The 1930s Alliance that would have doomed Germany, if maintained

[Sunforged General]

The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Ratifications were exchanged in Moscow on March 27, 1936, and the pact went into effect on the same day. Though this treaty would later fall apart and the Soviets would sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to replace it.

But one must wonder, if the French and Soviets had put a little more effort into making this alliance work, wouldn't it have virtually guaranteed either Germany backing down and accepting peace, or Germany being destroyed early on, likely without even the British or Americans needing to get involved?

I wonder how warmer French-Soviet relations would affect the Munich Agreement, and how Germany's later strategy would pan out, do they still invade a Poland backed by France and USSR? Or do they try to invade France and hope the Russians dont come bulldozing through Poland.

For this scenario to work, France must accept closer military co-operation and co-ordination with the Soviets, something they apparently refused in real life.

 

[Rubidium]

Even without the Alliance going full bore, the Soviets were pledged to defend Czechoslovakia (if and only if the French also upheld their promise of support). Munich happened instead, so the French didn't go through with their support, and thus the Soviets didn't either.

But the bigger issue is Britain. Throughout the 1930s, there were various times when the government of France (where the Popular Front was in power) was interested in taking stronger anti-German actions, while the British (under Conservative governments during this time) was more skeptical. There was also plenty of internal opposition as well, especially from the French right, but the French government was acutely aware that it was dependent on Britain to prevent from being overrun. If forced to choose between the UK and USSR as an ally, any French government would choose the one that could actually deploy forces in France to strengthen their defenses.

It's also worth remembering that the c. 1939 Soviet military was in poor shape, as demonstrated by both the invasion of Poland (which, despite Polish forces already being in bad shape due to the Germans, still saw a wide variety of snafus) and the Winter War. It's not clear how well they would perform fighting in 1939 (and the French performance doesn't exactly fill one with confidence either). A two-front war is always difficult, but it likely encourages the Germans to focus on knocking out one front as quickly as possible.

 

[Ming]

Franco Soviet cooperation in the 30s is less interesting for the military consequences than the diplomatic and economic ones.

If French don't betray Czechoslovakia at Munich then the Little Entente is also a factor and if The Soviets are not badgering their neighbors they might actually get involved.

 

[Geriander]

With no MR-pact I imagine that Hitler would have focused on France rather than Poland first. The Soviets would then have to invade Poland to assist their French allies. I doubt that the Soviet army of 1939 would even reach the German border before France gets knocked out of the war. Then the Soviets face the Germans in the spring of 1940 in Poland. Its hard to imagine the result being a worse disaster for the Soviets than Barbarossa but it would probably still be a long and bloody conflict.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

The Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Ratifications were exchanged in Moscow on March 27, 1936, and the pact went into effect on the same day. Though this treaty would later fall apart and the Soviets would sign the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact to replace it.

But one must wonder, if the French and Soviets had put a little more effort into making this alliance work, wouldn't it have virtually guaranteed either Germany backing down and accepting peace, or Germany being destroyed early on, likely without even the British or Americans needing to get involved?

I wonder how warmer French-Soviet relations would affect the Munich Agreement, and how Germany's later strategy would pan out, do they still invade a Poland backed by France and USSR? Or do they try to invade France and hope the Russians dont come bulldozing through Poland.

For this scenario to work, France must accept closer military co-operation and co-ordination with the Soviets, something they apparently refused in real life.

Not only the french did refuse that. The polish state had fought a war against the soviets between WW1 and WW2 in which Poland reconquered a huge chunk that was polish once but what the soviets considered theirs, and would neither trust any soviet promises nor allow any soviet armies to pass through Poland (in the thought that if soviet armies are there they won’t leave peacefully again) even if the CSSR would have been invaded by Germany. As the USSR did not share a border with either Germany or the CSSR there was no way to actually do something, unless the USSR would become an aggressor themselves before.

The whole Franco-Soviet alliance was impractical as to pacify the UK it was specifically worded to be compatible with the Locarno Treaties (in which the UK and France guaranteed Germanys western border to improve relations and which required that the League of Nations would mark an invasion as "unprovoked aggression" after it started before either France or the USSR would be legally aloud to invoke the alliance.

The only party reaping a benefit from the Franco-Soviet alliance was - Germany. Because Germany could point out to that treaty and rightfully claim that it was designed for one purpose only, to threaten Germany with another two-front-war by the very France that in the Locarno Treaty had guaranteed Germany western border before. It became the pretext for Germany to remilitarize the Rhineland as it could claim that it could not leave that part of the country undefended when France was threatening the border again and even british politicians voiced understanding for that action.

 

[Grandpa Maur]

As the USSR did not share a border with either Germany or the CSSR

Freudian slip, surely, comrade

 

[Sunforged General]

With no MR-pact I imagine that Hitler would have focused on France rather than Poland first. The Soviets would then have to invade Poland to assist their French allies. I doubt that the Soviet army of 1939 would even reach the German border before France gets knocked out of the war. Then the Soviets face the Germans in the spring of 1940 in Poland. Its hard to imagine the result being a worse disaster for the Soviets than Barbarossa but it would probably still be a long and bloody conflict.

Its worth mentioning that if Germany "focuses on France" they still have to attack through Belgium, otherwise they have to attempt to hack their way through the maginot line, the strongest fortifications in the world. And if Germany invades Belgium, Britain is probably going to get involved again. France falling before the Soviets break through Poland? Debatable, but not guaranteed. It depends how fast British reinforcements get to France, and if Germany will divert forces to Poland to slow the Soviet Advance.

 

[Director]

There was also the 'Little Entente' of Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia, backed by guarantees from France. Had France stood with them, the partition of Czechoslovakia would not have happened and the German Army (had Hitler gone for it) might have been defeated in the mountains. France would probably have required support from Britain, and that was where it all fell apart.

What we learn from this is that you cannot save yourself by sacrificing others; if you could, you might not be worth saving. As Rudyard Kipling observed, if once you pay the Danegeld, you never get rid of the Dane.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

Freudian slip, surely, comrade

Ooops, indeed it should be CSR at that time as it became the CSSR only after the war.

 

[Lord Tim]

Not only the french did refuse that. The polish state had fought a war against the soviets between WW1 and WW2 in which Poland reconquered a huge chunk that was polish once but what the soviets considered theirs, and would neither trust any soviet promises nor allow any soviet armies to pass through Poland (in the thought that if soviet armies are there they won’t leave peacefully again) even if the CSSR would have been invaded by Germany. As the USSR did not share a border with either Germany or the CSSR there was no way to actually do something, unless the USSR would become an aggressor themselves before.

I was reading a book on the diplomacy before World War Two where the author claimed the Romanians had agreed to let Soviet forces pass through the Carpathians if they intervened to assist Czechoslovakia, and that was to happen even if the Romanians weren't involved themselves. It's certainly worse than Poland in terms of infrastructure but supposedly the Stavka felt they could supply twenty divisions that way.

 

[Acheron]

Germany had the good fortune to be able to amass the bulk of their forces first against Poland and then against France. Any change that screwed up this fool-given gift might have spelled disaster for the Wehrmacht. IIRC, military theorists argue that your advantage increases exponentially with you forces, that is, doubling your forces more than doubles your edge. The reverse of course means that even minor forces sucked away elsewhere can have a disproportionate effect on the main effort.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

I was reading a book on the diplomacy before World War Two where the author claimed the Romanians had agreed to let Soviet forces pass through the Carpathians if they intervened to assist Czechoslovakia, and that was to happen even if the Romanians weren't involved themselves. It's certainly worse than Poland in terms of infrastructure but supposedly the Stavka felt they could supply twenty divisions that way.

That would only have been considered before the USSR annexed Bessarabia from Romania.

Poland and Romania signed an alliance in 1926 directed against an attack by ANY side (regardless if german or soviet aggression) which made it unlikely that Romania would allow soviet armies to circumvent the polish territorry around the southern border. Even more unlikely as that area has been one of the most desolate places imaginable regarding the infrastructure to move an entire army, even worse than the Ardennes. In addition to the difficult terrain the way would have been prolongated by several hundred kilometres (as pre-WW2 Poland reached far more to the southeast beyond Lemberg/Lwow/Lviv than nowadays Poland) - only to reach the eastern outskirts of the CSR and then would need to pass through Slovakia (where almost noone wanted to fight Germany for the Czechs) through the entire snakelike CSR

 

[Rubidium]

That would only have been considered before the USSR annexed Bessarabia from Romania.

But that annexation only happened after the M-R Pact and the USSR deciding to align with Germany. Stalin would like to have Bessarabia, but he wanted a solid alliance (ideally with France/UK, less ideally with Germany) more than that. In a scenario where the USSR and France remain allied, Stalin would never make those demands (which would almost certainly doom the alliance).

The post-war situation may look different (if the USSR has put a ton of troops and infrastructure into Romania and Czechoslovakia in order to defeat Germany, I'm skeptical that they'll just leave quietly after the war is over, although that will depend on the relative balance of power) if a Munich-war scenario happens, but pre-war that's no barrier. Poland will probably complain, but pre-1939 Poland tended to favor Germany over the USSR anyway, and France and the Czechs will both have plenty of leverage on Romania.

 

[yerm]

Hitler/Germany are not the "bad guys" until they actually do something. If Munich doesn't happen and Hitler doesn't annex the rest of Czechoslovakia, nobody is upset at him. Further, until France falls, they are not yet taken as seriously as we do today with the advantage of hindsight.

Sure, a Franco-Soviet pact that endures may shut down German ambitions. Hitler cannot throw his weight around, cannot annex Czechoslovakia without an absurdly lopsided war (or coup I suspect if he tries). Poland won't bend either here.

So maybe the Germans end up leading a central European alliance to repel the absurdly hostile France and the warmongering soviets. The British here are inclined to sympathise with Hitler since his rump state with no colonial holdings left is being bullied by bigger stronger neighbors. The Poles and Romanians are going to be absolutely terrified of a seemingly-ambitious USSR who has a friendly France smiling from the far side of Europe.

 

[Sunforged General]

the absurdly hostile France

France has every reason to be hostile to Germany, Even prior to 1936 Hitler was making Hostile gestures toward France (and Britain to a lesser extent). The Germans not paying their reparations should have been reason enough for France to annex the Rhineland. Both as payment, and also to use the Rhine as a barrier against German hostility.

Since the Rhineland was demilitarized, annexing it would have been simple prior to 1936. Sure the British would kick and scream, but they probably wouldn't do anything more serious than put some trade restriction on France like they did in the early 1920s when France occupied the Ruhr over Germany not paying reparations.

 

[loup99]

Hitler/Germany are not the "bad guys" until they actually do something. If Munich doesn't happen and Hitler doesn't annex the rest of Czechoslovakia, nobody is upset at him. Further, until France falls, they are not yet taken as seriously as we do today with the advantage of hindsight.

Wrong, Hitler stood for a dangerous and aggressive ideology and it was widely well-known, only later traitors in France and conservative elites in the UK gave him the benefit of doubt. He already breached against the Versailles Treaty by remilitarising the Rhineland and before that had written a book where he explains his plans very clearly.

 

[ConjurerDragon]

France has every reason to be hostile to Germany, Even prior to 1936 Hitler was making Hostile gestures toward France (and Britain to a lesser extent).

Hitler dreamed of an allied Britain and expected it to at least stay neutral even to the day that the UK declared war. That was the major reason for the anglo-german naval agreement that removed one of the major annoyances between Britain and pre-WW1 Germany and agreed to limit the, at the time after WW1 far smaller, german navy to a level that imperial Germany before had never been willing to accept.
At the same time that agreement allowed Germany to build up the navy beyond the limits of the Treaty of Versailles (angering the french and weakening the treaty of Versailles), as british politicians recognized that opposition against that treaty was one of major reasons that could unite most germans, even with different political views, to follow Hitler.

The Germans not paying their reparations should have been reason enough for France to annex the Rhineland.

There was a moratorium on war debts and reparations suggested by the USA because it was during the Great Depression and a major financial crisis where several austrian and german banks collapsed and unemployment was rapidly rising. Insisting on the reparations would have resulted in Germany defaulting and even the delay until the Lausanne Conference caused the Brüning administration to collapse.

Both as payment, and also to use the Rhine as a barrier against German hostility.

And how well did that go the last time the Ruhr was occupied by french and belgian forces? Occupying it again would only serve to convince Britain just like last time that Germany was the one in need of help against an overly aggressive neighbour and not France and that this time France was threatening the balance in Europe. In addition the Rhineland is inhabited by germans, so being a supposed barrier against german hostility is somewhat paradoxical.

Since the Rhineland was demilitarized, annexing it would have been simple prior to 1936. Sure the British would kick and scream, but they probably wouldn't do anything more serious than put some trade restriction on France like they did in the early 1920s when France occupied the Ruhr over Germany not paying reparations.

With the difference that in 1932 it was not only Britain that saw the french as aggresors but the US agreed with them and that it would be nonsensical to punish Germany for not paying reparations that it’s economy was not able to pay in full. And instead of merely occupying an area actually ANNEXING it is quite something different. Especially as we are talking about a time where Hitler is not even in power yet and Germany has annexed nothing yet. Going that course would likely achieve what Hitler always wanted to - keep Britain neutral when the downtrodden germans rise up to reclaim their own country and throw back the french invaders to the other side of the border.
I mean annexing the left bank of the rhine would probably remind anyone of Napoleons Empire and how to react when any european power threatens the balance
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipe...isions_of_the_First_French_Empire_1812-en.svg

 

[Rubidium]

Pretty much every one of Germany's neighbors had reason to be worried about Hitler. His revanchist rhetoric naturally implied taking Alsace-Lorraine, the Polish Corridor, Sudetenland, Austria. And even before the remilitarization of the Rhineland, he had already attempted to annex Austria once, shortly after coming to power. The current owners of all of those lands were understandably concerned about Hitler (Poland gave him some leeway only because they were even more concerned about the USSR).

The big problem with maintaining an anti-German alliance was that Britain (led by the Conservative Party at this point, and crucially didn't have a border with Germany) was much less concerned about Hitler than France was, and deeply suspicious of the USSR (with good reason, to be fair, but to the extent of ignoring the more immediate problem). You see this with e.g. the Spanish CIvil War, where the (Popular Front) French government was interested in providing support to the Republicans, but Britain was adamantly opposed (to the point of effectively favoring the Nationalists in their selective enforcement). I do wonder how a Labour Britain would have reacted to the crises of the late 1930s.

 

[yerm]

France has every reason to be hostile to Germany, Even prior to 1936 Hitler was making Hostile gestures toward France (and Britain to a lesser extent). The Germans not paying their reparations should have been reason enough for France to annex the Rhineland. Both as payment, and also to use the Rhine as a barrier against German hostility.

Since the Rhineland was demilitarized, annexing it would have been simple prior to 1936. Sure the British would kick and scream, but they probably wouldn't do anything more serious than put some trade restriction on France like they did in the early 1920s when France occupied the Ruhr over Germany not paying reparations.

If France annexed the Rhine, English speaking people would have ended up celebrating Hitler if he took Paris. With their help. People on the internet today would be arguing about how France was given way too much leeway at Versailles and they should have anticipated the French would cause another war and maybe WW1 Germany was right to fear encirclement.

Wrong, Hitler stood for a dangerous and aggressive ideology and it was widely well-known, only later traitors in France and conservative elites in the UK gave him the benefit of doubt. He already breached against the Versailles Treaty by remilitarising the Rhineland and before that had written a book where he explains his plans very clearly.

People weren't blind or supportive, you are right, but until he follows through it is all talk. People were not actually scared of him or Germany until given a reason to be. Until Czechoslovakia, many considered the German nation a weakened rump state deserving sympathy. Hitler broke that illusion... but a ridiculously hostile France and Soviet gang up hefore Hitler had done more than write?

 

[loup99]

People weren't blind or supportive, you are right, but until he follows through it is all talk. People were not actually scared of him or Germany until given a reason to be. Until Czechoslovakia, many considered the German nation a weakened rump state deserving sympathy. Hitler broke that illusion... but a ridiculously hostile France and Soviet gang up hefore Hitler had done more than write?

The Soviet Union would have loved a such alliance, but it would have meant either France cutting ties with the UK or at least a more pro-USSR Foreign Minister in France with the aim of pursuing closer ties. While a such Minister was in office he died before achieving this aim (Barthou).