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Is there anything which contradicts this reading of Stalin's vision? To my knowledge this interpretation is pretty uncontroversial.
This note is apparently widely debated, especially now that once closed archives are now open to historians (I have related this before). There are those who see the note as a ruse so as to keep East Germany in the Soviet sphere of influence and that it was the West that kept Germany split.
 
Roosevelt had to be aware of the Soviets push into the Balkans and installation of friendly communist governments as that was happening after Yalta.
That was hardly a secret, Stalin wanted to secure friendly regimes on the borders of the Soviet Union. So clearly not some big revelation or trigger for the Cold War, just a realistic foreign policy goal.
Truman would know of this as well and quite possibly led to more tensions at Potsdam.
Yes, although Truman also started making the choice of adopting a hostile stance towards the USSR, when it could have been avoided. Letting hawkish diplomats getting more influence and sidelining those favourable to cordial relations meant tensions increased.
And while Potsdam did push to keep Germany broken up, it was seen that letting western part of Germany cooperate economically was best to help the country move forward.
The Potsdam declaration guaranteed Germany remaining united. The monetary reform and constitution of a government in the occupation zones of France, the UK and the US weren't done out of charity or to "help" in any way. It was done to minimise Soviet influence and to guarantee Western alignement. It was clearly a part of the US containment strategy.
The weastern powers had seen signs that the Soviets were operating to their own tune and how they wanted things to be as early as Tehran. Things went downhill from there at each conference.
You are exclusively putting the blame on the Soviet Union. The US and the UK also pushed for their agendas. Your narrative is far too one-sided here.
 
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The weastern powers had seen signs that the Soviets were operating to their own tune and how they wanted things to be as early as Tehran. Things went downhill from there at each conference.
Since Brest-Litovsk 1918, actually. The USSR abandoned its allies in WW1 while various Western powers intervened in the Russian civil war. The lack of trust between them was a big factor in Hitler's diplomacy in the 1930s and he was sorely disappointed when it didn't work anymore in the early days of WW2. Both Soviet and Western leaders expected the animosity to resume after they dealt with the greater or more immediate threat.
 
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Since Brest-Litovsk 1918, actually. The USSR abandoned its allies in WW1 while various Western powers intervened in the Russian civil war. The lack of trust between them was a big factor in Hitler's diplomacy in the 1930s and he was sorely disappointed when it didn't work anymore in the early days of WW2. Both Soviet and Western leaders expected the animosity to resume after they dealt with the greater or more immediate threat.
Note that in the interwar context the USSR felt abandoned by France and the UK with which it had attempted to negotiate a treaty of mutual military assistance against Nazi Germany prior to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet Union also criticised the two powers for having abandoned their ally Czechoslovakia in the Munich Agreement.
 
Note that in the interwar context the USSR felt abandoned by France and the UK with which it had attempted to negotiate a treaty of mutual military assistance against Nazi Germany prior to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The Soviet Union also criticised the two powers for having abandoned their ally Czechoslovakia in the Munich Agreement.
The Soviet Union also criticised all the capitalist nations for being capitalist, spoke out for the overthrow of their political and social systems, and ran a border control and public relations system based on total secrecy, lies, and violent repression. Mistrust didn't come out of nowhere. ;)
 
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The Soviet Union also criticised all the capitalist nations for being capitalist, spoke out for the overthrow of their political and social systems, and ran a border control and public relations system based on total secrecy, lies, and violent repression. Mistrust didn't come out of nowhere. ;)
Of course that in the eyes of the Conservatives in power in the UK at the time, the Soviet Union might have been a great danger and threat, for them such concerns were certainly grounded in a reality. That being said, I tend to think that they could have overcome such considerations to unite against the common enemy that was Nazi Germany and defend countries like Czechoslovakia. Stalin was seemingly ready to abandon the previous declarations about capitalism and fascism being the two different facets of the same coin and pursue that alliance, which several figures, both on the right and left, publicly defended in France at the time. On the other hand, seeing how some of the elites in the UK preferred Hitler to the Soviet Union does show that the USSR's mistrust was not unfounded either.
 
Of course that in the eyes of the Conservatives in power in the UK at the time, the Soviet Union might have been a great danger and threat, for them such concerns were certainly grounded in a reality. That being said, I tend to think that they could have overcome such considerations to unite against the common enemy that was Nazi Germany and defend countries like Czechoslovakia. Stalin was seemingly ready to abandon the previous declarations about capitalism and fascism being the two different facets of the same coin and pursue that alliance, which several figures, both on the right and left, publicly defended in France at the time. On the other hand, seeing how some of the elites in the UK preferred Hitler to the Soviet Union does show that the USSR's mistrust was not unfounded either.
Ach Loup. Revolution, civil war and revolutionary terror were not just bugbears for the UK tories, they were scary to anyone.

That alliance proposal came out of nowhere, like the 1952 Stalin note. From the very same USSR who had for years helped Germany's military subvert the armistice terms. I'll be the last to defend the UK / French weak responses to Hitler but the USSR wasn't much of a trustworthy partner in those years either. Maybe some trust building measures in advance of such proposals could have helped, if they were genuine?
 
Ach Loup. Revolution, civil war and revolutionary terror were not just bugbears for the UK tories, they were scary to anyone.
The question isn't our personal sympathy for one side or the other. I personally condemn the reign of terror imposed by Stalin and the dictatorship in the hands of a privileged nomenklatura, but that isn't the subject of historical analysis. That being said, the Soviet Union did not exclusively inspire fear, the improved working conditions and social reforms also inspired sympathy amongst a part of the working movements. I'm putting the emphasis on the UK Tories because of the Germanophilia and Russophobia that existed within a part of the British elite at the time, I did not mean to reduce or minimise the scale of Stalinist terror.
That alliance proposal came out of nowhere, like the 1952 Stalin note. From the very same USSR who had for years helped Germany's military subvert the armistice terms. I'll be the last to defend the UK / French weak responses to Hitler but the USSR wasn't much of a trustworthy partner in those years either. Maybe some trust building measures in advance of such proposals could have helped, if they were genuine?
In part it was a reversal of policy, away from the narrative of the two equal evils, but it was a progressive transition. Had it come as a surprise out of the blue and had no credibility a French Foreign Minister like Louis Barthou would never have pushed for a such option publicly. The UK and France accepted contacts with the Soviet Union, which indicated this option might be feasible. Afterwards they made it more or less clear that the option was not on the table, which in part lead to turn of events we know.
 
This thread is like a smorgasbord of counterfactual pet peeves of various posters. We need some hardcore Anglophile and maybe a Nazi apologist to round out the mix.
 
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This thread is like a smorgasbord of counterfactual pet peeves of various posters. We need some hardcore Anglophile and maybe a Nazi apologist to round out the mix.
Care to address what I post before accusing me of "counterfactual pet peeves" or comparing me with a "Nazi apologist"? Where in this thread have I made any counterfactual statement? What "apologia" is there I stated? Maybe quote the posters directly before accusing everyone in this thread collectively.
 
I'm not comparing you to a Nazi apologist. I am saying that as an easily identifiable subset of historical revisionism, same with the "but railroads" Empire apologia.

As for where you are wrong, other people in this thread are already doing this.
 
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The motivations behind his policy on Germany were likely different. He didn't allow the east German communists to proclaim their own government until after the western powers had allowed the west German leaders to proclaim their own government. Stalin's real motivations may remain unknown but many things, including his 1952 note to the western powers ("Stalin note") and traditional Russian political views of Germany, indicate that he was actually willing to trade "his" chunk of Germany in exchange for a neutral status of a unified Germany (in which the communist party would stand for elections).
West-Germany had 51 million people and was well in progress of rebuilding with Western help, while East-Germany had 18 million people and Soviets were still hauling away everything valuable. Obviously if both get integrated to respective power blocks the West gains a lot more. So in that context Stalin starts offering some great stuff like free, democratic, neutral Germany, what is there not to love? Surely gotta start negotiations pronto! But lets be realistic. People in democracy can vote in unexpected ways, Soviets have "perfectly reasonable" security needs for some safeguards to make sure that the "neutral" part sticks around, Germans aren't exactly trustworthy folks in less than a decade after the war! Options for additional demands then negotiations are on the way are quite endless, maybe some direct Soviet military presence for safeguard, maybe insisting for structure of government where "democratic" East-Germany maintains veto power to derail all developments they don't like etc. etc.

Ultimately there are no risks for Soviets, negotiations can be broken off at any time, there is no danger of public backlash, SED comrades will salute whatever is required from them. Nothing actually needs to be agreed, even simply stalling negotiations to prevent or slow down West-German integration to Western bloc is a win in itself. On other hand, there are quite obvious risks for Westerners, division between those who want to provide more concessions to Soviets and those who are less flexible are pretty much inevitable. Many opportunities for discord among Western-Germans themselves, between Germans and Western Powers, and even among the Western powers themselves. Quite a gamble just on hopes of good will of Stalin, who had well proven that agreements really only lasted as long as they were in Soviet geopolitical interest.
 
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West-Germany had 51 million people and was well in progress of rebuilding with Western help, while East-Germany had 18 million people and Soviets were still hauling away everything valuable. Obviously if both get integrated to respective power blocks the West gains a lot more. So in that context Stalin starts offering some great stuff like free, democratic, neutral Germany, what is there not to love? Surely gotta start negotiations pronto! But lets be realistic. People in democracy can vote in unexpected ways, Soviets have "perfectly reasonable" security needs for some safeguards to make sure that the "neutral" part sticks around, Germans aren't exactly trustworthy folks in less than a decade after the war! Options for additional demands then negotiations are on the way are quite endless, maybe some direct Soviet military presence for safeguard, maybe insisting for structure of government where "democratic" East-Germany maintains veto power to derail all developments they don't like etc. etc.

Ultimately there are no risks for Soviets, negotiations can be broken off at any time, there is no danger of public backlash, SED comrades will salute whatever is required from them. Nothing actually needs to be agreed, even simply stalling negotiations to prevent or slow down West-German integration to Western bloc is a win in itself. On other hand, there are quite obvious risks for Westerners, division between those who want to provide more concessions to Soviets and those who are less flexible are pretty much inevitable. Many opportunities for discord among Western-Germans themselves, between Germans and Western Powers, and even among the Western powers themselves. Quite a gamble just on hopes of good will of Stalin, who had well proven that agreements really only lasted as long as they were in Soviet geopolitical interest.
The issue in this post is that you write as if the Potsdam declaration did not exist. That was a prior engagement which the Soviet Union had respected with regards to Germany. Furthermore, you seem to presume that the SED were already in government in Eastern Germany, when no such government existed at the time. What would later become East Germany was simply the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. On the other hand, Stalin had a lot to lose from a neutral Germany, he would no longer dispose of an area under direct occupation in the region and three fourths of the new Germany would not have been occupied by the USSR. That being said, if he accepted to give that up he avoided a division of Germany which he did not seek and prevented a Western-aligned Germany which advanced US positions with Europe.
 
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The issue in this post is that you write as if the Potsdam treaty did not exist. That was a prior engagement which the Soviet Union had respected with regards to Germany. Furthermore, you seem to presume that the SED were already in government in Eastern Germany, when no such government existed at the time. What would later become East Germany was simply the Soviet occupation zone of Germany. On the other hand, Stalin had a lot to lose from a neutral Germany, he would no longer dispose of an area under direct occupation in the region and three fourths of the new Germany would not have been occupied by the USSR. That being said, if he accepted to give that up he avoided a division of Germany which he did not seek and prevented a Western-aligned Germany which advanced US positions with Europe.
Which Potsdam treaty, Loup?

The Potsdam conference didn't conclude with any kind of treaty. Just a conference memorandum, which included a "declaration".
 
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Which Potsdam treaty, Loup?

The Potsdam conference didn't conclude with any kind of treaty. Just a conference memorandum, which included a "declaration".
I did indeed mean the conference, my bad, I will edit that. Thank you for correcting me. It does not have the same value as a treaty, sorry for any confusion caused by that.
 
It's an old con-man's trick to offer two apparently different choices, closing off from discussion all other choices (that don't benefit you). That could be what is operating here.

I would construe Stalin's offer as a mechanism for keeping the Allies out of active control of Germany post-war. 'See how reasonable I can be?' Perhaps he believed the communists would be better than the democracies at influencing a neutral Germany, or at least less inhibited. I do think Stalin believed Soviet affairs could prosper whichever way the democracies decided.

Taking up Stalin's offer gives a united, prosperous and industrialized Germany, open to Soviet influence, propaganda and meddling, un-militarized yet with excellent transportation networks, opening on the west to a NATO without German money and manpower and with the Atlantic just a few hundred tank-drivable-miles away... How long before revolutionary activity provoked a crackdown that required Soviet armies to protect the revolutionaries?

But really, I think Stalin expected to be able to work steadily to advance Soviet interests whatever the choices made by the West. 'Do you want to buy a sedan or a van?' is a con-man's question, if you haven't decided anything (or aren't shopping for a car at all).
 
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It's an old con-man's trick to offer two apparently different choices, closing off from discussion all other choices (that don't benefit you). That could be what is operating here.

I would construe Stalin's offer as a mechanism for keeping the Allies out of active control of Germany post-war. 'See how reasonable I can be?' Perhaps he believed the communists would be better than the democracies at influencing a neutral Germany, or at least less inhibited. I do think Stalin believed Soviet affairs could prosper whichever way the democracies decided.

Taking up Stalin's offer gives a united, prosperous and industrialized Germany, open to Soviet influence, propaganda and meddling, un-militarized yet with excellent transportation networks, opening on the west to a NATO without German money and manpower and with the Atlantic just a few hundred tank-drivable-miles away... How long before revolutionary activity provoked a crackdown that required Soviet armies to protect the revolutionaries?

But really, I think Stalin expected to be able to work steadily to advance Soviet interests whatever the choices made by the West. 'Do you want to buy a sedan or a van?' is a con-man's question, if you haven't decided anything (or aren't shopping for a car at all).
You're doing something that persons interested in studying history should generally not do. You are formulating a preconceived notion about what a specific event was about, entirely circumstantial, without referring to substantial evidence. I don't think it's useful for gaining insight to do that.

Nothing about the 1952 proposal, unspecific as it was, spoke of demilitarization of the reunified Germany, or of any Soviet military guarantees. Quite the contrary, the proposal spoke of Germany being allowed to have such a military as was necessary to defend itself. Soviet intervention rights were also not part of what was negotiated. The balance of power being what it was (3 western powers vs 1 eastern power, US nuclear supremacy) such rights were completely unlikely to be given to the USSR anyways.

Of course the general nature of the proposal was not one to which the western powers and the west Germans could have agreed. The two German states had already diverged radically in their political systems, and the east German communists in particular were very militant, very organized, very determined to have their way no matter the cost. And yeah it's certain that Stalin was looking for advantages. What exactly those advantages would be, well the Soviet archives were never completely opened, and nothing has been found that gives insight into the Soviet leadership's thinking at the time. So we cannot know. Only speculate. And speculation is open, not certain...

For Germans who were faced with a severe division of their country, a division that separated families and regions, reunification and removal of foreign occupation was a tempting choice. Perhaps one worth a few sacrifices? A few risks? With hindsight (40 years of separation, impoverishment and tyrannical oppression in east Germany, political neutering and utter submission of west Germany under US hegemony, 100s of people shot dead at the intergerman border) you find arguments both in favor and against the idea that reunification and neutralization could have been a worthy goal to strive for via negotiations.

Anyways, I think it should be treated as a typical "what if" scenario. The value is in looking at what the situation at the time was, and looking at all that can be investigated to find out preparations, motivations and intentions, of the involved parties.
 
You're doing something that persons interested in studying history should generally not do. You are formulating a preconceived notion about what a specific event was about, entirely circumstantial, without referring to substantial evidence. I don't think it's useful for gaining insight to do that.

Nothing about the 1952 proposal, unspecific as it was, spoke of demilitarization of the reunified Germany, or of any Soviet military guarantees. Quite the contrary, the proposal spoke of Germany being allowed to have such a military as was necessary to defend itself. Soviet intervention rights were also not part of what was negotiated. The balance of power being what it was (3 western powers vs 1 eastern power, US nuclear supremacy) such rights were completely unlikely to be given to the USSR anyways.

Of course the general nature of the proposal was not one to which the western powers and the west Germans could have agreed. The two German states had already diverged radically in their political systems, and the east German communists in particular were very militant, very organized, very determined to have their way no matter the cost. And yeah it's certain that Stalin was looking for advantages. What exactly those advantages would be, well the Soviet archives were never completely opened, and nothing has been found that gives insight into the Soviet leadership's thinking at the time. So we cannot know. Only speculate. And speculation is open, not certain...

For Germans who were faced with a severe division of their country, a division that separated families and regions, reunification and removal of foreign occupation was a tempting choice. Perhaps one worth a few sacrifices? A few risks? With hindsight (40 years of separation, impoverishment and tyrannical oppression in east Germany, political neutering and utter submission of west Germany under US hegemony, 100s of people shot dead at the intergerman border) you find arguments both in favor and against the idea that reunification and neutralization could have been a worthy goal to strive for via negotiations.

Anyways, I think it should be treated as a typical "what if" scenario. The value is in looking at what the situation at the time was, and looking at all that can be investigated to find out preparations, motivations and intentions, of the involved parties.

If I may,

What is the motivation of the East German Communists, Stasi, and Markus Wolf? These men are competent by all accounts. What end result are they trying to parley?

It is a legitimate question, I am enjoying your elaborations. Please continue. This is the part I do not know or have seen through another perspective. I am learning much with this back and forth.
 
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If I may,

What is the motivation of the East German Communists, Stasi, and Markus Wolf? These men are competent by all accounts. What end result are they trying to parley?

It is a legitimate question, I am enjoying your elaborations. Please continue. This is the part I do not know or have seen through another perspective. I am learning much with this back and forth.
The people who ran the GDR during the forty years of its existence were all part of the founder generation who were of age and already politically active when the GDR was founded. They had mostly one of two possible backgrounds:

- Moscow exiles, those were communist activists who had left Germany after Hitler came to power and fled to Moscow where Stalin gave them refuge. They got entangled in Stalin's paranoia and the purges in a bad way though, you can Google "Hotel Lux" for the full story. Those who came back were paranoid Stalinists, utterly obedient to the USSR and skilled in the dark arts of intrigue and treachery. Stalin picked these guys to be the leaders of the German communist party.

- Anti fascist idealists, these were the guys who had either stayed in Germany throughout the Hitler years and suffered various degrees of repression (Strafbat service, intermittent police arrest, long term prison sentences, or concentration camp) and came out of that with a strong determination to rebuild Germany along socialist ideals not just for communism's sake but also to prevent fascism from ever coming to power again.

You also have the former members of the international brigades i.e. veterans of the
Spanish Civil War. Possible overlap with the first two groups. Nevertheless, having served in the international brigades was a very strong credential in itself so these guys, few in numbers, stood out as well.

The GDR also had, on lower levels of hierarchy, all kinds of people who didn't fit into those backgrounds... Ex SPD people who joined in 1946 with the merger of SPD and KPD, normal people with no strong antifascist creds, converted ex Nazis and so on. Those were never given much of a say in how things were run, though.

People who were too young to have been politically involved at the time of the GDR's foundation were also never given a say in how things were run. There never was a generational transfer of power away from the founder generation until the very last days of the GDR (Egon Krenz would have been the first leader to not be part of the founder generation). This was one of the things that caused it to collapse as quickly as it did in 1989.

What motivated these people? For most, genuine idealism, and for some, lust for power. The Soviet Union controlled much of the way in which the communist party was rebuilt after the war, and told the German communists what was allowed and what was not allowed. But the German communists were eager enough that they never needed any pushing from Moscow to go forward with this or that initiative. Unlike the communists in most other satellite states.

Walter Ulbricht, Erich Honecker and Markus Wolf were all Moscow exiles.

BTW You ask about "end result". In my view that's not something that people involved in the practical side of statecraft worry about. Statecraft knows no end goals. You solve one problem and the next arises immediately afterwards. And then the next. And then the next. There's always more to do than there is time. Staying in control, and if possible ahead of events, is the main goal.
 
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I think these East German communists are interesting and all, but the GDR figure that Andre would probably find most interesting is Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and the KoKo.


From wiki:
Kommerzielle Koordinierung was a secret commercial enterprise in East Germany, run by the Stasi officer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and called "KoKo" (short for Kommerzielle Koordinierung). KoKo developed from the official smuggling operations of the 1950s. Its main goal was to bring foreign currency to the German Democratic Republic. It was officially established in 1966 and was involved in business dealings and industrial espionage in Western countries. It is estimated that between 1966 and 1989 it generated nearly 25 billion DM.[1]

KoKo operated 180 front companies in the West and brought their hard currency profits to secret accounts in East Germany. Its operations were controlled by Erich Honecker, Erich Mielke, and Günter Mittag. KoKo was involved in illegal arms deals with Iran, Third World regimes, and even the CIA; "selling" East German political prisoners to West Germany; purchasing of high technology products despite a Western embargo; selling antique artworks to the West; and importing luxury items for the top nomenklatura of the Socialist Unity Party.[2] One of the closest Schalck's partners in the West was Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Josef Strauss. In 1983, they negotiated an agreement under which Western banks provided a one billion DM credit to the German Democratic Republic in return for the easing of restrictions on the travel of East German citizens to the West. West German politician Egon Bahr later said in an interview that this had "worked wonderfully."
 
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