In Russian historiography, the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940, or, as it is called in the West, the Winter War, was for many years virtually forgotten. This was facilitated by its not too successful results, and the peculiar “political correctness” practiced in our country. The official Soviet propaganda was more afraid than any other "friend" to offend, and Finland, after the Great Patriotic War, was considered an ally of the USSR.
Over the past 15 years, the situation has radically changed. Contrary to the well-known words of A.T. Tvardovsky about the “indiscreet war” today this war is very “famous”. One after another, books dedicated to her go out, not to mention the many articles in various magazines and collections. Here are just a "celebrity" this is very peculiar. The authors, who have exposed the Soviet "evil empire" as their profession, cite in their publications an absolutely fantastic ratio of our and Finnish losses. Any reasonable reasons for the actions of the USSR are completely denied:
“And under what conditions did this useless and very unpopular war among the people break out? First and foremost, it was not an objective necessity. It was Stalin’s personal whim, caused by unclear reasons. ”
Of course! What could be the logic of the atrocities of the "criminal Stalinist regime"? Is it any wonder that many of our compatriots today are sincerely convinced that the Soviet Union lost this war?
Before proceeding with the analysis of the events of the Winter War, one should recall, at least in brief, the history of Russian-Finnish relations.
State from the royal test tube
As you know, Finnish tribes that never had their own statehood were in the XII-XIV centuries. gradually conquered by Sweden. Under the rule of the Swedes, Finland had neither administrative, nor even cultural autonomy. The official language was Swedish. This language was spoken by the nobility and the entire educated layer of society, it was taught, books were printed. Finnish was considered the language of commoners.
According to the Friedrichsham Peace Treaty, signed on September 5 (17), 1809, which concluded the last Russo-Swedish war, the whole territory of Finland was ceded to Russia [364]. For more than 100 years of being in the Russian Empire from the former Swedish province of Finland, through the efforts of unreasonable Russian monarchs, it has actually turned into an autonomous state with all its inherent attributes. The Grand Duchy of Finland received its own authorities, a monetary unit, its army, mail, customs. The official language remained Swedish, and since 1863 the Finnish language acquired the same status. All posts in the administration, with the exception of the governor-general, were held by local natives. The taxes collected in the Grand Duchy were spent exclusively on the needs of the region. The authorities of the empire tried not to interfere in Finnish affairs. As one of the deputies of the People’s Party of Sweden figuratively remarked in the 1880s: “The little Finnish lion, having fallen on the wide chest of the Russian eagle, has grown so strong that we, leaving it in the form of a frail lion cub, do not recognize our former vassal.”
No policy of Russification was observed. Migration to the Grand Duchy of the Russian population was actually banned. Moreover, Russians living in Finland were in an unequal position compared to the natives. Thus, the Finns should not complain about national oppression in the “prison of peoples”.
To crown it all, on December 11 (23), 1811, the Vyborg province was transferred to the Grand Duchy, which included lands that were transferred to Russia under peace treaties of 1721 and 1743. As a result, the administrative border of Finland came close to St. Petersburg.
Of course, in return for gratitude, the local nationalist elite raised and nurtured with the connivance of the then Russian authorities wanted independence. After the revolution began in Russia, her dream came true. On November 23 (December 6), 1917, the Sejm proclaimed Finland an independent state. On December 18 (31), 1917, the independence of Finland was recognized by the Soviet government.
On the night of January 15 (28), 1918, a revolution began in the former Grand Duchy, which soon grew into a civil war. White called for the help of German interventionists. On April 3, 1918, German troops landed on the Hanko Peninsula - the so-called “Baltic Division” of 12,000 men under the command of General von der Goltz. Another German detachment of 3 thousand people landed on April 7 near the city of Lovisy. With their help, the White Finns managed to defeat the Reds. On April 14, German troops occupied Helsinki, on April 29, Vyborg fell. In early May, the war ended.
Winners unleashed mass terror. 8.3 thousand people were executed, about 12 thousand died in concentration camps in the summer of 1918. The total number of people thrown into prisons and concentration camps reached 90 thousand. For comparison: in the course of hostilities, white lost 3,178 people, red - 3,463.
In addition to supporters of the Reds, the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Finland were destroyed. As it was said on this occasion, in a note signed by the Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs G.V. Chicherin to the German Ambassador Count V. Mirbach of May 13, 1918, “there was a real extermination of the Russian population without any difference, old people, women and children, officers, students and in general, all Russians. ”
Fearing that the newly minted "independent state" might get out of their control, the German masters categorically demanded that a monarchy with a German prince be established there. On October 9, 1918, the Sejm elected King Kaiser Wilhelm II, Prince Frederick Karl of Hesse, the king of Finland. Alas, this loyal impulse was lost in vain, because a month later Germany lost the First World War and thus the German king on the Finnish throne became completely inappropriate.
Not satisfied with the separation from Russia, the authorities of the newly-minted state tried to snatch a piece in the Russian unrest. On February 23, 1918, the Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, General K. G. Mannerheim, declared that "he would not put his sword into the scabbard until it was liberated from the Bolsheviks East Karelia." On March 15, Mannerheim approved the so-called "Wallenius Plan", which envisaged the seizure of Russian territory to the line White Sea - Lake Onega - Svir River - Lake Ladoga. At the same time, the region of Pechengi and the Kola Peninsula also departed for Finland, and Petrograd was to receive the status of a “free city” like Danzig. On the same day, the Finnish Commander-in-Chief ordered the expeditionary detachments of volunteers to come forward to conquer East Karelia. On May 15, 1918, the Finnish government declared war on Soviet Russia. Nevertheless, thanks to the intervention of Germany, which concluded the Peace of Brest with the RSFSR, until the autumn of 1918 the Finns actually did not conduct military operations.
The situation changed after the defeat of Germany in the 1st World War. On October 15, 1918, Finnish troops occupied the Rebolsky volost belonging to the RSFSR. In January 1919, the neighboring Porosozersky volost was captured.
In April 1919, the so-called Olonets Volunteer Army went on the offensive. Having captured part of South Karelia, including the city of Olonets, its units approached the capital of Karelia, Petrozavodsk. However, during the Vidlitz operation June 27 - July 8, Finnish troops were defeated and driven back from Soviet territory. In the fall of 1919, Finnish troops again launched an attack on Petrozavodsk, but on September 26-27 they were driven back during the Lizhema operation.
Finally, after the Red Army knocked out the Finnish armed forces from the territory of Karelia on July 14-21, 1920, with the exception of the Rebolsky and Porosozersky volosts, the Finnish government agreed to negotiations. On October 14 of that year, the St. George Treaty was concluded, according to which the region of Pechengi (Petsamo), which never belonged to it, was transferred to Finland.
Nevertheless, in Helsinki they did not intend at all to abandon plans to create "Great Finland". Taking advantage of the fact that in the protocol to the Yuryev treaty the Soviet government undertook to not contain troops on the territory of the Rebolsky and Porosozersky volosts for two years, with the exception of the border and customs guards, the Finnish leadership again tried to solve the Karelian issue by force. In October 1921, an underground "provisional Karelian Committee" was created on the territory of the Tungud volost, which began the formation of kulak "forest detachments" and gave a signal for the invasion of the White Finnish troops. From the Finns and Karelians, the Rebol battalion was formed under the command of Major Paavo Talvela. Soon, the Talvela battalion captured Rebola and Poros Lake. By the end of December, Belofin units, numbering 5-6 thousand people, advanced to the line Kestenga - Suomusalmi - Rutozero - Padany - Poros Lake.
To repulse the invasion, by the end of December, the Soviet authorities concentrated 8.5 thousand people, 166 machine guns, 22 guns in Karelia. By early January 1922, Soviet troops occupied Poros Lake on the southern flank of the front, Rebola and Kimas Lake on the central section of the front, defeating the main Finnish group. On January 25, the northern group took control of Kestenga and Kokisalma, and in early February 1922, together with the central group, it took over the military-political administrative center of the Karelian Committee - the city of Ukhta. By mid-February, the territory of Karelia was completely liberated. February 17, 1922 hostilities ceased.
Cool world
The events of 1921-1922 in Karelia deserve special attention in connection with the constant confusion of the accusers of the Soviet "evil empire": they say, is little Finland capable of threatening huge Russia? It turns out that the Finnish threat remained quite real. As the commander of the Belofin volunteers Talvela stated after a failed Karelian campaign: “I was convinced that it was possible to liberate Karelia from Russia (the contemptuous name of the Russians. - IP) only by taking it. For the liberation of Karelia, new bloodshed will be required. But there is no need to try to do it with small forces anymore, a real army is needed. ” This statement was not just the personal opinion of one of the Finnish “field commanders”, it reflected the position of the influential circles that determined the politics of the then Finland.
Of course, Helsinki was well aware that Russia alone could not be defeated by them. Therefore, they followed the principle formulated by the first Finnish prime minister, Per Ewind Svinhuvud: "Any enemy of Russia should always be a friend of Finland." Adhering to this simple rule, the Finnish leadership was ready to enter into an alliance with anyone. For example, with Japan. When Soviet-Japanese relations sharply escalated in 1933, Japanese officers were frequented in Finland. Some of them stayed there for 2-3 months, undergoing an internship in the Finnish army. A new Charge d'Affaires of Japan in Finland was appointed, "an active and apparently influential figure, cousin of a foreign minister’s comrade (that is, deputy. - I.P.) and nephew of the chairman of the board of the Manchu railway." If before that the Japanese had managed one military attaché with their place of residence in Riga throughout the Baltic States and Finland, now a separate attache was sent to Helsinki.
As noted in the letter of the Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR B.S. Stomonyakov to the Chargé d'Affaires of the USSR in Finland N.G. Pozdnyakov dated June 5, 1934: “It is extremely significant that the Finnish press treats negatively both the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations, so and the rapprochement between the USSR and France. The same is the attitude of Poland. These two countries are afraid of strengthening the power and international significance of the USSR, because their leading circles rely on the possibility of making profit at the expense of the USSR in the event of an attack on it by Japan or in case of intervention against the USSR in general. ”
From a letter from Stomonyakov to the Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Poland, J.Kh. Davtyan dated July 4, 1934: “For her (Finland. - I.P.) political orientation, the completely accurate information we received was typical that when he was in Geneva, the Finnish Foreign Minister Haxel probed the ground regarding the prospects of our military clash with Japan. Moreover, in confidential conversations, Haxel did not hide the fact that Finland is guided by our defeat in this war. ”
However, since the calculations for the war between the Soviet Union and Japan did not materialize, the Finnish authorities had to back down. In a telegram from the USSR Plenipotentiary Envoy to Finland, B.E. Stein, to the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of September 12, 1934, it was reported: “Irye-Koskinen, who had just visited me (Finnish envoy to Moscow. - IP), recognized that the desire to achieve“ liberation ”of Karelia and Ingermanland during a possible conflict between us and Japan has become a universal opinion in Finland. He acknowledged the correctness of all my arguments. According to him, the Finnish government is already preoccupied with this wave of unprecedented propaganda against the USSR and even discussed the project to close the Karelian academic union. ”
The organization in question in Russian-language literature is usually referred to as the Karelian Academic Society. It was created in 1922 by students participating in the campaign in Soviet Karelia and set as its goal the creation of “Great Finland” by seizing Soviet territories. It is clear that it was impossible to close such a useful society: "This measure met resistance from the Minister of the Interior, who himself is a member of this union."
When on February 27, 1935, the envoy of Finland to the USSR A.S. Iryo-Koskinen, in an interview with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs M.M. Litvinov, complained that the volume of Soviet purchases in Finland was too small and there was not even a trade agreement between our countries, in response he was rightly noted:
“In no country is the press waging a campaign as systematically hostile to us as in Finland. No neighboring country has such open propaganda for an attack on the USSR and the seizure of its territory, as in Finland. This propaganda is carried out in Finland by a number of organizations, especially the so-called Karelian academic society, which includes very influential people and almost a member of the government represented by the Minister of Internal Affairs Pukhak. The White Guard newspaper "Klich" even calls for terrorist acts. I’m not saying that the military people of distant Japan made Finland a favorite place of tourism. ”
However, there was nothing unnatural in the Finnish-Japanese alliance. Even during the war of 1904-1905, in an effort to undermine the Russian empire from the inside, Japanese intelligence established contacts with Connie Zilliakus, the leader of the Finnish “active resistance” party who lived in exile. An old-style Swiss rifle was purchased with Tokyo money. However, the attempt to deliver them to Finland ended in failure. The steamer John Crafton, hired for this purpose, on August 26, 1905, ran aground in the skerries of Larsmo north of Jacobstadt. Over the next day, the team unloaded part of their cargo on a neighboring island, and then, after blowing up the ship, left it. As a result, rifles and ammunition intended for revolutionaries partially died, and partially fell into the hands of the tsarist authorities. As for the party of active resistance, its members (usually called "activists") subsequently formed the backbone of the Mannerheim army during the Civil War, and then ended up in the front ranks of the guardians of the Great Finland cause.
But back in the 1930s. The hostility of the Finnish leadership towards our country was not a secret for foreign diplomats either. Thus, the Polish envoy to Helsinki F. Harvat reported to Warsaw that Finland’s policy is characterized by “aggressiveness against Russia ... Finland’s position in the USSR is dominated by the question of Karelia joining Finland”. Harvat called Finland "the most belligerent state in Europe." The Latvian envoy to Finland, in turn, wrote that “in the minds of Finnish activists ... the Karelian question is deeply rooted. These circles are looking forward to a conflict between Russia and any great power, formerly with Poland, and now with Germany or Japan, in order to implement its program. This movement ... may someday serve as a spark, from which the powder keg ignites. ” An American military attache in the USSR, Colonel F. Feymonville, reported to Washington on September 23, 1937: "The most pressing military problem of the Soviet Union is preparation for repelling the simultaneous attack of Japan in the East and Germany together with Finland in the West."
Hostility towards the USSR was reinforced by concrete deeds. On the Soviet border, the Finnish authorities constantly organized all kinds of provocations on earth, in heaven and at sea.
So, on October 7, 1936 at 12:00 on the Karelian Isthmus in the area of border pillar No. 162, the Soviet border guard commander of the detachment Spirin, who was making a round of the border, was seriously wounded by a shot from the Finnish side and soon died. Before his death, he said that the persons who shot him were in military clothing of a standard form in Finland. Negotiations on the settlement of this incident ended only in November 1937. Initially, the Finnish authorities tried to deny their involvement in the murder, but then they were forced to admit their guilt and, albeit with delays, to pay compensation to the family of the victim.
On October 27, 1936, at 10 a.m., two shots from the Finnish side were fired upon by the chairman of the collective farm, Vaida-Guba Kolichmanen. On October 29, at 13:30, from the Finnish side, two Finnish border guards approached the bank of the Sestra River, in the area of border post No. 73. One of them hid behind a tree, and the other from his knee began to aim with a rifle at the Red Army men Mashina and Martynova, who cleared the clearing on Soviet territory. The Red Army soldiers, noticing the actions of the Finnish border guards, lay down on the ground, after which the Finns left in the direction of border post No. 74. On October 30, at 5 p.m., Finnish border guards fired at a residential building and a pigsty located on the northern outskirts of Waida Guba with four rifle shots. In a memo to the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transmitted by the Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland Payula to Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Finland A.A. Austrin on November 10, 1936 in response to the Soviet protest, all these cases of shooting were denied.
On December 9, 1936, at 3 p.m., at a section of the Petrozavodsk border guard detachment in the area of border guards No. 439-440, which is opposite the village of Mezilamba, from the territory of Finland, two automatic fire shots were fired at our guard along with our guard. The bullet flew directly near the head of the border guard Galyuk. After the shot, a conversation was heard between two men in Finnish. On December 12, a shot was fired at Finland’s border guard detachment at the Mainil outpost of the Sestretski border detachment in the area of border sign No. 66 from Finland. The bullet fell on Soviet territory.
For a change, the Finnish authorities recognized these shelling facts, explaining that in the first case, “a Finnish peasant shot at a distance of 300 m from the border,” moreover, “along the border, not in the direction of the border,” and in the second “400 m from the border a Finnish border guard soldier shot a bird. ”
On December 17, 1937, at 12:30 p.m., our border detachment of the Ternavolok outpost of the Kalevala border detachment was fired at by border guard No. 690 from two Finnish soldiers located on Finnish territory near the border. Bullets flew over the heads of our border guards.
On January 21, 1938 at 9:20 on the sixth outpost section of the Sestroretsky district at border post No. 191, two Finnish border guards violated the Soviet border. When our detachment attempted to detain violators, the latter put up armed resistance. As a result of the shootout, one of the Finnish border guards was seriously injured.
Provocations were also organized in the air. So, in a conversation with Finnish Foreign Minister Holsti on June 7, 1937, Plenipotentiary of the USSR in Finland E.A. Asmus complained about “repeated flights by the Finnish planes of the Soviet border”.
The complaint had a peculiar effect, because three weeks later, on June 29, 1937, at 15 o’clock the Finnish plane violated our border near the village of Sona. Having flown over the border sign No. 384 on the southeast of Olonets, in 16 minutes the intruder flew back to Finland in the same area.
On July 9, 1938, the Finnish single-engine biplane violated the USSR border in the area of border post No. 699. Flying at an altitude of 1,500 m, the plane went deeper into the USSR for 45 km, flying about 85 km parallel to the border line across the USSR, and then returned to Finland in the area of border post No. 728.
This time the Finns acknowledged the violation. As V.K. Derevyansky, USSR envoy to Finland, reported to Moscow: “On July 20, he was invited to negotiate with [temporarily] and [fulfilling] the [commitment] of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Woyonmaa, who informed me that he should state with regret, that the fact of violation of the Soviet border by the Finnish plane, described in our note, is true. With the receipt of our note, the competent authorities of Finland immediately launched an investigation and found that this sad incident occurred as a result of the pilot losing orientation. ”
The water borders of our country were not ignored. As Deputy People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs B.S. Stomonyakov, Envoy of the USSR in Finland, E.A. Asmus informed in a telegram dated April 10, 1936, from February to April 1936, our territorial waters in the Gulf of Finland were violated nine times, while 68 people were detained .
In turn, in a letter to the USSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs dated July 8, 1937, Asmus reported: “The fishing of Finnish fishermen in Soviet territorial waters and their detention by our border guards not only did not decrease, but they took on a wider scale. During the winter of 1936/37, at least 75 Finnish fishermen were detained, some of them repeatedly. The situation in the Gulf of Finland shows that Finland has not taken measures to stop the illegal crossing of territorial waters by fishermen. There is no doubt that these crossings are also used for reconnaissance purposes. ”
On May 16, 1938, at 11:57 a motor boat No. 38 belonging to the Finnish citizen Alexander Peltanen was detained in the waters of the USSR in Lake Ladoga due to a violation by the said citizen of the fishing rules provided for by the Soviet-Finnish Convention.
On July 19, 1938, the Finnish hydrographic vessel Ayristo and the border boat AB-55, accompanying it, were detained in our waters. Both ships plunged into Soviet territorial waters by 1.5 miles.
Cooperation with the Germans
Of particular concern to the USSR were Finnish-German contacts. Remembering to whom they owe their “independence”, Finnish nationalists did not tire of showing solidarity with their benefactors. So, when during the civil war in Spain on May 31, 1937, the German “pocket battleship” “Deutschland” and 4 destroyers fired at the Republican-controlled city of Almeria, the Uusi Suomi newspaper devoted two special issues to this event. On the central streets of Helsinki, students celebrating graduation on that day were greeted by telegrams about German actions shouting "Hurray."
However, the Finns were driven not only by gratitude for the affairs of the past days. Fruitful cooperation with the Germans continued in the future.
After the defeat in World War I, Germany, bound by the limitations of the Versailles Treaty, withdrew part of its military industry abroad. So, to preserve and develop the scientific and technological potential in the construction of submarines in July 1922 in The Hague, the design bureau of the IVS (Ingenieurs kantoor voor scheepsbouw) was founded. Formally, being a private company, in fact it belonged to the German Navy. About 30 German engineers and designers worked at the enterprise in order to conspire from the naval service.
In accordance with the Treaty of Versailles, Germany could not have a submarine fleet. However, no one forbade German designers to build submarines for friendly Finland. In 1930, the IVS began developing the project, and 1.5 million Reichsmarks were released from the German budget for this purpose. Submarines built (Vetikhinen, Vesikhiishi and Iku-Turso) after tests conducted by German crews became part of the Finnish fleet. These submarines became prototypes for German boats of the II series U-1 - U-24. When designing boats for Finland, German designers made a technological breakthrough by creating a ship consisting of the maximum number of typical units and parts. This was the first step towards the serial production of submarines.
In exchange for deliveries of copper and nickel, the Finns received 20-mm anti-aircraft guns and shells from the Germans, agreed on the purchase of combat aircraft, exchanged visits between senior generals and officers, and in August 1937 even hosted a squadron of 11 German submarines.
With the consent of Finnish intelligence in Finland, in mid-1939, the German intelligence and counterintelligence agency Krigsorganizatsion Finland was established, tentatively called the “Cellarius Bureau”. His main task was to conduct intelligence work against the Soviet Union, in particular, collecting data on the Baltic Fleet, parts of the Leningrad Military District and Leningrad industry. Abwehr chief Admiral V. Kanaris and his closest assistants, Lieutenant General G. Pickenbrock and F. Bentiveni, have repeatedly met in Finland and Germany with Finnish intelligence leaders Colonels Svenson and Melander, exchanged information about the USSR and developed joint plans.
“I am sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province”
So, by the end of the 1930s, there was a clearly unfriendly state near the northwestern borders of the Soviet Union. It is very significant that even before the start of the Soviet-Finnish War of 1939-1940. The blue swastika was an identification mark of the Finnish Air Force and tank forces. Those who claim that it was Stalin who, by his actions, pushed Finland to the Nazi camp, prefer not to recall this. As well as about why the peace-loving Suomi needed a network of military airfields built by the beginning of 1939 with the help of German specialists, capable of receiving 10 times more aircraft than there were in the Finnish air force. However, in Helsinki they were ready to fight against us both in an alliance with Germany and Japan, and in alliance with England and France.
Seeing the approach of a new world conflict, the leadership of the USSR sought to secure the border near the country's second largest and most important city. Back in March 1939, Soviet diplomacy sensed the issue of transferring or leasing a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland, but in Helsinki they refused categorically.
With the outbreak of World War II, the needs of our defense increased significantly. In order not to give the fleet a potential adversary, whether Germany or Western democracies, to break through to Kronstadt, and then to Leningrad, it was necessary to block the waters of the Gulf of Finland with artillery fire from both banks. This problem was effectively solved by the creation of two defensive lines. Firstly, directly on the approaches to Kronstadt. In pre-revolutionary times, the entrance to the so-called Markizov puddle was covered from the south by Fort Krasnaya Gorka, and from the north by Fort Ino. Ino now belonged to Finland. It made sense to organize the far line of defense at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland, having received suitable bases on the northern and southern coasts for this. In addition, it was necessary to push the border on land, where it passed only 32 km from Leningrad, making it possible to fire long-range artillery.
On September 28, 1939, a mutual assistance agreement was concluded between the USSR and Estonia, according to which Soviet troops of 25 thousand troops were sent to the territory of this small but proud republic. The Soviet Union was given the right to deploy garrisons and build naval bases in Paldiski and Haapsalu, as well as on the islands of Ezel (Saaremaa) and Dago (Hiiumaa).
On October 12, Soviet-Finnish negotiations began in Moscow. The Soviet side proposed concluding a local agreement on mutual assistance in the joint defense of the Gulf of Finland. Then the conversation touched upon the need to have a military base on the coast of Finland, in connection with which Hanko Peninsula was mentioned as a possible place for its deployment. In addition, Finland was called upon to cede its part of the Rybachy Peninsula, a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland and move the border on the Karelian Isthmus. As compensation, the Soviet Union offered much larger areas of East Karelia. However, the Finnish representatives categorically rejected the idea of concluding an agreement on mutual assistance, and regarding the territorial changes they said that Finland could not refuse the inviolability of its territory.
On October 14, negotiations continued. The Soviet position remained unchanged. As Stalin said: “We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the border line would be seventy kilometers. These are our minimum requirements, and you should not think that we will reduce them. “We cannot move Leningrad, so the border line must be moved.”
In response, the head of the Finnish delegation, Y. Paasikivi, said that he should consult with the government. Then the Soviet side presented its proposals in the form of a written memorandum. They boiled down to the fact that Finland should lease the Hanko Peninsula "for the construction of a naval base with coastal artillery defense, which, together with coastal artillery on the other side of the Gulf of Finland at the Baltic port (Paldiski. - I.P.), could block the passage with artillery fire to the Gulf of Finland ”, as well as pushing the border on the Karelian Isthmus and transferring to the Soviet Union a number of islands in the Gulf of Finland and the western part of the Rybachy Peninsula. The total area of territories passing from Finland to the USSR would be 2761 square meters. km, 5529 square meters were proposed as compensation. km in East Karelia near Rebola and Poros Lake. The next day, the Finnish delegation departed for Helsinki.
Meanwhile, in the Finnish leadership, the opinion formulated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs E. Erkko prevailed that the Soviet Union was bluffing and a firm line should be drawn towards it. As early as October 12, Finland announced the general mobilization and evacuation of civilians from large cities. Arrests of members of left-wing public organizations began, and the publication of a number of newspapers and magazines was prohibited. On October 17, Marshal Mannerheim is appointed commander in chief. The structure of the Finnish delegation at the talks included V. Tanner, who at that time held the post of Minister of Finance, who was supposed to control Paasikivi, inclined to compromises.
October 23 Moscow talks resumed. In accordance with the instructions received, representatives of Finland agreed to transfer 5 islands in the Gulf of Finland and move the border on the Karelian Isthmus 10 km away. Regarding the rental of Hanko, a categorical refusal followed. In turn, the Soviet side continued to insist on the creation of a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula, although it agreed to reduce the number of its garrison from 5 to 4 thousand people. In addition, a readiness was expressed to push the line of the future border on the Karelian Isthmus to the east. Referring to the need to consult with parliament, on October 24, the Finnish delegation went to Helsinki.
However, sober voices were heard among the Finnish leadership. A supporter of the compromise with Moscow was Marshal Mannerheim, who in March 1939, in conversations with President K. Kallio and Prime Minister A. Kayander, suggested that it would be beneficial for Finland to come forward with a proposal to withdraw the border line from Leningrad and get a good one compensation. On October 16, during a meeting in the Council of State, the ambassador to the USSR, Iryo-Koskinen, expressed the opinion that if the reasonable defense requirements of the Soviet government were met, as others had done, war would not break out, and Mannerheim noted that if Russia was satisfied with the border seventy kilometers from Leningrad then the military will be able to develop appropriate proposals. Speaking against the rental of Hanko, the marshal proposed an alternative option: “Perhaps they would have achieved a compromise by sacrificing some islands. In this regard, I named the island of Yussaro as a possible negotiation object, the location of which offered the Russians good conditions for interacting with the forts of the island of Naissaar (10 km north of Tallinn. - IP), adjacent to the southern coast of the Gulf of Finland. " As Tanner testifies, after the negotiations on October 23, Paasikivi was ready to recommend the transfer of Yussare to the Soviet base, and on the Karelian Isthmus to cede territory right up to the border line proposed by Mannerheim.
November 3 began the last round of negotiations. Having met with Paasikivi on the eve of the departure of the Finnish delegation to Moscow, Mannerheim convinced him: “You must come to an agreement. The army is not able to fight. ” However, strict instructions approved by President Kallio ruled out the possibility of any diplomatic maneuver.
Seeking to obtain a naval base, the Soviet side was ready to go to any option that suits Finland that would give us the Hanko Peninsula, whether for rent, sale or exchange. Finally, we agreed to the islands off its coast. As Mannerheim notes in his memoirs: “The Soviet government, in turn, stated that it could be satisfied with a group of Hesto-Busyo-Hermansyo-Koyo islands located east of Cape Hanko, as well as the previously mentioned anchorage in Lappohja. This was a rather significant concession, which in an economic sense would have been less difficult than Hanko’s transfer, although important coastal artillery batteries would have been lost. ”
On November 4, the Finnish delegation sent an encrypted telegram to Helsinki in which it asked its government for consent to transfer fortress Ino on the Karelian Isthmus to the Soviet base of the island of Yussare and the concession to the USSR. However, the Finnish leadership has completely lost its sense of reality. In a reply telegram dated November 8, it was ordered to abandon any options for deploying a Soviet base on Hanko or any islands in its vicinity. The concession of Ino could be considered only on condition that the USSR renounce its claims under Hanko. As Tanner writes: “We were all very disappointed with the instructions received. We expected that in Helsinki they would understand: an agreement can only be reached through new concessions. ”
On November 9, the last meeting of the Soviet and Finnish delegations took place. As Tanner recalls:
“Stalin indicated on the map the island of Roussareau:“ Maybe you will give way even to it? ”
As our instructions prescribed, we answered negatively.
“Then nothing seems to work out. Nothing will come of it, ”said Stalin.”
It became clear that the negotiations had finally reached an impasse. On November 13, the Finnish delegation left Moscow. When she crossed the border, the Finnish border guard opened fire on Soviet border guards.
It should be noted the inflammatory role of British diplomacy. On November 24, England hinted to the USSR that it would not intervene in the event of a Soviet-Finnish conflict. At the same time, Finland stated that it should take a firm position and not succumb to pressure from Moscow. Thus, it was a question of provoking a war with the aim of using Finland “in order to do as much harm to Russia as possible, even if the Finns ultimately crashed in the face of its superior power.
Those who denounce the “crimes of the Stalinist regime” like to talk about the fact that Finland is a sovereign country that controls its own territory, and therefore, they say, it was not at all obliged to agree to an exchange. In this regard, we can recall the events that took place two decades later. When Soviet missiles began to be deployed in Cuba in 1962, the Americans had no legitimate reason to impose a naval blockade on Liberty Island, much less to launch a military strike against it. Both Cuba and the USSR are sovereign countries, the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons concerned only them and was fully consistent with international law. Nevertheless, the United States was ready to start World War 3 if the missiles were not removed. There is such a thing as a "sphere of vital interests." For our country in 1939, the Gulf of Finland and the Karelian Isthmus entered this sphere. Even by no means sympathetic to the Soviet regime, the former leader of the Cadet Party P.N. Milyukov in a letter to I.P. Demidov expressed the following attitude to the outbreak of war with Finland: "I am sorry for the Finns, but I am for the Vyborg province."
On November 26, a famous incident occurred near the village of Mainila. According to the official Soviet version, at 3:45 p.m. Finnish artillery fired at our territory, as a result of which 4 Soviet soldiers were killed and wounded. Today it is considered good form to interpret this event as the work of the NKVD. The allegations of the Finnish side that their artillery was deployed at such a distance that its fire could not reach the border are perceived as undeniable. Meanwhile, according to Soviet documentary sources, one of the Finnish batteries was located in the Jäppinen area (5 km from Mainila). However, whoever organized the provocation at Mainila, it was used by the Soviet side as a pretext for war. On November 28, the USSR government denounced the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact and withdrew its diplomatic representatives from Finland. November 30 hostilities began.
I will not describe in detail the course of the war, since there are already enough publications on this topic. Its first stage, which lasted until the end of December 1939, was generally unsuccessful for the Red Army. On the Karelian Isthmus, Soviet troops, breaking the forefield of the Mannerheim line, on December 4-10 reached their main defensive line. However, attempts to break through it were unsuccessful. After bloody battles, the parties switched to a positional struggle.
What are the reasons for the failure of the initial period of the war? First of all, underestimating the enemy. Finland mobilized in advance, increasing the size of its Armed Forces from 37 to 337 thousand. Finnish troops were deployed in the border zone, the main forces occupied defensive lines on the Karelian Isthmus and even managed to conduct full-scale maneuvers at the end of October 1939.
Soviet intelligence was also not up to par, which could not reveal complete and reliable information about Finnish fortifications. However, there is also the exact opposite opinion. For example, here is what Lieutenant Colonel V.A. Novobranets claims in his memoirs:
“I remember well that all of us, employees of the operations department, used the so-called“ black album ”, which contained all the comprehensive data on the Finnish fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus (“ Mannerheim Line ”). The album contained photographs and characteristics of each bunker: wall thickness , coast, weapons, etc.
Later, already working in Razvedupra, I again saw this “black album”. He was also in the headquarters of the active forces on the Karelian Isthmus. How dare the government leaders say that there was no such data? ”
Apparently, the Recruit is referring to the "Album of fortifications of the Karelian Isthmus", compiled according to Soviet intelligence in 1937. However, the fact is that the most modern part of the Finnish fortifications, including the famous “millionaire” pillboxes, was built in 1938-1939. Reliable intelligence information about them was completely absent.
Finally, the Soviet leadership had unreasonable hopes for "class solidarity of the Finnish workers." The belief was widespread that the population of the countries that entered the war against the USSR would almost immediately “rise and go over to the side of the Red Army”, that the workers and peasants would come out to meet Soviet soldiers with flowers.
As a result, the proper number of troops was not allocated for military operations and, accordingly, the necessary superiority in forces was not provided. So, on the Karelian Isthmus, which was the most important section of the front, in December 1939 the Finnish side had 6 infantry divisions, 4 infantry brigades, 1 cavalry brigade and 10 separate battalions - a total of 80 military battalions. On the Soviet side, they were opposed by 9 rifle divisions, 1 rifle-machine gun brigade and 6 tank brigades - a total of 84 estimated rifle battalions. If we compare the number of personnel, then the Finnish troops on the Karelian Isthmus totaled 130 thousand, the Soviet - 169 thousand people. On the whole, 425 thousand Red Army soldiers acted against 265 thousand Finnish troops on the entire front.
Reaction of the West
The outbreak of war caused the hysteria of the "world community." December 14, the Soviet Union was expelled from the League of Nations. Moreover, this was done with obvious violations of the procedure. The Council of the League of Nations consisted of 15 members, 7 votes were cast for the resolution on the exclusion of the USSR (England, France, Belgium, Bolivia, Egypt, the Union of South Africa, and the Dominican Republic), the remaining 8 members of the Council did not vote or abstained. Thus, the resolution on the exclusion of the USSR was adopted by a minority of members of the League Council. It is noteworthy that 3 out of 7 members of the League Council who voted for the exclusion - the Union of South Africa, Bolivia and Egypt - were elected to the Council just on the eve of the vote.
The Western powers generously supplied Finland with weapons. Responding to a parliamentary request on March 12, 1940, Prime Minister Daladier stated that France had delivered Finland 145 aircraft, 496 guns, 5 thousand machine guns, 400 thousand rifles and 20 million rounds of ammunition. In turn, his colleague Chamberlain told March 19 members of the British Parliament that 101 aircraft, 114 guns, 185 thousand shells, 200 anti-tank guns, 100 Vickers machine guns, 50 thousand gas shells, 15,700 bombs were sent from England to Finland , as well as a large number of uniforms and equipment.
In addition, 11.6 thousand foreign volunteers arrived in Finland. The most numerous of them were Swedes (8680 people), Danes (944), Norwegians (693), American Finns (364) and Hungarians (346).
Not intending to limit themselves to arms deliveries, Britain and France hoped to take a direct part in the Soviet-Finnish war.
In the last chapter, I already talked about the truly titanic efforts undertaken by the Allied command to prevent real military operations against the Germans on the Western Front. As the English historian John Fuller writes in his book: “A complete world reigned on this front. The French did not shoot, they said: “Ils ne sont pasmechants” (Germans are not villains), and “if we start shooting, they will also shoot”. ”
Well, of course, the Germans are not villains. It’s Russian business! Having received a suitable excuse, the Allied leadership began enthusiastically building plans for an attack on the USSR.
With the outbreak of the Winter War, a French military mission led by Lieutenant Colonel Haneval was sent to Finland. At the headquarters of the Commander of the Armed Forces of Finland, Marshal Mannerheim, was the personal representative of Gamelin, General Clement-Grankur. According to Captain P. Stélen, a member of the French military mission, the main task of the French representatives was to "keep Finland at war with all its might."
In pursuance of the decisions of the Supreme Council of the Allies, the French headquarters developed a plan of military operations against the USSR, providing for the landing of the Anglo-French troops in Pechenga (Petsamo), as well as bombing attacks on important targets on Soviet territory. In a memo to the chief of the General Staff of the Navy of France and the future commander of the pro-Hitler government, Vichy Admiral Darlan, addressed to Prime Minister E. Daladier, the need for such an operation was justified by the following argument: “In the region of Murmansk and Karelia there are thousands of political exiles, and the inhabitants of the concentration camps there are ready to rebel against oppressors. Karelia could eventually become a place where anti-Stalinist forces within the country could unite. "
The Deputy Chief of the Air Force General Staff General Berger, in a conversation with Captain P. Stélen in December 1939, said that the Anglo-French allies would attack the USSR not only in the north, in Finland, but also in the south, in the Caucasus. “General Weygang commands troops in Syria and Lebanon. His forces will advance in a general direction to Baku in order to deprive the USSR of oil produced here. From here, Weigan’s troops will advance towards the allies advancing to Moscow from Scandinavia and Finland. ” “I was surprised and flattered,” Stelin wrote in his memoirs, “that they confidentially introduced me to an operation of such a large scale. The design of the operation was expressed on the map with two curved arrows: the first from Finland, the second from Syria. The pointed tips of these arrows connected in the area east of Moscow. ”
But all these far-reaching plans were foiled by the Red Army. Having completed the necessary training, the significantly strengthened Soviet troops launched a decisive attack on the Karelian Isthmus on February 11, 1940. Having broken through the main defensive line, by February 21 they reached the second line of the Mannerheim Line, on March 3 they were on the outskirts of Vyborg, and on March 7–9 they broke through to its outskirts. On March 9, Mannerheim told the government that the Finnish army was in danger of total defeat. Despite the persuasion of England and France, who assured that their troops were already approaching, on March 12, 1940, the Finnish delegation in Moscow was forced to sign a peace treaty on Soviet terms.
The defeat of Finland caused a government crisis in France. At first glance, this seems rather strange. Indeed, by that time the government headed by Daladier had already managed to betray allied Czechoslovakia twice: in September 1938 and in March 1939. Then in September 1939 it betrayed allied Poland. This did not particularly disturb anyone. And here is Finland, with which France was not bound by any treaties and which, under the conditions of the world, retained its independence, having lost only part of the territory. Nevertheless, the fact of the defeat of the Finns was so unbearable for the French public that the government of Daladier was forced to resign. What is the reason for this reaction? Everything is very simple. This time, the winners were not respectable Nazi Germans, but Russian Bolshevik barbarians. To what extent does the notorious “civilized world” hate us! And what naive idiots do those of our compatriots look who seriously believe that the Russians will someday be "taken to Europe."
Defeat or victory?
So, to summarize the Soviet-Finnish conflict. As a rule, such a war is considered to be won, as a result of which the winner is in a better position than before the war. What do we see from this point of view?
As we have seen, by the end of the 1930s Finland was a country that was clearly unfriendly towards the USSR and ready to enter into an alliance with any of our enemies. So in this regard, the situation has by no means worsened. On the other hand, it is known that the unbelievable bully understands only the language of brute force and begins to respect the one who managed to beat him. Finland was no exception. On May 22, 1940, the Society for Peace and Friendship with the USSR was created there. Despite the persecution of the Finnish authorities, by the time it was banned in December of that year, it had 40 thousand members. This mass character indicates that not only the supporters of the Communists entered the Society, but also just sane people who believed that it was better to maintain normal relations with a great neighbor.
According to the Moscow Treaty, the USSR received new territories, as well as a naval base on the Hanko Peninsula. This is a clear plus. After the outbreak of World War II, Finnish troops were able to enter the line of the old state border only by September 1941.
It should be noted that if the negotiations in October-November 1939, the Soviet Union requested less than 3 thousand square meters. km and even in exchange for twice as much territory, as a result of the war acquired about 40 thousand square meters. km, without giving anything in return.
It should also be noted that in the pre-war negotiations, the USSR, in addition to territorial compensation, proposed reimbursing the value of property left by the Finns. According to the calculations of the Finnish side, even in the case of the transfer of a small piece of land, which she agreed to give us, it was about 800 million marks. If it came to the cession of the entire Karelian Isthmus, the bill would have gone into many billions.
But now, when on March 10, 1940, on the eve of the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Paasikivi started talking about compensation for the transferred territory, recalling that Peter I paid Sweden 2 million thalers in the Nishtad peace, Molotov could calmly reply: “Write a letter to Peter the Great. If he orders, we will pay compensation. ”
Moreover, the USSR demanded an amount of 95 million rubles. as compensation for equipment and property damage taken out from the seized territory. Finland also had to transfer to the USSR 350 sea and river vehicles, 76 locomotives, 2 thousand wagons, a significant number of cars.
Of course, during the hostilities, the Soviet Armed Forces suffered significantly greater losses than the enemy. According to name lists, in the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940. 126 875 soldiers of the Red Army died, died and went missing. The losses of the Finnish troops amounted, according to official figures, 21,396 killed and 1,434 missing. However, another figure of Finnish losses is often found in Russian literature - 48,243 killed, 43 thousand wounded. The primary source of this figure is the translation of the article by Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff of Finland Helge Seppälle, originally published in the Finnish edition of Mailma me, published in the newspaper Abroad, No. 48 for 1989. Regarding Finnish losses, Seppälä writes the following:
“Finland lost in the“ winter war ”more than 23,000 people killed, more than 43,000 people wounded. During the bombing, including merchant ships, 25,243 people were killed ”[485].
The last figure - 25,243 killed during the bombing - is in doubt. Perhaps there is a newspaper typo here. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity to familiarize myself with the Finnish original article of Seppälä.
Be that as it may, the Soviet losses are several times higher than the Finnish ones. This ratio is not surprising. Take, for example, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. If we consider the fighting in Manchuria, the losses of both sides are approximately the same. Moreover, often the Russians lost more than the Japanese. However, during the assault on Port Arthur fortress, the loss of the Japanese far exceeded the Russian losses. It would seem that here and there the very same Russian and Japanese soldiers fought, why is there such a difference? The answer is obvious: if in Manchuria the parties fought in the open field, then in Port Arthur our troops defended the fortress, even if it was unfinished. It is only natural that the attackers suffered much higher losses. The same situation developed during the Soviet-Finnish war, when our troops had to storm the Mannerheim line, and even in winter conditions.
As a result, Soviet troops gained invaluable combat experience, and the command of the Red Army got an occasion to think about the shortcomings in the training of troops and urgent measures to increase the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.
Speaking in parliament on March 19, 1940, Daladier said that for France, “the Moscow Peace Treaty is a tragic and shameful event. This is a great victory for Russia. ” However, do not go to extremes, as some authors do. Not very great. But still a victory.
