World War II's Endgame, birth of a Cold War

[JodelDiplom]

I think these East German communists are interesting and all, but the GDR figure that Andre would probably find most interesting is Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and the KoKo.

Kommerzielle Koordinierung - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

From wiki:

Spoiler

Kommerzielle Koordinierung was a secret commercial enterprise in East Germany, run by the Stasi officer Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and called "KoKo" (short for Kommerzielle Koordinierung). KoKo developed from the official smuggling operations of the 1950s. Its main goal was to bring foreign currency to the German Democratic Republic. It was officially established in 1966 and was involved in business dealings and industrial espionage in Western countries. It is estimated that between 1966 and 1989 it generated nearly 25 billion DM.[1]

KoKo operated 180 front companies in the West and brought their hard currency profits to secret accounts in East Germany. Its operations were controlled by Erich Honecker, Erich Mielke, and Günter Mittag. KoKo was involved in illegal arms deals with Iran, Third World regimes, and even the CIA; "selling" East German political prisoners to West Germany; purchasing of high technology products despite a Western embargo; selling antique artworks to the West; and importing luxury items for the top nomenklatura of the Socialist Unity Party.[2] One of the closest Schalck's partners in the West was Bavarian Prime Minister Franz-Josef Strauss. In 1983, they negotiated an agreement under which Western banks provided a one billion DM credit to the German Democratic Republic in return for the easing of restrictions on the travel of East German citizens to the West. West German politician Egon Bahr later said in an interview that this had "worked wonderfully."

Schalk-Golodkowski and his guys at KoKo were interesting, but they were not in charge of anything except fund raising. They were not the kind of behind the scenes wire pullers whom André loves so much, that was Wolf and Mielke and the Stasi.

 

[Director]

@JodelDiplom -

You're doing something that persons interested in studying history should generally not do. You are formulating a preconceived notion about what a specific event was about, entirely circumstantial, without referring to substantial evidence. I don't think it's useful for gaining insight to do that.

What motivated these people? For most, genuine idealism, and for some, lust for power. The Soviet Union controlled much of the way in which the communist party was rebuilt after the war, and told the German communists what was allowed and what was not allowed. But the German communists were eager enough that they never needed any pushing from Moscow to go forward with this or that initiative. Unlike the communists in most other satellite states.

So... it is OK to speculate about the motivations of persons so long as they are not Stalin, and to speculate about events so long as I'm not the one doing it?

I can't play by those rules.

I did, however, not speculate about an event, but about the possible motivation of a person making a decision. If that's off the table then history is indeed nothing but a recitation of facts.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Schalk-Golodkowski and his guys at KoKo were interesting, but they were not in charge of anything except fund raising. They were not the kind of behind the scenes wire pullers whom André loves so much, that was Wolf and Mielke and the Stasi.

Andre loves all tales of this sort. What the few of you have pieced together over the last few pages will keep my mind busy assimilating details for a while. If I'm not replying, rest assured I am reading and thinking. Wolf and Stasi I have some knowledge of and am very interested in following the Russian Exile/Jews returning to Germany with the occupation forces. KoKo sounds like a brilliant backstory in an unwritten Robert Ludlum novel.

The sinews of war are limitless gold, you can't make war - intelligence, military, diplomatic, industrial - without a source of income. I see an easy parallel between KoKo and the cash extraction element of RSHA.

RSHA was first and foremost a profit center and cash machine for the Nazi Party's discretionary funds account. Based on a ten minute reading of KoKo they were skilled at making a profit in exactly the same way using many of the same techniques of state seizure internally, counterfieting and extortion, and banking manipulations as their SD predecessors without quite so many bodies to dispose of.

 

[JodelDiplom]

@JodelDiplom -





So... it is OK to speculate about the motivations of persons so long as they are not Stalin, and to speculate about events so long as I'm not the one doing it?

I can't play by those rules.

I did, however, not speculate about an event, but about the possible motivation of a person making a decision. If that's off the table then history is indeed nothing but a recitation of facts.

I didn't want to muzzle you, god forbid.

Just wanted to encourage to keep the speculation somewhat tethered to some of the facts. Like, when I say that idealism was a big motivator for many of the people who built the GDR, I'm generalizing, but it's based on biographies and on known facts about living standards the east which weren't super even for mid level leaders compared to living standards for every day people in west Germany (which mostly rules out greed as a motivator)

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

So tell me a bit about the mindset of the average German amongst all this doubt when all eyes are on the Fulda Gap.

The visuals are always people running from East to West, clammering over the wall or around it whenever possible. I assume there wasn't a big flood of people going West to East. How is all this playing out with families on either side of an artificial wall?

 

[Barsoom]

So tell me a bit about the mindset of the average German amongst all this doubt when all eyes are on the Fulda Gap.

The Fulda Gap was overrated. It was much easier and more logical for a potential Soviet attack to simply continue going straight west across the plain towards Rotterdam and Antwerp. It makes no sense to instead turn south through hills and (low) mountains to reach Hessen. Literally the only reason to focus on the Fulda Gap was because it was the US sector of the front and therefore the only interesting part to some US analysts.

 

[loup99]

So tell me a bit about the mindset of the average German amongst all this doubt when all eyes are on the Fulda Gap.

The notion of any Soviet attack is complete fiction in my view. The USSR never got even close to the US in terms of military expenditure and did not have the capacity to project itself in a such attack. That sort of endeavour would have been doomed from the very beginning, it would simply have lead to the end of the Soviet Union. It should be clear that the only superpower which was ever capable of attacking the other was the US, and the relationship was fundamentally unequal from start. Only in the cultural domain and a few other irrelevant niches the Soviet Union caught up or outdid the United States.

 

[Barsoom]

The notion of any Soviet attack is complete fiction in my view. The USSR never got even close to the US in terms of military expenditure and did not have the capacity to project itself in a such attack. That sort of endeavour would have been doomed from the very beginning, it would simply have lead to the end of the Soviet Union. It should be clear that the only superpower which was ever capable of attacking the other was the US, and the relationship was fundamentally unequal from start. Only in the cultural domain and a few other irrelevant niches the Soviet Union caught up or outdid the United States.

In hindsight this is true. But neither the general public nor military and strategic experts knew it at the time. Attitudes were shaped by an overestimation of Soviet capabilities that was aided both by Soviet secrecy and Western paranoia.

 

[Geriander]

The notion of any Soviet attack is complete fiction in my view. The USSR never got even close to the US in terms of military expenditure and did not have the capacity to project itself in a such attack. That sort of endeavour would have been doomed from the very beginning, it would simply have lead to the end of the Soviet Union. It should be clear that the only superpower which was ever capable of attacking the other was the US, and the relationship was fundamentally unequal from start. Only in the cultural domain and a few other irrelevant niches the Soviet Union caught up or outdid the United States.

The balance of land forces in Europe did favor the Soviets during the whole Cold War and for much of it they had more tactical aircraft as well. The superior industrial capacity of the US could have reversed this in time but in any sort of conventional war West Germany was likely to fall under Soviet occupation for a time.

Edit: These declassified force comparison estimates from NATO are quite interesting. In reality the Warsaw Pact forces may have been paper tigers but it seems that they had fooled NATO into believing itself weaker in almost every category.
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

My question is not about the possibility of the 3rd World War actually being ignited, but the mindset of Germans Who live with its possibility.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

The balance of land forces in Europe did favor the Soviets during the whole Cold War and for much of it they had more tactical aircraft as well. The superior industrial capacity of the US could have reversed this in time but in any sort of conventional war West Germany was likely to fall under Soviet occupation for a time.

Edit: These declassified force comparison estimates from NATO are quite interesting. In reality the Warsaw Pact forces may have been paper tigers but it seems that they had fooled NATO into believing itself weaker in almost every category.
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

Yes, and a good deal of bad information overestimating Soviet capability and stockpiles is handed to the West by Gehlens organization for precisely that purpose.

 

[WhiteKnight77]

That was hardly a secret, Stalin wanted to secure friendly regimes on the borders of the Soviet Union. So clearly not some big revelation or trigger for the Cold War, just a realistic foreign policy goal.

Yes, although Truman also started making the choice of adopting a hostile stance towards the USSR, when it could have been avoided. Letting hawkish diplomats getting more influence and sidelining those favourable to cordial relations meant tensions increased.

The Potsdam declaration guaranteed Germany remaining united. The monetary reform and constitution of a government in the occupation zones of France, the UK and the US weren't done out of charity or to "help" in any way. It was done to minimise Soviet influence and to guarantee Western alignement. It was clearly a part of the US containment strategy.

You are exclusively putting the blame on the Soviet Union. The US and the UK also pushed for their agendas. Your narrative is far too one-sided here.

Potsdam was used to affirm what was declared at Yalta. While Roosevelt did try to push a specific goal of a free Europe, he was met by what was already true about where the Soviets were and what they wanted. It affirmed that Germany was to be divided into the zones.

Roosevelt did see what others did as he was informed about it, yet he pretty much let Stalin have his gains with promises that Stalin did not intend to keep. You have to remember that Stalin had started to distrust the other Allies as early as 1942. This carried over in the last 2 conferences.

Both sides had their agenda. The US still wanted a free Europe, while Stalin, and the follow on Soviet Premiers all wanted to keep Eastern Europe under Soviet control and feared that what would become NATO would end up on their doorstep, which is pretty much what happened after the fall of the Iron Curtain. My narrative might be one sided, but that is based on what I have read in regard to Stalin and the lead-up to the war as well as the war itself.

 

[loup99]

The balance of land forces in Europe did favor the Soviets during the whole Cold War and for much of it they had more tactical aircraft as well. The superior industrial capacity of the US could have reversed this in time but in any sort of conventional war West Germany was likely to fall under Soviet occupation for a time.

Edit: These declassified force comparison estimates from NATO are quite interesting. In reality the Warsaw Pact forces may have been paper tigers but it seems that they had fooled NATO into believing itself weaker in almost every category.
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

Having superior numbers in terms of raw manpower does not have much of an impact if you are not able to sustain your land forces logistically and do not posses a sufficient industrial base.

Potsdam was used to affirm what was declared at Yalta. While Roosevelt did try to push a specific goal of a free Europe, he was met by what was already true about where the Soviets were and what they wanted. It affirmed that Germany was to be divided into the zones.

Roosevelt did see what others did as he was informed about it, yet he pretty much let Stalin have his gains with promises that Stalin did not intend to keep. You have to remember that Stalin had started to distrust the other Allies as early as 1942. This carried over in the last 2 conferences.

Both sides had their agenda. The US still wanted a free Europe, while Stalin, and the follow on Soviet Premiers all wanted to keep Eastern Europe under Soviet control and feared that what would become NATO would end up on their doorstep, which is pretty much what happened after the fall of the Iron Curtain. My narrative might be one sided, but that is based on what I have read in regard to Stalin and the lead-up to the war as well as the war itself.

Sorry, but the whole "free Europe" and "US defender of freedom" narrative is just US propaganda which has no grounding in the actual policies they pushed for. The US wanted a Western Europe aligned upon its interests, with economic prospects to sell their industrial goods and trade. This could both be in the form of liberal democracies with a strong welfare state securing redistribution and relative material well being in times of economic growth and ruthless dictatorships if the American allies couldn't win democratically. Sitting dictators, such as Franco and Salazar, were maintained in place and actively encouraged. So freedom was not the main aim of the US foreign policy at all. The US wanted an Europe free from its own ennemies.

On Potsdam and Yalta, dividing Germany into temporary occupation zones is not the same thing as splitting it up in two countries with distinct governments and economies.

 

[Barsoom]

Having superior numbers in terms of raw manpower does not have much of an impact if you are not able to sustain your land forces logistically and do not posses a sufficient industrial base.


Sorry, but the whole "free Europe" and "US defender of freedom" narrative is just US propaganda which has no grounding in the actual policies they pushed for. The US wanted a Western Europe aligned upon its interests, with economic prospects to sell their industrial goods and trade. This could both be on the form of liberal democracies with a strong welfare state securing redistribution and relative material well being in times of economic growth and ruthless dictatorships if the American allies couldn't win democratically. Sitting dictators, such as Franco and Salazar, were maintained in place and actively encouraged. So freedom was not the main aim of the US foreign policy at all. The US wanted an Europe free from its own ennemies.

On Potsdam and Yalta, dividing Germany into temporary occupation zones is not the same thing as splitting it up in two countries with distinct governments and economies.

NATO never supported Franco. It's true enough that it included dictators but an actual fascist closely associated with Hitler was a step too far. The inclusion of dictators was defended as a strategic necessity even when it contradicted the values of the Atlantic Charter and the self-identity of the core member states. Organized hypocrisy IMO but as often with hypocrisy it expressed an ideological commitment which couldn't be flatly denied.

Also, NATO did start to take its rhetoric seriously about halfway through the Cold War. The protests of 1968 were a big factor, as were democratic revolutions starting with Portugal 1974; these were social movements from below in which the left played a big role but which at the same time, after the suppression of the Prague Spring, reject Soviet communism. Domestically Western governments sometimes responded by compromising and sometimes with repression but in foreign policy they accommodated by including human rights in the Helsinki Accords, realizing shortly afterwards that they'd been handed a splendid propaganda tool. As Southern Europe democratized it turned out its commitment to NATO and European institutions only deepened, which allayed strategic worries. The West did nothing to stop the overthrow of allied dictators in South America and the Pacific Rim in the 1980s. In an ironic turn of events by the end of the Cold War the rhetoric had become a reality.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Radio Free Europe by REM tells a different tale.

And the West's alliances with the pro-Nazi regimes in South America as a deterrent to Communism I know rather well. Especially the part where they require a source of income to wage a war. Which gets us to Jesuit Liberation Theology in Nicaragua v. the Nazi Contra Brigade paid for by Medellin Cartel cocaine flown in the US on CIA aircraft that weren't exactly CIA aircraft but when the plane went down Felix Rodriguez calls Reagan VP George H.W. Bush's office immediately according to Iran-Contra Hearings. Which is the portal through which I entered this conversation several decades ago and crawled backwards up the Ratlines to find myself in Germany.

 

[Director]

@loup99 - you should recognize that the US is not required to provide liberty to every and any nation. We have taken our treaty responsibilities seriously. If you think we haven't done enough then I'd be happy to present you with the bill for, say, an aircraft carrier so you can help out.

It isn't possible to bring every nation, at any point in its history, to freedom, democracy, capitalism and lack of corruption ( I do not think those, except for the last, universally good). Nor is it possible for any nation engaged in power-politics survival against a powerful enemy to keep its hands clean. I wish it was; I wish the West and the Soviets and everyone else had not done some of the things they did.

Any nation may come to freedom when its people are sufficiently motivated to fight for it. Even an absolute dictatorship relies ultimately on the consent of the governed, and if that is withdrawn then even a dictator must bow - as the collapse of Soviet Eastern Europe showed.

But instead of complaining about the actions of the West, pick an example and tell us how you would have handled it differently.


@Andre Bolkonsky - I'd agree that persons in power should have brought the CIA and FBI to heel, good and hard. I don't like secret agencies with black budgets doing undisclosed things to friends as well as enemies. And frankly his CIA connection is the main reason I never liked Bush senior.

I don't know if you've ever read the Co-Dominion series by Pournelle. It describes pretty well what happens when you try to fight your enemy by becoming like him, as well as the creeping rot that those compromises bring.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

@loup99 - you should recognize that the US is not required to provide liberty to every and any nation. We have taken our treaty responsibilities seriously. If you think we haven't done enough then I'd be happy to present you with the bill for, say, an aircraft carrier so you can help out.

It isn't possible to bring every nation, at any point in its history, to freedom, democracy, capitalism and lack of corruption ( I do not think those, except for the last, universally good). Nor is it possible for any nation engaged in power-politics survival against a powerful enemy to keep its hands clean. I wish it was; I wish the West and the Soviets and everyone else had not done some of the things they did.

Any nation may come to freedom when its people are sufficiently motivated to fight for it. Even an absolute dictatorship relies ultimately on the consent of the governed, and if that is withdrawn then even a dictator must bow - as the collapse of Soviet Eastern Europe showed.

But instead of complaining about the actions of the West, pick an example and tell us how you would have handled it differently.


@Andre Bolkonsky - I'd agree that persons in power should have brought the CIA and FBI to heel, good and hard. I don't like secret agencies with black budgets doing undisclosed things to friends as well as enemies. And frankly his CIA connection is the main reason I never liked Bush senior.

I don't know if you've ever read the Co-Dominion series by Pournelle. It describes pretty well what happens when you try to fight your enemy by becoming like him, as well as the creeping rot that those compromises bring.

I have not read the Co-Dominion series, but it certainly explains your sig I've been wondering about.

 

[Easy-Kill]

The balance of land forces in Europe did favor the Soviets during the whole Cold War and for much of it they had more tactical aircraft as well. The superior industrial capacity of the US could have reversed this in time but in any sort of conventional war West Germany was likely to fall under Soviet occupation for a time.

Edit: These declassified force comparison estimates from NATO are quite interesting. In reality the Warsaw Pact forces may have been paper tigers but it seems that they had fooled NATO into believing itself weaker in almost every category.
https://www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/declassified_138256.htm

NATO knew they were stronger than the Warsaw pact, but what they didn't know was whether they would be able to bring about that strength sufficiently quickly to bring about a decisive defeat. There was also the rather pointed feature that Soviet/Russian doctrine made heavy use of tactical nuclear warheads - indeed the penultimate action for almost every division sized exercise s ded with a tactical nuclear strike on a large population centre. Effectively, they were refiguring the battles of ww2 (Stalingrad, Kursk and Berlin) with modern weapons.

NATO doctrine always favoured an assymetric technological advantage over the Soviets. Every engagement that included NATO and Soviet equipment was generally a one way showing and while everyone points out that this was because the winning side fought with Modern NATO equipment and the losers with older Soviet equipment ... This is true, but it is also true of Soviet forces. Their best technology was invariably a bit behind and too few to challenge the best NATO had to offer. Yes they had thousands of T55s and T64s ... But would that help? The Soviets aimed to counter NATO technology and manouverist approach with huge numbers and the deployment of tactical nukes. At that point both sides would lose. As log as NATO kept its tech advantage and the Soviets committed to using tactical strikes ... The cold war stayed cold.

 

[Director]

@Easy-Kill - I quite agree. The Cold War balance in Europe was, I think, an example of the age-old clash of strategic doctrines. One compensated for a smaller industrial and logistical base by stockpiling massively and going for a quick, decisive win; the other counted on industrial, logistical and technological superiority to win in the long run what could not be won quickly - or to deter the aggressor sufficiently that they would not roll the dice.

In my opinion the key battles of a Cold War gone 'hot' would have been the air war for the railroad lines through Poland and the naval war over merchant shipping in the Atlantic. Western ability to destroy logistical infrastructure was pointed up in several cases, including Iraq I, and Soviet armies would consume vast amounts of supplies on the offensive. Could NATO have stopped the Soviets short of the Channel? Maybe... maybe not. Could they have done it without successfully moving convoys across the Atlantic? Almost certainly not. Could the Soviets reach the Channel without working railways and supply depots in their rear? Doubtful. So those three decision points more-or-less define the scope of outcomes for me.

Soviet doctrine may have permitted using tactical nukes to break open the battlefield, but NATO had them too... and once you start tossing nukes, the difference between tactical and strategic can quickly be lost. I'm glad it never came to a test.


@Andre Bolkonsky - Pournelle was a character. I don't agree with his politics a lot of the time, but he must have been a great guy to converse with.

Recommended reading would include 'Prince of Sparta', 'Footfall' and what may be the greatest science fiction novel of all time, 'Mote in God's Eye'. The last two he co-authored with Larry Niven.

 

[loup99]

@loup99 - you should recognize that the US is not required to provide liberty to every and any nation. We have taken our treaty responsibilities seriously. If you think we haven't done enough then I'd be happy to present you with the bill for, say, an aircraft carrier so you can help out.

This sort of historical paternalism is absolutely insufferable for me, to be entirely honest with you. First of all, if we really are to take this sort of propaganda seriously, I would like to remind you that it was France and French soldiers who sacrificed themselves for US independence and went heavily in debt to secure the Thirteen Colonies from the British. So if we are to lecture the other on retroactive costs or "providing liberty", the US has no lesson to give.

Enough of that, it is a completely false narrative. Obviously France did not intervene in favour of the Thirteen Colonies out of any professed love for liberty, even if one should not neglect the power of ideas, especially to legitimate a political discourse (your intervention shows the efficiency of such communication). That intervention was one against the powerful rival the British were, and defeating them in North America could weaken the UK. The US "provision of liberty", as you elegantly call it, is no different to France's motivation for taking party in the American Revolution. During the Cold War you provided "liberty" for your business, more often than not at the cost of democracy, to guarantee economic prospects, trading opportunities and political influence. That isn't something to be ashamed of or interpret as some big conspiracy, it is entirely natural that a superpower like the US want to secure their influence and guarantee hegemony. Those goods that you sold provided material benefits to the Americans at home, meaning you could afford raising their salaries and improve standards of living.

It isn't possible to bring every nation, at any point in its history, to freedom, democracy, capitalism and lack of corruption ( I do not think those, except for the last, universally good). Nor is it possible for any nation engaged in power-politics survival against a powerful enemy to keep its hands clean. I wish it was; I wish the West and the Soviets and everyone else had not done some of the things they did.

The question for me was not to retroactively "bring" anything to anyone or to judge what is "universally good", since this isn't the "Philosophy Forum". Such discussions are very interesting, but mut be separate from historical analysis. If you want my political views on the specific matter, they are not a secret however, I'm a staunch pacifist and anti-imperialist, I oppose all interventions abroad which aren't unanimously supported by the UN Security Council and confirmed by the UN General Assembly.

Any nation may come to freedom when its people are sufficiently motivated to fight for it. Even an absolute dictatorship relies ultimately on the consent of the governed, and if that is withdrawn then even a dictator must bow - as the collapse of Soviet Eastern Europe showed.

Indeed, although it should be said that "freedom" is relative and the dictators who fell were more often than not replaced by some of their former fellow party "comrades", who ensured that the economic profit of the transition away from the Soviet model of state central planning towards a cut-throat form of capitalism remained in the hands of the old nomenklatura. Is that "freedom"? Was the US "free" during the Cold War? Given the widespread segregation or the red scarce of a McCarthy some would argue no. Others would argue yes, on the grounds of regular free elections with political pluralism.

But instead of complaining about the actions of the West, pick an example and tell us how you would have handled it differently.

The point of the analysis isn't to "complain". It is to analyse what happened and why. When I analyse the US support for Franco's dictatorship in Spain or Salazar's in Portugal, to cite two pertinent instances, I'm not judging American foreign policy out of a personal opinion, I'm just making the factual conclusion that "freedom", "liberty" and whatnot could be compromised away. Those are thus not the key values dictating American foreign policy during the Cold War, just as "revolution" and "national liberation" were not those of the Soviet Union.

Also, one more thing I might bring into the debate, now that I cited France above to question the moral superiority of the US, namely that "the West" is a big simplification. Sure, France did accept the Marshall Plan with the strict conditions that came attached to it, but we also had an independent foreign policy, entirely distinct to that of the US (which certainly didn't mean the French defended "freedom" or "liberty" more than the Americans). I don't think France should be considered to have by default supported all American choices which are often attributed to the abstract "West". Each member of NATO had different degrees of implication, not being a part of the integrated command made a difference.