Lotzen Decision

[fr-rein]

In the end, the whole operational plan was catastrophic anyway - kick the door in and the whole rotten construction will fall in. Except there was no plan in case that the Sovjetunion somehow didn't collapse.

Operational plan was to destroy Red Army in invasion. And, frankly, they hot rid of 5 million enemy troops and awful lot of tanks, planes and such. They essentially destroyed what was Army in the 1941.

They didn't expect a few things however - larger amount of Soviet troops, inability to get rid of Red Army at once (so that in one moment there would be no opposing resistance, like in France after Dunkirk) due to them giving up land more than getting destroyed (and Kiev battle and a few episodes like it being mainly Stalin's mistake), supply issues in late 1941, etc. With landlease it got much worse - since Allied supplies allowed Soviets to suffer way less from a lot of critical problems (food issues, lack of radios and a lot of other things) and stand up to German Army much better, making the supposedly rotten structure far more durable.

 

[Cavalry]

Didn't the Soviets draw their strongest armies to Moscow, precisely because they expected it to be the focus of the assault, thereby giving the Germans a huge element of surprise when the focus of the offensive tilted far more south

And I also heard that while the nazis certainly had irrational beliefs about eastern europeans, their harsh policies there was also to do that they had to voraciously plunder the resources of these nations to prop up the homeland and the war effort in general.

Soviet initially expected German main attack on Kiev, that was the wheat source and industrial center, but German main attack was in the Center (West) and to Moscow. So German got huge advantage numbers to push in the Center, then Hitler turned to the South to encircle Kiev.

Some source said Stalin want to hold on Kiev despite Zhukov 's warning, because he want to convince the Americans that Soviet wouldn't collapse. Other said he sacrifice Kiev and the troops there to get more time (2 months) for Moscow.

 

[Premu]

And I also heard that while the nazis certainly had irrational beliefs about eastern europeans, their harsh policies there was also to do that they had to voraciously plunder the resources of these nations to prop up the homeland and the war effort in general.

This did definetly play a role - Hitler feared a repetition of 1918, in which a revolution might force an end of the war and a German defeat. For that purpose he wanted to plunder the occupied areas as much as possible to prevent any serious lack of food in Germany itself.

 

[Sunforged General]

The biggest reason why this is wrong is because the Soviets had huge formations In Kiev, ignoring them to rush Moscow would have left the southern German flank vulnerable to the Considerable Soviet Forces still in Kiev. This is exactly What Hitler feared, and why he took the time to encircle Kiev and destroy the forces there. Rushing Moscow could very well have opened the German army up to a huge defeat and having to retreat from most of their gains in Russia. At the very least, even if a Soviet counter attack from Kiev didnt succeed, it would still require the Germans redirecting resources from the Moscow push to defend against the Kiev attack, meaning Moscow likely still wouldn't Fall.

Another possibility is the Soviets dont do a counter attack from Kiev, and Rush those huge formations to defend Moscow. Either way, Moscow would not fall. An extra 600,000 Soviet troops and 28,419 guns and mortars defending Moscow would surely have made a huge difference. They at the very least could hold the Germans until the Siberian Armies reach Moscow to defend it.

David Glantz, an American military historian says " had Kiev not been taken before the Battle of Moscow, the entire operation would have ended in a disaster for the Germans."

 

[bz249]

The biggest reason why this is wrong is because the Soviets had huge formations In Kiev, ignoring them to rush Moscow would have left the southern German flank vulnerable to the Considerable Soviet Forces still in Kiev. This is exactly What Hitler feared, and why he took the time to encircle Kiev and destroy the forces there. Rushing Moscow could very well have opened the German army up to a huge defeat and having to retreat from most of their gains in Russia. At the very least, even if a Soviet counter attack from Kiev didnt succeed, it would still require the Germans redirecting resources from the Moscow push to defend against the Kiev attack, meaning Moscow likely still wouldn't Fall.

Another possibility is the Soviets dont do a counter attack from Kiev, and Rush those huge formations to defend Moscow. Either way, Moscow would not fall. An extra 600,000 Soviet troops and 28,419 guns and mortars defending Moscow would surely have made a huge difference. They at the very least could hold the Germans until the Siberian Armies reach Moscow to defend it.

David Glantz, an American military historian says " had Kiev not been taken before the Battle of Moscow, the entire operation would have ended in a disaster for the Germans."

Those Soviet formations were unable to prevent being encircled which much easier than mounting a counterattack while their flanks are threatened by Heeresgruppe Sud. If the Germans ignore the opportunity to encircle those troops than HGS just pushed them out from the Kiev area after a hard and bitter fight. Unless some genius orders a counterattack against HGM. In that case they are ill prepared to recieve the blow from HGS and Kiev falls easily with massive casualties for the Red Army.
The real thing is that Panzerarmee-s badly needed a rest and refit therefore any offensive is per se wrong.

 

[Sunforged General]

Those Soviet formations were unable to prevent being encircled which much easier than mounting a counterattack while their flanks are threatened by Heeresgruppe Sud. If the Germans ignore the opportunity to encircle those troops than HGS just pushed them out from the Kiev area after a hard and bitter fight. Unless some genius orders a counterattack against HGM. In that case they are ill prepared to recieve the blow from HGS and Kiev falls easily with massive casualties for the Red Army.
The real thing is that Panzerarmee-s badly needed a rest and refit therefore any offensive is per se wrong.

You are vastly underestimating what was destroyed at Kiev. If I remember correctly, at the time of the Final Soviet surrender of Kiev, the Germans captured more artillery pieces than the entire Wehrmacht had. Though I cant find the exact source for that, The battle does list 28,000 guns and mortars lost for the Soviets in Kiev, a figure rivaling the total amount of artillery and mortars the Germans had at the start of operation Barbarossa.

A force with that much firepower in such a concentrated area is very powerful. Not encircling them could be a fatal mistake.

 

[bz249]

You are vastly underestimating what was destroyed at Kiev. If I remember correctly, at the time of the Final Soviet surrender of Kiev, the Germans captured more artillery pieces than the entire Wehrmacht had. Though I cant find the exact source for that, The battle does list 28,000 guns and mortars lost for the Soviets in Kiev, a figure rivaling the total amount of guns and mortars the Germans had at the start of operation Barbarossa.

A force with that much firepower in such a concentrated area is very powerful. Not encircling them could be a fatal mistake.

Kiev was a major victory as it was... but those formations showed nothing remarkable in the defensive so i see no reason to give them somehow large offensive capabilities. They cannot shift their forces to counter the German attack that is telling on what they might have done.

 

[fr-rein]

Kiev was a major victory as it was... but those formations showed nothing remarkable in the defensive so i see no reason to give them somehow large offensive capabilities. They cannot shift their forces to counter the German attack that is telling on what they might have done.

They were ordered by Stalin to not give up Kiev and not fall back until Germans encircled them and it became too late to retreat or break out of encirclement. They didn't defend rationally due to such political orders, which is why Germans managed to destroy that entire army.

 

[Sunforged General]

Kiev was a major victory as it was... but those formations showed nothing remarkable in the defensive so i see no reason to give them somehow large offensive capabilities. They cannot shift their forces to counter the German attack that is telling on what they might have done.

Focusing on Moscow means leaving only relatively small German units to defend the Kiev sector. Assuming the Forces in Kiev were not very well organized, they would still have a good chance to break through smaller units using their extensive artillery and mortar firepower.

 

[bz249]

Focusing on Moscow means leaving only relatively small German units to defend the Kiev sector. Assuming the Forces in Kiev were not very well organized, they would still have a good chance to break through smaller units using their extensive artillery and mortar firepower.

They would have been envelopped because HGS is still there and would welcome the opportunity that Soviet formations facing the wrong direction.

 

[Sunforged General]

They would have been envelopped because HGS is still there and would welcome the opportunity that Soviet formations facing the wrong direction.

Well, both David Glantz, Historian, and Adolf Hitler, Supreme commander of the German army, both seem to disagree with you. Not to mention army group south had its own problems in other parts of Ukraine, including but not limited to the Siege of Sevastopol. Kiev was also a significant industrial center. There is no telling how much it could contribute to the Soviet war effort if left to continue production.

 

[George Parr]

They at the very least could hold the Germans until the Siberian Armies reach Moscow to defend it.

I dont disagree with your general point, but I had to comment on this one: the Siberians are nothing but a myth. There wasn't any particular influx of Siberian troops that turned the tide. The help came from freshly created units in the west, not troops from Siberia.

There were only about 30 divisions or so that were moved from or raised from Siberian troops in the whole of 1941. Most of these came in the summer months and where already destroyed by the time the attack was halted. The handful of Siberian units that actually were involved during the winter offensive were operating near Leningrad, not Moscow.

 

[Sunforged General]

I dont disagree with your general point, but I had to comment on this one: the Siberians are nothing but a myth. There wasn't any particular influx of Siberian troops that turned the tide. The help came from freshly created units in the west, not troops from Siberia.

There were only about 30 divisions or so that were moved from or raised from Siberian troops in the whole of 1941. Most of these came in the summer months and where already destroyed by the time the attack was halted. The handful of Siberian units that actually were involved during the winter offensive were operating near Leningrad, not Moscow.

I'm sure the majority of red army troops used in the offensive weren't from Siberia, but a significant portion were transferred from Siberia specifically for the counter offensive around Moscow. " Stalin transferred over 18 divisions, 1,700 tanks, and over 1,500 aircraft from Siberia and the Far East."-Goldman p. 177 If that 18 is included in the 30 divisions you mentioned, then it seems the majority did not arrive in Summer.

Thats from Wikipedia, but it lists its source, make what you will of it.

 

[yerm]

A change in focus to force the capture of Moscow is not going to help Germany, let alone get them over the sky high hump they need it to that let's them win (or hell, just not lose) the war.

Let's take the most favorable possible hypothetical here: Germany puts more effort towards Moscow, successfully takes the city in 1941, and also maintains the same success elsewhere as well. Kiev is still encircled. Their lines are all still as far up as historically, except one that goes a few dozen more miles and sacks the capital.

Germany still loses.

Let's go a step further and say that the rotten structure is actually, finally, shaken by this. Stalin is replaced by someone less useful. The allies support is diminished as they fear collapse or at least poor return on investment. The USSR has to fight with less national stability and less outside aid, and of course the loss of men and logistics we gave away above.

Germany STILL loses.

The only way they win here is to get to the black gold and get it pumping back home ASAP. We can throw them Moscow AND Leningrad, hell we can have them even shut down Archangel, it's still not enough without the oil. They can't maintain their war machine without it, they can't threaten the other allies, they still either struggle with massive partisan resistance or the loss of plunder. They have to either take and most importantly hold the oil, or get the USSR to fully collapse or surrender, and Moscow does neither.

So when you start budgeting for taking it by actually pulling troops and/or supplies towards it, away from other enterprises, it only gets worse.

 

[Kovax]

….and then it got far worse. The German forces at the front, tantalizingly close to Moscow, started running short on manpower, so to bolster the riflemen on the front lines, they pulled signal operators, mechanics, supply drivers, clerks, and other specialists from their duties and pushed them up to the front. The casualties among the previously non-combat personnel were as bad as with any other inexperienced troops, and the losses were irreplaceable in the short or medium term. You can train a raw recruit to shoot a rifle in a matter of weeks, but to train a mechanic or radio technician takes months, followed by years of experience to reach the level of proficiency needed for a lot of the work. The Heer never recovered, and many of the former veteran units were effectively reduced to green status.

 

[Henry IX]

I feel the need to point out that there was fundamentally no way for German forces to capture Moscow in 1941. The forces that got 'close' to Moscow in 1941 were all advanced forces, often with minimal armour support, due to a lack of fuel. At the point of the Soviet counter-attack at Moscow many of the Panzer units were strung out over 100km, due to lack of fuel to move the divisions en-mass. The infantry were even further behind.

Concentrating extra forces on the Moscow axis would not improve the lack of supplies and fuel that crippled the advance. The problem was that there was limited rail capacity, of the wrong gauge, with numerous river bridges down, too long distances between water and coal points (Soviet trains had larger coal and water capacity than German) with the final railway depot points too far behind the front lines. Finally the Russian roads were very poor and could not be effectively used as a replacement for rail transport, even if the Germans concentrated their logistical efforts on one sector.

The 'Siberian' units that reinvigorated the Soviets, whilst not actually Siberian, were often pre-war formations with their full 1940 ToE allocations. Each of these formations had more organic firepower than an entire army level formation formed in 1941. They had a notable impact thanks to their superior training (as in they were actually trained and not militia) and equipment (including proper winter gear). The formations smashed at Kiev were of similar quality to those that spearheaded the Moscow counter-attack and could have been used to support the defence of Moscow.

 

[Cavalry]

It is interesting to know that Stalin had the same kind of decision to eliminate German troops on the North flank before go straight to Berlin!

The Soviet Southern troops was the most successful defenders on all Soviet Fronts, until they was encircled and destroyed in Kiev.