Remilitarization of Rheinland; possible French response

[Kovax]

Which was working in the 18th century when outside Europe you had nothing but "worthless wasteland"... in the 20th century the British failed to realize that it is the US, which is endangering their position as the dominant world spanning empire.

I think the first real inkling of that was shortly after the ACW, when one of the monitors was towed across the Atlantic and displayed in European ports. That shifted the balance of naval power practically overnight, as Europe suddenly awoke to the fact that a lot of their best ships had just become obsolete. During the late 1880s or 1890s, the US went from still importing specialty steel from the UK for more demanding applications to exporting its own high-grade steel.

Before WWI, the US was viewed as just another source of manpower to be armed and led by the superior Europeans. By the end of the war, the sheer scale of industrial power in the US had clearly grown to where they were no longer a second-rate agricultural nation, and heading rapidly toward the top spot, but by then it was already too late for the UK to change the situation. The post-war naval treaties reflected the reality of US naval power. By WWII, the US was indeed the senior partner in any alliance. If WWI never happened, or happened in such a way that the US never got involved, it might have been another few decades before that reality became blatantly obvious.

From what I've come to understand, WWI didn't happen immediately after the assassination, in part because Hungary initially blocked Austria-Hungary's vote to declare war, and had to be persuaded and pressured into accepting it. Further expansion of Austria via the conquest of additional territory would have reduced the already limited representation of Hungary in the A-H Parliament, so it was not in Hungary's interests to allow it.

 

[Jorlaan]

It's amazing how overlooked the ACW was in the rest of the world, particularly Europe. It changed how was was fought yet the world didn't get the memo for a good 50 years. Trench warfare and artillery barrages a-la WW1 (just on a smaller scale) along with ironclads, railroads, telegraph, rifled muskets and more changed the face of war forever. Europe was watching the ACW but took almost none of it to heart as it was a war over there, between those odd people with their strange ideas.

The Russo-Japanese war showed just how effective those new machine guns could be in combat, but once again the lesson was overlooked. More bullets just means more determination!

 

[mccarty.geoff]

Off topic but, the Americans were if anything 10 years behind on technology by the ACW. Monitor class type ships had already been used by the French in the Baltic Sea during the Crimean War. The French Gloire and British Warrior were way advanced to anything in the American naval stock. French had breech loaded howitzers with telegraphic signalling. Prussians had breech loaded rifles that could fire 5 times the rate of American bore loaded ones.

 

[Jorlaan]

The Americans were not on the forefront of all these techs to be sure, but I am not alone in seeing the ACW as the first large scale "total war" to involve all of these things together. All of these things existed and were used by other countries, but the combination of them all in such a long total war was something unique before WW1.

The Franco-Prussian was more a short war of movement than a long trench war, despite the fact they had better rifles and artillery. I think this war in particular was a real "last gasp" of the Napoleonic style warfare in fairly large scale. I think it was a bit of an outlier in the period that gave the European nations a false sense of what could be realistically expected in future wars. This becomes especially true with the widespread and proper use of machine guns.

The Crimean war definitely involved trench warfare but was very limited in scale and scope.

The ACW is credited AFAIK with the first rapid redeployment of troops to get to a battle in progress: 1st Bull Run. I believe that the sheer scale of trench and static warfare that dominated the latter phase of the war can definitely be used as a warning that the world failed to recognize.

 

[LizarDAMN]

European powers took great interest in Russo-Japanese war, but they took home the wrong lessons. They saw how "inferior" Japanese army took on those fancy Russian machine guns, but they won, because they trusted the bayonet and had the determination to press attacks home. Imagine, if those were properly led European troops?

 

[Herbert West]

European powers took great interest in Russo-Japanese war, but they took home the wrong lessons. They saw how "inferior" Japanese army took on those fancy Russian machine guns, but they won, because they trusted the bayonet and had the determination to press attacks home. Imagine, if those were properly led European troops?

Yeah, that's not even true for the Elan!-obsessed french army..

 

[demanvanwezel]

European powers took great interest in Russo-Japanese war, but they took home the wrong lessons. They saw how "inferior" Japanese army took on those fancy Russian machine guns, but they won, because they trusted the bayonet and had the determination to press attacks home. Imagine, if those were properly led European troops?

the thing is that machine guns alone aren't enough to stop attacks, they serve to slow down attacks but don't stop them
artillery can stop attacks if they're already primed and ready but that takes time
machine guns combined with artillery however stop any straight-up infantry advance

The Americans were not on the forefront of all these techs to be sure, but I am not alone in seeing the ACW as the first large scale "total war" to involve all of these things together. All of these things existed and were used by other countries, but the combination of them all in such a long total war was something unique before WW1.

The Franco-Prussian was more a short war of movement than a long trench war, despite the fact they had better rifles and artillery. I think this war in particular was a real "last gasp" of the Napoleonic style warfare in fairly large scale. I think it was a bit of an outlier in the period that gave the European nations a false sense of what could be realistically expected in future wars. This becomes especially true with the widespread and proper use of machine guns.

The Crimean war definitely involved trench warfare but was very limited in scale and scope.

The ACW is credited AFAIK with the first rapid redeployment of troops to get to a battle in progress: 1st Bull Run. I believe that the sheer scale of trench and static warfare that dominated the latter phase of the war can definitely be used as a warning that the world failed to recognize.

this was AFAIK because the european powers saw the americans as amateurs who had to learn everything from scratch
their conscripts or professional army would do much better since they were already trained was the general idea
the prussians did learn from it that railways were the key to a succesfull mobilisation leading to their succes in the franco-prussian war and generally people learned (alongside the crimean war) that cavalry had lost it's shock value but was still usefull for scouting

 

[Henry IX]

The major conclusions drawn from the Russo-Japanese war were:

1. Attacking infantry could take any defended position provided they were willing to accept heavy casualties
2. Charges with the bayonet remain the most effective way to take ground and rout the enemy
3. Artillery can destroy field fortifications, allowing infantry attacks to succeed
4. If a flank can be turned the enemy must counter-attack, retreat or risk a rout

This led to the conclusion that success was ultimately due to moral factors rather than purely material ones. It was also assumed that cowering in a trench was deleterious to moral, while aggressive attacks, when carried through, shattered the enemies moral. Hence, virtually every army developed an aggressive doctrine (or at least confirmed their existing ideas about the effectiveness of aggressive doctrine).

The real lessons of the war - largely those that were painfully learnt in 1914-15, are evident to a modern reader but, unfortunately, the phenomenon of confirmation bias meant that the observers of the war drew the conclusion that what they already believed in, and found the evidence to support those beliefs.

The idea that warfare is primarily economic, a matter of material and resources is a fairly modern one, only really becoming accepted with the advent of Marxist history and its emphasis on long term trends and material factors. At the beginning of the 20th century most military theorist fell into two broad schools:

1. That of 'great men' which ascribed success in war to the peculiar genius or limitations of the leaders involved. These type of theorists tended to emphasise the campaigns of people like Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon, seeing the success and failure of a nation in war as being due to the actions of the leadership. These theorists tended to emphasise the importance of leadership training and studying the campaigns of the 'great generals'.

2. That of war as chess, (or in the case of Clausewitz maybe poker), which is won by careful planning and correct implementation of strategy and tactics. These theorists tend to emphasis the importance planning lines of advance, sound tactical training of soldiers and junior officers and detailed mobilisation plans to ensure rapid assembling of mass for the critical battle.

Neither of these schools viewed war as a economic battle, won by the side able to sustain the largest army in the field for the longest time. This view of total war as a societal and economic battle, where armaments policy and social cohesion are the primary factors that determine the outcome of wars, only really gained in popularity as a result of the WWI and its aftermaths such as the Soviet revolution and the collapse of the 2nd Reich.

 

[demanvanwezel]

The major conclusions drawn from the Russo-Japanese war were:

1. Attacking infantry could take any defended position provided they were willing to accept heavy casualties
2. Charges with the bayonet remain the most effective way to take ground and rout the enemy
3. Artillery can destroy field fortifications, allowing infantry attacks to succeed
4. If a flank can be turned the enemy must counter-attack, retreat or risk a rout

This led to the conclusion that success was ultimately due to moral factors rather than purely material ones. It was also assumed that cowering in a trench was deleterious to moral, while aggressive attacks, when carried through, shattered the enemies moral. Hence, virtually every army developed an aggressive doctrine (or at least confirmed their existing ideas about the effectiveness of aggressive doctrine).

The real lessons of the war - largely those that were painfully learnt in 1914-15, are evident to a modern reader but, unfortunately, the phenomenon of confirmation bias meant that the observers of the war drew the conclusion that what they already believed in, and found the evidence to support those beliefs.

The idea that warfare is primarily economic, a matter of material and resources is a fairly modern one, only really becoming accepted with the advent of Marxist history and its emphasis on long term trends and material factors. At the beginning of the 20th century most military theorist fell into two broad schools:

1. That of 'great men' which ascribed success in war to the peculiar genius or limitations of the leaders involved. These type of theorists tended to emphasise the campaigns of people like Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon, seeing the success and failure of a nation in war as being due to the actions of the leadership. These theorists tended to emphasise the importance of leadership training and studying the campaigns of the 'great generals'.

2. That of war as chess, (or in the case of Clausewitz maybe poker), which is won by careful planning and correct implementation of strategy and tactics. These theorists tend to emphasis the importance planning lines of advance, sound tactical training of soldiers and junior officers and detailed mobilisation plans to ensure rapid assembling of mass for the critical battle.

Neither of these schools viewed war as a economic battle, won by the side able to sustain the largest army in the field for the longest time. This view of total war as a societal and economic battle, where armaments policy and social cohesion are the primary factors that determine the outcome of wars, only really gained in popularity as a result of the WWI and its aftermaths such as the Soviet revolution and the collapse of the 2nd Reich.

as an example of your second point and frankly one of the most impressive things coming out of WWI
the germans had a staf general specificly for organising troop transports, for the first few weeks of the war that man had nothing to do except for following up reports as everything went along predetermined pathways and frankly if I were him I'd find that'd be the scariest outcome

 

[Henry IX]

as an example of your second point and frankly one of the most impressive things coming out of WWI
the germans had a staf general specificly for organising troop transports, for the first few weeks of the war that man had nothing to do except for following up reports as everything went along predetermined pathways and frankly if I were him I'd find that'd be the scariest outcome

Cool, but also kind of freaky.

On the flip side, and almost as scary as your example was impressive was the decision in the Austro-Hungarian Empire to slow all the trains down to the speed of the slowest train to make the timetabling easier. Broadly speaking the Germans followed the second school of technocratic warfare while the Austrians were far more of the first school, with a reliance on the 'genius' of their generals to defeat the Russians and Serbs in a quick decisive campaign. Indeed, the Austrian refusal to acknowledge the importance of such mundanities as adequate supplies, railway timetables, platform capabilities and marching speeds was perhaps the worst example of professional negligence in a war littered with examples of incompetence.

 

[Director]

The American monitors were a special-case ship, very useful in coastal waters and rivers but not really capable of fighting at sea. Where Gloire and Warrior would never have been able to operate close-in, the monitors would have been difficult to fight in a seaway. The real advantage the Americans had was superior ordinance: no other nation could roll out 15" Dahlgrens or massive rifled cannons of the Brooke, Parrott and Dahlgren types. They were quite capable of smashing any seagoing ironclad's armor of that period; in its own element of shallow water the monitor was more manueverable (but slower) and presented a far smaller target. If the two types fought each other it would likely be on the monitor's home ground - shallow, restricted waters - where the seagoing ironclad would not be able to use its superior speed nor manuever to use its broadside guns very often. So... for the purpose it was built for, the monitor was an excellent ship. The error was in theorizing from the specific to the general - it was not the best warship in all cases.

The purpose of 'shell' munitions was to stick in the side of the ship, explode and rip open the armor (or wood). it was not to penetrate the hull and explode inside, partly because the fuses weren't that sturdy and accurate and partly because if the shell went through one side it might well go out of the other, too. Shell was best used against wooden ships, or thinly armored ones. Shot was intended to smash at armor plate like a hammer, racking and cracking it so that shell could be used.

The American armies of the ACW were miracles of improvisation and European observers were often appalled at the lack of parade-ground spit-and-polish; they could, however deeply appreciate, for one example, Grant's supply base at City Point. The Northern armies in particular were well supplied and equipped, and well-led. Given the British Army's record from the Crimean War to the Boer War to WW1, I would not be confident that Britain could match an American force after, say, 1862. There was nothing wrong with the British Army's manpower - splendid soldiers - but quite a lot wrong with the ones who supplied, equipped and led them. There were of course outstanding British generals and inept American ones, and I do think generalship counts for a lot in this period.

Always bear in mind that the North fought over and conquered an area the size of Western Europe from Spain through Germany. Thinly populated, to be sure, but the sheer scale of the ACW often gets overlooked.

The 'American Century' can be dated from the end of WW1, in large part because the industrial and financial center of the world moved across the Atlantic. The latter may be more important; to pay for the war, Britain liquidated her financial holdings and borrowed enormous amounts. The USA had until that time been a debtor nation - the vast expansion of American industry and railroads was paid for largely by European loans. But as Britain and France cashed in and borrowed, the USA became the largest lender and New York became the new financial center.

 

[_Harpoon_09]

Even if German pulled its troops away due to the French reacting, wouldn’t Germany just try again later? All i see happening is the war effort just being delayed for whatever amount of time. Unless France somehow maintained complete stability until Germany’s second try

 

[Henry IX]

Even if German pulled its troops away due to the French reacting, wouldn’t Germany just try again later? All i see happening is the war effort just being delayed for whatever amount of time. Unless France somehow maintained complete stability until Germany’s second try

The political cost to the Nazi party maybe sufficient to prevent a second attempt. Having to withdraw troops before a French action will be a humiliation, which for a government that still lacks a measure of legitimacy could be disastrous. In OTL the remilitarisation of the Rhineland was a huge boost the Nazi's popularity, particularly with the conservative/military faction, who represented the greatest real threat to Nazi power. A retreat from the French could well be enough to set off a serious coup attempt.

Ultimately, if the Germans were prepared to keep trying there would likely be a point where the French give up or fail to react, but this approach may not be possible given the internal political situation in Germany.

 

[VTs]

Even if German pulled its troops away due to the French reacting, wouldn’t Germany just try again later? All i see happening is the war effort just being delayed for whatever amount of time. Unless France somehow maintained complete stability until Germany’s second try

General Heinz Guderian, a German general interviewed by French officers after the Second World War, claimed: "If you French had intervened in the Rhineland in 1936 we should have been sunk and Hitler would have fallen."