There were historically warm relations between the US and Ireland, not least because of the large numbers of Irish who immigrated here and the relatives they had at home. The Irish Brigade of the Civil War and the post-Civil War Fenian quasi-invasions of Canada, launched from US soil, underscore this.
And, to be cynical, if Germany did occupy the British Isles it would find the holding of them more difficult and costly than the taking... those long coastlines are ideal for submarine deliveries of weapons. At the risk of being trite and stereotypical it can be said the Scots and Irish have been known to fight just for the fun of it, and what they might do to a German garrison should give one pause.
I've just finished reading a biography of George Marshall and a work on the command relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower. I can't see Marshall agreeing to a major invasion in North Africa without the serious historical British pressure for it (or away from a cross-channel invasion; not quite the same thing). The true purpose of Torch was to break up the Axis threat to Egypt and it did so - German and Italian losses in the Tunisia pocket were larger than at Stalingrad. But it took armies coming from BOTH directions to make that happen -
The problem is simply strategic: there is no place to the east of North Africa with military significance short of Suez; nothing to the south or, obviously, the west... No invasion of Sicily or southern France is possible without the Royal Navy and British bases in the Mediterranean. Even taking French bases at Algiers and Oran would be insufficient - you'd need Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria for air cover, scouting, repair and fueling.
And, frankly, the ability of the Italian Navy is often overlooked, but no invasion of Sicily or Southern France will happen without significant naval superiority. Italian light forces and mini-subs were superb, and if the battle fleet had had the fuel it would likely have been more aggressively handled. Despite their accuracy problems, the Littorios were big, fast, powerful ships - arguably more so than Bismarck.
If you can quash the Italian Navy and open the Med you'd still have to take Sicily, work your way up the boot and/or take Sardinia and Corsica for aircover over Southern France. Remember that Dragoon (the invasion of southern France) was not intended to be the main effort - for these strategic reasons - but was instead to be a relatively small commitment that would, along with Overlord, lever the Germans out of France.
Politically, militarily and strategically, I think the odds of Marshall agreeing to an attritional dead-end in the Med are scant. he might use North Africa as a testing and training exercise but I think the real thrust would go to Ireland, Scotland or Cornwall. (Post-Torch he and Eisenhower admitted the US Army was not as ready as they had thought and that Torch was important for getting the Army up to fighting standard).
And, to be cynical, if Germany did occupy the British Isles it would find the holding of them more difficult and costly than the taking... those long coastlines are ideal for submarine deliveries of weapons. At the risk of being trite and stereotypical it can be said the Scots and Irish have been known to fight just for the fun of it, and what they might do to a German garrison should give one pause.
I've just finished reading a biography of George Marshall and a work on the command relationship between Marshall and Eisenhower. I can't see Marshall agreeing to a major invasion in North Africa without the serious historical British pressure for it (or away from a cross-channel invasion; not quite the same thing). The true purpose of Torch was to break up the Axis threat to Egypt and it did so - German and Italian losses in the Tunisia pocket were larger than at Stalingrad. But it took armies coming from BOTH directions to make that happen -
The problem is simply strategic: there is no place to the east of North Africa with military significance short of Suez; nothing to the south or, obviously, the west... No invasion of Sicily or southern France is possible without the Royal Navy and British bases in the Mediterranean. Even taking French bases at Algiers and Oran would be insufficient - you'd need Gibraltar, Malta and Alexandria for air cover, scouting, repair and fueling.
And, frankly, the ability of the Italian Navy is often overlooked, but no invasion of Sicily or Southern France will happen without significant naval superiority. Italian light forces and mini-subs were superb, and if the battle fleet had had the fuel it would likely have been more aggressively handled. Despite their accuracy problems, the Littorios were big, fast, powerful ships - arguably more so than Bismarck.
If you can quash the Italian Navy and open the Med you'd still have to take Sicily, work your way up the boot and/or take Sardinia and Corsica for aircover over Southern France. Remember that Dragoon (the invasion of southern France) was not intended to be the main effort - for these strategic reasons - but was instead to be a relatively small commitment that would, along with Overlord, lever the Germans out of France.
Politically, militarily and strategically, I think the odds of Marshall agreeing to an attritional dead-end in the Med are scant. he might use North Africa as a testing and training exercise but I think the real thrust would go to Ireland, Scotland or Cornwall. (Post-Torch he and Eisenhower admitted the US Army was not as ready as they had thought and that Torch was important for getting the Army up to fighting standard).
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