It's a journal article. I get access through my university but you may be able to find a freely available version.
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Are you going to say that lack of supplies doesn't cause or even multiple casualties on the battlefield?
Are you going to say that lack of supplies alone defeated Germany around Moscow in 1941?
Are you going to say that he is going to say that you are going to say that he is going to say that lack of supplies may or may not have an influence on causalities on the battlefield around Moscow in 1941?!
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Basically any scenario where Germany is under duress due to a possible Western interference (e.g. invasion threat and/or bombing campaign) is leading to an Axis defeat one way or another. So let's focus on the only situation where they can had a honest chance, there a cease-fire/peace with the UK and the US is not coming. Though they might still send supplies to the Soviet Union.
If Germany had to attack at all under these conditions is questionable (Hitler had its glorious war, his life work is now complete... while the German industry/general population can reap the fruits of conquest). Let's say they still choose to attack and do it in 1941 (the later they do the worse it will be due to the nature of the armaments cycle).
Now according to the Barbarossa setup the populations are
Greater Germany: ca 110 mio (not all of them are "perfectly loyal")
Romania: ca 15-18 (reconquered Bessarabia can be used as a recruiting basis)
Hungary: ca 15
Finnland: ca 4
Slovakia: ca 2.5
So we have a population basis of 147 mio people for the agriculture, industry and military
Agains that we have the Soviet Union with ca 197 mio... whom also had issues with their own population.
The basic math is nevertheless: if the Axis can do better then 4:3 exchange they can win by attrition.
If the Axis can occupy the Baltic (-5.5 Mio to the USSR) Bessarabia (-2 to the USSR +2 to the Axis) and Belarus (-9 Mio to the USSR)
Than it is 150 vs 180... so 6:5 exchange ratio will do it. If they also able to occupy Ukraine (-40 mio) than it is 1:1.
Thus the plan: try to encircle and destroy as much of the Red Army as possible. Try to seize the territory till the Panther-Wotan line... Slug it out, 1:1 exchange rate is now favorable. Encircle Leningrad if it is possible (that's also a few million lower recruting base for the USSR).
Remember too that, depending how long it takes them to occupy said areas, a decent amount of the men of fighting age may already be recruited and/or may still contribute toguerilla units. Also not sure a long, drawn-out attritional war is all that great for the attackers. With attrition and partisans it’s going to be hard maintaining good casualty ratios after initial encirclement the further they get in.
It is not great for the attacker, we already knew it from WW1 that even winning such a slugfest is quite devastating.
However unlike againt the UK or even more against the US, the (Eastern) European Axis had a path to victory in single-front war against the Soviet Union without ASB help. Depending on the actual casualty rate they might be even somewhat favourites.
Though if there is the right setup for a single front war against the Soviet Union, then the best option for the Axis is to maintain the peace.
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@bz249 - That does not go to the question of how Germany can maintain its armed forces with inadequate logistical infrastructure and severely inadequate oil, while using up resources at a greater rate (due to being on the strategic offensive) over an ever-lengthening supply line and an ever-expanding front width.
Please remember that one of Hitler's great hopes for the invasion is the capture, retention and exploitation of the Caucasus - for oil, which Germany has enough of to basically run the army through the end of 1941. Everything past that is fiddling and improvisation, and most German operations past 1942 are severely constrained by lack of oil.
I can't see there would never be a situation in which Germany could remove or even much reduce its garrisons in the West - too much chance of a surprise American/Commonwealth bid to free the British Isles, and too much chance of civilian unrest in Britain, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia.
Germany (including the various minor nations in that for brevity's sake) was at full strength in 1941. Its armed forces had already exhausted reserves and replacements by early 1942 and the rest of the war in the east saw a frantic scramble for manpower, up to and including cannibalizing existing formations. There will, as @Eric The Red 33 points out, more likelihood of partisans behind German lines than Soviet, which puts the 'policing and logistics protection' burden more on the Axis.
Your population figures may be correct but your assumption that the two sides can draw similar numbers from their population pool is not backed by the historical record, I think. I could easily be wrong - there isn't any sensible arguing over opinions, anyway.
Thank you for the explanation and the discussion - I appreciate it even if I do not agree.
Please remember that one of Hitler's great hopes for the invasion is the capture, retention and exploitation of the Caucasus - for oil, which Germany has enough of to basically run the army through the end of 1941. Everything past that is fiddling and improvisation, and most German operations past 1942 are severely constrained by lack of oil.
I can't see there would never be a situation in which Germany could remove or even much reduce its garrisons in the West - too much chance of a surprise American/Commonwealth bid to free the British Isles, and too much chance of civilian unrest in Britain, France, the Low Countries and Scandinavia.
Germany (including the various minor nations in that for brevity's sake) was at full strength in 1941. Its armed forces had already exhausted reserves and replacements by early 1942 and the rest of the war in the east saw a frantic scramble for manpower, up to and including cannibalizing existing formations. There will, as @Eric The Red 33 points out, more likelihood of partisans behind German lines than Soviet, which puts the 'policing and logistics protection' burden more on the Axis.
Your population figures may be correct but your assumption that the two sides can draw similar numbers from their population pool is not backed by the historical record, I think. I could easily be wrong - there isn't any sensible arguing over opinions, anyway.
Thank you for the explanation and the discussion - I appreciate it even if I do not agree.
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Oh there is no Typhoon and no Blau. It would be a body count war in the good olde ww1 style... maybe in reality it is not 4:3 but 3:2 is required, but those are finer details. The actual number is not ASB-ish.
If a Kessel can be reasobably created then go for it. If the rail can catch up and an area can be captured then go for it. But the key is that the Soviet manpower pool is indeed limited and they can be broken in a long war (IRL the Wehrmacht planned for a short war... because a long war means defeat at the West).
That might have worked in WW1 but it won't work in WW2. The Red Army is better equipped and supplied, better led and motivated. I would think a straight-up battle of attrition would favor the Soviet style of war.
I will say that a one-on-one fight between Germany and the SU would be pretty hard to call... but taking out Britain means postponing Barbarossa for a year, or two, and that leaves the Soviets much better prepared. And who knows - maybe Stalin kicks it off instead of Hitler. If the SU is attacking, I give the edge to Germany; if Germany is advancing into Russia, I think the SU wins.
I will say that a one-on-one fight between Germany and the SU would be pretty hard to call... but taking out Britain means postponing Barbarossa for a year, or two, and that leaves the Soviets much better prepared. And who knows - maybe Stalin kicks it off instead of Hitler. If the SU is attacking, I give the edge to Germany; if Germany is advancing into Russia, I think the SU wins.
The later it starts the more advantage the Soviets have (due to the nature of the armaments cycle).
But unless there is a pressing need or a cakewalk level discrepancy the only power benefiting from such a war is the US by not playing it. Moreover the side who have to win quickly is at disadvantage because they need to gamble more.
In regards to military losses (and only military losses), that ratio misses an important difference: the population of the USSR was significantly younger, so the Soviets had more men of military age in proportion to their total population than Germany.
Paris was heavily fortified and garrisoned, and its commander, Gallieni, was resolved to fight. Taking it would have involved surrounding the city completely, and thus crossing the Seine upstream or downstream the city and cutting all the roads and railway links communicating it with the rest of France. This would have needed a heavy German investment in troops, guns and ammunition, and if they did this before beating the French field armies, it would jeopardize the whole campaign, unless the Germans were able to bring more forces to the campaign.
On the other side, ignoring Paris and bypassing it to the east without surrounding it and curtting the city off from the rest of France gave the French the possibility of using it as a base to concentrate their forces for an attack against the open right flank of the German First Army, exactly as it happened.
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I know that it's already been mentioned and discussed, but I think Ireland would have been the best bet for US forces to use as a staging area. It's close to the UK, has plenty of ports and harbors for ships and landing craft, and it has more than enough room for the multitude of new airfields that the USAAF would need to challenge the Germans for control of the air. Using Ireland as a fortified base then enables expansion into other parts of the British isles.
If Ireland is still an independent democracy and its government's cooperation could be secured, the American presence could be spun as necessary for Irish security. While others have pointed out that the IRA had Nazi contacts, I'm not sure if the Irish Govt would feel safe with the Nazis just across the Irish Sea.
If Ireland is occupied and under a Nazi puppet govt, an invasion under heavy naval air cover might be possible. However, overwhelming force would be needed to ensure a rapid conquest of the island, its airfields, and its ports, lest the Germans manage to bring up reinforcements and air units.
As a note, this is going off of a belief that liberating the UK itself would be seen as necessary before landing in Europe.
If Ireland is still an independent democracy and its government's cooperation could be secured, the American presence could be spun as necessary for Irish security. While others have pointed out that the IRA had Nazi contacts, I'm not sure if the Irish Govt would feel safe with the Nazis just across the Irish Sea.
If Ireland is occupied and under a Nazi puppet govt, an invasion under heavy naval air cover might be possible. However, overwhelming force would be needed to ensure a rapid conquest of the island, its airfields, and its ports, lest the Germans manage to bring up reinforcements and air units.
As a note, this is going off of a belief that liberating the UK itself would be seen as necessary before landing in Europe.
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While I agree that the Irish would be concerned about a Nazi occupation of Britain, I doubt they would respond by inviting American troops in. That would be begging for the Nazis to invade before the Americans arrived in force (and it's not like you could sneak an invasion force into Ireland by stealth). I imagine the Irish tell the US "thanks, but no thanks" if they suggest such a thing, and do everything possible to preserve their neutrality (assuming they don't simply throw in with the Axis in this case, under the assumption that the war is won and they better join the winning side or lose out on the spoils).
If Ireland is actively occupied by (or allied with) the Axis, then invading it seems a poor choice: it will be just as difficult as launching a cross-Atlantic invasion of Great Britain, and much less useful once occupied.
I'm also skeptical that liberating the UK itself will be seen as immediately necessary. With the fall of Great Britain, the UK government-in-exile will have a lot less sway with the other Allies than they did as one of the Big 3. A Mediterranean strategy is vastly easier from a logistics standpoint than trying to invade across the North Atlantic, and once the Allies have secured a beachhead in Provence or wherever and can move to liberate France, any German forces in the British Isles can be left to wither on the vine much like the Axis forces in Norway/Denmark. At that point you can either launch a separate invasion from France (basically Sealion, except with an actual navy and air superiority over whatever the Axis have left there) or go for the German heartland and hope to end the war and force the Germans to surrender everywhere.
@Rubidium - please note that Operation Torch achieved strategic and operational surprise despite crossing the Atlantic.
I doubt the Irish would welcome in the British but perhaps American and Commonwealth troops could do it. Invading Ireland might be easier than invading Britain - lack of airfields, several ports. But I tend to agree that invading Britain through Wales and/or Scotland is the way to go. Skipping over Britain to invade Europe isn't feasible because there are too many airfields in Britain; you cannot ignore that kind of threat to your flank.
Invading North Africa goes nowhere except deeper into North Africa and opens up a long coastline for a counterstroke. Persuading Franco to join the Allies is promising - providing it could be kept secret until Allied troops landed, which I doubt. The Allies could certainly satisfy all of Franco's needs for cash, machinery and raw materials - and despite the mountains, a drive into France from Spain would be do-able.
Given the difficulties the Allies had in the D-Day invasion (only 6 divisions) and the follow-on reinforcement of men and supplies, I seriously doubt they could put a successful invasion of France in place across the Atlantic. No air cover, no nearby fuel dumps, slow build-up of forces... Germany would crush it like Dieppe.
I doubt the Irish would welcome in the British but perhaps American and Commonwealth troops could do it. Invading Ireland might be easier than invading Britain - lack of airfields, several ports. But I tend to agree that invading Britain through Wales and/or Scotland is the way to go. Skipping over Britain to invade Europe isn't feasible because there are too many airfields in Britain; you cannot ignore that kind of threat to your flank.
Invading North Africa goes nowhere except deeper into North Africa and opens up a long coastline for a counterstroke. Persuading Franco to join the Allies is promising - providing it could be kept secret until Allied troops landed, which I doubt. The Allies could certainly satisfy all of Franco's needs for cash, machinery and raw materials - and despite the mountains, a drive into France from Spain would be do-able.
Given the difficulties the Allies had in the D-Day invasion (only 6 divisions) and the follow-on reinforcement of men and supplies, I seriously doubt they could put a successful invasion of France in place across the Atlantic. No air cover, no nearby fuel dumps, slow build-up of forces... Germany would crush it like Dieppe.
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I agree that the Irish Government would have good reasons not to cooperate with the US. However, if the US sees Ireland as key to the liberation of the UK and the invasion of Europe, it could find ways of either persuading or coercing the Irish Government into cooperation. With the UK occupied, the US might twist on the British Govt-in-Exile to agree to hand over Northern Ireland in exchange for the RoI's assistance (though the germans, if smart, would have already handed it over in some capacity).
I would say that any plan of cooperation between Ireland and the U.S. would almost certainly require an Operation Torch-style landing of US forces in sufficient numbers to make a German invasion of Ireland impractical. It would be difficult, but as @Director pointed out, Operation Torch was a successful surprise attack that crossed the Atlantic. Such a landing could also be used if the Irish were actively in the German camp, though one would have to wonder how much the Irish people would be willing to fight for the Germans against American troops if it came to that.
In terms of usefulness, I see it mainly as a springboard for an invasion and liberation of the UK. A secure and fortified Ireland provides the ability to mass troops, aircraft and supplies across the Atlantic. It also has ports that the US Navy can operate from, and room for the US to build air fields needed to gain air supremacy over Great Britain. Having Ireland would enable the United States to invade the UK in force and then rapidly bring up reinforcements and supplies, which would be close at hand rather than all the way across the Atlantic. Essentially, Ireland serves the same purpose for the liberation of the UK that the RL UK served for Overlord.
I would say that any plan of cooperation between Ireland and the U.S. would almost certainly require an Operation Torch-style landing of US forces in sufficient numbers to make a German invasion of Ireland impractical. It would be difficult, but as @Director pointed out, Operation Torch was a successful surprise attack that crossed the Atlantic. Such a landing could also be used if the Irish were actively in the German camp, though one would have to wonder how much the Irish people would be willing to fight for the Germans against American troops if it came to that.
In terms of usefulness, I see it mainly as a springboard for an invasion and liberation of the UK. A secure and fortified Ireland provides the ability to mass troops, aircraft and supplies across the Atlantic. It also has ports that the US Navy can operate from, and room for the US to build air fields needed to gain air supremacy over Great Britain. Having Ireland would enable the United States to invade the UK in force and then rapidly bring up reinforcements and supplies, which would be close at hand rather than all the way across the Atlantic. Essentially, Ireland serves the same purpose for the liberation of the UK that the RL UK served for Overlord.
Operation Torch worked because the area was garrisoned by Vichy forces (who were limited in what they had available and of mixed reliability) and at the end of a supply line that was almost as bad for the Axis as it was for the Allies (the African ports were already over-stretched supplying Rommel's drive, much less reinforcing Morocco in time to drive the Americans back over the sea), while once the invaders had seized relevant ports they could be supplied just as easily. On the other hand, the Germans are going to be much better prepared to oppose an invasion of the UK (which they would certainly garrison with their own troops) and will have a much easier time reinforcing the defenders with the infrastructure available, while the US in this scenario would have to rely on a cross-Atlantic supply line that will be much longer and easier to threaten with U-boats. The US hasn't a hope of getting air superiority or even parity in that scenario (and the seas are much worse as well).
North Africa is a perfectly adequate base for an invasion: it served as the staging point for invasions of Sicily/Italy, and supported Operation Dragoon, which is a logical model for what an invasion of France without the UK would look like (land in Southern France, seize Marseilles and Toulon as logistics bases, and then advance rapidly to the Rhine, although presumably with more difficulty without the fighting in Normandy at the same time). Sure it opens up more coastline for a counterstroke, but that's not a big concern: the American Navy is far more powerful than the Italian and German ones (otherwise any invasion, certainly including any cross-Atlantic invasion, would be futile), while the converse is also true: the European coast is longer, and the Axis will have to garrison against Allied invasions anywhere from the Pyrenees to Greece.
Axis airfields in Britain are irrelevant in such a scenario; once the Allies land in France (wherever they land) there will be plenty of Axis airfields available anywhere in France equally as close (and if the do pull a Dragoon, even German/Italian airfields will be more relevant than British ones). They can be ignored just as the Axis bases in Norway were, unless political factors cause the Allies to attempt to liberate the UK (which would be vastly easier once France had fallen), and it would be in line with American doctrineboth in the Pacific (which was perfectly happy to bypass major Japanese bases as part of their island-hopping approach) and Europe (where they consistently opposed what they saw as Churchill's irrelevant diversions from the main effort).
I agree that Ireland would be useful for an invasion of Britain, but if you can invade Ireland you can invade Britain just as easily, so you might as well go for the more useful target (as Britain is just as useful to invade Ireland if you still want to do that, but is also vastly more useful if you want to invade France instead, a la the historic Operation Overlord). Invading Ireland loses any element of surprise for follow-on operations (as doing so is utterly useless for any reason other than invading Britain), while the German spy network in Ireland is active enough that they will be able to identify where your troops are concentrated (so something like Operation Fortitude is unlikely to work).
Franco had no interest in joining even in the historical war, when the Axis were obviously losing. I can't imagine he'd be any more interested in joining the Allies in a situation where the UK has fallen and his nation would be expected to be the major campaigning area.
North Africa is a perfectly adequate base for an invasion: it served as the staging point for invasions of Sicily/Italy, and supported Operation Dragoon, which is a logical model for what an invasion of France without the UK would look like (land in Southern France, seize Marseilles and Toulon as logistics bases, and then advance rapidly to the Rhine, although presumably with more difficulty without the fighting in Normandy at the same time). Sure it opens up more coastline for a counterstroke, but that's not a big concern: the American Navy is far more powerful than the Italian and German ones (otherwise any invasion, certainly including any cross-Atlantic invasion, would be futile), while the converse is also true: the European coast is longer, and the Axis will have to garrison against Allied invasions anywhere from the Pyrenees to Greece.
Axis airfields in Britain are irrelevant in such a scenario; once the Allies land in France (wherever they land) there will be plenty of Axis airfields available anywhere in France equally as close (and if the do pull a Dragoon, even German/Italian airfields will be more relevant than British ones). They can be ignored just as the Axis bases in Norway were, unless political factors cause the Allies to attempt to liberate the UK (which would be vastly easier once France had fallen), and it would be in line with American doctrineboth in the Pacific (which was perfectly happy to bypass major Japanese bases as part of their island-hopping approach) and Europe (where they consistently opposed what they saw as Churchill's irrelevant diversions from the main effort).
I agree that Ireland would be useful for an invasion of Britain, but if you can invade Ireland you can invade Britain just as easily, so you might as well go for the more useful target (as Britain is just as useful to invade Ireland if you still want to do that, but is also vastly more useful if you want to invade France instead, a la the historic Operation Overlord). Invading Ireland loses any element of surprise for follow-on operations (as doing so is utterly useless for any reason other than invading Britain), while the German spy network in Ireland is active enough that they will be able to identify where your troops are concentrated (so something like Operation Fortitude is unlikely to work).
Franco had no interest in joining even in the historical war, when the Axis were obviously losing. I can't imagine he'd be any more interested in joining the Allies in a situation where the UK has fallen and his nation would be expected to be the major campaigning area.
I think that this point deserves far more emphasis than it actually gets. In preparation for war in the west saw a huge upsurge in armaments production in Germany and while this should be obvious, the important part to emphasise is that this came at a huge cost to the distribution of resources from military to civilian industry (it jumped from about 20% to 60%). An often overlooked fact about the battle of France is that Germany made available huge volumes of munitions (shells and bombs) in a greater concentration than was seen later in Barbarossa.
It is interesting to think that German offensive strength peaked with Operation Barbarossa (and arguably was at its peak density in the Battle of France). The main issue for Germany is the well known fuel issue, which in turn is linked to the Coal issue. Specifically, Pre-war Europe was a net importer of coal; Germany struggled to make use of the European coal fields which in turn meant that Germany struggled to produce sufficient synthetic fuel and .. munitions.
As a result, German offensive strength peaked in terms of density/concentration with the Battle of France, then peaked in total strength with Operation Barbarossa. The major German offensives in the East started with multiple Army Groups across a broad front in 1941; was a single large army group across a broad front in 1942; and a smaller army group in 1943.
Units and manpower notwithstanding, the German Army started the Eastern War at peak strength and gradually got weaker. Conversely, the Soviet Army (and indeed the British and American) grew throughout the war both in size and offensive strength.
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Speaking of German early peak, Luftwaffe actually had more total planes for France in 1940 than for Barbarossa in 1941.
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