 500km. Soviet at 400. Not a big difference.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

As i said, compare Dneper and Rhine.

The second-to-last allied offensive stalled at 500km. Soviet at 400. Not a big difference.

Let's look at the Soviet Army in 1945. Their good armor units - using American Trucks, operating American M-5 International Harvester half tracks to move their mechanized Guards units, eating a steady diet of American Spam, coordinating using American radios - form a spearhead of infantry and armor that takes massive losses against a badly crippled enemy a few hundred miles from their border following four years of warfare.

And, since Germany was spent before she ever invaded Russia, I am still waiting to hear how the Wehrmacht kept the Almighty Soviets fighting for their lives for four years operating on fumes.

The US Army, crossing a few thousand miles of ocean, push the Nazis at a lightning pace to the German border after making an amphibious landing less than six months earlier; and their supply chain chokes only once for about a week because the Americans are advancing simply too rapidly.

Remind me of your point again?

 

[Director]

If Allied and Soviet advances were similar in length, between pauses for regrouping and resupply, then I think there are two causes:

1) Allies were coming out of a confined beach-head through excellent defensive terrain in the bocage
2) Both armies were truck-dependent for supply

Additionally, as has been pointed out above, the Allies were having to move supplies over beaches or through artificial harbors; the Soviets, of course, had to try to rebuild shattered rail lines as they moved west. If either had possessed efficient supply networks the war would have been over by Christmas of 1944 - probably by Halloween.

In WW2 you could fight a battle with limited supply, but you had to have large forward depots of POL (petroleum, oil, lubricants) and materiel to advance afterwards. The size of those depots, and the number of vehicles available to disperse the materiel, and the quality of the road network, determined how far you could go. No gas=no motorized vehicles, no artillery, no bullets, no food. In addition, any offensive movement tends to attrit and disperse units (especially mechanized vehicles) while defensive actions tend to attrit and compress units (unless cut off), so any sensible commander has 'stop lines' for his offensive operation.

It was true in Poland, France, Africa, and Russia: any forward movement requires pauses for regrouping and resupply. This was still true in the Gulf Wars, even when the enemy was largely blinded and disorganized. If the length of the advances after D-Day are similar it is because the supply solution (trucks) and constraints are similar. Soviet soldiers might be accustomed to doing with less than their American and British counterparts, but the vehicles burn up just as much gas, hence similar advances.

 

[Easy-Kill]

As i said, compare Dneper and Rhine.

The second-to-last allied offensive stalled at 500km. Soviet at 400. Not a big difference.

Which is approximately the distance Germany planned for and advanced in the opening phase of Barbarossa.

 

[MCMartel]

And, since Germany was spent before she ever invaded Russia, I am still waiting to hear how the Wehrmacht kept the Almighty Soviets fighting for their lives for four years operating on fumes.

1. In what possible way was the German army "spent" before Barbarossa, the Axis forces were at, by far, their greatest point of strength right before barbarossa, it was basically downhill from there.
2. Both the Red army and the American army were ludicrously powerful by 1945, and any fight would have ended literally millions of lives, which neither side wanted. There were basically a low single-digit number of people who even considered this in the entire allied leadership. Basically churchill, and maybe patton. This entire hypothetical is kinda pointless, cause it's not plausible.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

1. In what possible way was the German army "spent" before Barbarossa, the Axis forces were at, by far, their greatest point of strength right before barbarossa, it was basically downhill from there.
2. Both the Red army and the American army were ludicrously powerful by 1945, and any fight would have ended literally millions of lives, which neither side wanted. There were basically a low single-digit number of people who even considered this in the entire allied leadership. Basically churchill, and maybe patton. This entire hypothetical is kinda pointless, cause it's not plausible.

I am not the one who said the German Army was spent in 1941.

 

[Easy-Kill]

1. In what possible way was the German army "spent" before Barbarossa, the Axis forces were at, by far, their greatest point of strength right before barbarossa, it was basically downhill from there.

The German military wasn't but its national economic ability to support that army was. Lack of investment into the civilian sector and infrastructure stymied German armaments production. This is one of the main reasons why German offensive power diminished as the war went on. While I woulnd't say they were spent, the writing was very clearly on the wall by the end of 1941.

 

[Yakman]

I am not the one who said the German Army was spent in 1941.

Oh snap.

 

[Yakman]

The German military wasn't but its national economic ability to support that army was. Lack of investment into the civilian sector and infrastructure stymied German armaments production. This is one of the main reasons why German offensive power diminished as the war went on. While I woulnd't say they were spent, the writing was very clearly on the wall by the end of 1941.

Well, they had declared war on the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd most powerful countries in the world at the same time... So...

 

[Henry IX]

i don't think that there are words in the english language which can express my agreement with this.

Oh, I think there are. We would just be banned from the forum from using them...

 

[MCMartel]

Like, can we not do this even ironcially? It's less funny with actual fascists out their shooting up synagogues and such.

 

[JodelDiplom]

... Skipping by all the WW2 fan fiction about the SS...

The German military wasn't but its national economic ability to support that army was. Lack of investment into the civilian sector and infrastructure stymied German armaments production. This is one of the main reasons why German offensive power diminished as the war went on. While I woulnd't say they were spent, the writing was very clearly on the wall by the end of 1941.

How can you justify all this doom saying about Germany on the eve of Barbarossa?

Germany in may 1941 was enjoying still rather high living standards, thanks to the Nazi policy of plundering the occupied countries. Food rations were high, what little strategic bombing there was, was ineffective, and the trains ran on time.

Her war effort against Britain wasn't going anywhere, but neither was Britain's war effort against the axis powers.

You can't tell me that a mere three or four years of economic neglect would doom a country. This is just nonsense. During the cold war, the USSR did mostly fine upholding an arms race situation against the western world while neglecting the civilian economy for decades. What kind of grand economic investments was Britain doing, in WW1, that Germany was not making? Britain was quickly depleting its currency reserves and its remaining political capital in the world (the writing was on the wall for India and east Asia in general) Her days as a world power were coming to an end regardless of how the war with Germany would turn out.

I think you are really over interpreting the economic troubles that Germany went through in those early war years. Yeah sure they were in no position to win a war against the Americans and the Soviets but in may 1941 Germany was not yet fighting either. But so what. Her situation against Britain was alright. The economic difficulties notwithstanding. Economic difficulty is unavoidable when you get involved in world wars, just ask the British of 1814 how they felt their civilian economy was doing. Or ask the Soviets of 1945 whether they felt their civilian economy was still in good shape. When you fight large wars, the needs of the war come first and every other concern is a distant second to that. Locomotives and omnibuses and municipal sewers can go with reduced maintenance for a while, this is really not something you can interpret as a sign of doom.

Having no way to defeat Britain or keep her from drawing the United States ever closer into the war, and having no way to keep Stalin off Germany's back for another 3 years, those were the real black clouds on Germany's horizon in May 1941. Not whatever neglect was hampering the civilian economy. You can only say "the writing was in the wall" if you look at this whole picture. Not just from the economic situation. Even with an economy that were capable of fully replenishing its locomotive stock and keeping up the maintenance of civilian infrastructure, Germany wasn't going to have the means to defeat Britain if the USA or the Soviet Union joined them.

 

[Easy-Kill]

How can you justify all this doom saying about Germany on the eve of Barbarossa?

Germany in may 1941 was enjoying still rather high living standards, thanks to the Nazi policy of plundering the occupied countries. Food rations were high, what little strategic bombing there was, was ineffective, and the trains ran on time.

Apologies for the slow and fractured replies, but there are a few simple points which outline this.

If you compare German GDP per capita to that of the UK in 1940, it is 25-33% lower. Further, the grain and crises following the fall of France was quite stark. Though rations were good, Germany was eating into its reserves quite substantially ... This is not a position to be in when you are preparing a land war with Russia.

Her war effort against Britain wasn't going anywhere, but neither was Britain's war effort against the axis powers.

That isn't strictly true. Pre war, the UK was the world's largest arms exporter, despite having a small Army, it's naval and aircraft industries were both huge and world leading. This allowed Britain to rearm with the latest technologies. In 1941 Britain had started to produce large 4 engine strategic bombers en masse, while the Germans were relying on the nearing obsolete he88 (just as an example). Germany's war effort against Britain was going nowhere, but by mid 1942, Britain's war effort included strategic bombing that would already begin to affect Germany's ability to wage war.

You can't tell me that a mere three or four years of economic neglect would doom a country. This is just nonsense.

Nonsense?Calling THIS IS ADAM TOOZE CHAPTER 9 ... something nonsense without critically analysing source material is a quick way to a useles discussion.

The simple way to look at this problem was the German was lack of coal and steel. The 4 year plan had already apportioned huge amounts of steel from the civilian sector for the armaments sector, while the munitions production to prepare for France had taken even more. All of this meant that German production in the civilian sector dropped dramatically which in turn had a knock on effect in the German war fighting capability post 1941. While the 'eve' of Barbarossa may be too early as the 'peak Wehrmacht' moment, it had definitely done so by end of that year.

To put it in contrast. Germany of 1936-1940 was spending around 25% of its GDP on the military. This is North Korea levels of economic stupidity.

But so what. Her situation against Britain was alright.

I'm not sure that Britain is a part of the discussion here. The problem is that once Germany occupied Europe, while it got an initial boost, it was then beholden to provide for those nations. This was worse felt in Coal where Germany suddenly had to make up for British shortfall across all of Europe; it was felt in the steel which was increasingly needed for munitions production. The UK, much derided was either out producing Germany (a larger nation), or simply purchasing the shortfall on the open market. Germany's strength peaked during those summer months of 1941 and it's ability to wage offensive war never reached that capability again (one of the key theses of Frieser's book).

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

That isn't strictly true. Pre war, the UK was the world's largest arms exporter, despite having a small Army, it's naval and aircraft industries were both huge and world leading. This allowed Britain to rearm with the latest technologies.

Naval technology wise Britain was getting somewhat backwards by '30s. See Nelson to Vanguard for hopefully non-biased view by Royal Navy career naval architect and historian. Notable exception would be some aspects of naval electronics (mainly radar). Their high tide was in the immediate aftermath of WW1 pretty much.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Apologies for the slow and fractured replies, but there are a few simple points which outline this.

If you compare German GDP per capita to that of the UK in 1940, it is 25-33% lower. Further, the grain and crises following the fall of France was quite stark. Though rations were good, Germany was eating into its reserves quite substantially ... This is not a position to be in when you are preparing a land war with Russia.

That isn't strictly true. Pre war, the UK was the world's largest arms exporter, despite having a small Army, it's naval and aircraft industries were both huge and world leading. This allowed Britain to rearm with the latest technologies. In 1941 Britain had started to produce large 4 engine strategic bombers en masse, while the Germans were relying on the nearing obsolete he88 (just as an example). Germany's war effort against Britain was going nowhere, but by mid 1942, Britain's war effort included strategic bombing that would already begin to affect Germany's ability to wage war.


Nonsense?Calling THIS IS ADAM TOOZE CHAPTER 9 ... something nonsense without critically analysing source material is a quick way to a useles discussion.

The simple way to look at this problem was the German was lack of coal and steel. The 4 year plan had already apportioned huge amounts of steel from the civilian sector for the armaments sector, while the munitions production to prepare for France had taken even more. All of this meant that German production in the civilian sector dropped dramatically which in turn had a knock on effect in the German war fighting capability post 1941. While the 'eve' of Barbarossa may be too early as the 'peak Wehrmacht' moment, it had definitely done so by end of that year.

To put it in contrast. Germany of 1936-1940 was spending around 25% of its GDP on the military. This is North Korea levels of economic stupidity.



I'm not sure that Britain is a part of the discussion here. The problem is that once Germany occupied Europe, while it got an initial boost, it was then beholden to provide for those nations. This was worse felt in Coal where Germany suddenly had to make up for British shortfall across all of Europe; it was felt in the steel which was increasingly needed for munitions production. The UK, much derided was either out producing Germany (a larger nation), or simply purchasing the shortfall on the open market. Germany's strength peaked during those summer months of 1941 and it's ability to wage offensive war never reached that capability again (one of the key theses of Frieser's book).

Thanks for the reply, but my main point was that in my opinion you have a false picture in your mind about what an economy that can win a war should look like. You keep saying things like "Germany was eating into its reserves" or "German GDP was 30% lower than the UK's GDP" but GDP and high living standards do not win wars. Granted, a collapse in living standards can lose you a war, but nowhere is it written that you need X pound sterling of GDP to win a war.

I wrote that Britain's war effort in 1941 wasn't going anywhere and you replied that they were doing this and that on the armaments front. Yeah okay they were building big 4 engine bombers and Germany was not, but at the same time Germany was occupying all of western Europe and Britain was not anywhere close to invading any part of continental Europe.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Naval technology wise Britain was getting somewhat backwards by '30s. See Nelson to Vanguard for hopefully non-biased view by Royal Navy career naval architect and historian. Notable exception would be some aspects of naval electronics (mainly radar). Their high tide was in the immediate aftermath of WW1 pretty much.

That may be true with some of the more conventional battleship technologies, but the Royal Navy entered WW2 as the largest navy and innovated throughout the war. For example in anti submarine warfare, naval aviation, ASDIC and anti-submarine warfare, plastic armours, radar, fire control radar and mechanical control etc.

I might agree that British battleships were starting to becoming outdated, but I'm struggling to see that they were 'backwards'.

 

[Acheron]

Regarding Patton, was he ever at the receiving end of a major (counter-)attack? AFAIK, he pushed for very aggressive attacks, I wonder if he neglected defense.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

I might agree that British battleships were starting to becoming outdated, but I'm struggling to see that they were 'backwards'.

Outdated machinery, outdated construction practises that were only slowly being tugged foward at the direction of Admiralty, poor choice of materials, stuff like that as I recall. Brown presents Daring class as the point where they finally caught up with US standard of destroyer design, if a decade late. There's also a quote from the DNC from circa 1943 that to replicate Fletcher RN would need to build a significantly (IIRC ~50%) larger vessel. On the other hand, British yards were very cheap.