If OKH would have decided to go straight for Moscow from the beginning It could have certainly succeeded, the Reds may not have surrendered but they most certainly would have committed their best formations on the defense of the city and thus the bulk of their remaining strength. The capture of Moscow which was the rail and communication hub for the entire country would have split the remaining Soviet forces from each other and they wouldnt be able to coordinate. If the Wehrmacht would have captured Moscow they would have destroyed most of the Red Army in the process thus making the destruction of the remaining forces certain. Thus the lotzen decision was the turning point of the Eastern Theatre. Any thoughts?
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I don't see the capture of Moscow winning the war for Germany though. They had lost around a million men by the end of 1941, dead and wounded, and this would still be the case even if they had made it to Moscow. Winter still comes and the entire German army is still ravaged by general winter. They still need to recruit teenagers to fill the ranks for offensives in 1942, just like they did, to replace all the experienced and battle hardened soldiers they lost in Russia in 1941. Their supply lines are still extended, there's still an enormous battle of attrition going on behind the lines against Russian partisans AND they still haven't captured any large oil producing areas.
Meanwhile Russia still has its incredible pool of conscripts, its military industry is still moved east out of the reach of German planes, they still have all the oil and raw materials they need, they're getting food and other stuff from the British/American convoys... I don't see them being unable to do what they did in 1942 (encirclement at Stalingrad, destruction of an entire army group and 6 months worth of German tanks/planes/artillery) just because the Germans captured Moscow.
Also Germany already destroyed most of the Red Army (and tanks, and airforce) in the first 4 months of the war. The numbers of Red Army soldiers, tanks and aircraft destroyed or captured are astonishing. And yet... it still didn't get the job done.
So er... no. I think the turning point was later, in 1942. Not even because of Stalingrad necessarily, but because they had been bleeding to death in Russia for a year and a half without victory, or without capturing vital oilfields.
Meanwhile Russia still has its incredible pool of conscripts, its military industry is still moved east out of the reach of German planes, they still have all the oil and raw materials they need, they're getting food and other stuff from the British/American convoys... I don't see them being unable to do what they did in 1942 (encirclement at Stalingrad, destruction of an entire army group and 6 months worth of German tanks/planes/artillery) just because the Germans captured Moscow.
Also Germany already destroyed most of the Red Army (and tanks, and airforce) in the first 4 months of the war. The numbers of Red Army soldiers, tanks and aircraft destroyed or captured are astonishing. And yet... it still didn't get the job done.
So er... no. I think the turning point was later, in 1942. Not even because of Stalingrad necessarily, but because they had been bleeding to death in Russia for a year and a half without victory, or without capturing vital oilfields.
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Hindsight is a bliss, if the Whermacht would have captured Moscow instead of Kiew we(you) now would talk about how the idiot Hitler should have moved the troops southwards to easily win the war.
Moscow would have been a major blow, yes but Kiew was also a major blow. Delivering both would have been amazing (if you are a Nazi) hence they tried so hard in December.
Moscow would have been a major blow, yes but Kiew was also a major blow. Delivering both would have been amazing (if you are a Nazi) hence they tried so hard in December.
Surely the Germans will meet the best of Soviet and there was the risk that they wouldn't capture both Moscow and Kiev!
Moscow is an important hub, but Soviet have built another North-South railroad far behind Moscow, evacuate the Government out of the city (except Stalin), and they still had near 2 million troops on Japan Front to back up. No way they would surrender with those millions troops still intact.
German bombers did little damage to the Moscow city because of incredible heavy AA in Moscow. The German could not bomb Kremlin ! And they didn't have air superiority here.
Guderian has big mouth on this decision, but even he could not capture Tula city. That's made German line of supply very difficulty and Guderian had to abandon his try to encircle Moscow.
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Especially that the correct move would have been "Rest and refit"
Let the Soviets die en masse in fruitless counterattack while improving the supply situation (rail catch up) and occupy a strategic staging ground which can threaten both Moscow and the Volga the oil artery of the USSR. The exact course of the 1942 Campaign will be decided by how the events unfold.
That would lead to discussions like: if only the Germans defeated the USSR decisively in 1941 then they could have put the oil wells back in production by 1943 so air parity in the West would have never been lost and the US would have never risked nuking Berlin, Nürnberg and Köln.
It's fun to speculate how they could've won in Russia though, just because it's an almost impossible task and everybody loves an underdog, even when they're an evil underdog that ought to be put down.
My own personal alternate history that results in German victory in Russia is:
1. Invade in 1941 and do everything pretty much the same as they did, with one key difference - expect the winter. Produce winter clothes and aim to move to create a decent line to the west of Moscow before winter hits. Defend this line throughout the winter, maybe even use some Hannibal tactics and let the Russians push into the line in the center and create a huge bulge (giggity giggity goo) in preparation for a decisive blow in 1942.
2. Treat Ukraine and captured Soviet POW's not only as equals but as friends. A lot of Soviet soldiers didn't want to be fighting and hated Stalin. Ukraine definitely hated Stalin. Here the Germans have potentially millions of volunteers ready for 1942 who could fight the partisan war for them behind the lines (the war against partisans behind the lines was extremely vicious and sapped a lot of German strength throughout the war).
3. Repeat step 1 and win, or if this still isn't enough for a decisive blow, choose another line and prepare another winter. You can fill the frontline with Ukrainian and Soviet troops to get hammered throughout the winter, saving your proper veterans for another try in 1943.
Of course, all this really does is prolong the war until German defeat and maybe risk Berlin getting nuked. Once America got going with its incredible industrial capacity there really was no winning for Germany. They'd even be able to hit captured oilfields in Russia and shut them down by launching huge bomber raids from the Middle East, so even if the Germans managed to capture those the allies could still deny the oil once they built up their air strength in the right areas.
My own personal alternate history that results in German victory in Russia is:
1. Invade in 1941 and do everything pretty much the same as they did, with one key difference - expect the winter. Produce winter clothes and aim to move to create a decent line to the west of Moscow before winter hits. Defend this line throughout the winter, maybe even use some Hannibal tactics and let the Russians push into the line in the center and create a huge bulge (giggity giggity goo) in preparation for a decisive blow in 1942.
2. Treat Ukraine and captured Soviet POW's not only as equals but as friends. A lot of Soviet soldiers didn't want to be fighting and hated Stalin. Ukraine definitely hated Stalin. Here the Germans have potentially millions of volunteers ready for 1942 who could fight the partisan war for them behind the lines (the war against partisans behind the lines was extremely vicious and sapped a lot of German strength throughout the war).
3. Repeat step 1 and win, or if this still isn't enough for a decisive blow, choose another line and prepare another winter. You can fill the frontline with Ukrainian and Soviet troops to get hammered throughout the winter, saving your proper veterans for another try in 1943.
Of course, all this really does is prolong the war until German defeat and maybe risk Berlin getting nuked. Once America got going with its incredible industrial capacity there really was no winning for Germany. They'd even be able to hit captured oilfields in Russia and shut them down by launching huge bomber raids from the Middle East, so even if the Germans managed to capture those the allies could still deny the oil once they built up their air strength in the right areas.
The Hungarian Royal Army brought CV-33 Ansaldos to fight the Red Army at the Don. That thing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L3/33
Do you really think that the main problem for the Germans is that they cannot find enough lightly equipped and badly trained troops? Because in case they could supply more units then they could start equipping their own existing allies. Or even better... just equip the run the mill German infantry divisions and upgrade them to be capable of conducting high pace offensives.
The Hungarian Royal Army brought CV-33 Ansaldos to fight the Red Army at the Don. That thing:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/L3/33
Do you really think that the main problem for the Germans is that they cannot find enough lightly equipped and badly trained troops? Because in case they could supply more units then they could start equipping their own existing allies. Or even better... just equip the run the mill German infantry divisions and upgrade them to be capable of conducting high pace offensives.
Okay, so forget frontline duty. Equip them with captured light equipment (by god they captured enough of it to get this job done) and put them to work against partisans, freeing up the German units doing that.
I guess the biggest factor is that in 1941 the Red Army units surrendered lightly but later on they kept fighting. I do not know whether the morale would recover after the German victory is less inevitable... but mass atrocities before actually winning the campaign did indeed pushed the average grunt that it is better holding the ground and die like a man. Though the typical soldier expect anyway that the invaders did committed atrocities so it is likely that it had made no change at all.
While I admire your taste in adult cartoons and mostly agree with your sentiment, the war in Russia had been lost as far back as the economic policies of the 1936 and perhaps even sooner. Essentially, this was back when Germany decided that re-armament and the international isolation attitude of the Wilhelm II years was the way to go. Specifically, you can see in the four year plan of 1936, where the armaments industry monopolised steel and the civilian sector subsequently lagged behind. While this allowed Germany to leap ahead technologically and in terms of productions growth (particularly in munitions), it also meant that Germany would essentially fight with what she had. This was a particularly difficult situation to be in, as we see in the build up to the Battle of France, that more and more of the steel and coal is used for munitions. There are materials shortages and less and less material is available for the civillian sector. Following the battle of France (and pillaging of their stockpiles), more and more men and materials are taken away for the military, leaving fewer people/stuff available for working developing the industry necessary to support the military.
What we see is a downward spiral, where German offensive strength peaks in 1941. Barbarossa consists of two sustained advances of three army groups, for several hundred km across a huge front. 1942 sees a single sustained advance of a shorter distance, by a single army group, while 1943 sees a narrow offensive over a potentially short distance.
That is, Germany was not able to do more than they actually did. Barbarossa was almost fantasy in its success. The problems facing the German military of 1942 were born in the four year plan of 1936, itself an artefact of the balance of payments of 1933-1936. The question in my eye is what the Soviets do of Moscow is captured? Because, it wasn't in Germany's power to do anything more!
Ah ha! But if they go with my plan, of advancing to a certain pre-determined line in 1941 before the winter, they can still have the mind blowing success they had in 1941 (huge encirclements, Kiev captured, massive advances, pretty much all Russian air force and tanks destroyed), but they don't throw everything they have into one final push to try to knock out Russia for good during winter, resulting in catastrophic losses in men and equipment. They still have it all left over for another push in 1942 that is as big (or almost as big) as the one in 1941, and Russia brings everything they have to resist it also, except they won't have the ridiculous numbers of tanks and aircraft they had in 1943 onward to resist with, so Germany has a chance.
Essentially they went into Russia with the mindset of "throw absolutely everything at them all at once, win in 3 months, don't worry about casualties or tank/aircraft losses because we're going to win before Christmas anyway so just schnell schnell schnell!!!".
Instead they go in with the mindset that they do significant damage in what's left of '41, advance to some line or another in time for general winter's arrival, wait there and repel counter attacks, continue and win in 1942.
...then lose to the USA and Britain and all the other countries that joined them in that endeavour.
(I'm only being half-serious btw, I know Germany could never have won, it's still fun to speculate on how it could've been done differently and been even more successful for them than it actually was).
I feel that I want to chip in that, the whole German plan was to destroy the Red Army before it could withdraw to the east and thus make the campaign impossibe for the German logistics to support. So what the cities are named should be unimportant as opposed to what damage can be done to the Red Army in that area. Sure, the Red Army might have thrown in everything to defend Moscow but that kind of thinking sounds very much like the German thinking regarding the Battle of Verdun and we know that the "bleed them white" didn't work in France and probably wouldn't have worked in Russia.
I'd be happy to argue that after Kiev fell, it would probably have been better to make a big push on Leningrad and secure that harbor and, if I understood it correctly, railway hub for the German supply and logistic system in preparation for more fighting in 1942, rathern than do a Napoleon and take Moscow on the eve of winter and find out it don't win the war in one blow anyway.
I'd be happy to argue that after Kiev fell, it would probably have been better to make a big push on Leningrad and secure that harbor and, if I understood it correctly, railway hub for the German supply and logistic system in preparation for more fighting in 1942, rathern than do a Napoleon and take Moscow on the eve of winter and find out it don't win the war in one blow anyway.
Kiev battle allowed encircling a million men, a whole army, which was the point of Barbarossa - to surround and destroy Red Armies.
If they didn't take Kiev, Nazis would still have a whole enemy Army there and have to put up their own army to counter Soviets. So it was a critical battle that gave Germans the edge over Red Army.
DukeDayve is right that not starting attack on Moscow could be a preferable strategy. If German Army could crush Soviet counteroffensive then, like in 1942 near Kharkiv, and destroy and encircle attackers, they could have a chance to take Moscow on their shoulders.
If they didn't take Kiev, Nazis would still have a whole enemy Army there and have to put up their own army to counter Soviets. So it was a critical battle that gave Germans the edge over Red Army.
DukeDayve is right that not starting attack on Moscow could be a preferable strategy. If German Army could crush Soviet counteroffensive then, like in 1942 near Kharkiv, and destroy and encircle attackers, they could have a chance to take Moscow on their shoulders.
The German need was to destroy the Russian Army in early battles so a hard push could capture the oil fields. Nothing else mattered; Germany could not maintain or expand her mobile forces (and air force, and Italy) without oil. Halder's plan was to concentrate on Moscow first, which is one reason Hitler was so angry with him and sacked him.
The German Army had plenty of winter clothing for the men at the front. They decided to gamble and forward POL, ammo and supplies instead, hoping to knock the Russians out before winter really set in. They lost the bet, but it was a choice and not an accident.
If Germany doesn't capture the oilfields in '41 or at most mid-'42 then the war is decided: Germany will lose. And I see no way Germany can defeat Soviet Russia in '41... wound, yes; kill, no.
The German Army had plenty of winter clothing for the men at the front. They decided to gamble and forward POL, ammo and supplies instead, hoping to knock the Russians out before winter really set in. They lost the bet, but it was a choice and not an accident.
If Germany doesn't capture the oilfields in '41 or at most mid-'42 then the war is decided: Germany will lose. And I see no way Germany can defeat Soviet Russia in '41... wound, yes; kill, no.
How do you figure? Germany fought a war against the western allies and Soviets until 1945? Romania was still pumping oil and there was no second front yet
Germany poured everything it could spare, and some that it couldn't, into knocking the Soviets out of the war, and things were only going to get worse as Allied production increased and German production slipped. There wasn't anywhere near enough oil coming out of Romania, nor being made synthetically in Germany, and industry and military training were both suffering as a result. The long-term price had to be paid. Without an additional source of oil, the war was a dead end for Germany. Amazingly, they were able to mostly hold things together until 1945, but there was basically nothing left at the end.
Germany MIGHT have been able to take Moscow (nowhere near "certainly", as Jpgh puts it) if they had dedicated their efforts to it almost from the start (once the initial encirclements were completed), but that probably wouldn't have won the war by itself. They MIGHT have been able to take Stalingrad a little sooner, and hold it while they advanced into the Caucasus with smaller forces to secure the oil fields and sources of specialty metals. The Allies would probably have bombed the oil fields, making it somewhat of a moot point, but at least they'd have denied those resources to the Soviets, putting the two sides in the same unenviable position. Trying to achieve both, or indecisively wavering between the two goals, wasn't going to work.
@Kovax - admirably said.
@Jpgh - The Soviets wrecked the Caucasus oil fields before the Germans could get there, so... I rate a German victory in the East at maybe 10%. They tried Barbarossa because they had the Russian Army of WW1 and the Soviet Army of the Winter War as examples of what the Red Army would do, and because - like Japan - they had a small, fixed reserve of fuel and a small trickle of oil from Romania to draw on. Not enough to wage war with, and not enough to run a civilian economy on for very long. Make no mistake - Barbarossa looked more possible to the Germans than it does to us (we have hindsight and history, after all) but even German generals thought it was a wild plan.
From the end of 1942 to the end of the war the Germans fought a mostly-defensive war without the broad mobility they employed in 41-42. The Luftwaffe was handicapped (and then knee-capped) by lack of fuel; German generals seriously debated reducing the armored and mechanized forces; the German auto industry (making trucks for the Army) was at one point forced to stop production because they couldn't get even a few liters of gas per vehicle to run the finished units off the assembly line. Look at the Battle of the Bulge - an operation limited in every particular by lack of fuel.
Had Germany possessed twice the oil she historically had, the story of WW2 might be very different. But like Japan, Germany ran wild for a few years before being brought down by resources and logistics.
Taking Moscow (and the railroad lines around it) might have helped limit Soviet buildups, but it wouldn't put any gas in the tanks. If Stalin had stayed in Moscow and died, it is conceivable that a successor might have brokered some kind of peace, had Hitler been smart enough to make a sensible offer. But in general, I stand by what I said: Germany bet all its petroleum reserves on a wild plunge into Russia, hoping to win the oil of the Caucasus - and failed. After that it was all downhill...
@Jpgh - The Soviets wrecked the Caucasus oil fields before the Germans could get there, so... I rate a German victory in the East at maybe 10%. They tried Barbarossa because they had the Russian Army of WW1 and the Soviet Army of the Winter War as examples of what the Red Army would do, and because - like Japan - they had a small, fixed reserve of fuel and a small trickle of oil from Romania to draw on. Not enough to wage war with, and not enough to run a civilian economy on for very long. Make no mistake - Barbarossa looked more possible to the Germans than it does to us (we have hindsight and history, after all) but even German generals thought it was a wild plan.
From the end of 1942 to the end of the war the Germans fought a mostly-defensive war without the broad mobility they employed in 41-42. The Luftwaffe was handicapped (and then knee-capped) by lack of fuel; German generals seriously debated reducing the armored and mechanized forces; the German auto industry (making trucks for the Army) was at one point forced to stop production because they couldn't get even a few liters of gas per vehicle to run the finished units off the assembly line. Look at the Battle of the Bulge - an operation limited in every particular by lack of fuel.
Had Germany possessed twice the oil she historically had, the story of WW2 might be very different. But like Japan, Germany ran wild for a few years before being brought down by resources and logistics.
Taking Moscow (and the railroad lines around it) might have helped limit Soviet buildups, but it wouldn't put any gas in the tanks. If Stalin had stayed in Moscow and died, it is conceivable that a successor might have brokered some kind of peace, had Hitler been smart enough to make a sensible offer. But in general, I stand by what I said: Germany bet all its petroleum reserves on a wild plunge into Russia, hoping to win the oil of the Caucasus - and failed. After that it was all downhill...
Besides, everyone who says "They should just have captured Moscow" makes it far easier than it was.
A frontal assault would have ended in a bloody street fight which would not be over in a week - we're talking about something more like Stalingrad. The original plan was to bypass and encircle Moscow first - which means a significant further push was necessary for the German army. The same army which had already supply problems with the frontline they reached.
Furthermore, once they were close to Moscow, the German army wasn't in the shape they were when starting Barbarossa - most divisions were not capable for fully offensive operations at this time. For such a further push a large, fresh army would have been necessary which simply wasn't available.
In the end, the whole operational plan was catastrophic anyway - kick the door in and the whole rotten construction will fall in. Except there was no plan in case that the Sovjetunion somehow didn't collapse.
A frontal assault would have ended in a bloody street fight which would not be over in a week - we're talking about something more like Stalingrad. The original plan was to bypass and encircle Moscow first - which means a significant further push was necessary for the German army. The same army which had already supply problems with the frontline they reached.
Furthermore, once they were close to Moscow, the German army wasn't in the shape they were when starting Barbarossa - most divisions were not capable for fully offensive operations at this time. For such a further push a large, fresh army would have been necessary which simply wasn't available.
In the end, the whole operational plan was catastrophic anyway - kick the door in and the whole rotten construction will fall in. Except there was no plan in case that the Sovjetunion somehow didn't collapse.
Didn't the Soviets draw their strongest armies to Moscow, precisely because they expected it to be the focus of the assault, thereby giving the Germans a huge element of surprise when the focus of the offensive tilted far more south
And I also heard that while the nazis certainly had irrational beliefs about eastern europeans, their harsh policies there was also to do that they had to voraciously plunder the resources of these nations to prop up the homeland and the war effort in general.
And I also heard that while the nazis certainly had irrational beliefs about eastern europeans, their harsh policies there was also to do that they had to voraciously plunder the resources of these nations to prop up the homeland and the war effort in general.