The US Bonus Army Conflict of 1932

[Jopa79]

The US Army WWI veterans and their families camping on the lawn of the US Capitol in Summer 1932.

The US Bonus Army was a reference used by the media of the WWI American Expeditionary Forces. The Bonus Army Conflict was an incident between the US WWI veterans, their families (together 42 000 demonstrators) and the US Army (500 of infantrymen - 500 of horsemen - 800 policemen - 6 M17 light tanks). Simultaneously with the Bonus Army Conflict also the Great Depression and the Dust Bowl draggled and plagued the US economy and the industry. Many of the US WWI veterans were unemployed and their money was scarce.

In 1924 the US Congress enacted the World War Adjusted Compensation Act, promising to pay subsidies for the 3.6 million US WWI veterans - the value of the total supposed payment in 2018 money is equivalent to $54 billion. Based on the days-in-duty during the war every veteran received a bonus certification, but they could not redeem the certificates until 1948. However, in 1932 many of the war veterans had been hit hardly during the early days of the Great Depression and asked the Congress to redeem their bonus certificates early. President Herbert Hoover and the Republican congressmen refused such a action as any potential economy recovery would be slowed in case of early redeems.

In order to suppress the US Bonus Army demonstrators the US Army used M17 tanks for instance. Probably the only time the US has used tanks against its own people.

It was not only the demonstrators, but also many ordinary Americans were outraged - how could the Congress treat the WWI veterans with a such a disrespect, 20% of the demonstrators were disabled. Later and after the conflict Hoover was heavily criticized using excessive actions against the US Bonus Army veterans.

Most of the Bonus Army camped in "Hooverville" (a shanty town built by the homeless during the Great Depression). Remonstrating, they organized parades, marching against the Congress and Hoover demanding the early redeeming of the certificates. The US Senate voted about the Bonus Bill on June 17th and the Bonus Army massed at the US Capitol. The Bonus Bill was defeated by Senate voting. On July 28th Hoover ordered the US Army to disperse the protesters. Infantry, cavalry, machine gunners and tanks pushed the protesters out of Washington injuring more than 1 000 marchers during the Bonus Army Conflict. Later on, back in the "Hooverville" the police shot two veterans whom died afterwards.

Overall, the US Army and the police intervention in order to suppress the protest was violent with cavalry charging and infantry using fixed bayonets and tear-gas. After hitting the "Hooverville", tearing down and burning the "Bonusers" campsite Hoover ordered to stop the assault, however General Douglas MacArthur ignored the President's command, claiming that the Bonus March was an attempt to overthrow the US Government MacArthur ordered a new attack chasing down the routed protesters - the veterans, their wives and children were driven out, all their shelters and belongings burned.

The Bonus Army Conflict was disastrous for Hoover and while also unable to resolve the miseries by the Great Depression this event is considered as a contributor factor Hoover losing the 1932 elections. After the second Bonus March in 1933, the US Congress decided to pay the subsidies in 1936.

 

[Henry IX]

Ah, General MacArthur, the great American hero, patriot and murderer of the innocent. It is one of the injustices of history that people like him get statues and medals instead of a long time in a small dark prison cell.

 

[Yakman]

Ah, General MacArthur, the great American hero, patriot and murderer of the innocent. It is one of the injustices of history that people like him get statues and medals instead of a long time in a small dark prison cell.

he almost destroyed the UN Army two, if not three times in Korea. Essentially embezzled a massive sum from the Philipines treasury before heading to Australia while leaving his army to disaster at Corregdior. Completely failed to adequately garrison and prepare the Philippines for the Japanese invasion. His 'great triumph' was that he followed a playbook which Eisenhower and Nimitz devised.

overrated blowhard.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

he almost destroyed the UN Army two, if not three times in Korea. Essentially embezzled a massive sum from the Philipines treasury before heading to Australia while leaving his army to disaster at Corregdior. Completely failed to adequately garrison and prepare the Philippines for the Japanese invasion. His 'great triumph' was that he followed a playbook which Eisenhower and Nimitz devised.

overrated blowhard.

No, he did not follow Nimitz's playbook. He demanded a separate team of his own with its own playbook whose agenda was to physically wrest the Phillipines back in his own name regardless of the fact it was totally unnecessary to the Island Hopping strategy of the Big Blue Fleet. And George C. Marshall gave it to him. Marshall was an excellent judge of men, it is quite possible he knows things we do not.

I remember Gregory Peck balking at playing MacArthur because he did not like the man personally. But he spent a great deal of time studying the man and the realities of his situation and came away with a great deal more respect.

MacArthur is never one of my favorites, but he is more than you describe.

 

[Kovax]

As said, there is more to MacArthur than a cursory review of his actions would suggest. Whether that's a positive thing or not is questionable, and I'm not sure if some of it might not be confidential information, but other people seem to have made unusual exceptions for him on several occasions, for some unknown reason. I get the impression that I'm somehow missing a very important piece of the puzzle, so I reserve judgement at least to some degree.

I consider his concept of taking on the Japanese "head on" after telling them what he was going to do, in order to refute their beliefs in their own infallibility, as very likely criminally wasteful of human lives (both American and Japanese).

 

[Henry IX]

MacArthur is never one of my favorites, but he is more than you describe.

I tend to agree, as military commander he was generally competent, although his rank exceeded his competence. My deep dislike of him is related to his utter disregard for human life. He did not care how many of his own men he lost (or at least showed no signs of caring), he willingly murdered civilians when it suited his political beliefs and actively attempted to bring on a nuclear apocalypse for strategic advantage.

 

[Gerle]

I remember Gregory Peck balking at playing MacArthur because he did not like the man personally.

Gregory's son Stephen served in Vietnam as a Marine Lieutenant. Most Marines aren't part of the MacArthur fan club.

Regarding the Bonus Army, Smedley Butler sided with the veterans. "On July 19 Butler arrived with his young son Thomas, the day before the official eviction by the Hoover administration. He walked through the camp and spoke to the veterans; he told them that they were fine soldiers and they had a right to lobby Congress just as much as any corporation. He and his son spent the night and ate with the men, and in the morning Butler gave a speech to the camping veterans. He instructed them to keep their sense of humor and cautioned them not to do anything that would cost public sympathy. On July 28, army cavalry units led by General Douglas MacArthur dispersed the Bonus Army by riding through it and using gas. During the conflict several veterans were killed or injured and Butler declared himself a "Hoover-for-Ex-President-Republican"."

 

[newtlord]

While 'Dugout Doug' did give the order and was clearly the one in charge, he took the blame for this in a way that future President/General Eisenhower and 'Old Blood and Guts' Patton very successfully dodged.

Without going into full Nuremberg Defense territory, I suspect that most people feel that doing wrong in the course of following orders is less culpable than doing wrong in the face of superior orders not to do said wrong thing.

 

[Henry IX]

That seems to have been a prerequisite for higher command in WW2.

While 'Dugout Doug' did give the order and was clearly the one in charge, he took the blame for this in a way that future President/General Eisenhower and 'Old Blood and Guts' Patton very successfully dodged. Eisenhower was his aide and took part with what I would argue is equal guilt, and no more hesitation than to write a line in his diary about how he wished MacArthur had handled things differently. Patton was confronted by a veteran who literally saved his life in France in WW1 and begged him not to drive them down with the tanks, but that didn't mean anything to him either.

The only difference between these 3 careerists is that MacArthur was the biggest show off and had more time in the army to get disliked more later, Patton was able to channel his numerous faux pas into the image of an 'aggressive commander' because the Americans needed someone to compare favourably to the German and Russian leaders and Eisenhower never left his office again after having gained his only combat experience on this 'battlefield'.

I agree that a commander needs to be able to 'spend' the lives of his men for military victory and to this extent all commanders have a disregard for the lives of their men. MacArthur, however, was willing to spend the lives of his men for his own ego and political gain. He was also willing to kill civilians for his own ego and political gain.

I will not argue with the statement that Patton was callous with the lives of his men, but he at least appeared to genuinely believe that his methods would win the war most effectively. Unless MacArthur was an idiot (and he wasn't) he must have known that invading the isolated garrison in the Philippines was not going win the war. He invaded to make good on his bombastic promise to return. That is the difference between a brutal and uncaring commander, such as Patton or Zhukov, and someone like MacArthur.

 

[Director]

MacArthur is the most sharply contradictory personality I am aware of from the American Army. I do have some deeply grudged respect for the man, but I have to say my father served in the Pacific in WW2 under his command and never had one, single thing to say about him that was not contemptuous.

He was, simultaneously, a fine administrator and a careless one, a fine combat leader and a disinterested one, a public-relations hog with Presidential Fever who had no actual political instincts, a military visionary of limited vision. His combat record in WW1 is outstanding; his assault on the Bonus Army a black mark that should never be expunged. He achieved the pinnacle of the Army, retired, accepted the job of building up the Philippine Army (for which he received only a fraction of the money and arms needed). His response in the hours after the Pearl Harbor strike was curiously muted - he did nothing - permitting his B-17s to be attacked and destroyed. He mis-estimated what the Philippine Army could do, lost the battle at the water's edge and retreated in decent order to the Bataan Peninsula.

His controversial escape to Australia was in fact directly ordered by the President. His early record in Australia was mixed - his ego apparently did not charm the Allies - but he did put together forces to hold Port Moresby and then push across New Guinea. His land-sea-air 'base hopping' campaigns up New Guinea are both a master class in how to get the most from superior mobility and logistics, and a horror story of him driving men past the point they should reasonably have been expected to go.

The invasion of the Philippines was typical MacArthur: Leyte was called a success long before it was over and Manila was abandoned to Japanese atrocities (200,000 Filipinos dead) because he feared fighting in the city would destroy it. In the end, his willpower - and American naval, air and ground power - did get the job done, and MacArthur did see to it that the starving civilians got fed and treated. His conduct of the Japanese surrender ceremony was without reproach.

Inchon in Korea was a masterstroke; his attempts to drive to the Yalu and re-unite Korea a thorough and horrifically costly mistake.

Dwight Eisenhower once said, "I studied dramatics under General MacArthur" and there is no doubt the patience earned that way stood him in good stead as SHAEF.


MacArthur is, I think, everything good AND bad said about him. I always think of him as Montgomery on steroids... MacArthur was outsized, petty, brilliant and egotistical, a man who could not live up to his own PR but did at least try. I think it would have been better for FDR to call him back to DC and give command in the Pacific to Nimitz, but I have no idea what job you could give MacArthur that would keep him quiet and busy. He would have relentlessly backstabbed and second-guessed, sabotaged and leaked to the newspapers because he KNEW beyond any doubt that he MUST be in charge.

All you can do with that sort is let them lead or shoot them. it is a pity Roosevelt couldn't find a way to shoot him - but he didn't, so the SW Pacific command was probably the best place to push him off to.

Apologies for this going on so long. it's just that I really want to despise the man, and then I study his base-hopping campaign, or Inchon, and I just can't.


Just as a note: the Philippines were invaded for one strategic reason, to provide airbases for American bombers. It came down to the Philippines or Formosa, and MacArthur swung the argument his way in staff conferences with the service heads and the President. He did sincerely want to redeem himself and free the Filipino people, but the real reason was bases for further forward movement and for aerial bombardment.

 

[AjayAlcos]

Just as a note: the Philippines were invaded for one strategic reason, to provide airbases for American bombers. It came down to the Philippines or Formosa, and MacArthur swung the argument his way in staff conferences with the service heads and the President. He did sincerely want to redeem himself and free the Filipino people, but the real reason was bases for further forward movement and for aerial bombardment.

I should also add that during that stage of 1944, the only areas in considered for invasion in the Pacific Theatre were Formosa (aka Taiwan) or the Philippines.

The historian Robert Ross Smith dedicated a hefty chunk of a chapter in his book Triumph in the Philippines covering the strategic debate (see Chapter I if you wish to read the section as a whole) on whether the US should invade Formosa or liberate the Philippines. To summarize & simplify: the US Navy (Nimitz to be specific) desired an invasion of Formosa whereas the US Army (MacArthur to put it bluntly) wanted an invasion of the Philippines. As to which was or would've been the more viable target, all I can say is that Formosa would've been a much tougher nut to crack considering its more rugged terrain (especially the mountainous ranges running along the eastern side of the island), its proximity to Japanese airbases on the Chinese Mainland (which would've caused more aerial interdiction on Allied naval assets) and lastly a perhaps not so compliant populace - something which by extension would certainly keep them bereft of sources for local intel (e.g. the type gathered by extensive guerilla networks) unlike with the Philippines (see Philippine resistance movement.

As for how the Philippines Campaign played out, the operations to retake Luzon and parts of the Visayas (e.g. Leyte) were by my humble reckoning of strategic necessity; whereas the ones to retake Mindanao (conducted by the US 8th Army) was a waste of time.

Addendum:

If you guys don't feel like reading the PDF. Bernhard Kast incidentally did a video regarding this topic:

 

[bz249]

I should also add that during that stage of 1944, the only areas in considered for invasion in the Pacific Theatre were Formosa (aka Taiwan) or the Philippines.

The historian Robert Ross Smith dedicated a hefty chunk of a chapter in his book Triumph in the Philippines covering the strategic debate (see Chapter I if you wish to read the section as a whole) on whether the US should invade Formosa or liberate the Philippines. To summarize & simplify: the US Navy (Nimitz to be specific) desired an invasion of Formosa whereas the US Army (MacArthur to put it bluntly) wanted an invasion of the Philippines. As to which was or would've been the more viable target, all I can say is that Formosa would've been a much tougher nut to crack considering its more rugged terrain (especially the mountainous ranges running along the eastern side of the island), its proximity to Japanese airbases on the Chinese Mainland (which would've caused more aerial interdiction on Allied naval assets) and lastly a perhaps not so compliant populace - something which by extension would certainly keep them bereft of sources for local intel (e.g. the type gathered by extensive guerilla networks) unlike with the Philippines (see Philippine resistance movement.

As for how the Philippines Campaign played out, the operations to retake Luzon and parts of the Visayas (e.g. Leyte) were by my humble reckoning of strategic necessity; whereas the ones to retake Mindanao (conducted by the US 8th Army) was a waste of time.

How would the Battle of Leyte play out with Formosa? Because as it was the Philippines Campaign did serve its role, namely it forced the Japanese Navy to commit their last remaining forces.

 

[AjayAlcos]

How would the Battle of Leyte play out with Formosa? Because as it was the Philippines Campaign did serve its role, namely it forced the Japanese Navy to commit their last remaining forces.

Battle of Leyte?

If Operation Causeway had proceeded, the U.S land forces would've made landfall within the vicinity of Kaohsiung (to the south of the island) and then advance up the lowlands along the western coastline all the way up to Taipei to the north. The Japanese forces, having lost the more populated lowlands would in all likelihood fall back to the highlands & mountains to the west of the island - turning them into fortified killzones.

It would be akin to the Battles of Okinawa & Iwo Jima combined.

As for the Battle of Leyte Gulf - there are too many variables unique to that battle to forsee how such a situation may have been replicated in the event of invading Formosa. What is certain is that the IJN would've proceeded with Shō-Gō 2 as envisioned by Admiral Soemu Toyoda (Shō-Gō 1 being that plan which lead to the naval battles off Samar and the one at Leyte Gulf) which would in likelihood repeat the similarly sophisticated manoeuvres which the IJN employed in the Philippines.

I guess it depends on whether Admiral Halsey Jr. repeats the cock-up he made just before Leyte Gulf like in RL. Other than that, the Japanese would have more multiple directions (i.e. airbases in occupied Mainland China) with which to launch kamikaze attacks on allied shipping - if Formosa were to have been invaded.

 

[bz249]

Battle of Leyte?

If Operation Causeway had proceeded, the U.S land forces would've made landfall within the vicinity of Kaohsiung (to the south of the island) and then advance up the lowlands along the western coastline all the way up to Taipei to the north. The Japanese forces, having lost the more populated lowlands would in all likelihood fall back to the highlands & mountains to the west of the island - turning them into fortified killzones.

It would be akin to the Battles of Okinawa & Iwo Jima combined.

As for the Battle of Leyte Gulf - there are too many variables unique to that battle to forsee how such a situation may have been replicated in the event of invading Formosa. What is certain is that the IJN would've proceeded with Shō-Gō 2 as envisioned by Admiral Soemu Toyoda (Shō-Gō 1 being that plan which lead to the naval battles off Samar and the one at Leyte Gulf) which would in likelihood repeat the similarly sophisticated manoeuvres & which the IJN employed in the Philippines.

I guess it depends on whether Admiral Halsey Jr. repeats the cock-up he made just before Leyte Gulf like in RL. Other than that, the Japanese would have more multiple directions (i.e. airbases in occupied Mainland China) with which to launch kamikaze attacks on allied shipping - if Formosa were to have been invaded.

If I understood correctly: no matter what the IJN cannot evade anymore and have to seek battle, however they had had more "home field advantage" in case we have a naval battle of Formosa.

 

[AjayAlcos]

If I understood correctly: no matter what the IJN cannot evade anymore and have to seek battle, however they had had more "home field advantage" in case we have a naval battle of Formosa.

Pretty much.

Though I must duly stress that in such a scenario. It cannot be expected that the battle will play it the way it did like in IRL. Its possible that the IJN would've caused more damage to allied naval forces or perhaps even less so; if lady luck were show more favour to the allies then. It all depends on how the "actors" onstage react when placed in such new circumstances - like Vice Admiral Kurita pressing his attack off Samar or Admiral Halsey deciding not to pursue Admiral Ozawa's depleted decoy force in an alternate reality. Even so, it would almost certainly have ended with the same result