-
We have updated our Community Code of Conduct. Please read through the new rules for the forum that are an integral part of Paradox Interactive’s User Agreement.
I'm afraid I'm going to dispute this thesis as well, largely for much the same reasons as @stnylan has brought up, but particularly in light of one statement made in its support:
I imagine this assertion would have come as quite a surprise to the people who were already living on the land at the time
Now, granted, the many and various Native American tribes and nations never really presented themselves as a unified whole politically, which made them easier to "divide and conquer," but the pressure they exerted in aggregate against Westward expansion was certainly considerable enough for the United States Army (with the direct mandate of the Federal government) to justify the systematic "pacification" and displacement of the natives onto carefully controlled reservations.
I'm afraid I'm going to dispute this thesis as well, largely for much the same reasons as @stnylan has brought up, but particularly in light of one statement made in its support:
I imagine this assertion would have come as quite a surprise to the people who were already living on the land at the time
Would what @stnylan posted not be true of every human community? Small or large? Certainly that doesn't make all communities "great powers." Great Powers, historically, have also employed longstanding centuries long grand strategies as policies afforded to them by great power status.
What, can we say, has been America's Grand Strategy in comparison to other great powers? Certainly there is something more than power grabbing and conflict and "bullying" to grand strategy as the most eminent of writers and scholars acknowledge? Now obviously all of this equally reflects the thoughts of our own eminent AAR historian!
Moreover, as eminent historians and scholars have explained, which I should have referenced here, grand strategy is something entirely different. Which is the very specific caveat and distinction I made and will be continuing to make in this chapter explaining the path of how America got involved in the first "Great War" triggered in the game. It has a double purpose. First, introduction to the concept as is so much of this AAR through its many twists and turns; second, a useful narrative tool to be employed by our writAAR in pushing the narrative onward to explain the very odd fact of how the US got involved in a war over the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.
In any event, I leave here, for future referencing, what has been taken as influences to this chapter, as well as quick reads on the topic -- should anyone be interested:
The Absence of Grand Strategy: US in the Persian Gulf
The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire
Promised Land, Crusader State
What is Grand Strategy?
If Destruction Be Our Lot
You might say it as such. A bit more complicated but, essentially, yes, the game's "Great War" was triggered because of a crisis relating to the Ottoman Empire. And now our historAARian is crafting the explanations for it!
- 1
- 1
Counterpoint: A power need not have global reach in order to have a grand strategy -- otherwise, it would not make sense to talk of, say, the Roman Empire having one at all. I would consider it valid for a regional power to have a "baby grand strategy" (if you'll excuse the analogy) for the corner of the world where it can exert influence, even if said influence might be overridden by some greater power with a longer reach -- the possibility of which they'll have undoubtedly factored into their plans if they're at all competent.
As someone who personally identifies my own views on international relations as most closely falling under the realist camp, I naturally tend to be a bit skeptical of any assertions that states don't ultimately have the display or exercise of power in mind for whatever they do. (This isn't to say that I don't believe that the policymakers themselves might not be motivated by higher ideals in one way or another, only that, even within the scope of those ideals, such actions tend to have a sort of transactional logic behind them; not even idealists can afford to act selflessly on the national or international stage.)
I have a few ideas on a deeper critique bubbling in my brain, but I'll probably have to sleep on them a bit before I develop them further.
Ha! It's funny you bring up yourself falling in the realist camp. See, it is very particularly unhelpful that I'm trained in political philosophy and the classics and moderns of political thought and theory; combined, then, with my penchant for travel (having been to China and most continents whilst on the topic) and own colorful idealism as a general dissident concerning American power. The realist in me (given that, if push comes to shove, I'd identify as a realist) recognizes the tremendous importance of American imperium and power. The idealist, given my Midwestern heritage and republicanist romanticism, is an out and out opponent of our large standing army, international imperium, and de facto empire. Then, of course, there are the problems of speaking of the pros and cons. Now certainly many from Europe like to pillory the US, just as they did Britain back in the day, but only the truly ideologically blind cannot see the beneficial shield and hedonistic indulgence afforded by the American Empire people otherwise wouldn't have in its absence.
Then this spirals into questions of the good life and the good life's relationship to politics. But at this point, the political science students lose interest in the "philosophy" from which their entire discipline originally sprang; even if you accept Machiavelli, not Socrates, as the founder of political "theory." Though as a realist, you should naturally agree with the distinction of grand strategy vs. pragmatic reaction!
Alas, the ultimate form of my own idealistic romanticism is probably reflected in my own living and side enterprises in writing, humanities, and literature! Empire allows for the pleasant and artistic life!
Oh the ironies! As good old Reinhold Neibuhr would have been astutely aware of.
Just finished page 30, the taming of the west was great but the (rather unexpected) highlight was Bryan's cross of gold speech in chapter 18 of part 5. What a cracker of a speech!
Powerful moving stuff and not at all what I expected from a discussion on economics. I'm glad you chose to include in in the AAR, well done!
Powerful moving stuff and not at all what I expected from a discussion on economics. I'm glad you chose to include in in the AAR, well done!
I'm glad you enjoyed it. Like so many speeches, The Cross of Gold is one that so many people may have heard of but have never read. I thought it appropriate for people to read when given to chance.
CHAPTER XX: THE END OF CONTINENTALISM
CONTINTENALISM VS. ISOLATIONISM
I have made mention of the distinction between continentalism and isolationism. It is true that both are insular ways of viewing America and America’s relationship with the world. But there are important distinctions within the insular dynamic to address, for these dynamics were at play as the world descended into the conflagrations of the First World War.
Continentalism was a pragmatic approach to American foreign policy and self-identity from 1789-1900. It was active. It did not so much shun the world as it endeavored to carve out a space for America in the world. Continentalism was the pragmatic ideology, if we can call it that, for the United States to become the preeminent power in the Western Hemisphere. We can see the anger at Britain’s closing of the western frontiers to the settlers after the French and Indian Wars; the westward push by pioneers and settlers; the Northwest Ordinances; the Louisiana Purchase and Lewis and Clark Expedition; and the Mexican Wars as the culmination of this pursuit. It was restless and active. It demanded support from the federal government. It was, in no way, “isolationist.”
Isolationism grew out of the continental tradition. Isolationism, we might say, was the idealization of continentalism. Isolationism sought to now enjoy the fruits of American North American hegemony. With the continent secured and protected by the oceans on both sides, with no threats of European incursion anymore, the United States could finally bring its restless frenzy to a bountiful serenity and enjoyment. Isolationism as the idealism of continentalism turned away from the world and sought to enjoy the peace and blessings won by 60 years of hard labor and wars.
Continentalism, as a pragmatic outlook on American policy, had therefore run its course. Its proponents were no longer. Those who were the children of the continentalist tradition either abandoned it altogether (as was common among coastal elites who turned toward internationalism having marshaled the resources of the North American continent to benefit themselves and their industries) or became the stalwart isolationists of much derision and popular romanticism. Isolationism, then, is best understood as the idealistic fulfillment of continentalism; it is, to speak in theological terms, the end of the restless pursuit of God and the entry into Heaven.
North America, an admittedly geographically isolated continent.
America at the Crossroads
In the spring of 1911, a great international crisis was brewing in Constantinople. The reform minded Young Turks had deposed the Sultan and installed a revolutionary and progressive government.[1] The old imperial entity, long the declining sick man of Europe, was teetering on the brink of dissolution. The Russian Empire, strong but clumsy, was preparing for war.
Official British policy was aimed at securing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against Russian and German ambitions. Germany, too, sought a revitalized Ottoman Empire which would throw off British shackles and open the gates and riches of the Orient to Germany. Russia, the hereditary enemy of the Turks, had long sought to “liberate” Constantinople and seize the Bosporus for itself and its Slavic proxies. Theological imagination also brought Russian-Slavic unity under the regime of Russian Orthodoxy, Russia as the Christian defender of the Slavic Orthodox brethren. Italy and the decrepit Austrian Empire also took keen interest in the dynamics unfolding in Constantinople. Italy had become a major African colonial power and looked wearily at British domination of the Mediterranean Sea. Austria, too, long bloodied in the nineteenth century from its decades long war with Revolutionary and Napoleonic France, then its gradual retreat in the face of a nationalist Italy and Germany, hoped to sure up its integrity against encroaching powers. Moreover, Austria did not want to see either Italy or Russia gain from a catastrophic collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Lastly, France still had the pretensions of being the greatest power in Europe and could not let a crisis go without French intervention for the sake of French pride and prestige. Europe was dividing itself over the spoils of the Sick Man of Europe.
As the storm clouds gathered over Europe, Americans were largely going about their daily business and routines without much care or concern for the storms ready to roll over Europe. Yet some forces in America were taking keen interests in the falling dominoes. American financial interests had, over the last 30, and especially last 10, years, had become increasingly tied up with Britain and France. The closeted push under Roosevelt toward an internationalist foreign policy meant the United States had sympathies for the British outlook. Britain, naturally, became the stalwart defender of “Turkish integrity” (with or without the Sultan). Moreover, Britain’s liberals scored a decisive propaganda victory in recognizing the reformist and progressive minded Young Turks. Britain, again, could claim the mantle of being a supporter of democratic reformism in the aftermath of its anti-democratic ideology from the American Revolution to the French Revolution and beyond. (We mustn’t forget, as I opened with this chapter, liberalism and democracy were never the avowed policies of the British; if European integrity and balance of power happened to coincide with reformism, the British would pursue it—if European integrity and balance of power was threatened by reformism, the British would oppose it.)
The Russian Imperial Black Sea fleet, 1910.
The shifting alliances and dynamics of the Ottoman Crisis was also testing relations among the European powers and left the Roosevelt Administration guessing in the dark. American ambassadors couldn’t inform Washington of the prospective fallout. Would Germany support Russia, its ally, or would it support the new Turkish government who may or may not continue supporting the Berlin-Baghdad Express? Germany’s interests in Turkey were solely for Germany’s self-interest. Was a reformist Turkey in Germany’s best interest or a reactionary monarchy which was already in Germany’s pocket in her best interest? Russia, as all knew, wanted the Bosporus and Constantinople for her own great power pretensions. Britain would have none of it. Germany was rivaling Britain as the new European great power. It wasn’t in the interest of Britain to have a strong Germany. Would an Anglo-German alliance be more beneficial to London or Berlin? What of France and Italy? France was the stagnant great power of Europe. Italy was on the ascendant and had even defeated France for control of Tunisia. Who would they support.
Time was ticking away. What was certain in May of 1911 was this: Britain had come to the defense of the new Turkish government. Russia was mobilizing its army for a ‘restorative’ war but many believed that was merely a pretext for Russia’s final move into the Balkans and securing a direct outlet in the Mediterranean. Moreover, Britain feared Russia’s entry into the Middle East would put stress on the Suez Canal and overturn a half century of containment against Russia in the “Great Game” in Central Asia. While everyone was looking, primarily, to see which side Germany and France would support; American financial and political interest was already tethered to the Anglo-Turkish alliance. While America remained on the sideline, Roosevelt’s sympathies, and the sympathies of the rich and powerful in America—especially New York and Boston—were decidedly on the side of the British even if they dared not speak of it openly.
As the clouds of war gathered, the emergence of the isolationists as a political force in America came into being.
[1] I have rewritten the script for how this war came about. Originally it was an international crisis over Russian claims on Ottoman territory. But given the Ottoman’s recent political change (socialists in power), I have augmented it to make it more dramatic for our history’s purpose. A banal Russia vs. Ottoman war is less enticing.
- 2
A very strange war it turned out to be in the game! Which of course, we'll get to when appropriate. But the lamps will not go out over all of Europe. Just some ... but we will still have some great classic films from OTL be possible in this new alternative reality! xD
CHAPTER XX: THE END OF CONTINENTALISM
THE GUNS OF APRIL
Easter 1911 was an Easter to remember, or to forget. On April 24, 1911, just eight days after the Easter celebrations sounded joyfully over much of Europe (on the Western calendar), the guns of death—rather than resurrection—sounded forth. A pale rider descended over the old continent. Off the shores of Constantinople, Russian ships of the Black Sea Fleet appeared over the horizons. Their silhouettes and coal-burning smoke brought with them terror as they grew closer to the shore. The Imperatritsa Mariya, Russia’s first dreadnought, was leading the juggernaut. Over the next two or three hours, Russian ships fired on Turkish military installations, often overshooting and damaging civilian property.
The sudden Russian foray into Constantinople shocked the world, at least the Old World. The brazen Russian raid was front page headlines only in a handful of U.S. papers, most prominent being the New York Times. While Europe gasped and fumed, Americans yawned. What hath America to do with some petty European squabble? It didn’t help that the conflict, at least initially, seemed posed between Oriental mystics and Slavic anarchists. Neither the Turk, nor the Arab, let alone the Russian and their anarchistic ilk, were of much concern to Americans at the turn of the century. In fact, Americans looked upon both—but especially Slavs, as people to keep out of the country. They were troublemakers. Degenerates. Assassins.
The events in Europe, when learned by Roosevelt, augmented his plans. 1912 was to be an election year. He’d be up for his third term should he choose to run. McKinley’s assassination by “Russians” (now according to leading isolationist newspapers) had meant Roosevelt’s ascendency as the accidental president marked his first term. His resounding reelection in 1908 marked his second. While there was no Constitutional provision as of yet specifically limiting the President to two terms in office, the tradition established by Washington was sacred and mystical; for most, anything other than two terms veered on the unconstitutional and tyrannical. But, as Roosevelt privately wrote in his journal, “I have waited all my life for this moment.” He didn’t want to let it slip by as a private citizen.
The Russian attack on Constantinople started a chain reaction of events in Europe to take sides in the conflict. The Russian attack also changed the dynamics of old European rivalries. Barbara Tuchman, in her Pulitzer Prize winning history of the first weeks of the war, The Guns of April,[1] had this to say:
One prime objective governed French policy: to enter the war with England as an ally. To ensure that event and enable her friends in England to overcome the inertia and reluctance within their own Cabinet and country.[2]
A day after the Russian raid, German troops were being mobilized with rapid speed. Moreover, German troops were preparing to advance into Austria-Hungary en route to the Balkans. The famous Orient Express was cancelled. Hundreds of thousands of travelers and tourists were trapped in a powder keg ready to explode.
Who were the Germans amassing to support? The Russians? Or the Turks? Despite grand strategy dictating a balance of power in Europe and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the liberal government in London was hamstrung by promises of peace and stability; for many Englishmen, the affair in Constantinople was a distant and uninteresting one. Russia and the Ottomans were fighting yet again. It was a sad and tired old story. But high-ranking officials, though a minority in the government, were warning of the impending peril of a Russian advance on the Young Turk government which could cause the entire collapse of the edifice of the Ottoman Empire. The Russians, naturally, would be in prime position to sweep into the whole of the Orient. This was expressly not in the interest of the British. Nor was it in the interest of the Germans.
Russian cossacks invading Turkey.
In the end, however, the Germans sided with the Turks. As the Russians marched on Constantinople and invaded Central Asia, Britain, France, and Germany put aside their many differences and united against naked Russian aggression. But they each had competing interests. The only uniting interest was preventing Russia from seizing the Bosporus. But if the Germans managed to seize the Bosporus through ingratiating themselves with the Turks, the Germans certainly wouldn’t mind. The British wanted no one to control the Bosporus because such encroachment would threaten the Suez. As the guns of April roared Europe descended into flames with Russia and Italy trying to seize the opportunity for further expansion while Britain, France, and Germany played catchup.
Rip Van Wrinkle
As Europe descended into chaos and old rivalries frayed and new alliances were being sought, Rip van Wrinkle, it seemed, had fallen asleep. As mentioned, the brazen Russian assault was front page news in only a handful of American newspapers. All of them from New England or Washington D.C. Some Americans were not even aware a major war had broken out in Europe until a month or two after the fighting had started.
Roosevelt, ever the pragmatist and showman, knew that American public opinion was against “entangling alliances.” He kept a low public profile in the early weeks of the war. He was reassuring of America’s commitment to “neutrality.” In reality, he was already orchestrating massive federal and private financial assistance to the British.
The question of internationalism and the new isolationism is appropriate here, especially in the context of populism and progressivism. The populists, following Bryan, believed the government should act in the expressed interest of the people. And the populists felt that war in Europe was expressly not in the interest of the people. It may have been in the interest of the Rockefellers and Morgans of the country, but Joe Smith down the street had absolutely no interest in the Russian advance against Turkey and the flames of war it lit throughout Europe.
German soldiers mobilized for war.
The progressives, taking a cue from Herbert Croly, didn’t want to appear against the people. But the progressives believed that the policies and interest of the elite were tied to the people. In sum, progressivism would help lift the people up while continuing to advance the expressed interest of the elite. This is the actual reality of the progressive disposition. It speaks the language of populism while advancing the policies of the elite while throwing a public bone to the people in the name of “reform” or “regulation” to appear more “populist” than it is. Yet one musn’t negate the paternalism of progressivism either. Progressives believed internationalism was also in the interest of the masses—they just didn’t know it. In fact, all progressive policies were in the interest of the masses even if they didn’t know it. Thus the progressive was duty-bound to advance his cause because they genuinely believed that their cause was the cause of the common lot of mankind.
Thus Roosevelt and his administration maneuvered to begin helping the British prop up the fledgling Turkish government from the onslaught of Russia.
[1] Just a retitle of her magisterial The Guns of August.
[2] Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August, p. 100.
- 3
You'd think that the Populists and the Young Turks would be natural supporters of each other as anti-establishment forces. But there are some insurmountable differences... some of them the result of Joe Smith hearing the preacher down the street rant about dirty, unwanted foreigners on Sunday.
A Roosevelt trying to manoevure public opinion to war and to have a third term ....
- 3
Up to the end of page 32 and Bryan's leadership was a great read! It was defined by two things, the sucessful push for votes for women and less sucessful (but still admirable and principled) attempt to chart a moral path through the tangled maze of internation relations in the Americas.
Slowly but surely I catch up, it won't be long now!
Slowly but surely I catch up, it won't be long now!
Back at the turn of the century, this wouldn't have been far fetched. In fact, the journalist character Jackson Bentley (based on Lowell Thomas) facetiously, but still truthfully, proclaims that American interest in the Arab Revolt was because of the spirit of liberty and revolution! In fact, the "progressives," especially in the Mainline Protestant clergy of the time, were excessively enthusiastic in support of the war precisely on the grounds that the "Allies" represented the spirit of liberty against monarchial tyranny!
Interesting how the tide turns. A great book on the subject is Richard Gamble's The War for Righteousness, on how it was, in fact, progressive and liberal minded Christians and ministers who first created the mytho-theology of America as the "Messianic" nation. As Niebuhr wrote, ironies abound in American history! As this AAR, I hope, has also demonstrated.
A Roosevelt trying to manoevure public opinion to war and to have a third term ....
The apple doesn't fall far from the tree!
Your timing is impeccable, since by the time you should be caught up we will be near the conclusion! Mixed emotions from my end, really...
Last edited:
CHAPTER XXI: THE GREAT WAR
The LORD is a man of war: the LORD is his name. ~ Ex. 15:3
American Isolationism
The LORD is a man of war: the LORD is his name. ~ Ex. 15:3
American Isolationism
The Great War that erupted over Europe in April 1911 was very much a side show in American affairs. The 1912 Presidential Election weighed on the mind of Theodore Roosevelt. Should he run for a third term or not? He certainly wanted to. And wanting to, he calmly navigated the waters of the European conflict he had already financially tied the United States with his blank checks to Britain.
Europe was an affair for Europe, not America—that was the prevailing sentiment across much of the United States. What interest did America have in a war, especially a war that was being fought over the spoils of the Orient? Russia was such a distant and cold country. So too was the crumbling Ottoman Empire. While many Americans now had ties to Germany, Germany and England were on the same side albeit for competing reasons. Americans of German patrimony felt convinced that the fires and flames of Europe was the one thing they were trying to escape. Americans of a proud Anglo-Protestant heritage certainly felt sympathy for Britain, but Britain herself was not threatened and little was done other than occasional good will sermon to the “Allies.”
The summer of 1911 saw a Russian cascade into Turkey but it was stopped short of Constantinople in September and the invasion through the Caucasus was halted in December with the arrival of British forces. The rapid war of movement that defined the opening months of the war soon bogged down into massive defensive complexes. The German and French armies which had invaded through Poland were equally ground to a halt come winter. Both sides dug in.
Russian Cossacks rapidly advancing during the opening phases of the war. Cavalry was still utilized during the Great War by all major powers, and the “Eastern Front” saw its most effective use. Wide plains and opening landscapes allowed for rapid maneuvers. The Cossacks were feared by inhabitants and soldiers simultaneously.
In the Alpine region, French forces were continuously rebuffed by stout Italian defenders. Northern Algeria was nearly overrun by Italian forces who were halted outside Oran. French and British forces launched a counterattack hoping to cut off the Italian forces from the main base of operation in Tunisia by sweeping north through the treacherous stretches of the Italian Maghreb. British forces also launched an invasion of Italian Libya from Egypt.
As the war headed into its second year, Roosevelt declared himself the candidate for the Republican Party in the 1912 election and was enthusiastically re-nominated. The Democrats, divided as ever, were partly stunned and equally enthusiastic when William Jennings Bryan came out of retirement to run for a third term as well. Bryan, ever the populist and isolationist, lambasted Roosevelt as a crooked thief and puppet of Wall Street. He argued, in his usual bombastic style at train stop campaign posts, that Roosevelt was secretly guiding the United States into war. Roosevelt championed himself as a man of pragmatic nationalist reforms and having kept the United States out of the war. He promised more reform under his “New Nationalism” banner and also promised continued American isolation while, in private, assuring his British allies that the United States would continue to financially and materially support the Allied war effort.
And with the good reason too. Italy was proving more than a match for France and Britain in North Africa. The British invasion of Libya was decisively halted at Tobruk. And the Franco-British sweep north through the Italian Maghreb was extremely slow. More men died from exhaustion than from fighting. Desertion was as high as 50-60% in some units.
In Europe, German and French forces in Russia and the Baltics faired a little better but the bloodletting was extensive. Moreover, German forces were divided between Russia and the Balkans. Turkish armies desperately holding onto their Balkan holdings and Constantinople in particular were dependent on German troops to hold back the Russian tide. Likewise, British forces were quickly being depleted in North Africa as the Egyptian divisions were split between Libya and the Middle East. Anglo-Indian forces were needed to sure up the Mesopotamian Front and prevent the renewed Russian offensive toward Baghdad and Jerusalem.
Baghdad became a central city in the Mesopotamian Campaign. Above, Anglo-Indian troops march to the front.
But the Russian juggernaut was unmistakably ground to a halt. In the late summer of 1912, as Roosevelt and Bryan battled each other in a grand rematch in America, the Russian Army in the Balkans suffered an extensive defeat which saw a massive retreat into the Ukraine that was not stabilized until Christmas. Likewise, the arrival of fresh Indian units in Mesopotamia saw the slow withdrawal of Russian forces from the regions. As the Turks advanced and regained land, anyone suspected of Russian sympathy and aid were dealt harshly by the newly rejuvenated Turkish army.
Furthermore, the slow trek up the Maghreb was finally paying off. The French defenders at Oran continued to hold out and when French and British forces drove on Tunis in November, it became apparent that the Italian Army in North Africa was doomed to be surrounded. The Italian Navy, powerful and modern as it was, was unable to confront the combined might of the British and French fleets.
Luck of the Lion
As the tide of the war in Europe swung decisively in the favor of the Allies, Theodore Roosevelt benefited greatly. Part of Bryan’s appeal was to heartland voters suspicious of American entanglement overseas. The initial stalemates of the spring and summer of 1912 was cause for concern. The longer the war dragged on in such a fashion the more plausible it seemed that Roosevelt could orchestrate an American intervention. With the collapse of the Russian advance on Constantinople underway and news of the daring Anglo-French advance on Tunis gaining steam by October, Bryan’s campaign for peace ran stale. Roosevelt had kept America out of the war and the war seemed to be turning in favor of the nations most Americans did, in fact, sympathize with.
When the election of 1912 was finished, Roosevelt was decisively elected to a third term. Only the “Solid South” had sided for Bryan, along with Nebraska and Colorado. The luck of the lion, it seemed, could not falter.
But even as the Allies began turning the tide of the war in late 1912, new fissures were erupting. As Roosevelt settled into a third term in the spring of 1913, Allied leaders were already conniving against each other for the spoils. The German foreign ministry published a secret report, only made available after the German defeat in 1917, that they expected the Russians to force for peace by Christmas 1913. The Italians, the secret report concluded, were likely to sue for peace in the summer.
The German report called for a white peace with Italy. The Germans did not want to see the French and British gain in Africa at Italy’s expense. Moreover, the Germans also called for pressing German claims along the Orient Express in the Balkans as compensation for their help defending Turkey.
The British and the French, meanwhile, were conniving on their own while excluding the Germans. The French drew up plans to seize the Italian Maghreb and Tunisia, with a split of Libya with the British. The British had agreed to the plan and were seeking additional gains in Mesopotamia. They planned a permanent garrison in Mesopotamia to ward off further Russian interests in the region and as a hard force to keep Persia in line but to also dissuade Russian interference in Persian affairs. The allies who had so far fought to keep the integrity of the Ottoman Empire intact were laying the seeds for the most spectacular and horrifying turn of events in the Great War—the “Fratricide of the Allies.”[1]
[1] In reality the “Great War” as the reader might begin to infer, was actually two separate wars. The first was fought between April 1911 and July 1913 over some petty claims by Russia on the Ottoman Empire. The Second Great War, which is recontextualized in this AAR as being part of the “Great War,” began, later. We’ll get to that later and weave the two wars together as one.
Last edited:
- 3
Well, that's an ominous (but all too believable) note to close on there. It sounds as though the United States is going to be making some difficult decisions in the coming years once the European situation collapses...