Maginot Line - Kursk Fortifications comparison.

[Sunforged General]

Some Historians mention that perhaps the fortifications built around Kursk in WWII circa 1943 were even more formidable than the French Maginot Line. I wanted to explore this statement and see if it was true. Now I understand there are a few difficulties comparing the fortifications of the two, since the fortifications around Kursk were heavily focused on defense in depth, and were very deep. While the Maginot line was a (Relatively) more linear set of fortifications, relatively thin but very strong. But what are your thoughts?

If you are a German Field Marshal, offered the choice of attacking a well manned Maginot line, or at Kursk (with full Soviet reserves present as in OTL) What would you rather deal with? Assuming for either scenario your force is the same size, about the size of an army group. (For this discussion, of course the Maginot line is properly manned by the French army circa 1940, with the amount of defenders the line was intended to have, I.E. not undermanned, and Kursk fortifications manned by the Red Army circa 1943, the same number of troops as present in the Battle of Kursk.)

 

[Jopa79]

The French had nearly two decades to build-up and prepare the Maginot Line - it was based on the French experiences during the WWI and was supposed to prevent a German surprise attack - deter a cross-border attack - give time to the French Army to complete the mobilization and to be used as a basis for the French counter-attack. All this based on the WWI strategies and tactics, the Maginot Line was never build thinking of the idea and the concept of the German Blitzkrieg-tactics. In addition the Germans were aware of this line and had time to reformulate their plans - occurred in form of the invasion through the Low Countries. In the French view the Maginot Line was experienced as a work of a genius - an impenetrable obstacle and an ultimate settlement for the German threat. In reality the Maginot Line has become a concept presenting a false sense of security.

In 1943 the Soviets had at most a few months to build the Kursk fortifications. However, by that time the tactics of the German infantry and the modern tank-warfare were familiar for the Soviets also - so they could build the fortifications and the defensive line basing on this idea, the main concept was not the length of the line (like the Maginot Line) but the depth of the line. In addition the nature in the Kursk Salient favored the Soviet defender and they were able to to build a virtual fortress backed up by the man-made fortifications. There were eight fortified lines stretching to a deep over 150 km. The Soviet immense use of manpower to build the Kursk fortifications - both the military and civilian left no doubt about the significance of the coming battle - the complexion of the warfare of the Eastern Front was cruel and harsh compering to the warfare of the Western Front in 1940. And even if the Germans had made a breakthrough in Kursk they would have received the Soviet counter-attack by the newly-formed and fresh Steppes Front - there was no French force or a threat standing like this ever in the WWII.

But your question, considering the above-written, as a German Field Marshal, I would definitely attack against the Maginot Line in 1940 rather than against the bulge in Kursk 1943. The Maginot Line would had probably fallen under a German Blitzkrieg-attack. The 1943 German launch of the Operation Citadel against the Soviets in Kursk was insane - there was no premises for the success in there.

 

[Sunforged General]

The French had nearly two decades to build-up and prepare the Maginot Line - it was based on the French experiences during the WWI and was supposed to prevent a German surprise attack - deter a cross-border attack - give time to the French Army to complete the mobilization and to be used as a basis for the French counter-attack. All this based on the WWI strategies and tactics, the Maginot Line was never build thinking of the idea and the concept of the German Blitzkrieg-tactics. In addition the Germans were aware of this line and had time to reformulate their plans - occurred in form of the invasion through the Low Countries. In the French view the Maginot Line was experienced as a work of a genius - an impenetrable obstacle and an ultimate settlement for the German threat. In reality the Maginot Line has become a concept presenting a false sense of security.

In 1943 the Soviets had at most a few months to build the Kursk fortifications. However, by that time the tactics of the German infantry and the modern tank-warfare were familiar for the Soviets also - so they could build the fortifications and the defensive line basing on this idea, the main concept was not the length of the line (like the Maginot Line) but the depth of the line. In addition the nature in the Kursk Salient favored the Soviet defender and they were able to to build a virtual fortress backed up by the man-made fortifications. There were eight fortified lines stretching to a deep over 150 km. The Soviet immense use of manpower to build the Kursk fortifications - both the military and civilian left no doubt about the significance of the coming battle - the complexion of the warfare of the Eastern Front was cruel and harsh compering to the warfare of the Western Front in 1940. And even if the Germans had made a breakthrough in Kursk they would have received the Soviet counter-attack by the newly-formed and fresh Steppes Front - there was no French force or a threat standing like this ever in the WWII.

But your question, considering the above-written, as a German Field Marshal, I would definitely attack against the Maginot Line in 1940 rather than against the bulge in Kursk 1943. The Maginot Line would had probably fallen under a German Blitzkrieg-attack. The 1943 German launch of the Operation Citadel against the Soviets in Kursk was insane - there was no premises for the success in there.

I enjoy reading your assessment, it is very well thought out. But one thing to consider with the Maginot line is using Blitzkrieg to push pincers through the line is potentially a bad idea, as the pincers would have to go around the Gros Ouvrages of the line. These are large, artillery resistant fortresses, they would have to go around due to destroying the forts being very difficult, thus potentially opening the possibility of a pincer being cut off and encircled, if the French have a reserve to use for that purpose that is.

 

[Jopa79]

I enjoy reading your assessment, it is very well thought out. But one thing to consider with the Maginot line is using Blitzkrieg to push pincers through the line is potentially a bad idea, as the pincers would have to go around the Gros Ouvrages of the line. These are large, artillery resistant fortresses, they would have to go around due to destroying the forts being very difficult, thus potentially opening the possibility of a pincer being cut off and encircled, if the French have a reserve to use for that purpose that is.

But wait...I only said I would rather attack against the Maginot Line than the Kursk fortifications...not claiming as easy tasks either of those. Furthermore, even if I fail (as a German Field Marshal) my tomorrow seems like more optimistic in the Western Front than it would be after I lose in Kursk.

 

[Sunforged General]

But wait...I only said I would rather attack against the Maginot Line than the Kursk fortifications...not claiming as easy tasks either of those. Furthermore, even if I fail (as a German Field Marshal) my tomorrow seems like more optimistic in the Western Front than it would be after I lose in Kursk.

Very true!

 

[DukeDayve]

The Kursk fortifications were designed to blunt the German assault and bog them down having to fight through minefield after minefield after anti-tank trench after anti-tank trench after trench network complete with incredible amounts of anti-tank guns, anti-tank rifles and so on and so on. The Maginot Line didn't go very deep. If I had to choose I'd probably go for attacking the Maginot Line. I feel like the Germans could've succeeded with a full-on Maginot assault in 1940 with what they had in 1940, but they were never going to succeed in attacking the Kursk fortifications.

Even if they did attack the Maginot Line full on in 1940, and even if it was fully manned, I still think the French defenses would've fallen apart after a breakthrough was made. Fully manned Maginot Line or not, the French (and British) in 1940 were still going to have the "we really don't want another full on war with Germany" general attitude and surrender/retreat/panic as soon as things start to go wrong for them.

 

[bz249]

How is the scenario supposed to be played? Using the historical advantage of men and material and lack of unified Allied GHQ against the Maginot? With the historical disadvantage of men and material against the Kursk Salient? Or make everything similar (force ratio, force concentration, etc)?

Because it is not even apples to oranges but watermelons to nuts. In both cases the better supplied side won. Period.

 

[Denkt]

Was not the defence line at Kursk an preparation for an Soviet offensive and Soviet union in the past had seen its offensive being stopped by German counterattacks so this time Soviet took the safe route and build up their defence first so they could hold ground and build up their offensive strength during much of 1943 and Germany was at the choice of either try an new encirclement to win back the initiative or move back into an easier position to defend and the Kursk line did prevent the German encirclement from succeeding which put the Germans at a really bad position for the Soviet counterattack.

Maginot line was something built before the war and my understand is that french after the ww1 losses did want an as safe environment for its soldiers as possible so they spent alot of resources on that line and it was perhaps never intended to support an offensive, just to protect its soldiers and keep the germans out of France?

 

[L'Afrique]

The purpose of the Maginot line is being misconstrued in this thread. It was built to ensure that a future franco-german war would happen in the Low Countries rather than on french soil. The allied war plan correctly assumed that the german thrust would be into Belgium, and the line "worked" in that regard. It was the armoured spearhead coming where it did- through the wallonian Ardennes into reserve units- that doomed the allies in 1940. The crack First Army and BEF proved a match for the germans they faced, but there was no defence to be had when the main german thrust was south of you and rushing west and north for an encirclement, and Paris.

The idea that "blitzkrieg tactics" could have broken the Maginot line head on is absurd- the entire thesis of the blitzkrieg of 1940 was that you do not attack your enemy head-on. You hit him where you are strongest and he is weakest, and then push fast and hard through and fuck him before his strength can react. The german victory was in communications, co-ordination, flexible officers, flexible battle plans, concentration of mobile units where they could leverage their mobility, etc. Ramming tanks and stukas into the Maginot line abandons all of those strengths. Blitzkrieg explicitly means you make just enough of a show at the Maginot line to keep them manning it, and then attack elsewhere. There is no Blitzkrieg when you're attacking your enemy where he is strongest- and remember, in this "Blitzkrieg breaks the Maginot line" scenario, without the other 2/3 of the border to care about, without the allies rushing into Belgium, then the BEF, the First Army, and practically France's entire armoured strength, are all in immediate reserve to respond to potential breakthroughs. Again, german strategy in 1940 explicitly relies on them being elsewhere. There is not Blitzkrieg directly into the Maginot line.

 

[Jopa79]

It was built to ensure that a future franco-german war would happen in the Low Countries rather than on french soil.

Well, if this truly was a purpose why the French build the Maginot Line, I have two things to say - firstly this means that the French were ready to sacrifice the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg only in order to save and guard their own nation, France - secondly, during the Battle of France the Wehrmacht rapidly advanced through the Low Countries, the battle was over in less than two weeks - if the purpose of the Maginot Line was to turn the future German attack through the Low Countries, this objective was completed, but there never was a true Franco-German warfare in the Low Countries - the French couldn't resist the attacking German Army. The French design of the Maginot Line is useless when they didn't have a proper battle-plan for what-to-do if their defense fails in the Low Countries - the French northern border next to Belgium was virtually left without fortifications. So, what to do with the Maginot Line when the left flank is wide-open and the Wehrmacht is flanking from the rear?

 

[Sunforged General]

The purpose of the Maginot line is being misconstrued in this thread. It was built to ensure that a future franco-german war would happen in the Low Countries rather than on french soil. The allied war plan correctly assumed that the german thrust would be into Belgium, and the line "worked" in that regard. It was the armoured spearhead coming where it did- through the wallonian Ardennes into reserve units- that doomed the allies in 1940. The crack First Army and BEF proved a match for the germans they faced, but there was no defence to be had when the main german thrust was south of you and rushing west and north for an encirclement, and Paris.

The idea that "blitzkrieg tactics" could have broken the Maginot line head on is absurd- the entire thesis of the blitzkrieg of 1940 was that you do not attack your enemy head-on. You hit him where you are strongest and he is weakest, and then push fast and hard through and fuck him before his strength can react. The german victory was in communications, co-ordination, flexible officers, flexible battle plans, concentration of mobile units where they could leverage their mobility, etc. Ramming tanks and stukas into the Maginot line abandons all of those strengths. Blitzkrieg explicitly means you make just enough of a show at the Maginot line to keep them manning it, and then attack elsewhere. There is no Blitzkrieg when you're attacking your enemy where he is strongest- and remember, in this "Blitzkrieg breaks the Maginot line" scenario, without the other 2/3 of the border to care about, without the allies rushing into Belgium, then the BEF, the First Army, and practically France's entire armoured strength, are all in immediate reserve to respond to potential breakthroughs. Again, german strategy in 1940 explicitly relies on them being elsewhere. There is not Blitzkrieg directly into the Maginot line.

I understand that blitzkrieg would want to avoid attacking fortifications. But you don't always have the luxury of doing that. For example, the Germans couldn't really avoid the battle of Kursk, and thus had to attack the most heavily fortified point on Earth head on. Otherwise the Kursk salient would keep compromising their lines.

This makes us wonder what the Germans would do if the French just extended the Maginot line to the coast, so there is no going around it.

The purpose of this thread was just to compare the strength of the fortifications around Kursk 1943 vs the fortifications of the Maginot line. The Germans attacking either scenario was just an example to help compare the two.

 

[bz249]

Well, if this truly was a purpose why the French build the Maginot Line, I have two things to say - firstly this means that the French were ready to sacrifice the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg only in order to save and guard their own nation, France - secondly, during the Battle of France the Wehrmacht rapidly advanced through the Low Countries, the battle was over in less than two weeks - if the purpose of the Maginot Line was to turn the future German attack through the Low Countries, this objective was completed, but there never was a true Franco-German warfare in the Low Countries - the French couldn't resist the attacking German Army. The French design of the Maginot Line is useless when they didn't have a proper battle-plan for what-to-do if their defense fails in the Low Countries - the French northern border next to Belgium was virtually left without fortifications. So, what to do with the Maginot Line when the left flank is wide-open and the Wehrmacht is flanking from the rear?

If the Germans attack across the Low Countries then they join automatically the Allies. And the French needed every possible man and gun to have a chance.

 

[Sunforged General]

If the Germans attack across the Low Countries then they join automatically the Allies. And the French needed every possible man and gun to have a chance.

The French actually had a materiel superiority to the Germans. The French had more tanks, artillery, trucks, and a bigger Navy, especially more battleships and even an aircraft carrier. The French also had more resources to sustain a long war, which is why the Germans came up with blitzkrieg, they knew they couldn't win a long war with the French and British.

The only advantage the Germans had was a bigger population than France, and more aircraft, but both of these could be countered by the British. British manpower could help the French match German manpower, and British aircraft production in 1940 would surpass that of Germany.

 

[bz249]

The French actually had a materiel superiority to the Germans. The French had more tanks, artillery, trucks, and a bigger Navy, especially more battleships and even an aircraft carrier. The French also had more resources to sustain a long war, which is why the Germans came up with blitzkrieg, they knew they couldn't win a long war with the French and British.

The only advantage the Germans had was a bigger population than France, and more aircraft, but both of these could be countered by the British. British manpower could help the French match German manpower, and British aircraft production in 1940 would surpass that of Germany.

If you start counting ww1 leftovers at questionable state of operability and munition with whatever state... then yes. It is possible to show a French superiority. But there is pretty good reason why the French/Germans behaved how they behaved. And it is German material superiority on the part which mattered.

 

[Sunforged General]

If you start counting ww1 leftovers at questionable state of operability and munition with whatever state... then yes. It is possible to show a French superiority. But there is pretty good reason why the French/Germans behaved how they behaved. And it is German material superiority on the part which mattered.

The older French tanks like the Renault ft could easily take on German Panzer Is, which still made up a significant fraction of German tanks in 1940. Also I'd imagine in the case of artillery, WWI artillery is still good enough for early WWII battles. I've never heard of any sources about French equipment being in a poor state, the French had a high military budget. The French trucks were mostly all new models, more than half of the French tanks were also newer, and Superior to all German models, the Char B1 being a good example.

 

[bz249]

I understand that blitzkrieg would want to avoid attacking fortifications. But you don't always have the luxury of doing that. For example, the Germans couldn't really avoid the battle of Kursk, and thus had to attack the most heavily fortified point on Earth head on. Otherwise the Kursk salient would keep compromising their lines.

This makes us wonder what the Germans would do if the French just extended the Maginot line to the coast, so there is no going around it.

The purpose of this thread was just to compare the strength of the fortifications around Kursk 1943 vs the fortifications of the Maginot line. The Germans attacking either scenario was just an example to help compare the two.

The Germans did broke through at Kursk... the Battle of Prokhorovka was a Soviet attempt to plug the hole using operational reserves... and it failed. However the numerical superiority of the Red Army meant that they were able to successfully counterattack elsewhere, thus the local German success at Prokhorovka was meaningless. Put two German armies at Orel, give one more panzerkorps to Manstein and you will see a different result.

It was not the fortification, but the superiority of resources which decided the battle.

 

[Sunforged General]

The Germans did broke through at Kursk... the Battle of Prokhorovka was a Soviet attempt to plug the hole using operational reserves... and it failed. However the numerical superiority of the Red Army meant that they were able to successfully counterattack elsewhere, thus the local German success at Prokhorovka was meaningless. Put two German armies at Orel, give one more panzerkorps to Manstein and you will see a different result.

It was not the fortification, but the superiority of resources which decided the battle.

The fortifications at Kursk were over 300km deep. The German penetration near prokhorovka did not reach the final defensive lines of the Soviets. The furthest German advance was only 36 km, so they only made it 1/9 of the way through the maze of Soviet fortifications that was around Kursk. That was in the southern pincer, the northern pincer fared worse.

 

[Jopa79]

The Germans did broke through at Kursk... the Battle of Prokhorovka was a Soviet attempt to plug the hole using operational reserves... and it failed.

The German plan in the Operation Citadel was to cut off the Soviet forces present in the Kursk salient. This was meant to be done by two separate pincer movements from the south -and north sides of the salient. By converging these pincer movements the Soviet forces would be encircled and later annihilated. The maximum German advance by the northern pincer movement was 12 km and the maximum advance by the southern pincer movement was 35 km. The salient length from north to south was 250 km, so after the advance of both pincer movements there still was a gap of 203 km (250 - (35+12) = 203 km). The Germans made some advance, but never made the final breakthrough, the spearheads of the pincer movements never met and the salient was never closed.

After the German attack stalled on the southern side the Soviets launched counter-attacks and one of them led to the Battle of Prokhorovka. On the northern side the Soviet launched Operation Kutuzov against the the rear of the stalled German pincer movement. After the Battle of Prokhorovka the Soviet launched the second phase of the southern counter-attack known as the Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev aiming to capture Belgorod and Kharkov, ultimately aiming to destroy the German 4th Panzer Army and the German Army Detachment Kempf

 

[bz249]

The German plan in the Operation Citadel was to cut off the Soviet forces present in the Kursk salient. This was meant to be done by two separate pincer movements from the south -and north sides of the salient. By converging these pincer movements the Soviet forces would be encircled and later annihilated. The maximum German advance by the northern pincer movement was 12 km and the maximum advance by the southern pincer movement was 35 km. The salient length from north to south was 250 km, so after the advance of both pincer movements there still was a gap of 203 km (250 - (35+12) = 203 km). The Germans made some advance, but never made the final breakthrough, the spearheads of the pincer movements never met and the salient was never closed.

After the German attack stalled on the southern side the Soviets launched counter-attacks and one of them led to the Battle of Prokhorovka. On the northern side the Soviet launched Operation Kutuzov against the the rear of the stalled German pincer movement. After the Battle of Prokhorovka the Soviet launched the second phase of the southern counter-attack known as the Operation Polkovodets Rumyantsev aiming to capture Belgorod and Kharkov, ultimately aiming to destroy the German 4th Panzer Army and the German Army Detachment Kempf

Let's consider a variation of the Battle of France where Prioux decisively wins the Hannut tank battle and decides to pursue the routing Hoepner threatening the rear of the German forces in the Ardennes.

Would the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan be still an important event or a small footnote before the eventual German retreat?

 

[Sunforged General]

Let's consider a variation of the Battle of France where Prioux decisively wins the Hannut tank battle and decides to pursue the routing Hoepner threatening the rear of the German forces in the Ardennes.

Would the crossing of the Meuse at Sedan be still an important event or a small footnote before the eventual German retreat?

You are correct in that matter, Soviet counter attacks dashes the German plans. But that doesn't change the fact that Soviet fortifications were 300km deep and the farthest German advance was only 36km.