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The situation is probably somewhere between the extremes. As said, the UK was not going to allow either France or Germany a free hand to gain hegemony over the continent. There was still a lot of bad feelings about Germany over WWI, but the population had to be well aware of the various earlier issues between the UK and France, so it's not a 100% versus 0% popularity situation. France would get a bit more slack than Germany, but not a free hand.

In my opinion, a incursion into Germany by France, with a Franco-Soviet alliance in place, would be threatening enough to drive the UK to take diplomatic and possibly economic action, but short of military intervention of any kind, against France. If things go badly for Germany, the UK might even provide non-military aid. If France violated the neutrality of Belgium or Luxemburg in the process, or the Soviets decided to attack Germany through Poland without permission, then I see matters very likely escalating. Otherwise, I don't see any realistic chance of the UK joining Germany against France if the French restrict their incursion and subsequent demands to the Rhineland area.
 
France had demonstrated it's free hand against Germans in 1870 with the invasion of Luxembourg. If anything French-UK general relations had improved to the point of being in a continual military alliance with strategic naval and army cross training and mission sharing. If the French slide into socialism then Chamberlain would not approve of them diplomatically but, there are enough socialists in the UK to keep the British from somehow becoming Francophobes. There would be no reason for France to invade Belgium and if Vandervelde wins the elections due to heightened socialist continental power than they might even ally with France. French and Soviet navy and naval infantry would not possibly be interfered with but, there's a chance Germans could wreck them in the Baltic which would necessitate an invasion of Poland. UK/USA and Italy would probably respond with threats over that but, they wouldn't go at the new alliance unprepared.

I believe that is exactly what would have happened if the French economy recovered from the market crash fast enough. If the French industrial magnates were deposed by unions and in the vacuum the Popular Front took power.
 
My beliefs are simple, whether founded or not.

1. France is viewed as considerably more powerful than Germany in 1936.
2. Germany/Hitler are not viewed as warmongers or dealbreakers in 1936.
3. Every sinlgle nation, every one, located to the east of Germany is more afraid of the USSR than of Germany in 1936. Every nation formed out of the remnants of the Russian Empire considers its existence to be threatened by the USSR, while Poland alone considers part if its territory to be directly threatened by Germany - who it fears less than the USSR.
4. The desire for balance in Europe and the avoidance of domination held by Britain is there whether France or Germany is the one being aggressive. They do not want either to conquer and/or annex from the other.
5. The British in 1936 can easily circumvent, resist, or even shut down a blockade in the North Sea area. Any attempt by the French to conduct naval operations in the North or Baltic Sea requires passing through (Baltic) or operating in (North) an area in which Britain has firm naval superiority. Even if they conquer to Hamburg or hell occupy NL and Belgium this is still true.

Based on the above, my expectation is that Britain would respond at minimum equally, in likelyhood more firmly, to a French blockade and invasion of Germany pre-1938 than they did to Germany aggression against Poland historically. I am also going with an expectation that eastern Europe is terrified of the prospect of a Franco-soviet alliance coupled with a naked war od aggression. Lastly, I am doing all this while spotting the French a free hand to be absurdly militant and draft etc and NOT even giving anyone else the same change.
You are forgetting that the French have ties to eastern Europe. In 1936 the little entente still technically existed, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are still French allies. If France is allied to USSR, then these allies of France can expect some reasonable exemption from Soviet aggression. Poland may fear the USSR, but they aren't going to go out of their way to help Germany, whom they fear only slightly less than the Soviets.

And no, Britain is not going to be more hostile to France over them attacking Germany because they violated the treaty of Versailles. Poland did nothing to deserve invasion by Germany, while Germany occupying the Rhineland is a violation of international law and agreements, which warrants a French response.
 
You are forgetting that the French have ties to eastern Europe. In 1936 the little entente still technically existed, Romania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are still French allies. If France is allied to USSR, then these allies of France can expect some reasonable exemption from Soviet aggression. Poland may fear the USSR, but they aren't going to go out of their way to help Germany, whom they fear only slightly less than the Soviets.

And no, Britain is not going to be more hostile to France over them attacking Germany because they violated the treaty of Versailles. Poland did nothing to deserve invasion by Germany, while Germany occupying the Rhineland is a violation of international law and agreements, which warrants a French response.
The Little Entente was purely against AH, not germany.
 
No need to care about the Little Entente. France had strong alliances with both Poland and Czechoslovakia. Plus a new treaty with the Soviets.
Germany had no army yet.
It was much more then needed to show Hitler his place, even without British support.
 
This is false, France had separate agreements with each little entente member that gaurenteed general security against any country. France created these agreements with the intent of use vs Germany.

Somewhat. The Cordon Sanitaire, as the set of alliances with the smaller states of eastern Europe was termed, was originally developed to restrain communism. It was later repurposed to contain the resurgent Germany of the mid '30s. It is likely that the states of central and eastern Europe would remain pro-French so long as France was not aggressively expansionist.

The only way for the French to 'win' in the Rhineland crisis would have been a rapid military reaction to German occupation of the Rhineland. If the French managed to rapidly move a division or two into the Rhineland and force a German back down without shots being fired, followed by a rapid withdrawal, the French could have effectively signalled their intent to hold to the Versailles treaty with only minor diplomatic fallout. The British would likely be irritated, but not sufficiently to significantly change their foreign policy. The nations of the Cordon Sanitaire would likely be reassured by the French willingness to act, as in reality is was partly the French incapacity in the face of German actions that detached many of the states from the French alliance.

Rapid military action was a risky strategy, as it required the committing of a significant part of the metropolitan army to an action, which in the case of actual warfare could expose the French army to losing a key part of their regular army to defeat in detail, with appalling consequences for their capacity to mobilise effectively (the regular units furnish the core cadres which the reserve formations form around). In the end the supremely conservative Gamelin would not authorise the deployment of French forces into a potential combat zone without mobilisation.

If the French had been prepared to mobilise there is also a fair chance that Germany would back down without conflict. If the French were more jingoistic and in a stronger financial position this might also work. The key danger I can see in this scenario is the French pushing for restitution from Germany for the cost of mobilisation, which could diplomatically isolate the French, ultimately helping the German cause.
 
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Somewhat. The Cordon Sanitaire, as the set of alliances with the smaller states of eastern Europe was termed, was originally developed to restrain communism. It was later repurposed to contain the resurgent Germany of the mid '30s. It is likely that the states of central and eastern Europe would remain pro-French so long as France was not aggressively expansionist.

The only way for the French to 'win' in the Rhineland crisis would have been a rapid military reaction to German occupation of the Rhineland. If the French managed to rapidly move a division or two into the Rhineland and force a German back down without shots being fired, followed by a rapid withdrawal, the French could have effectively signalled their intent to hold to the Versailles treaty with only minor diplomatic fallout. The British would likely be irritated, but not sufficiently to significantly change their foreign policy. The nations of the Cordon Sanitaire would likely be reassured by the French willingness to act, as in reality is was partly the French incapacity in the face of German actions that detached many of the states from the French alliance.

Rapid military action was a risky strategy, as it required the committing of a significant part of the metropolitan army to an action, which in the case of actual warfare could expose the French army to losing a key part of their regular army to defeat in detail, with appalling consequences for their capacity to mobilise effectively (the regular units furnish the core cadres which the reserve formations form around). In the end the supremely conservative Gamelin would not authorise the deployment of French forces into a potential combat zone without mobilisation.

If the French had been prepared to mobilise there is also a fair chance that Germany would back down without conflict. If the French were more jingoistic and in a stronger financial position this might also work. The key danger I can see in this scenario is the French pushing for restitution from Germany for the cost of mobilisation, which could diplomatically isolate the French, ultimately helping the German cause.

that's france winning in the short-term and what then? stay there? for how long? move back inmediatly?
the moment the french stay it's a repeat of the ruhr-occupation with france looking the bad guy and the moment the french leave the germans will attempt to re-occupy it again
 
that's france winning in the short-term and what then? stay there? for how long? move back inmediatly?
the moment the french stay it's a repeat of the ruhr-occupation with france looking the bad guy and the moment the french leave the germans will attempt to re-occupy it again

It could be a game of chicken/fatigue... Hitler is not a sneeky, clever Jew, but a fearless Germanic warrior. He cannot play that game indefinetly without damaging his reputation at home (both at the army and the general population).
 
It could be a game of chicken/fatigue... Hitler is not a sneeky, clever Jew, but a fearless Germanic warrior. He cannot play that game indefinetly without damaging his reputation at home (both at the army and the general population).

You clearly know nothing of propaganda.
 
You think it is possible to sell the thing that we bravely run away?

Fought a rearguard action.
Suffered no casualties.
Bravely stood, outnumbered, against vile French attacks, before conserving German lives. We will not help them shed out blood, but we shall be back!
Italy managed to spin defeats into "we will be back".
 
Fought a rearguard action.
Suffered no casualties.
Bravely stood, outnumbered, against vile French attacks, before conserving German lives. We will not help them shed out blood, but we shall be back!
Italy managed to spin defeats into "we will be back".

Dunno about Italy, they switched side pretty soon afterwards...
 
I think @Henry IX has it right. You can get away with a lot if you move quickly and purposefully. A rapid French military response using the standing army and without first waiting to mobilize would give France every advantage and force Germany to respond or acquiesce, with the latter being much more likely.

I do agree that a clear 'end game' goal would be essential, clearly stated before or during the military forward movement.

All of this supposes a French government with enough political strength to be able to act, which was not the case. I'd say that a French government with willingness and ability to act might have prevented WW2 entirely, with the same going for Britain. In any event, waiting to co-ordinate a response with Great Britain was a fools' errand since they were never going to do more than dither; going it alone, and swiftly, was the only way to pull it off.
 
I think @Henry IX has it right. You can get away with a lot if you move quickly and purposefully. A rapid French military response using the standing army and without first waiting to mobilize would give France every advantage and force Germany to respond or acquiesce, with the latter being much more likely.

I do agree that a clear 'end game' goal would be essential, clearly stated before or during the military forward movement.

All of this supposes a French government with enough political strength to be able to act, which was not the case. I'd say that a French government with willingness and ability to act might have prevented WW2 entirely, with the same going for Britain. In any event, waiting to co-ordinate a response with Great Britain was a fools' errand since they were never going to do more than dither; going it alone, and swiftly, was the only way to pull it off.

Ok Gamelin is as he is... can someone else with a realistic shot as a chief of staff (so someone who is also supportive of the Republic and apolitical) would choose the more risky path?
 
It would have to be someone with enormous... amounts of arrogance and self-confidence. DeGaulle is far too junior... perhaps a general who hates the Germans enough to put his career on the line by acting without authorization? I simply don't know the interwar French generals well at all, so i'm not able to name names.

Not sure why you specify someone who is supportive of the Republic, or apolitical. if moving in and forcing the Germans to back down succeeds, the person responsible could become popular and politically powerful. it could certainly be a prelude to an army-supported extremely conservative, monarchial or even fascistic government.
 
Not sure why you specify someone who is supportive of the Republic, or apolitical. if moving in and forcing the Germans to back down succeeds, the person responsible could become popular and politically powerful. it could certainly be a prelude to an army-supported extremely conservative, monarchial or even fascistic government.

The French govt would not select Gen Bounaparte/Pinochet as their chief of staff. And given how they behaved in WW2 it is unlikely that a rogue division commander will act on his own.
 
Leon Blum's popular front government with Daladier as Minister of War would be the only ones with the political motives to attack Germany during the Rhineland remilitarisation. Problem is without ongoing economic collapse and corporate hegemony in France the socialists wouldn't have ever gained power without some kind of coup. Which is a paradox of causation.
Just to nerd out on what-ifs I think a better early war would have been France allying with Italian fascism under their neo-socialist trend. While Germany falls to a communist coup. Modder's always ally France and the UK for WW1/2 hypotheticals while I think the entente is the least probable alliance ever made. Victoria was duped by Napoleon III and the world hasn't been sane since.
 
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. Modder's always ally France and the UK for WW1/2 hypotheticals while I think the entente is the least probable alliance ever made. Victoria was duped by Napoleon III and the world hasn't been sane since.

The British have had a policy of always supporting the second most powerful nation in Europe against the most powerful, since at least Tudor times (with a handful of exceptions such as under the Charles I and II). Until the 19th century this made France the enemy, but with the rise of Germany and Russia the balance of power in Europe permanently shifted. Britain supported France in the 19th and 20th centuries for a variety of reasons (such as being the only other democratic major power) but the simple fact that they were the key to balance of power and stability in Europe is sufficient reason. Germany was always a greater threat to British power than France, and with its rapid industrialisation it only became more so.
 
The British have had a policy of always supporting the second most powerful nation in Europe against the most powerful, since at least Tudor times (with a handful of exceptions such as under the Charles I and II). Until the 19th century this made France the enemy, but with the rise of Germany and Russia the balance of power in Europe permanently shifted. Britain supported France in the 19th and 20th centuries for a variety of reasons (such as being the only other democratic major power) but the simple fact that they were the key to balance of power and stability in Europe is sufficient reason. Germany was always a greater threat to British power than France, and with its rapid industrialisation it only became more so.

Which was working in the 18th century when outside Europe you had nothing but "worthless wasteland"... in the 20th century the British failed to realize that it is the US, which is endangering their position as the dominant world spanning empire.