Officer training method

[Acheron]

So in Arsenal of Democracy, each Land Doctrine tree had a tech component “Officer training”, these were
Superior Firepower (USA): West Point method
Grand Battleplan (UK, France and Japan): Sandhurst method
Spearhead (Germany): Bad Toelz method
Human Wave (USSR): Frunze method

Now I wonder, in how far did officer training methods differ between countries before and during WWII? I have come to believe that the changes were quite significant, various things I heard:

Germany: Reputedly the best in educating officers, due to not overemphasizing discipline and obedience like most other countries but instead heavily instilling a sense of responsibility and initiative. Related to the concept of “Auftragstaktik”, supposedly, superiors would tell their underlings what to achieve with what resources and within what timeframe but usually abstain from telling them how to do it. Also, the Germany army would rather go into battle with too few officers than inferior ones. However, most of this might come from a gamebook (GURPS Iron Cross), so please, correct me.

United States: Here I read that junior officers were encouraged to lead from the front and might have done excessively so, leading to avoidable casualties. I do not know anything else frankly, though comparing the American with the British army seems to indicate that US officers were more aggressive and probably were given more leeway to use their own judgment. This would also fit in with what I read about the infamous American artillery, that relatively minor officers could summon and apocalypse worth of bombardment quickly.

Japan: Japanese ranks were commonly beaten by their officers. However, the training of said officers was reportedly so cruel that they usually were shorter than the average Japanese due to malnutrition. Fighting style of the Japanese army seems to indicate that it emphasized total obedience with hardly any initiative given at all, reckless aggression on the attack, nailed to their posts on the defense. I may of course have fallen victim to stereotypes so by all means, correct me.

Britain: Here, too, I worry that I might believe in cliches. In case of Britain, I currently think, that their training overemphasized discipline at the expense of initiative. It seems to me they were heavily reliant on plans, especially on the offensive. Usually quite good and competent plans mind you, but still rendering them usually unable to quickly seize an only temporary weakness with the enemy, especially if this would have required lower ranks to seize the moment before it passed.

Soviet Union: While the concepts of the pre-purge general staff looked very promising, the Great Purge seems to have resulted in an officer corps that abstained as much as it could from initiative. Also, Soviet leaders to have a callous disregard for their men’s live in such a degree that it adversely affected their performance, needlessly throwing away lives, especially if the alternative was to abort or even deviate from an attack plan.

Reading my own posts, my views seem rather cliche, so again and by all means, correct me and maybe point me to a good read (though I am weary of getting more books due to my backlog of old ones).

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Comparing German and Soviet officiers for example.

Using German style officiers for the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle would be an absolute nightmare. Sticking to the plan and NOT going for targets of opportunity is critical and deceisive here.
Also this Soviet disregarding of their soldiers live

Likewise Soviet officiers would have been ill suited for German tactical approaches. Also independent thinking officiers can be a blessing like if you frontline is in entire chaos. (Geman officiers been very good at improvising here)
On the other side you get some Mansteins and Guderians who think they always know better, disobey orders and compromise the front. Having a dickhead like Keitel as your superior aggravates this problem.


Personaly I think the Soviet system is superior since tactical advantages dont win a war.
In short, countries tend to train officiers akin to their military doctrine.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Regarding Japanese officiers.
Afaik they been not treated that bad compared to other branches.

The most importance been physical excercises, discipline and warrior spirit. (like for everyone else in the Japanese forces)
A higher education was also part of their training. Aslo often forgotten political reliance. After the Soviets the Japanese been the most political indoctrinated here.

I love people like to state how disciplined Japanese troops were but they simple werent. Especially their officiers. They did like they pleased and orders been often treated like suggestions if not insults.
Considering how ill they been teached in tactics, with inferior equipment on top of that you get results like in ww2.

That said everytime a competent Japanese officier showed up who had the respect of his troops the Allies really had to fight for their victories or lost.

 

[Grandpa Maur]

The German vs. Soviet operational vs. tactical difference seems to cover even more. For example massed operational artillery usage vs. rich tactical fire support.

 

[Ming]

Germany: Reputedly the best in educating officers, due to not overemphasizing discipline and obedience like most other countries but instead heavily instilling a sense of responsibility and initiative. Related to the concept of “Auftragstaktik”, supposedly, superiors would tell their underlings what to achieve with what resources and within what timeframe but usually abstain from telling them how to do it. Also, the Germany army would rather go into battle with too few officers than inferior ones. However, most of this might come from a gamebook (GURPS Iron Cross), so please, correct me.

GURPS books are relatively well researched for Game books so it is probably based on something and not total nonsense. IIRC the WW2 books are even sourced, however I don't have that book so it is also possible that it is based on outdated research or self serving memoirs of German officers.

I have heard those claims before.

 

[Acheron]

Comparing German and Soviet officiers for example.

Using German style officiers for the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle would be an absolute nightmare. Sticking to the plan and NOT going for targets of opportunity is critical and deceisive here.

If I understood the German model correctly, it was achieving your mission in the best way the local commander could think of, not merrily forgetting about the overall picture to capture some unimportant hill for bragging rights. But maybe I got an idealized version?

Likewise Soviet officiers would have been ill suited for German tactical approaches. Also independent thinking officiers can be a blessing like if you frontline is in entire chaos. (Geman officiers been very good at improvising here)

Given that war seems to be mostly chaos, it sounds like an important quality.

On the other side you get some Mansteins and Guderians who think they always know better, disobey orders and compromise the front. Having a dickhead like Keitel as your superior aggravates this problem.

The example coming to my mind would be Rommel, at his level of authority in North Africa, logistics really were no longer someone else's problem. Though a scornful neglect of logistics seems to have been a common theme within the Wehrmacht, I suspect a combination of their logistics being good enough for the immediate neighbors and a warrior-attitude that considered bean-counting logistics to be beneath them.

Personaly I think the Soviet system is superior since tactical advantages dont win a war.

A significant tactical advantage in a significant number of battles can IMHO be decisive. For once, it can change the outcome of battles and maybe even campaigns. Also, casualties themselves are bad enough, but replacements tend to be greener than their predecessors, I see potential for a downward spirals there that requires a significant edge in manpower to overcome.

In short, countries tend to train officiers akin to their military doctrine.

That is an excellent point.

Regarding Japanese officiers.
Afaik they been not treated that bad compared to other branches.

Do you mean other countries? Or branches within the Japanese military? Sorry, I am a bit unsure what or who you mean.

The most importance been physical excercises, discipline and warrior spirit. (like for everyone else in the Japanese forces)
A higher education was also part of their training. Aslo often forgotten political reliance. After the Soviets the Japanese been the most political indoctrinated here.

I love people like to state how disciplined Japanese troops were but they simple werent. Especially their officiers. They did like they pleased and orders been often treated like suggestions if not insults.
Considering how ill they been teached in tactics, with inferior equipment on top of that you get results like in ww2.

Not so surprising, given that the favorite sport of Japanese officers was apparently political assassination. Sounds to me like the rank-and-file were brutalized into submission while the officers where a snake's nest where you rank was less important than your connections.

That said everytime a competent Japanese officier showed up who had the respect of his troops the Allies really had to fight for their victories or lost.

Heard similar about the Italians, their force in Ethiopia is said to have acquitted itself well.

The German vs. Soviet operational vs. tactical difference seems to cover even more. For example massed operational artillery usage vs. rich tactical fire support.

That would be something for a HoI game, do you concentrate support units (most importantly artillery) on a high-level of command for efficiency or spread it out to lower-tier units for effectiveness.

 

[Acheron]

GURPS books are relatively well researched for Game books so it is probably based on something and not total nonsense. IIRC the WW2 books are even sourced, however I don't have that book so it is also possible that it is based on outdated research or self serving memoirs of German officers.

I have heard those claims before.

Mine is in some box and will remain there until I can figure out where to put shelves for books.

Of course, especially the performance of the Wehrmacht in the early years of the war indicate a higher level of competence than their enemies. Though I will argue that it was less the Wehrmacht being led by geniuses than the allies and soviets in early war being led by fools. Still, it seems to me that they got more things right than their opponents. And even later in the war, given the forces arrayed against them, not outright evaporating might indicate something.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

A significant tactical advantage in a significant number of battles can IMHO be decisive. For once, it can change the outcome of battles and maybe even campaigns. Also, casualties themselves are bad enough, but replacements tend to be greener than their predecessors, I see potential for a downward spirals there that requires a significant edge in manpower to overcome.

Tactics are indeed inportant but strategy wins wars. Funny enought what you describe is a strategy here. Winning tactical engagements to deplete your enemy is almost strategy.
Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht the Soviets been at least equal on the operational level and had the best strategists of World War 2.
I am also a huge fan of the Deep Battle doctrine.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Britain: Here, too, I worry that I might believe in cliches. In case of Britain, I currently think, that their training overemphasized discipline at the expense of initiative. It seems to me they were heavily reliant on plans, especially on the offensive. Usually quite good and competent plans mind you, but still rendering them usually unable to quickly seize an only temporary weakness with the enemy, especially if this would have required lower ranks to seize the moment before it passed.

One of the key principles taught to British officers was that of the Grand Plan and Mission Command. The first is that in order to lead, you first need to learn how to follow - that is everyone has a leader to follow,even the chief of the imperial general staff (The PM/War Cabinet). The concept of mission command is that you have your orders from the 1 Rank Up (1RU) and an intent from your 2RU. The way that you plan your mission is to follow both the 1RU direction in order to meet the 2RU's intent. It is difficult to fully ascribe, but a company might be given the objective of breaking the German lines at X position, to allow an exploitation by the attached tank company. The commander (e.g. platoon commander) is given an ops box to play in with clear lines of delineation and demarkaction from other platoons. Those platoons may have other orders (e.g. block a road junction to prevent a counter attack to enable the breakthrough).

The concept of grand battle was the idea that the battle field is divided into clear delineated ops boxes (sectors) where the commander is responsible for his area of operations. Each unit in that ops box has its own orders and accomplish those orders to achieve the battle group's (2RU for a platoon) intent.

Also, the British were very much favouring a concept of superior firepower (Monty's Collosal Cracks) from 1944 onwards. This was very much an artefact of having superior firepower and a citizen army that was far less indoctrinated to fight to the death as the Germans.

 

[Acheron]

Tactics are indeed inportant but strategy wins wars. Funny enought what you describe is a strategy here. Winning tactical engagements to deplete your enemy is almost strategy.
Unfortunately for the Wehrmacht the Soviets been at least equal on the operational level and had the best strategists of World War 2.
I am also a huge fan of the Deep Battle doctrine.

Would you be familiar with David Glantz "Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942"? I wonder, could this be an example of the Deep Battle doctrine failing, precisely due to lacking tactical competence? If I remember correctly, the attack featured the typical attacks on multiple points, but too many of them failed due to poor to very poor execution and the one or two that got though were containable.

So obviously, any strategy or doctrine is bound to fail if the officers are too incompetent to execute it or the very basics of warfare properly. This brings me back to German Auftragstaktik, I wonder if Germa-style educated officers in Auftragstaktik for the Soviet-style doctrine/strategy of Deep Battle would really have been a bad mix, it seems to me you would tell the officers of the breakthrough "here are your forces, attack the enemy in this area and make sure follow-up forces can move unmolested on at least Y-roads to X-depth at Z-time", or did I get evertyhing wrong here?

One of the key principles taught to British officers was that of the Grand Plan and Mission Command. The first is that in order to lead, you first need to learn how to follow - that is everyone has a leader to follow,even the chief of the imperial general staff (The PM/War Cabinet). The concept of mission command is that you have your orders from the 1 Rank Up (1RU) and an intent from your 2RU. The way that you plan your mission is to follow both the 1RU direction in order to meet the 2RU's intent. It is difficult to fully ascribe, but a company might be given the objective of breaking the German lines at X position, to allow an exploitation by the attached tank company. The commander (e.g. platoon commander) is given an ops box to play in with clear lines of delineation and demarkaction from other platoons. Those platoons may have other orders (e.g. block a road junction to prevent a counter attack to enable the breakthrough).

The concept of grand battle was the idea that the battle field is divided into clear delineated ops boxes (sectors) where the commander is responsible for his area of operations. Each unit in that ops box has its own orders and accomplish those orders to achieve the battle group's (2RU for a platoon) intent.

Interesting, though I am not sure on the difference to Auftragstaktik?

 

[Easy-Kill]

Interesting, though I am not sure on the difference to Auftragstaktik?

This is partly the point ... There isn't a huge difference. If you remove the battle of France there are very few tactical engagements where forces Germany outfights the western allies. The principal differences were that the allies had lots of guns, while the German soldiers were more indoctrinated and an attack or defense was less likely to break off early (albeit with higher casualties).

The myth that Germany was the only nation to instill an NCO discipline isn't really correct. The real routes of the NCO focus was that it had mobilised it's entire manpower pool by 1942 and that casualties were highest amongst junior officers (particularly the fanatical ones), meaning NCOs were frequently the platoon commanders. Given these were the more experienced soldiers and generally older and less fanatical they often did their own thing with out the appreciation of the wider battle. I will try to dig out some sources on this topic.

 

[bz249]

Comparing German and Soviet officiers for example.

Using German style officiers for the Soviet doctrine of Deep Battle would be an absolute nightmare. Sticking to the plan and NOT going for targets of opportunity is critical and deceisive here.
Also this Soviet disregarding of their soldiers live

Likewise Soviet officiers would have been ill suited for German tactical approaches. Also independent thinking officiers can be a blessing like if you frontline is in entire chaos. (Geman officiers been very good at improvising here)
On the other side you get some Mansteins and Guderians who think they always know better, disobey orders and compromise the front. Having a dickhead like Keitel as your superior aggravates this problem.


Personaly I think the Soviet system is superior since tactical advantages dont win a war.
In short, countries tend to train officiers akin to their military doctrine.

AFAIK that leadership style is adopted for project management.
On the other hand Auftragstaktik is meant to fight short and violent wars, using the hit first, hit hard and keep hitting principle. Outside that framework (where the Germans have no logistical advantage due to preparation before the war) it will not work.
Like the battle of trafalgar, letting the enemy to cross your t is a bad idea but there because of specific circumstances was the right move to win decisively.

 

[Grandpa Maur]

This is partly the point ... There isn't a huge difference. If you remove the battle of France there are very few tactical engagements where forces Germany outfights the western allies. The principal differences were that the allies had lots of guns, while the German soldiers were more indoctrinated and an attack or defense was less likely to break off early (albeit with higher casualties).

The myth that Germany was the only nation to instill an NCO discipline isn't really correct. The real routes of the NCO focus was that it had mobilised it's entire manpower pool by 1942 and that casualties were highest amongst junior officers (particularly the fanatical ones), meaning NCOs were frequently the platoon commanders. Given these were the more experienced soldiers and generally older and less fanatical they often did their own thing with out the appreciation of the wider battle. I will try to dog out some sources on this topic.

Whole North African campaign. Tunisia - Kasserine. Catania. Salerno. Anzio. Cassino. Caen. Metz. Plenty of examples.

 

[Kovax]

The battle for France was ideally suitable for German auftragstaktik, where the front was chaotic and distances between objectives was short. The ability to react quickly in a fluid environment was more useful than a prepared plan that made sense a couple of days ago, but was already obsolete. In a larger and overall more tactically stable situation like deep in Russia in 1942, that exercise of personal initiative didn't work, and the "big picture" became far more important than taking another village or hill. Logistical concerns at those distances required preparation before making another advance, so acting on impulse to exploit a perceived weakness wasn't much help, and endangered the overall plan of action.

 

[Acheron]

The battle for France was ideally suitable for German auftragstaktik, where the front was chaotic and distances between objectives was short. The ability to react quickly in a fluid environment was more useful than a prepared plan that made sense a couple of days ago, but was already obsolete.

I don't quite understand, it seems to me that the German executed their plan for France near perfectly, feint north at the Netherlands and Belgium to lure the allied armies north, then strike south through the Ardennes and Sedan to cut off the allied armies from their rear?

 

[bz249]

The battle for France was ideally suitable for German auftragstaktik, where the front was chaotic and distances between objectives was short. The ability to react quickly in a fluid environment was more useful than a prepared plan that made sense a couple of days ago, but was already obsolete. In a larger and overall more tactically stable situation like deep in Russia in 1942, that exercise of personal initiative didn't work, and the "big picture" became far more important than taking another village or hill. Logistical concerns at those distances required preparation before making another advance, so acting on impulse to exploit a perceived weakness wasn't much help, and endangered the overall plan of action.

It was also a method for making the battles more intense (and give the enemy no chance to regroup)... thus to exploit a general advantage in logistics, C3I and moral.
Furthermore the focus was get the job done in the shortest time possible and resources are of no concern. (Price was the free parameter in the usual time-quality-price triangle)

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

I don't quite understand, it seems to me that the German executed their plan for France near perfectly, feint north at the Netherlands and Belgium to lure the allied armies north, then strike south through the Ardennes and Sedan to cut off the allied armies from their rear?

He talks about tactics and you think about the Strategic/Operational layer.
Hence the disonance.

 

[Director]

Just my opinions, but:

The US Army was tiny between the Civil War and WW1, and only a little larger between WW1 and WW2. The officer corps was overwhelmingly made up of West-Point grads who all knew each other well; very few people rose through the ranks. On the plus side, George Marshall and other officers relentlessly evaluated and re-evaluated officers, promoting, demoting and transferring them if they did not measure up. Some (particularly those with difficult personalities like Terry Allen and George Patton) were sidelined and then moved to other responsibilities, sometimes even at the same or higher level. Marshall, in particular, wanted generals who were cheerful and optimistic, ready to make the situation work with what was on hand, as well as capable. The record of the US Army in both theaters in WW2 is filled with officers who didn't suit and who were moved on or out; this is a large reason for the rapid improvement of the Army after Kasserine Pass.

From what I've read and heard, US Army officer corps before each World War was aristocratic and closed, insular and conservative. The record of the lower level officers and NCOs is somewhat better as many of them were National Guard or wartime promotions and there was a widespread willingness to adapt and work outside doctrine to get jobs done ("Get it done and go home"). There also seems to have been a tendency for US soldiers to repair or otherwise acquire equipment that was outside their TOE, adding firepower at the expense of standardization. Whatever else you can say, the US Army officer corps learned faster than the British and Germans thought possible and the Army, by 1943, performed well both offensively and defensively.


Japanese officers seem to have run the gamut from close-minded and contemptuous to skilled and professional - like most early-War armies. Defensively their skills improved but the atrocities committed were horrific (the Philippines as just one of many cases in point) and largely unrestrained by higher-level officers. A reliance on relatively light equipment, skimpy logistics and offensive tactics did pay dividends early on but by late 1942 could not win against better-equipped Allied soldiers particularly when the Allies had airpower. The examples of failed offensive assaults at Guadalcanal sum this up: the Japanese did not have the numbers, heavy artillery, tanks, ammunition or supply, or proper intelligence and yet they attacked in reckless fashion and were crushed. In general, they started the war with 1920s tactics, doctrine and equipment and never had a chance to change.


If I were going to sum up, I'd say:

1) Soviets execute the plan; basic unit of operation is brigade-equivalent or larger
2) Germans seize opportunities; basic unit of operation is platoon and company up to regiment
3) British execute the plan, use materiel and conservative operations to keep casualties down; basic unit of operation is brigade or larger
4) French (pre-1940) operate in very top-down fashion; basic unit of operation is brigade or larger; post-1943 they mostly use Allied doctrine and equipment
5) Americans are somewhere between British and Germans; basic unit of operation is regiment
6) Japanese execute the plan and use headlong assaults if the plan fails; basic unit of operation is regiment (?) in South Pacific and brigade or larger in Burma

The 'basic unit of operation' is a measure of flexibility; if the Germans are operating in companies and you are trying to counter them by operating in brigades, you see the sort of 'order/counterorder/disorder' so prevalent in the early years of WW2. This flexibility is less important if you have a solid front, superior numbers and good communications and control. Conversely it increases in importance when you are outnumbered and/or the situation is fluid.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

While the Japanese army was indeed a "light" army considering the US and the British constantly "lighted" their TOEs they been on something. For example those Japanese mini mortars which would have been useless in Europe or Russia been held in high regard by US troops. (the kneebreaker)

On the other side Japanese rifles and their MGs been mediocre at best. Like wise much of their equipment.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Whole North African campaign. Tunisia - Kasserine. Catania. Salerno. Anzio. Cassino. Caen. Metz. Plenty of examples.

I'm confused. All of the battles you suggest here are strategic level operations (Kesserine pass notwithstanding) ... None of them are army corps or below. Further, all of them resulted in allied victory.

Did you mean to imply that there are plenty of examples where the Germans lose at the strategic and operational level (translation of tactics to strategy)?