Well a land cruising Surcouf would certainly have been a challenge against the German FlederMaus, as it would have been able to engage them in air, land and sea.
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Soviet flying armored carriers would have turned all your super duper machines into dust in few seconds.
I am not able to tell you much about the history of the propulsion system of the Béarn, but I can tell you that the Lenght-to-Beam ratio is pretty different between a BC and a BB.That doesn't mean that she couldn't get more powerful propulsion
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one potential use for the french state under petain instead of occupying it all was international recognition
petain's government had more legitimacy then that of de gaule being the continuation of the previous government
so if foreign governments recognised the petain government as legitimate (like the US did, a sore point with de gaulle) then any treaties would also have to be seen as legitimate, like for example any peace treaty it would have with germany
petain's government had more legitimacy then that of de gaule being the continuation of the previous government
so if foreign governments recognised the petain government as legitimate (like the US did, a sore point with de gaulle) then any treaties would also have to be seen as legitimate, like for example any peace treaty it would have with germany
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The only upgrades to the original vessel came at the end of WWII when it sailed to US and was refitted with modern AAA armaments for Atlantic patrols during France's militiary rearmament after the war and improvements to its AVGAS system
It remained in service till '67 when it was scrapped.
Forty years on a WWI era capital ship is getting your money's worth. Even if it sat out an entire war guarding an island and not getting into mischeif.
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Albeit there was a clear problem of doctrines and certainly also of logistics, the main problem of the French army, in my humble opinion, was that its High Command, including within the French government, actually wished a defeat against Germany in order to destroy the Republic and to establish a reactionary regime. We have to remember, after all, that, if I'm remembering correctly, German daily casualties were higher in France, during the invasion, than in the the East Front.
The French High command refused to obey orders from the government to organise counter-attacks and within the Government opposed to the war before it started, and plead to seek peace at day one of German invasion. (It started, in fact, when Germany violated the demilitarization of Rhineland: the government ordered to the French army to "bring Germans out of Rhineland" and the High Command simply refused).
Philippe Pétain even ordered to French soldiers to stop the fight while they were still fighting with German soldiers and while nothing was even negotiated with Germany yet!
So Germany invaded and found an agreement with Pétain. Germany get the opportunity to not have to occupy the whole French state and, hence, to neutralise it at lower cost. Pétain and other members of the High Command get the last opportunity of the reactionary traditional right to establish the regime of their dreams since Chambord failed to be crowd King of France.
One of the French act of the dictatorship of Pétain was, symbolically, the abrogation of Wallon's amendement. That is why Maurras, who was staunchly Germanophobic, welcomed the French defeat as a divine providence.
Pétain's government under the Lebrun's presidency of the Republic had more legitimacy, obviously, as Pétain was president of the Council of Ministers while Ch. de Gaulle was just a member of the government send in London by the previous president of the Council: Reynaud.
However, the presidency of the French state by Pétain result from a very clear institutional coup. Every aspects of his accession to dictatorial powers were illegal. Not only the result, but his disrespect from the act which allowed him to this result, the act itself, how this act was decided and the way it was decided...
1. A constitutional law need an adoption by an absolute majority of its members, but the count of the one of 1940 was based on valid votes only, while many members of the Parliament were prevented to seat there.
2. The Parliament hadn't the constitutional power to delegate constitutional powers to the head of government, while the so-called constitutional law does.
3. The Republican aspect of the French constitution cannot be constitutionally revised, while Pétain did.
4. The so-called constitutional law of 1940 did mend Pétain to establish a constitution which should had been ratified by the Nation (id est by referendum) and enforced by the Parliamentary assemblies... Pétain established the new constitution by himself, on his own authority, without ever asking anything to the Nation nor to the Parliamentary assemblies he did close.
So, no, Petain's government certainly hadn't more legitimacy than Ch. de Gaulle... It isn't exactly the good word to label his situation.
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Sure once the French army lost, there were military leaders and politicians like Petain who took advantage of it to pursue personal or ideological agendas, but it hardly means there was a massive conspiracy from the start to bring such a loss about. Even I’d such a conspiracy existed and had the power in the military to effect it, they would have just launched a military coup to replace the government rather than risking a potentially disastrous military defeat to Germany.
As to legitimacy, it’s a tricky concept. Both the Vichy and Free French governments came into existence in very unusual ways, in the midst of constitutional crisis level catastrophic events and extenuating circumstances. Regardless of precise legality, a fair amount of the world was willing to explicitly or tacitly recognize the Vichy regime (many more than recognized say Manchukuo or Mongolia for instance). Even Canada and Australia, staunch British Allies, recognized the Vichy Government.
There obviously wasn't a conspiracy (you argue against a straw man). There was a big sense of opportunity, and it appears quite clearly from historical documentation being waaaaaaaaaaay before "the French army lost". Before its first fights... Within the French High Command, many saw the Republican regime as a more despicable enemy and as a worse threat for French morality than Hitler's Germany, and English more malevolent than Germans.
Compared to other French generals, Petain seemed to be very republican; which just goes to show...
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I mean, if the military was refusing to follow orders because they believed a defeat for the nation would be the best outcome, it sounds like a conspiracy of some sort. That said, I disagree with some of your points on this.
The French Government didn’t order the army into the Rhineland. Sure the military opposed meeting it with force (as with practically the entire French Government, which was only a caretaker government at that), believing there were many more German forces in the Rhineland than in reality, being worried about the strength of the German Airforce compared to France, being worried about getting into a war with Germany without British support.
As for actual WWII, most of the French military didn’t actually have the capacity to organize any sort of viable counterattacks after the main force in Belgium was cut off.
they failed at it before that, the first french tankcorps ran out of fuel, the 2nd was overrun when they were forming up for their counter-attack, the third was already bled at gembloux and was stuck near sedan and the 4th (under de gaulle) actually did make a counterattack but was driven off by overwhelming stuka fire
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A conspiracy would be organised and proactive...
Opportunism is reactive, and it was, here, an opportunistic motive.
The timeline is:
The 7th of March, German Armies enter in Rhineland.
The 8th of March, the French council of ministers, albeit it was indeed divided, order a partial mobilization of the army, with the aim of a military action in Rhineland. IIRC, Sarraut, the president of the French Council ordered to Gamelin, the head of French High Command to immediately expel Germans troops out Rhineland... and Gamelin refused to obey to the government... It is as simple as that.
There were strong factious feelings within the army and especially the High Command, feed by defeatism, obviously, but also by anti-republicanism and anti-parliamentarism (and, paradoxically, by Anglophobia).
So, facing this refusal of the high command, and, informed by the High Command that there were many more German Forces in the Rhineland than in reality, and the army refusing to act. The divided council, now facing the insubordination of the High Command, lost its willingness, was dominated by "doves" and seek British and Italian support, like you describe it.
But it have to be added that the watchword of the right-wing politically close to Pétain and many others generals, at the time of the re-militarization of Rhineland was: "No Jewish Crusade [against Germany]" or "We'll not fight for Jewish". That also enlighten how Hitler's threat was perceived, and indeed it seem it wasn't what appeared to be the main threat in High Command's mind. A defeat would be a blessing in disguise and they indeed lauded the defeat as a divine providence.
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But motive alone isn't enough to prove anything. Otherwise, one might conclude from your username description and signature that your claims here are politically motivated and are therefore not credible. It's a possibility you should consider.
But motive alone isn't enough to prove anything. Otherwise, one might conclude from your username description and signature that your claims here are politically motivated and are therefore not credible. It's a possibility you should consider.
I feel this answer is to address to Eric, who talked about a conspiracy, not to me who wrote about an (accomplished) wish.
The main threat, for the French High Command, weren't Germans, but the parliamentary and social Republic. France had to be purged from French Revolution's and Popular Front's corruption. It had to renew to a nationalistic version of the Ancient Order. British allies were deemed more vile than German enemies. There was such a factious spirit that the Army dared to refuse obeying orders to the civil and political power! That isn't anecdotal.
When the High Command is in this state of mind, and when its representatives before the war, during the Phoney War, and during the Invasion of France oppose any fight and only weight on reaching peace with Germany, and when you had to that High Command defeatism, when the High Command is even more "pacifist" than the French population and when its figurehead become Philippe Pétain that everyone know here... it become clear that it is probable that having a full Maginot Line or that having proper carriers wouldn't had changed the course of war (which, if you read my post instead of Eric's, was my explicit point).
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Your claim was that...
This led to things like...
...and...
But you failed to demonstrate how this would make a difference. You failed to demonstrate that the French were capable of a counterattack (they weren't) or that Petain keeping the French fighting the Germans would result in anything but his men dying (it wouldn't).
Because you failed to demonstrate how the French were actually capable of counterattacks or that fighting on after all had clearly been lost would have accomplished anything, you have failed to eliminate other possible motivations for the French commanders' actions. If there are possible motivations A, B, C, and D for an action, you can't logically claim it is D without first eliminating A, B, and C.
Applying that logic here, refusing to undertake an offensive could be due to its infeasibility, its futility, its risk, or dislike for the government (along with a host of other reasons). Launching a particular counterattack could be a very risky move and any commander would be well-justified in refusing to attack on those grounds. It may also not have been feasible in the manner requested, which are also valid reasons to refuse. It could also be futile, which, depending on the intelligence a commander had, could be another perfectly valid reason. By failing to eliminate these reasons as possible motivations, you have failed to prove your argument.
That's my point. You're taking D and holding it up as the absolute truth, when in reality there are an array of better explanations for what happened. As to why you're doing so I can only speculate. I had a discussion recently with someone who thought the Italians could have taken Egypt in 1940, his explanation for why they didn't being that the Italian generals were conspiring against the government. I questioned him on the logistics, manpower, equipment, doctrine, and geographic limitations of the situation, but he kept coming back to that theory. This seems similar. People try all sorts of ways to rationalize how their particular favored country was defeated in a way that makes it look like they were defeated from within, rather than admit another nation beat them. That could be where this theory originated.
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I am not sure to understand what you want to see demonstrated? That Petain did ordered to French troops to ceasefire even before trying to reach an agreement with Germany (id est when German troops were still ordered to fire on French troops) or to demonstrate that would Petain had not ordered that that the course of war would had been different?
If you ask the former, that is simple: Philippe Petain order to French troops to cease fire the 17th of June. The German do not receive such kind of order the 16th of June. The armistice is negociated the 21st of June and signed the 22nd of June.
I feel you ask the latter. If so, nobody know, obviously, neither you nor me, and it couldn't be demonstrated. You ask for pure speculation, closer to fan fiction
than to History. My opinion is that History is about what happened, not about what might had happened...However, what we can see, when we only check what happened rather than wondering what could had happened, is:
1. That Pétain indeed established the regime that we know and collaborated with Germany...
2. That, contrary to Pétain, Darlan, & alii's expectations, this war wasn't the Franco-Prussian War III but the World War II, that Germany broke with the Soviet Union, that the United States entered to war and that Germany was eventually totally defeated.
2. That Free French forces and Ch. de Gaulle continuing the war allowed France, despite its debacle in 1940 and its quite modest contribution to the war after 1940, to seat among the Four main Victorious Powers in Europe, with its own occupation zone in Germany and Austria, and among the Five main Victorious Powers in the world, reaching a permanent membership with a right to express its veto in the Security Council of the United Nations organisation...
I didn't failed to demonstrate that French were capable or not capable of counterattacks or to fight. I didn't cared, nor even considered it. That simply isn't my point. That is out topic and, as I've said previously, not an historical questioning I feel (albeit I obviously respect those who like to wonder on "what if" scenarii; that is just not my cup of tea).
My point is, in fact, that having a better Maginot line or proper aircraft careers wouldn't had changed the fate of France, because albeit there was a clear problem of doctrines and certainly also of logistics, the main problem of the French army, in my humble opinion, was that its High Command, including within the French government, actually wished a defeat against Germany in order to destroy the Republic and to establish a reactionary regime (I quote myself in Italic).
There was a strong hostility against Weimar Republic among the French Far Right and the high command which was sensitive to this school of thought. But as soon as Hitler was elected, it sort of vanished. In 1936 like in 1939 or in 1940, there wasn't any strong willingness among the High Command, to fight Germany. It is well known when you read miscellaneous political memories. Defeatism is a word that happen very commonly. There was, however, a strong incentive to put down the corrupt Republic, even more after the Popular Front. "Everyone, but not Blum" was a famous watchword among the right wing of that time, and this "everyone" was obviously quite extensive...
This can be seen when The French High command refused to obey orders from the government to organise counter-attacks (I quote myself in Italic) which show an insubordination of the military power to the constitutional power which normally have authority over it. That isn't up to the military power to refuse orders from the government. Cedant arma togae. Gamelin, Weygan or Petain might obviously advise that it is a very, very, very bad idea to do so. But simply refusing, by their own authority, to obey order is called in any functional representative regime a faction.
When an High Command do not strongly want to succeed a war, it is off to a bad start... It is one major explanation to French defeat. An army of deer commanded by a lion is more to be feared than an army of lions commanded by a deer, you know this very old saying...
That doesn't mean, obviously, that an High Command that strongly want to succeed a war would automatically won the war nor even that wining the war would had been possible would the course of events had happened differently... This question is sterile. Nobody could know... But this mean that even with a better equipment, better doctrines or better logistics, France anyway ranked itself as a no-hoper...
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Try reading my post again. You're just repeating the same logical errors. Though you did perhaps betray more of your purpose:
From your signature and description, you seem like you're on the left. If you buy into the binary constructs that many people tend to, you perhaps think by categorizing the "right" as responsible for France's fall, it makes the left look better. Thus, the motive for your post and argument is not historical reality, it is modern politics. Political intentions make for poor history.
Now, I don't know if that's true for you, but you're giving off the impression of a partisan.
What I'm asking for you to do is show me otherwise. Make an argument grounded in historical fact that shows the reason for the commanders' actions was political disdain for the government. Saying that it's a possible explanation is worthless for your claim. You need to show that it was the reason. Saying the commanders didn't like the government isn't enough, you need to show how that dislike transformed into them taking actions that led to France's defeat. Showing they took actions like Petain's ceasefire isn't enough. You need to show how they took actions that were illogical and inexplicable except for a hatred for the government. To use Petain's ceasefire as an example, by that time everyone knew France was done. If Petain was trying to save his own men by ordering a ceasefire, that's a logical reason for doing what he did that is separate from a dislike for the government.
From your signature and description, you seem like you're on the left. If you buy into the binary constructs that many people tend to, you perhaps think by categorizing the "right" as responsible for France's fall, it makes the left look better. Thus, the motive for your post and argument is not historical reality, it is modern politics. Political intentions make for poor history.
Now, I don't know if that's true for you, but you're giving off the impression of a partisan.
What I'm asking for you to do is show me otherwise. Make an argument grounded in historical fact that shows the reason for the commanders' actions was political disdain for the government. Saying that it's a possible explanation is worthless for your claim. You need to show that it was the reason. Saying the commanders didn't like the government isn't enough, you need to show how that dislike transformed into them taking actions that led to France's defeat. Showing they took actions like Petain's ceasefire isn't enough. You need to show how they took actions that were illogical and inexplicable except for a hatred for the government. To use Petain's ceasefire as an example, by that time everyone knew France was done. If Petain was trying to save his own men by ordering a ceasefire, that's a logical reason for doing what he did that is separate from a dislike for the government.
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That's a very speculative allegation, and that's an argumentum ad hominem. And like any argumentum ad hominem, that's out-topic.
Well, no, I am not that old...
I'll answer it tomorrow, because it's late, but before continuing, just to be sure to understand what you expect... can you explain me what is, according to you, my "claim" exactly?
However, this one is just too funny:
Ceasing fire on those who still continue to fire on you is certainly a very good way to save "his own men", yes, good idea...
And by that time not everyone know France was done. Reynaud thought the war wasn't done for France. Mandel neither. Ch. de Gaulle thought the war wasn't done, nor Leclerc... The members of the parliament who sailed to French Algeria to continue the war from there thought the war wasn't done. Those who tried to join colonies or London to continue war thought that war wasn't done.
And if only one thought it, it invalidate your allegation that "everyone one knew it". Especially since History show that the war wasn't done. What was done was Mainland France. But France had colonies, still had a functional fleet, had allies to whom it promised to not conclude separate peace. And there was other powers that didn't yet joined the war...
The good sentence, hence, is "by that time many thought France was done".
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I'll ignore the rest since there are clearly comprehension issues probably caused by language differences so I'll boil it down to the basics (as a quick correction: it's not an ad hominem when it's relevant, and political views can be relevant in these discussions since they give motives for believing incorrect historical accounts. People believe what they wish to hear).
Here's what I see your claim as:
You have yet to provide any evidence for that claim. You have given examples of generals not following certain orders. My point, which you haven't understood, is that this is not evidence that supports your claim unless you can show that the reason they didn't follow orders was that they wanted to lose. You haven't done that at all.
Even if you show that, you're not done since you claim this is the main problem. Not mobilization issues caused by draft resistance, not inconsistent and strike-ridden industry, not doctrinal issues, not poor leadership or organization. You have to demonstrate why those things were not the main problem. In order to do that, you need to show that the main reason France lost was because its commanders wanted to lose for political reasons.
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