Did they really withhold tanks on D-Day because Hitler was sleeping?

[Kovax]

You don't need to bomb a tank to kill it. The top armor of a tank is surprisingly thin, and a .50 caliber machinegun firing down at a steep angle could pierce most WWII tanks. The P-47 could damage tanks and kill crewmen with its guns, although putting one permanently out of action would be less likely. What it could do to the supporting column of soft-skinned vehicles behind the tanks was absolutely horrifying.

 

[bz249]

You don't need to bomb a tank to kill it. The top armor of a tank is surprisingly thin, and a .50 caliber machinegun firing down at a steep angle could pierce most WWII tanks. The P-47 could damage tanks and kill crewmen with its guns, although putting one permanently out of action would be less likely. What it could do to the supporting column of soft-skinned vehicles behind the tanks was absolutely horrifying.

The roof armor is also 10 mm of the PzIV... so accidents may happen, but this should be fine against anything up to 20 mm at reasonable combat situations.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Air attacks might be not that effective for direct tank kills - a tank needs a direct hit to be destroyed after all, and it is a pretty small target for a bomber - but it might look differently for the support elements. Tank divisions consisted of not only tanks, but had also a lot of trucks for transporting infantry, supplies or towing guns. To destroy a truck and kill those inside a near miss can be good enough. These support troops are also vulnerable to strafing machine gun fire. So to actually move a tank division, it needs to be protected against air attacks, or you will end up with only tanks arriving at the battle who are actually pretty vulnerable on their own.

This goes without saying.

 

[Avernite]

In regards to airpower versus tanks, it's also important to remember that those loss figures take into account defensive measures - if tanks don't travel in easily-hit columns because of airpower, and therefore do not get slaughtered, it doesn't prove that aircraft can't slaughter slow-moving easily-hit tank columns.

 

[Narwhal]

It is also worth checking the actual hits during the sinking of the Yamato... the best pilots of WW2 against a battleship sized target and like a dozen of hits and a similar amounts of near misses. Now compare this with hitting a tank.

How many AA guns on a tank though ?

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

How many AA guns on a tank though ?

Very few in this case, the German divisions been stationed badly regarding Command authority and got stripped of most of their AA.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

When you talk about tactical air strike ripping up a column; hitting a tank is very, very hard using unguided rockets and bombs. But there is more than one way to skin a cat.

The strike scatters infantry, craters the road, possibly disables armor, and shreds thin skin mechanized and motorized transport.

All that matters is the afv’s are delayed or damaged, if they can’t fight it is as good as a kill for today’s needs.

 

[Acheron]

I thought the Germans kept saving up reserves for the "real" Calais landing of the allies, right up to the moment the allies broke out of Normandy?

 

[bz249]

I thought the Germans kept saving up reserves for the "real" Calais landing of the allies, right up to the moment the allies broke out of Normandy?

Because that's what a German general would have done. Calais is the key chokepoint. By controlling Calais you can drive to the heart of the German industry... or turn right and entrap most of the German formations in France. It is a knockout blow. However winning on points was ok for the Allies, thus they did not need to take any risky stuff.

 

[Henry IX]

While we shouldn't underestimate the moral effect brought on by air attacks, actual destruction of tanks by fighter bombers was minimal. Only a few percent of the total numbers lost. The Raf came to this conclusion researching the effect of air attacks in the aftermath of the battle of the falaise pocket.

Somewhat... Allied airpower caused a very small percentage of losses from German armour and had a very bad ratio of missions : kills, however, this is largely due to the measures the Germans took to prevent this. German airpower was critical in destroying both Soviet and French armoured formations in 1940-41 and airpower could be very effective at engaging and destroying armour if poorly deployed.

Allied airpower forced German commanders to two main things - move at night (reducing the first great strength of armour, mobility) and disperse their armour, removing the critical mass at the schwerpunkt that had been such a critical factor in the German operations of early to mid war. I think that even if German armour was available close to the breaches, the fact it could not be effectively and rapidly massed would have more or less doomed any counter-attack.

It is also worth noting that Allied planning assumed a much worse case scenario than occurred, with assumptions of 30% casualties in the first wave. In other words, Omaha beach was considered to be a good outcome by allied planners. Given the significant margin of success the Allies enjoyed in Neptune I cannot see how the arrival of a few platoons of tanks could have changed the outcomes in a significant way. One of the reasons for attacking five beaches was to give some redundancy to the plan - even if some of the landings were failures due to strong defences or counter-attacks there would still have been a successful landing.

A massive counter attack by several panzer divisions might have crushed the beachhead but the Germans:
1. Didn't have a couple of spare panzer divisions
2. The ones they had were in the wrong place (Calais)
3. Even if they had been there they would have been too dispersed and too slow to respond, due to Allied airpower, to crush all of the beaches.

As a side note, both Stalin and Hitler liked to have armoured reserves that they had sole control over, and in both cases this had significant negative impacts on the functioning of their armed forces.

 

[Easy-Kill]

A massive counter attack by several panzer divisions might have crushed the beachhead but the Germans:
1. Didn't have a couple of spare panzer divisions
2. The ones they had were in the wrong place (Calais)
3. Even if they had been there they would have been too dispersed and too slow to respond, due to Allied airpower, to crush all of the beaches.

As a side note, both Stalin and Hitler liked to have armoured reserves that they had sole control over, and in both cases this had significant negative impacts on the functioning of their armed forces.

I would add an additional point that the German forces would have been forced to attack over the Orne canal area and then form up on the other side. While the British were in a weakened position, all they need to do is to disrupt the crossing and prevent the Gean forces from forming up. If they do manage to force a crossing, this puts them in danger of a counter attack from the British airborne Division there. The other alternative is to transit around and through Caen - one of the reasons that the British were aiming to capture Caen on the first day was to prevent this. While that wasn't acheived, there was sufficient strength there to prevent them from effectively forming up (and a vast array of naval artillery to bring to bear on then).

As for Hitler keeping his personal control over the reserves, we often view that with hindsight. However, in 1942 Germany had destroyed the European powers and destroyed Russia's armies. Hitler had taken the ideas of Brilliant men and convinced both himself and others that they were his ideas. He and the German high command had convinced themselves of his absolute prowess, this allowing him to have absolute command over the mobile reserves would have been a logical point. It is only after 75 years do we really appreciate what actually happened and how Hitler wasn't really the genius he made out to be.

 

[Pyoro]

It is only after 75 years do we really appreciate what actually happened and how Hitler wasn't really the genius he made out to be.

That's an exaggeration. After the war, most Generals seemed to have quite quickly and readily decided that his interference was the sole reason they lost (and for everything else they needed someone to blame for).

 

[Easy-Kill]

That's an exaggeration. After the war, most Generals seemed to have quite quickly and readily decided that his interference was the sole reason they lost (and for everything else they needed someone to blame for).

If it is such an exaggeration, why then is there a thread discussing whether Hitler really held tanks back on D-Day.

Yes the German generals were quick to blame Hitler. The vast majority of them were trying to absolve themselves from guilt after having murdered their way across Eastern Europe. Further, it is only with the opening of the archives and the vast volume of primary research which accompanied this in the early 00's that a truer picture of events became apparent.

 

[Cavalry]

The more well know answer is Germans hold tanks because they think Normandy is just a diversify, the main landing would be at Calaise.

The more interesting question is who on the Ally side is sleeping and withhold D Day for more than 1 year. After D Day they found it is too easy!

 

[Acheron]

That's an exaggeration. After the war, most Generals seemed to have quite quickly and readily decided that his interference was the sole reason they lost (and for everything else they needed someone to blame for).

Yes the German generals were quick to blame Hitler. The vast majority of them were trying to absolve themselves from guilt after having murdered their way across Eastern Europe. Further, it is only with the opening of the archives and the vast volume of primary research which accompanied this in the early 00's that a truer picture of events became apparent.

Don't military historians also point to Kursk as a battle that was mostly planned and conducted by the German generals with minimum interference by Hitler, yet still a failure?

The more interesting question is who on the Ally side is sleeping and withhold D Day for more than 1 year. After D Day they found it is too easy!

AFAIK, the 1942 Dieppe raid convinced the allies that an amphibious landing would be a most hazardous undertaking. Rumors persist, that Churchill was quite happy with the failure, since it allowed him to promote his "soft-underbelly" strategy of attacking Germany via southern Europe. Incidentally, does anyone know if Churchill's geography teacher happened to be a German spy?

 

[Easy-Kill]

Don't military historians also point to Kursk as a battle that was mostly planned and conducted by the German generals with minimum interference by Hitler, yet still a failure?

It isn't something that I have read about explicitly, but at this time Hitler was both supreme commander of the German Military and commander in chief of the German Army. This was the major strategic offensive of 1943 and I would have been surprised if Hitler had not been involved.

the 1942 Dieppe raid convinced the allies that an amphibious landing would be a most hazardous undertaking. Rumors persist, that Churchill was quite happy with the failure, since it allowed him to promote his "soft-underbelly" strategy of attacking Germany via southern Europe. Incidentally, does anyone know if Churchill's geography teacher happened to be a German spy?

Andrew Roberts covers the topic of 1943 Vs 1944 in his book 'Masters and commanders' in a fair amount of detail. The problem was mostly one of landing craft and whether it was important to try to knock Italy out of the war in 1943 or not. I found it a very interesting read about the evolving Anglo-American relationship in ww2 and would recommend.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Actually regarding Kursk it was Hitler who delayed it and most Generals advocating for a earlier date.

 

[Acheron]

Actually regarding Kursk it was Hitler who delayed it and most Generals advocating for a earlier date.

Read that, too, waiting for current batch of Wunderwaffen to arrive, the Panthers and Ferdinands/Elefants. Still, wasn't the battle plan the generals doing, namely attacking the flanks of the salient, despite overwhelming evidence that this attack would lack the element of surprise?

 

[Cavalry]

Read that, too, waiting for current batch of Wunderwaffen to arrive, the Panthers and Ferdinands/Elefants. Still, wasn't the battle plan the generals doing, namely attacking the flanks of the salient, despite overwhelming evidence that this attack would lack the element of surprise?

I read somewhere that Model reported on Red Army increased prepared defense and called for a stop, but Hitler want a victory attack for political reason to get support from his allies, and many other German generals, including Manstein, support the attack.

 

[cpreston5]

I always figured that Hitler's delay of Citadel was a sign of his lack of confidence. I'm fairly sure it was Kursk he was speaking about when he said "the whole idea makes my stomach turn"?

I don't think his delays made a huge difference anyway, since the Germans were painfully uninformed of the Red Army build-up in any case. It's hard to criticise Hitler for allowing the Soviets to build-up more forces, when his own intelligence couldn't even accurately track that build-up of forces.